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This is a comparative study of intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in 
Canada and the United Kingdom (UK) between 1996 and 2006, the first phase of 
devolution in each country. The study focuses primarily on relations between the 
central government and a single sub-state in each country (Alberta in Canada and 
Scotland in the UK) and addresses three research questions: 1) to what extent were 
there differences in intergovernmental relations between the countries?2) what 
accounted for these differences? 3) what impact did these differences have on the 
character and workability of the intergovernmental relations system in each 
country? Workability was assessed based upon the degree to which trust ties 
developed between senior officials.  
 
The analysis concludes that the structure of the state, the structure of the policy 
domain, and the presence of two important accommodation mechanisms in the UK 
not found in Canada (the party system and the civil service) made intergovernmental 
relations in labour market policy in the two countries fundamentally different. In 
Canada, intergovernmental relations were multilateral, interprovincial and bilateral, 
whereas in the United Kingdom they were only bilateral. Despite devolution, the UK 
Government retained control of most policy levers, whereas in Canada devolution 
has limited federal control and influence and any notion of a national labour market 
system.  
 
Trust ties were enhanced by consistency between the key players, routinized 
engagement, reliability, honesty, respect, capacity and willingness to engage, and 
transparency. Although shared objectives made engagement easier, they were not a 
prerequisite for a positive relationship. Bilateral relationships that took place within 
the geographic boundaries of Alberta and Scotland were considered as positive and 
highly workable. Difficulties arose when relationships became multilateral or 
bilateral relations were managed at a distance. Despite devolution, multilateral 
relations in the historically conflicted labour market policy domain in Canada 
remained competitive, with a low degree of workability. Relationships with respect 
to disability and immigration issues were more positive. In the UK relationships in 
the welfare to work policy area were cooperative and highly workable. Relationships 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Topic of Research 
 
Over the past decade a devolution discourse has swept many nation states in Europe 
and North America, triggered in particular by demands for greater recognition and 
autonomy from existing regions, stateless nations, and cultural groups. Nowhere was 
this more evident than in the United Kingdom (UK), where, starting in 1997, the 
Labour Party under Tony Blair unfolded a devolution program that ultimately led to 
the establishment of parliaments and assemblies in Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland, and what some refer to as Britain’s ‘constitutional revolution’ (Gamble 
2006). Lesser known was Canada’s devolution experience, perhaps because, as a 
long established federation, Canada is already considered to be one of the most 
decentralized countries in the world (Watts 1999, Simeon 2006b). The devolution 
discourse in that country primarily focused on the further transfer of powers from the 
Government of Canada to the three northern territories. But another devolution story 
concerned how labour market policy was governed, when in 1996, without changing 
the constitution, the federal Liberals under Jean Chrétien offered all provinces and 
territories the opportunity to assume responsibility for important aspects of federal 
programs. 
 
Intergovernmental relations are relevant to any political system in which power is 
shared between governments that are at the same time both interdependent and 
autonomous. If one thinks of governments as operating in a system, 
intergovernmental relations focuses on the interactions that connect them, either one 
reacting to the other, trying to influence the other, or attempting to coordinate their 
policies, plan together and reduce conflict (Agranoff 2004, Simeon 1972). How these 
interactions are managed vary from nation to nation, determined by the country’s 
unique social, political, institutional, and constitutional context, as well as the 
interests, expectations, values, experiences, and capacity of the actors involved. 
Interactions also vary from one policy sector to another, based upon the complexity 
of the policy domain, how competence is shared, and how history and institutional 
 12
structures interact with the issues facing governments. All of these factors influence 
the intergovernmental power-relationship dynamic and shape the character and 
workability of the country’s intergovernmental relations system. 
 
This thesis undertakes a comparative investigation of intergovernmental relations in 
labour market policy in Canada and the UK during the period immediately following 
devolution in each country. Labour market policy concerns those social and 
economic activities of governments aimed at making more effective use of the 
country’s human resources (Bakvis and Aucoin 2000). Occupying an ambiguous 
position at the nexus of social policy (which focuses on equity) and economic policy 
(which concentrates on efficiency and growth), labour market policy is often 
subdivided into active and passive components. Financial transfers to mitigate the 
hardships of the unemployed (such as Employment Insurance, Social Assistance, 
Jobseekers Allowance, and Incapacity Benefit) are considered passive measures, 
while programs that improve access to the labour market and jobs, develop job 
related skills, and promote more efficient labour markets are considered active 
measures (OECD 1994).  
 
In neither Canada nor the UK did the devolution experience change the arrangements 
of who did what in passive labour market policy. However, in both countries it had a 
significant impact on many aspects of active labour market policy, including training, 
job placement, and employability supports for vulnerable workers. Before devolution 
most of these supports and services in both Canada and the United Kingdom were 
dominated by national governments and delivered through a centrally-run public 
employment service. Post-devolution, sub-state governments in both countries 
assumed many of these responsibilities.  
 
The study of intergovernmental relations is an essential component of the study of 
any multilevel political system, and there has been no shortage of academic studies 
on intergovernmental relations in the devolved United Kingdom or in the Canadian 
federation. In the UK most analysts agreed that, up to 2006, devolution had settled in 
well, with very few intergovernmental conflicts evident (House of Lords 2002, 
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McEwen 2003, Trench 2005, ESRC 2006, Jeffery and Wincott 2006). The 
assessment of Canada’s intergovernmental performance during the same period was 
more mixed. When Simeon revisited his landmark 1972 study on what he called 
‘federal-provincial diplomacy’ in Canada, he concluded that “the competitive and 
adversarial nature of intergovernmental relations appears to be even more apparent 
today than in the 1960s, despite the stated commitments to sharing, cooperation, and 
common values” (Simeon 2006b, p. 327).  
 
These assessments of intergovernmental relations are at the level of what Stephan 
Dupré (1985) refers to as ‘high politics’ involving First Ministers, Finance Ministers, 
and Intergovernmental Affairs Ministers. But this does not necessarily mean that the 
same story plays out one step below within such specific policy sectors as health, 
environment, immigration, transportation, education, or labour market. 
Intergovernmental interactions at this level determine the specifics of program 
design, shape the relative roles of the different orders1 of government, and determine 
how and whether social interest and citizen groups participate with government in 
decision making. In Lazar’s view there cannot be a single theory or practice of 
[intergovernmental relations], as, to some degree, it reflects the characteristics and 
needs of the particular policy file. In many policy sectors governments work quietly 
together to resolve disputes, and do not elevate them to high politics (Lazar 2006).  
 
Before devolution labour market policy in Canada was certainly considered as ‘high 
politics’. Indeed, as will be described in detail in Chapter Four, the express purpose 
of devolution was to reduce intergovernmental conflict and tension. This came 
primarily from the Province of Quebec, whose nationalist governments had long 
maintained that provinces had sole jurisdiction over matters relating to labour market 
training. Following failures to change the constitution and the near departure of 
Quebec from the Canadian federation through a referendum on sovereignty 
association in 1995, the Government of Canada felt they needed to demonstrate 
                                                 
1 The term ‘order’ of government will be used in a general as well as a Canadian context as it does not 
imply that a hierarchical relationship exists between the sub-state and central governments. When 
used in a UK context the term ‘level’ of government will be used as the retention of hierarchy is a 
feature of devolution in the UK. 
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‘flexible federalism’. In 1996 they officially recognized provincial2 responsibility for 
training and labour market development, and offered to transfer some responsibilities 
to provincial governments through Labour Market Development Agreements 
(LMDAs). Over the next ten years, agreements were negotiated with all provinces, 
and in the early years after devolution most commentators heralded the LMDAs as 
being responsible for improved federal-provincial collaboration and the removal of a 
major irritant in Quebec-Ottawa relations (Klassen 2000, OECD 2000, Bakvis 2002, 
Lazar 2002).  
 
Likewise, in the United Kingdom, it was nationalism that mobilized the Scottish 
people around constitutional reform. After the 1997 general election, Labour moved 
quickly to deal with territorial management issues by holding referendums and 
establishing sub-state governing structures. In 1998 and 1999 they devolved 
responsibility for many policy sectors to the Welsh and Northern Ireland Assemblies 
and the Scottish Parliament, including labour market functions such as vocational 
education, labour market information, skills development, and training and careers 
advice, as well as the related areas of economic development and postsecondary 
education. At the same time as devolution was being implemented, Labour also 
committed to wide-ranging welfare reform and implemented a variety of  ‘New 
Deals’ to move people from welfare to work and enhance the skill development of 
the workforce. Although there have been many criticisms of welfare reform in the 
UK (Fairley 1998, Finn 2000, Leitch 2006, Freud 2007), the territorial dimension has 
been muted and little examined, primarily because labour market policy is 
principally still considered a central government function and not subject to sub-state 
decision making. Post-devolution, there have been no assessments of 




                                                 
2 Territorial governments in Canada have a different constitutional status than provinces. Since this 
study focuses on provincial governments in Canada, the term ‘provinces’ will be used unless there is a 
significant territorial dimension.  
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Aims and Objectives  
 
This research seeks to investigate and provide insight into how shared governance in 
labour market policy within each country actually worked in practice, post-
devolution. For many years the Organisation for Economic Development and 
Cooperation (OECD) has advocated decentralization or devolution of labour market 
policy as a means to ensure a competitive labour force and reduce unemployment. In 
their view, labour market programs are most effective when they take into account 
the local characteristics of the target group, match them with local labour market 
needs, and coordinate them with locally driven economic development and social 
inclusion policies (OECD 2003). Given this emphasis on local or regional control 
over labour market policy, a comparison of the institutional context that informed 
and shaped the actions of regional and central government social and political actors 
in two countries during a period of governance changes will also enhance the study 
of the policy domain in general (Noël 2004, p. 18). 
 
But filling gaps in the literature was not the only motivation behind this research. An 
interest in this issue originated from the author’s personal experience in working in 
intergovernmental relations in Canada for the Province of Alberta3. In some policy 
areas, like social services, federal-provincial issues were worked through and 
accommodations made, but in general this was not the case in labour market policy. 
The author was curious about why intergovernmental relations in this policy area 
continued to be so difficult, even in the post-devolution environment where the 
Government of Canada had acceded to many provincial demands.  
 
Three central questions were selected to focus the work.  The first was: To what 
extent were there differences in intergovernmental relations in labour market policy 
between Canada and the United Kingdom? The second was: What accounted for 
these differences? Canada is and has always been a federal state, whereas until 1999 
the United Kingdom was a highly centralized state. In addition, Canada has had over 
140 years to develop norms and processes of intergovernmental relations, while the 
                                                 
3 From 1993 to 2003 the author worked as Director of Intergovernmental Relations with Alberta 
Social Services and Alberta Human Resources and Employment.   
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UK has had fewer than nine. It was therefore expected that the intergovernmental 
relations systems in the two countries would be significantly different.  
 
The third research question was: What impact did these differences have on the 
character and workability of the intergovernmental relations system in labour 
market policy in each country? In any political system involving more than one order 
of government, the political forces of conflict and cooperation are mediated by 
political and administrative actors through the intergovernmental institutions and 
processes they establish. One of the tests of these institutions and processes is their 
capacity to foster collaboration and cooperation, to accommodate conflict, and to 
resolve those disputes which impede the effective functioning of the system 
(Advisory Panel 2006). This concept is described in this thesis as ‘workability’, 
judged by the degree to which ties of trust develop between senior officials. Trust 
ties between senior officials are felt to be important because they are communicable 
to Ministers. 
 
Why are cooperation and workability in intergovernmental relations unavoidable and 
so important? They are unavoidable because governments within a single nation state 
are intertwined by geography. They are important because the functions in a modern 
state cannot be divided sharply, and without cooperation there will be gaps and 
inefficiencies. Citizens expect their governments to cooperate, because they know 
that dysfunctional and conflict- ridden relationships do not facilitate good 
governance. They also know that if ways to cooperate cannot be found the result 
could be either greater centralization or the break-up of the country. Commenting in  
1935 on why a formula for cooperation between the Dominion and the provinces was 
needed, Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King (1935, p.9) said: 
We should not lose sight of the fact that governments are only institutions 
created by men to serve human needs. After all, the citizens of the provinces 
are the citizens of the Dominion. The individuals whose interests the 
provinces seek to serve are the same individuals for whom the Dominion is 
concerned.  
 
During the period of this research Canadians were particularly frustrated with 
intergovernmental bickering and the duplication and inefficiencies they perceived to 
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be caused by a lack of collaboration (Watling, Nolte, and MacKinnon 2006). They 
had also seen the consequences of failed intergovernmental collaboration both 
domestically and in the United States. The Health Canada National Advisory 
Committee on Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) partly blamed an 
inability to contain the 2003 outbreak of the disease on a dysfunctional system of 
intergovernmental relations (Health Canada 2003). Many US commentators reflected 
on how Hurricane Katrina in 2005 turned from a disaster to a catastrophe, where the 
“breaks in the levies around New Orleans became literal as well as figurative 
‘cracks’ in intergovernmental relations” (Wright 2005, p. 12).  
 
There is a deep tension between the need for collaboration, partnership and 
coordination born of interdependence, shared responsibilities and citizen 
expectations, and the logic of parliamentary federations which institutionalizes a 
deeply competitive relationship among governments (Simeon 2002, p. 218, 222). 
The intent of this thesis is to explore this tension in two parliamentary federations 
within a defined policy sector.  
 
This brief introduction has provided some preliminary information about the purpose 
of this thesis, and identified the primary and secondary research questions. The rest 
of this chapter focuses on the comparative element and why Canada and the United 
Kingdom were chosen as case studies for this research. It also provides greater detail 
on the scope and parameters of the research, as well as an overview of the 
methodology used to collect the evidence. The chapter concludes with an outline of 
the remaining sections of the thesis. 
 
Comparing Canada and the United Kingdom 
 
Much of the analysis done in social sciences as well as in everyday life is done by 
making comparisons. Comparative politics is about the behavior of political systems 
and the behavior of individuals within these systems. Since political scientists cannot 
conduct experiments under controlled conditions to test theory and the impact of 
different variables, they must work instead with variations that already exist in the 
real world. Comparison is the principle method: by looking at similar processes and 
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institutions in different countries or organizational settings an understanding can be 
gained of what works and what does not, as well as the theoretical relationship 
between variables. Peters (1998 p. 13) suggests that the most difficult but crucial task 
for the comparative analyst is to devise the methods to construct meaningful 
statements about government and politics within complex and largely unplanned 
settings. By using the comparative approach and more than one case, a researcher 
can look at similarities and differences and think about the root causes of the 
performance of the system. In his view a case study (which also includes time in the 
analysis) is capable of saying a great deal about the process as well as the country in 
which it occurs and can be useful to develop a theory of some aspect of political life. 
 
Comparison has uses beyond the development of theory. Comparing political 
systems also provides an opportunity to think about what one country can learn from 
another. Although every nation is unique in terms of its history, culture, and 
institutions, policy concepts (as distinct from their application) are ripe for 
borrowing: 
All policy ideas have to be adapted to different cultural and institutional 
environments, improved and reshaped until sometimes their origins are 
unrecognizable…where most people recognize that things need to change, in 
these areas comparisons are essential, but they are more like explorations 
which provide insights (Mulgan 2003, p. 2). 
 
Through this thesis the author also wanted to explore whether there were 
intergovernmental policy ideas to be drawn from a two-country comparison that 




The first case (Canada) was selected on the basis of the author’s interest in 
examining intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in Canada in some 
detail. In choosing a comparator the most common approach is to select another 
country that is similar in some important ways (Peters 1998). Given that Canada is a 
federation, a logical choice would have been to select another federation (for 
example, Germany, Australia, Austria, Switzerland, or the United States). An 
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alternative approach is to choose a comparator with significant differences, and 
devolution in the UK provided a unique opportunity to compare an emerging 
intergovernmental relations system in a devolved system with one in an established 
federation. In the early days of devolution, many authors had already looked to 
Canada for lessons for the UK (Simeon 2001a, McEwen 2003, Trench 2003b).  
 
This new interest in Canada-United Kingdom comparisons is a result of key 
similarities between the two countries. With devolution the UK, like Canada, now 
has directly elected sub-state governments, resulting in the need for a system of 
intergovernmental accommodation that resembles federal-provincial relations in 
Canada. Governance in multi-tiered political systems is much more complicated than 
in unitary systems as the question of who should do it (policy control) is 
superimposed on the question of what should be done (policy content). 
 
Both countries function within a broader multilevel governance system, involving 
continuous negotiations among nested governments at several tiers- supranational, 
national, regional, and local. Multilevel governance comes about from institutional 
creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some previously centralized 
functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the 
local/regional level (Marks 1993).  
 
The presence of Westminster parliamentary systems in each country was a similarity 
of great significance, as this feature fundamentally shapes how intergovernmental 
relations are conducted. According to Watts (1999) the combination of Westminster 
type parliamentary systems with federal institutions inevitably produces a logic 
which is commonly described in the academic literature as ‘executive federalism’. 
Here, intergovernmental relations are dominated by elected and appointed officials of 
the two orders of government. 
 
Other similarities between the two countries were also evident. The distribution of 
functions in both was legislative, not administrative, meaning that each government’s 
capacity to legislate and administer coincided. Both were multinational political 
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systems where the presence of sub-state nationalism from the Province of Quebec 
and the nations of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland made governing 
particularly complex. The fact that both countries were liberal welfare regimes was 
also important, given the focus on labour market policy. These regimes are based on 
notions of ‘less eligibility’ and ‘self help’, reflecting a political commitment to 
minimize the state, to individualize risks and promote market solutions (Esping-
Anderson 1999). In the 1990s both countries followed the lead of the OECD Jobs 
Study (1994) in placing renewed emphasis on active labour market policy over 
passive, and on making labour markets more flexible. During the period of this 
research, both countries sustained periods of economic growth and low 
unemployment. In addition, both were governed by stable centre-left governments 
that took office after a number of years of Conservative party rule.  
 
Despite these similarities, choosing the United Kingdom as a comparator to Canada 
provided an opportunity to compare two political systems that are, on a number of 
variables, substantially different, thereby maximizing the variance with which to 
explore their differences (Peters 1998, p. 66). By using a most different systems 
design, the similarities between the two countries described above could be held 
constant, allowing for a focus on their differences, and an assessment of the impact 
that these differences had on the character and workability of intergovernmental 
relations in labour market policy within each country.  
 
There are a large number of variables that impact intergovernmental relations in any 
country. In the context of a comparison of intergovernmental relations between 
Canada and the United Kingdom, the variable of most significance is the 
constitutional status of sub-state governments in each country, and how this impacts 
the meaning attributed to the word ‘devolution’ in each. According to Rhodes (2003) 
decentralization means the distribution of powers to lower levels in a territorial 
hierarchy; devolution is the political form of decentralization, meaning the exercise 
of political authority by lay, mainly elected institutions perceived as separate levels 
of government where central authorities exercise little or no direct control. 
Devolution in the UK established new sub-state political institutions with authority 
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over a broad range of policy areas. In contrast, devolution of labour market policy in 
Canada was more focused, involving what the Government of Canada considered 
merely as an administrative delegation of authority.  
 
Although this change in Canada may seem minor, it was set within the context of an 
existing federal system, highlighting the difference between a federation and a 
devolved state. In his work on comparative federalism, Watts (2006) assists in 
understanding this difference by providing these definitions:  
 Federalism is a normative term that refers to the advocacy of multi-tiered 
government that combines elements of shared rule and territorial self rule 
 Federal political system is a descriptive term that applies to a broad category 
of political systems where, by contrast to the single central source of 
constitutional and political authority in a unitary political system, there are two 
(or more) levels of government combining elements of shared rule through 
common institutions and territorial self-rule for the governments of the 
constituent parts 
 Federations represent one particular species of a federal political system. For a 
country to be considered a federation, the following structural characteristics 
must be present: two or more orders of government acting directly on their 
citizens; a formal constitutional division of powers and allocation of revenues; 
provision for the representation of regional views within central policy-making 
institutions; a supreme written constitution not unilaterally amendable by 
either order of government; an umpire in the form of the courts; and processes 
and institutions to facilitate intergovernmental collaboration  
 
According to this definition Canada is both a federation and a federal political 
system; the United Kingdom, on the other hand, may be a federal political system, 
but is not a federation. Under his categorization scheme Watts considers that, with 
devolution, the United Kingdom has become a constitutionally decentralized union. 
British commentators have referred to the UK as a ‘quasi-federation’ or a ‘federacy’ 
(Gamble 2006).  
 
In 1980 Burrows and Denton explored the options of devolution or federalism for the 
United Kingdom and outlined the possible organizing choices as unitary, 
administrative decentralization, cautious devolution, advanced devolution, federalism 
or independence. In their view, the most essential feature distinguishing federalism 
from devolution was this: if the UK had become a federation the power to amend the 
constitution, acting alone, would have been removed from central government. The 
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UK choice of ‘cautious devolution’ over ‘advanced devolution’ has resulted in 
extreme asymmetry, with devolution impacting only 15 percent of the population4. 
This contrasts with Canada, where all areas of the country are represented by sub-
state governments.  
 
There are other significant differences between the two countries that will be 
explored throughout this thesis, including other elements of the overall country 
context (social, political, institutional, and intergovernmental), the policy specific 
context (history, competence, complexity, goals and issues, and intergovernmental 
machinery), and the involvement of actors external to government. These factors will 
be outlined in greater detail in Chapter Two, in conjunction with the analytical 
framework used for the comparison. 
 
Selection of Sub-state Governments 
 
Following the country selection, it was then necessary to choose a specific unit of 
analysis. In Canada there are 13 centre-sub-state government relationships (ten 
provinces and three territories) while in the United Kingdom there are three 
(Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). Any kind of relationship between 
organizations (whether it is between companies, between governments, between 
union and management within an individual company, etc.) is based on the 
individual relations that take place between people working in the various component 
parts over time and then gets rolled up to form a ‘relationship’. Since 
intergovernmental relations in labour market policy were experienced differently in 
different parts of Canada and the UK during the period of this research, a key 
question was which centre-sub-state relationship would be examined.  
 
Reference has already been made to fraught relationships between the Government 
of Canada and the Quebec Government, and cordial relationships between the 
                                                 
4 Burrows and Denton (1980) suggest that advanced devolution in the UK would have meant the 
establishment of assemblies for the English regions (in addition to Scotland, Wales, and Northern 
Ireland), as well as greater legislative powers for these assemblies over a wide range of issues. 
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Scottish Executive and the UK Government. Indeed, the prime UK case study 
selected was Scotland. This choice was by elimination: Wales did not have the 
degree of primary legislative powers that Scotland did, and for most of the period of 
this research the Northern Ireland Assembly was suspended due to continuing 
political instability5.  
 
Choosing a prime case study province in Canada was more difficult. First, there was 
a desire to examine relationships between the centre and a ‘strong’ rather than a 
weak province6. Second, devolution in labour market policy was implemented 
through two types of Labour Market Development Agreements: ‘transfer’ and ‘co-
managed’. However, it was only through transfer agreements that power, decision 
making, and resources were actually transferred. Given these two criteria, either 
Quebec or Alberta could have been selected for detailed examination. Alberta was 
chosen because there have been many assessments of Canada-Quebec relations and 
relatively few on Canada-Alberta relations. In labour market policy most academic 
attention has been paid to Ontario (Dupré 1972, Klassen 2000a) and Quebec (Marc 
2005). Even more than this, however, Alberta was chosen because, for most of the 
period of this research, Quebeckers chose political representatives who generally 
refused to participate in the governance of Canada. Until 2003 the Quebec provincial 
government was governed by a secessionist party, the Parti Québécois. Since the 
1993 election, an average of 64 percent of the available federal seats in Quebec have 
been held by the Bloc Québécois, a party dedicated to secession. A focus on Quebec 
would have required a detailed examination of the dynamics of nationalism, and 
there was a desire to look beyond nationalism as the explanation for 
intergovernmental conflict or collaboration in this policy field. 
 
A primary focus on Alberta and Scotland did not mean that other relationships were 
excluded. In the UK a secondary focus was placed on the North East Region of 
England, because in that area the potential for devolution was most advanced. In 
Canada, relationships between the Government of Canada and provincial 
                                                 
5 The Assembly was suspended from 2002 to 2007. 
6 This relates primarily to the concept of ‘have and have not’ provinces, which will be explored in 
greater detail in Chapter Three. 
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governments in the Provinces of Ontario and British Columbia were also examined 
in light of the size, prosperity, and significance of these provinces to 
intergovernmental relations in Canada. In addition, in each country unique 
relationships with other governments involved with labour market policy were also 
examined.  
 




The comparative approach is often used for the development and testing of theory. 
However, the purpose of this research was not so much to find the cause of a 
particular phenomenon, but rather was more exploratory, looking at an interesting 
process during an interesting period in two political systems that were expected to be 
significantly different (Peters 1998).  
 
The research strategy chosen reflects this overall intent. There are four general 
approaches to answering research questions in the social sciences: the inductive, the 
deductive, the retroductive, and the abductive. The choice of a strategy depends upon 
whether the research questions are ‘what’, ‘why’, or ‘how’ questions (Blaikie 2000). 
Based on the research questions outlined, this thesis adopts an ‘abductive’ strategy, 
exploring through everyday language the knowledge that social actors used in the 
production, reproduction, and interpretation of intergovernmental relations. From this 
‘thick’ description, meanings were deduced in order to explain (identifying the 
causes of events) as well as understand (reasons social actors give for their actions) 
actions and events. These were then transposed into previously developed categories 
and concepts as a basis for understanding and explanation. The categories developed 




Yin (2003) suggests that the most appropriate research strategy should be chosen 
according to the type of question, the degree of focus of the study on contemporary 
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versus historical events, and whether the question requires the investigator to exert 
control over events. In his view, the case study method is most appropriate for ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions which aim to explain contemporary phenomena within their real 
life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident. It is also a suitable strategy when the researcher has no control 
over the events. Case study was the approach chosen for this research.  
 
This case study compares a specific phenomenon (intergovernmental relations) in 
two countries (Canada and the United Kingdom), in a focused policy area (labour 
market policy) within a defined period (1996-2006). There are a small number of 
cases with a large number of variables. Since relationships between Alberta (in 
Canada) and Scotland (in the United Kingdom) were examined in detail in the 
context of their individual countries, this study could be characterized as an 
embedded multiple case study. This required research at different levels (Alberta, 
Scotland) while still treating the organizations (Canada, UK) each as a single case 
study (Blaikie 2000, p. 221).  
 
As this research was interested in the changes that had occurred in intergovernmental 
relations post-devolution, it can be considered a retrospective case study (Blaikie 
2000). The year 1996 was identified as a common starting point, as that was when 
the Government of Canada made a formal offer of devolution to provinces and 
governance arrangements started to change. Events in the United Kingdom were 
slightly later, given that the Scottish Parliament was not established until 1999. The 
end period for the study was identified as 2006, providing a period sufficiently stable 
and long to examine relationships over time. It was also the year that the Liberals 
were defeated in Canada and the Conservatives returned to power. By focusing on 
intergovernmental relations under two similar but stable centre-left governments 
(Liberals and Labour), the impact of ideology was held constant, reinforcing the 
significance of differences in other areas. 
 
The key focus of the analysis in both Canada and the United Kingdom was on the 
nation state and how the nation state related to sub-state governments, which in 
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Canada are provinces/territories and, in the United Kingdom, are the devolved 
administrations. Although there were other government-to-government relationships 
that were important within each country (notably the European Union, local 
governments, as well as aboriginal organizations), an extensive focus on these 
relationships, or indeed on relationships or partnerships with other stakeholders, was 
beyond the scope of the research. Although these views were sought throughout the 
evidence-gathering and hence informed the analysis, this was primarily a study of 
government involvement in governance.  
 
Civil Service Focused 
 
The most significant actors for this research were the senior civil servants who were 
involved in intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in each country, not 
the politicians. Politicians are ‘birds of passage’, changing positions much more 
frequently than civil servants7. The focus of this study was therefore on 
intergovernmental administrative relations, and the trust relationships that these 
individuals established among themselves. By 1996 in Canada the ‘high politics’ of 
the Quebec-Canada dispute on labour market policy had dissipated as federal and 
provincial governments went about negotiating and implementing Labour Market 
Development Agreements. In the United Kingdom the period after 1999 could be 
characterized as one of ‘making devolution work’. Writing in 1973 about the 
difference between intergovernmental liaison that accompanies the operation of adult 
occupational programs with that that precedes their political initiation, Dupré used 
imagery that still resonates today. In his view, once an issue moves into operation: 
federal-provincial liaison is left in the hands of the quite distinct group of 
operating officials who bear the ongoing responsibility for program 
implementation and development. After their periodic exercises in federal-
provincial summitry, the captains and kings depart, leaving the battlefield to 
their operating infantrymen (Dupré 1973, p. 85).  
 
                                                 
7 For example, a Canadian provincial Minister of Advanced Education sitting on the Council of 
Ministers of Education Canada could only find two Ministers with four years in their portfolio; all the 
rest were junior (Dupré 1992). In addition, provincial Ministerial forays into intergovernmental 
relations occur only two-three times per year.  
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A focus on senior civil servants within a policy sector provided an opportunity to 
examine to what degree political direction was translated into action. In Westminster 
political systems politicians play the role of policy-maker and are accountable for 
what happens in their departments. Civil servants take on the role of policy advisor, 
policy implementer, and, increasingly, the role of policy coordinator. This latter role 
is particularly relevant in multilevel governance systems, where civil servants are 
expected to focus on building relationships, networks, and policy communities with 
experts from the outside, with the goal of engaging the wider public and facilitating 
feedback and learning from the front line. In both countries intergovernmental 
relations during the period of this research were nestled within the context of civil 
service reform, guided by a governing philosophy called New Public Management. 
Not only did devolution emerge from this reform theme, other manifestations were 
found in privatization, performance management, and personnel management reform 
(Lodge and Kalitowski 2007).  
 
Defining Labour Market Policy 
 
The policy focus of this research was particularly difficult to define: indeed one 
Canadian provincial official claimed that labour market policy’s being so 
“amorphous and opaque” contributed to failure in intergovernmental relations 
(interview September 20, 2006). In liberal market economies, such as Canada and the 
United Kingdom, labour market policy is often not seen as a core dimension for state 
intervention (Haddow and Klassen 2006, p. 6). Although unemployment is seen as an 
important political issue, beyond income support labour market policy has rarely 
driven the political agenda (Noël 2004, p. 6). Despite this low profile, effective 
governance in labour market policy is critical to a nation, playing an important role 
in reducing poverty, inequality, and social exclusion. It is an integral complement to 
a competitive economic policy, contributing to keeping a country’s unemployment 
rate low and labour market participation rates high. Labour market programs also 
constitute a significant portion of overall government expenditures and impact 
almost all citizens at some point in their lives. 
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Passive income protection schemes such as Employment Insurance, social assistance 
and disability benefits (in Canada), or Jobseeker’s Allowance, Incapacity Benefit, 
and Income Support Programs (in the UK) are generally well understood, despite the 
variety of names that they are given. There is also a common understanding of 
regulatory aspects of the labour market such as industrial relations, employment 
standards, and workplace protection. But the third dimension active labour market 
policy is a more recent concept, first highlighted by the OECD in 1994.  
 
It was in active labour market policy that devolution changed governance 
arrangements in both Canada and the UK. It goes by different names in different 
places: active social policies or activation, employability supports, employment 
programs, welfare to work, workforce development, human resources management 
or manpower policy. The emphasis varies according to the times. When 
unemployment is low the focus is on skills development and immigration: when 
unemployment is high the focus is on getting people off of benefits and back to 
work. For individuals, active labour market policy provides the information, skills, 
and resources they need to prepare for, find, and keep secure, well-paid, and 
meaningful employment. ‘Second chance’ active labour market programs provide 
many individuals who were not successful in traditional education with the 
opportunity to acquire the human capital they need to avoid poverty. For employers, 
active labour market policy ensures that they have access to the workforce they 
require, with the necessary skills to produce the desired products and services in the 
most efficient and economical manner. For governments, active labour market policy 
is one of the key mechanisms used to ensure effective functioning of the labour 
market, combat unemployment, and reduce expenditures on passive labour market 
measures.  
 
For the purpose of this research the labour market policy domain was defined as 
programs and services supported by government funding that help individuals 
prepare for, find, and keep a job, and that assist employers in securing, retaining 
and developing the workforce they require.  
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These programs and services include: 
 skills acquisition and institutional training to assist unemployed workers 
acquire the skills demanded by the labour market; 
 job matching services to help employers secure skilled staff and job seekers 
secure information about vacancies; 
 careers advice, counseling and support services to help people choose a 
career, find a job or training opportunity, and support them through the 
process;  
 workforce development for employed workers including apprenticeships, work 
experience, and training on the job;  
 job creation activities that provide subsidies to employers, government 
departments, or self employment;  
 labour market information to provide intelligence on occupational trends and 
shortages and labour market functioning;  
 labour mobility to assist in the free movement of people, including 
professional qualification transferability and mutual recognition; 
 activation measures (either voluntary or compulsory) to address declining job 
search motivation and other problems for people on government benefits; and  
 targeted measures to reduce barriers to work for vulnerable groups such as 
immigrants, youth, older persons, single parents, aboriginal persons, and 
disabled people (adapted from Johnson 2001). 
 
The concept of employability is closely related to this research: indeed this was the 
area where much of the intergovernmental cooperation and collaboration took place 
within each country. In the UK, employability emerged as a central tenet of the Blair 
government’s ‘third way’ policies. From a European Union perspective, 
employability was one of the initial four pillars of the European Employment 
Strategy (EES). The term is also commonly used in Canada, and resurfaced during 
the period of this research as the subject title of a Government of Canada 
parliamentary committee study. In both countries programs to improve employability 
generally focus on people in receipt of government income support benefits, people 
in low pay/low skill jobs, or other vulnerable groups. During the period of this 
research, in the UK these programs were referred to as the New Deal or welfare to 
work or skills. In Canada the more common term was employment or labour market 
services or skills development.  
 
As will be demonstrated through this research, labour market policy is an extremely 
complex policy domain. Not only are there a variety of terms used to describe the 
policy area, over the past ten years the policy domain has become increasingly 
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merged with social security, immigration and economic development. Labour market 
policy also has a deep historic relationship to higher and postsecondary education, 
since many aspects of labour market training are delivered by community colleges, 
part of the higher education sector. It is also related to the notion of human capital 
development. Given that this research straddles governance across orders of 
government as well as across policy domains, labour market policy makes a 




Research methods are the techniques or procedures used to collect and analyze data. 
Three key data sources were used for this research: government documents, 
secondary sources, and elite interviews. Direct observation was used to a more 
limited extent. The data was analyzed through the application of a consistent 
framework that allowed for comparison across all governments in the two countries 
being studied. 
 
Government Documents  
 
A large variety of government documents were reviewed, including government 
policy papers, reports, budget documents, parliamentary committee transcripts, 
parliamentary debates, intergovernmental agreements and protocols, press releases 
and communiqués, and Minister’s speeches. The strength of documentary sources as 
evidence is that the technique is stable and unobtrusive, ensures exact names and 
references of an event, and provides broad coverage. Documentary information was 
important for providing factual information and an overview of the key issues 
governments were working on, as well as evidence on intergovernmental directions 
and intentions. Of key importance was judging who was involved in the production 
and release of a document, including whether it represented a single government’s 
direction or was the product of intergovernmental negotiation. 
 
The use of documents is impacted by whether they are publicly available, knowing 
whether they exist at all, and how to find them. Certainly the author’s previous work 
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experience in intergovernmental relations in Canada assisted in knowing what to 
look for, where to look for it, and its significance. There is a wealth of information 
on intergovernmental relations in Canada contained in Minister’s briefing books for 
intergovernmental meetings. Unfortunately, this is not public, and the sanitized press 
release issued at the conclusion of an intergovernmental meeting rarely provides the 
level of detail needed to gain insight into the issues being examined through this 
thesis. 
 
An excellent but unexpected source of information on intergovernmental relations 
emerged from public transcripts of parliamentary committee hearings in both Canada 
and the United Kingdom. The Scottish Enterprise and Culture Committee planned to 
undertake an inquiry into employability during 2005-2006, but in the end only took 
evidence in one hearing in December 2006, examining the Scottish Executive’s 
employability framework. Transcripts from the UK Education and Skills 
Parliamentary Committee were also informative. Most useful were the detailed 
minutes of proceedings from the House of Commons Standing Committee on Human 
Resources, Social Development and the Status of Persons with Disabilities in 
Canada. Between June 2006 and June 2007 this committee held 35 dedicated 
hearings across Canada on employability, and considered views on such issues as the 
mobility of workers, seasonal workers, older workers, skilled worker shortages, 
workplace literacy, and the recognition of foreign credentials. Almost 200 
individuals appeared as witnesses, including federal Ministers and officials, as well 
as stakeholders from across the country. Only a few provincial officials participated. 
This provided a rich, up to date, and topical data source that was particularly useful 
in triangulating the information obtained through secondary sources and elite 
interviews.  
 
It is acknowledged that information obtained from government sources is selective 
and only as objective as its author. For example, reports produced by civil servants 
are rarely critical of government action, and are sometimes produced to put a positive 
spin on an issue. Since website material can be ephemeral, copies were printed and 
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archived electronically. As much as possible, website information was included in 




Secondary sources were another key resource, including documents and analysis 
published by academics, research institutes, community, business and labour 
organizations, and the media. Much of this information was more critical than 
government sources. The OECD comparative material on local governance, 
managing across levels of government, and decentralization of labour market policy 
was especially useful. There was an abundance of secondary sources on 
intergovernmental relations in Canada, although considerably less at the labour 
market sector level. Although there was considerable material on devolution in the 
UK, the intergovernmental material was much more limited. Objectivity was 
improved when the volume of material increased; when there were only a small 
number of authors, bias was more of a problem. As a result, secondary sources were 
used primarily to generate ideas for framing the research and to validate information 




Three labour market policy conferences were attended where intergovernmental 
actors from both orders of government played a leading role. These included a 
Working Together Conference sponsored by the Centre for Economic and Social 
Inclusion in Edinburgh in November 2005, a Workplace Training Conference 
sponsored by Canadian Policy Research Networks in Ottawa in November 2006, and 
an open seminar on immigration sponsored by Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
in Edmonton in October 2006. These events provided insight on intergovernmental 





The prime data source for this research was semi-structured in person elite 
interviews. Elites can be loosely defined as those with close proximity to power or 
policy making; they include political representatives, executive officers of 
organizations and senior state employees (Lilleker 2003, p. 207). Elite interviews 
were appropriate for this study because the range of individuals possessing the 
specialized knowledge of the operation of intergovernmental relations in labour 
market policy was relatively limited, and only selected individuals had particular 
insight into the issues under investigation.  
 
A total of 77 interviews were undertaken for this study8 between March 2005 and 
June 2007 36 in Canada and 40 in the United Kingdom. One was undertaken in 
Brussels. The interviews consisted of a series of open-ended questions and averaged 
an hour in length. Fifty-six were with civil servants or ex-civil servants: the rest were 
with stakeholders or experts external to government. A full list of those interviewed 
by title and location is attached as Appendix 1. Those interviewed were initially 
chosen on the advice of key participants known to be involved with 
intergovernmental labour market issues in each country, and efforts were made to 
talk to people at the most senior level. In Canada there are dedicated 
intergovernmental specialists in labour market policy, as well as officials at the 
centre who oversee intergovernmental relations, so contacts here were essential. In 
the UK, during the period of this research, there were no intergovernmental 
specialists in labour market policy, but officials at the centre were interviewed.  
 
After identifying key officials, a snowball sample was generated based upon 
respondent’s suggestions as to who else ought to be interviewed, including key 
informants external to the governments involved. Although initially approached, 
Ministers in both countries declined to be interviewed. As the study progressed and it 
became clearer that this was a study of intergovernmental administrative relations, 
                                                 
8 In addition, the author was able to call on notes from interviews undertaken in the provinces of 
British Columbia and Ontario in 2002/03 for an unpublished study on policy coherence.   
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their absence was not felt to be critical, as officials were able to provide insight into 
the political dimensions of intergovernmental relations. One Canadian Member of 
Parliament was interviewed, and provided valuable insight into intergovernmental 
issues raised through the Canadian Employability Study. 
 
The strengths of interviewing as a data collection technique is that it provides insight 
and perception that is directly related to the research questions and can answer ‘how’ 
and ‘why’ questions: the weakness is the bias of the informant and inaccuracy due to 
poor recall (Yin 1994, p. 80). Civil servants in particular may feel that they need to 
stick to the ‘party line’, papering over differences between governments. This is 
especially the case in intergovernmental relations, given its traditional secrecy and 
sensitivity. As a result, some of the most important insights came from former civil 
servants, who no longer felt these same constraints. Access was gained through 
personal contacts and e-mail, explaining the nature of the research and their 
particular contribution. There were very few occasions where interviews were 
refused, and only a handful where there was no response. Timing and availability 
were the key issues. After agreeing to the interview each respondent was sent a draft 
agenda customized to their role but which nevertheless provided a template for ease 
of comparison. This allowed respondents to answer on their own terms. 
Confidentiality was a key issue and respondents were assured that quotes were non-





Although the use of a computer-assisted data analysis system was considered, it was 
rejected after courses demonstrated that analysis could just as easily be done through 
more traditional methods. In terms of the interview data, the first stage of analysis 
involved a careful reading of the interview transcripts. Data reduction and analysis 
was then undertaken by reviewing the data against the analytical framework to 
construct categories and themes, a circular or spiral process involving describing, 
classifying and connecting (Dey 1993, p. 44-45). The data was then coded according 
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to the data categories as outlined in Appendix 2. These categories were extracted 
from the analytical framework. Analysis involved searching for understanding of 
respondent’s words, and relating these to the pre-selected categories.  
 
The documentary sources and the transcripts from the Canadian Employability Study 
were also coded against the analytical framework. This material required significant 
reduction before coding because of its generality. Transcripts were reviewed and 
comments related to intergovernmental relations were extracted and copied into a 
separate document. This was reviewed for themes relevant to this research and then 
coded. 
 
The analytical framework which will be outlined in detail in Chapter Two was used 
as the basis of analysis for each of the case study countries, as well as in their 
ultimate comparison and the answering of the research questions. This analytical 
framework was developed early on in the thesis, and although refined, did not change 
substantially throughout the period of research. Government and secondary 
documentary sources, as well as interview data were critical to answering the first 
and second research question, regarding differences in intergovernmental relations 
between the two countries. The third research question relating to the character and 
workability of intergovernmental relations in each country was answered almost 
exclusively on the basis of interview information.  
 
Triangulation is the combination of several sources of evidence, and is particularly 
important in case study research (Yin 2003). It allows for converging lines of 
inquiry, making any conclusions more convincing and accurate. Not only were 
attempts made to triangulate between data sources (interviews, government 
documents, participant observation), triangulation was also done between 
respondents. Perspectives on the same issue were sought from intergovernmental 
actors working at the centre and for the sub-state government in each country. 
Differences were not reconciled, but provided instead a fuller understanding. 
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Ensuring Quality and Objectivity  
 
A crucial test of case study design is the extent to which it meets four tests of 
research validity: construct, internal, external, and reliability (Yin 2003). Figure 1 
draws on Yin’s criteria to summarize the tactics used for this particular study to 
ensure validity. 
Figure 1: Research Criteria and Tactics 
 
Test Tactics used to meet this criteria
Construct Validity: establishing correct 
operational procedures for the concepts 
being studied 
 Used multiple sources of evidence 
 Defined concepts and terms clearly 
 Established a chain of evidence 
 Used a standard analytical framework 
Internal Validity: establishing a causal 
relationship 
 Identified patterns across the cases 
 Sought multiple views on same issue 
 Used additional embedded units as a 
source of understanding 
External Validity: establishing the 
domain to which a study’s findings can 
be generalized 
 Used replication logic across the 
governments studied 
Reliability: demonstrating that the data 
collection procedures can be repeated 
with the same results 
 Documented procedures 
 Developed a case study database  
 Developed criteria for assessment 
 
To assess quality in social policy research, Becker, Bryman and Sempick (2006) also 
suggest that credibility (the extent to which a set of findings are believable) and 
confirmability (the extent to which the researcher has not allowed personal values to 
intrude to an excessive degree) are important additional criteria. When it comes to 
cross-national research, the methods and data have to be genuinely comparable, there 
needs to be sensitivity to the cultural and policy contexts, and researchers need to 
ensure that there is no bias in the research instruments. 
 
The use of an analytical framework for gathering the data and analyzing the research 
within each country and across the two case study countries was the key instrument 
used to ensure that this research was credible and genuinely comparable. In addition 
to the framework, key concepts such as the actors involved, the policy area being 
studied, the time period being covered, and the criteria used to judge character and 
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workability were carefully delineated to ensure that like was being compared to like. 
In terms of sensitivity to cultural and policy contexts, as a Canadian the author was 
already familiar with the Canadian political system and norms, but unfamiliar with 
how similar issues were managed in the UK. To compensate, the author took up 
residence in Scotland for most of the period of this research. This provided access to 
media and citizen accounts of events, and improved understanding of the UK 
political system and government approach to both devolution and labour market 
policy. 
 
In case study research the researcher is the source of many errors, allowing equivocal 
or biased views to influence the findings and outcomes (Peters 1998, p. 154). The 
possibility of bias in this research could be anticipated, given the author’s previous 
work experience for a sub-state government in Canada. For example, the significant 
centralization of labour market policy in the UK seemed particularly foreign. Having 
represented provincial concerns in federal-provincial discussions, a view which 
assumed that the Government of Canada was in control and superior to provinces did 
not sit comfortably. To deal with this bias, a wide variety of views on 
intergovernmental relations in Canada were solicited, especially those of civil 
servants, stakeholders and experts at the centre. In the UK, officials were specifically 
asked to reflect on why national equity as a central organizing principle of the UK 




This concludes the introductory section of this thesis. The research questions have 
been identified, the country comparators and sub-state governments selected, and the 
research design and methods outlined. The rest of this thesis unfolds as follows. 
 
Chapter Two outlines the theoretical approach chosen, reviews the literature on 
intergovernmental relations, and explains the analytical framework developed for 
comparing the two countries, and on which the subsequent empirical analysis is 
based. It also provides a detailed overview of the concept of workability, the criteria 
chosen to assess intergovernmental performance. 
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Chapter Three examines the social, constitutional, political, and institutional 
structures in Canada and the United Kingdom and considers how these have shaped 
the intergovernmental power dynamics in each country. Although some attention was 
paid to history, the prime emphasis is on the post-devolution period. 
 
Chapters Four and Five present the empirical examination of the Canadian case 
study. Chapter Four examines three key elements: the interests, expectations, values, 
experiences and capacity of the intergovernmental administrative actors; the 
influence of other actors external to government; and the specific dynamics of the 
labour market policy domain (history, competence, complexity, issues and 
intergovernmental machinery). Chapter Five assesses the power relationship dynamic 
between governments in Canada between 1996 and 2006, using the concepts of 
interdependence and hierarchy, mitigated by how the intergovernmental structures 
and machinery were used. Based on this information, the character and workability 
of the intergovernmental relations system in labour market policy is assessed based 
on the presence or absence of ‘trust ties’ between officials. This results in an 
assessment of high, medium, or low workability in intergovernmental relations. 
 
Chapters Six and Seven deal with the British case study, using the same parameters 
as outlined for the Canadian case study. The chapter also highlights key differences 
in the policy domain, including a much shorter historical period of domestic 
multilevel governance, and the influence of a significant actor not found in Canada- 
the European Union. 
 
Chapter Eight pulls together the case study analyses and compares the two countries, 
focusing in particular on their differences. It also responds directly to the research 
questions. The final section of the chapter looks to the future to consider political 
developments in 2007 and beyond. The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
whether what has been learned about intergovernmental relations in labour market 
policy in Canada and the UK might more broadly be applied to intergovernmental 
relations elsewhere.  
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CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS 
 
Institutions are more important than people. But only people, with the 
necessary strength and power, can transform and enrich those elements 
which the institutions pass onto succeeding generations (Jean Monnet9 as 
quoted in Pierce 1996).  
 
Chapter One outlined the aims and objectives of this research, identified the research 
questions, justified the selection of the countries to be compared, and provided 
further details to frame the research. The research design, methods utilized, and the 
criteria established to judge the quality and objectivity of the research were also 
detailed. 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical approach to the 
research, review the relevant intergovernmental relations literature, and identify an 
analytical framework for assessing and explaining intergovernmental relations within 
the two case study countries. Having a detailed and consistent analytical framework 
is important as it will also be used for undertaking the comparison between the two 
countries and answering the research questions. 
 
The chapter starts with an overview of the actor-centered institutional approach, the 
theoretical basis chosen for this study. This considers the importance of both actors 
and institutions in the decision making process, and how these intersect to control 
political events. The significance of history is also highlighted. 
 
The intergovernmental relations literature is explored next, organized around the 
considerations of who, what, why, when, and how, especially as these relate to the 
case study countries. In this context there is a detailed discussion of the concept of 
‘executive federalism’ and how it applies to both Canada and the United Kingdom. 
The final section of the literature review provides a synthesis of approaches used by 
various authors to assess intergovernmental relations in a variety of country contexts. 
                                                 
9 Jean Monnet is considered the founding father of the European Community.  
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Drawing on this literature, the chapter outlines in some detail the analytical 
framework developed for this study. Placing intergovernmental administrative actors 
at the centre, this analytical framework considers the impact of institutions (the 
country and policy domain context) and the role of actors external to government on 
the power relationship dynamic between centre and sub-state governments. The 
framework also considers factors which influence the power relationship dynamic, 
and how these in turn determine the character and workability of intergovernmental 
relations. The chapter concludes with a detailed discussion of the concept of 
workability, used to assess intergovernmental performance in this research. 
Workability focuses on the process and handling of interaction between 
governments, as opposed to policy outcomes. 
 
An Actor-centered Institutional Approach 
 
A key consideration of the political decision making process is determining what 
motivates political and administrative actors. The behavioral and rational choice 
approaches to political theory assume individuals act autonomously, are free from 
the constraints of institutions, and act based on their individual values or calculations 
of utility. March and Olsen were the first to challenge this approach and to highlight 
the importance of institutions: 
In their view, institutions have a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that is transmitted 
to their members and which those members in turn use to structure their own 
behavior (Peters 1998, p. 122). 
 
There are a variety of institutional approaches, but at the core is the view that 
institutions structure social and political relationships and socialize those working 
within them to their values, norms, and practices. Peters suggests that an institution 
must have a structure (either formal or informal), it transcends individuals to involve 
groups of individuals, it is stable over time, it must affect or constrain behavior, and 
there is a sense of shared values and meaning among the members (Peters 2000, p. 
18). Institutions operate in a partial and select fashion, whereby some institutions are 
engaged while others are excluded. According to Hall (1986), institutional 
frameworks establish a hierarchy of power among actors, which determines the 
degree of power they exert over decision-making and its outcomes. The institutional 
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position of actors influences the definition of their interests, responsibilities, and 
relationships10. Institutions also specify who may legitimately participate in a 
relationship and how participants should conduct themselves. In the context of this 
study, relevant institutions included government departments and agencies, policy 
networks, political parties, advisory groups, and intergovernmental committees. 
 
Historical institutionalism has particular relevance, given that this study focuses on 
two federal political systems operating under British parliamentary traditions with a 
long evolutionary history. In this approach not only do institutions matter, but history 
also matters, for the reason that both the institutions and preferences of actors are 
framed by the past (Rothstein and Steinmo 2002). This is particularly relevant to any 
understanding of relations between the centre and sub-states, as any tensions are part 
of early relationships and adaptations made over time. Historical institutionalism also 
suggests that once institutional choices are made, the patterns created will tend to 
persist (Peters 1999, p. 64). Without other forces, inertia arises and institutions 
evolve in an incremental, ‘path dependent’ way. While path dependency does not 
imply determinacy, it does suggest that the range of possible future choices is 
constrained by initial choices. It also implies that directions chosen are those that 
exhibit positive feedback, with each step in a particular direction making it more 
difficult to reverse course (Pierson 2004, p. 21). 
 
Although historical institutionalism was considered relevant, it could not explain or 
could not have predicted the institutional changes that came about through 
devolution in the two case study countries. As a result, historical institutionalism 
needed to be supplemented by an approach that also looked at how political actors 
interact with institutions. Scharpf (1997) developed an actor-centered institutional 
approach, looking at how the perceptions, interests, and behavioural patterns of 
actors within a particular policy area were shaped by institutions. In this model, 
while actor attitudes and behaviour may to some extent be determined by norms, 
rules, regulations, and constitutions, these can be altered by purposive action or as a 
                                                 
10For example, the institutional context in Canada for an actor working in a line department within a 
provincial government (Alberta Human Resources and Employment) is very different from that of an 
actor working in a central department at the centre (with the Privy Council Office in Ottawa). 
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result of unintended consequences of decisions within a specific domain. Marks used 
a similar approach to assess multilevel governance in the European Union. In his 
view, although states provide institutional contexts in which human beings pursue 
their goals, actors can change the rules to those that might suit them better. He makes 
the following distinction between institutional rules and political actors: 
In this conception, institutions do not think, have preferences or act, but are 
sets of commonly accepted formal and informal norms that constrain political 
actors (individuals and groups of individuals), who are the only agents 
capable of goal oriented action (Marks 1997, p. 22). 
 
For Marks, intergovernmental relations represent negotiations among political and 
administrative actors representing the state rather than negotiations among states. 
These actors have their own interests, expectations, and values constrained to varying 
degrees by their particular institutional context. As Anderson suggested in 1960: 
It is human beings clothed with office who are the real determiners of what 
the relations between units of government will be. Consequently, the concept 
of intergovernmental relations necessarily has to be formulated largely in 
terms of human relations and human behaviour (Anderson 1960, p. 3).  
 
Any human interaction must consider the players, their strategies, and the payoffs. 
Adopting Scharpf’s terminology, the theoretical approach selected for this research is 
actor-centered institutionalism. Rather than institutions being identified as the 
structuring factor, this approach places actors and human interaction at the centre. 
Actor’s views are significantly shaped by the norms and constraints of the overall 
institutional context in which they work, by the order or level of government to 
which they owe their loyalty, and by their place within that government. Their views 
are also shaped by the historical context in which they operate; as a result, each case 
study includes a historical perspective. But this was not enough: since this study was 
about relationships and it is people (not states) that form relationships, the political 
actor’s personal experiences, as well as their interests, values, expectations, and 





Essential Features of Intergovernmental Relations 
 
Chapter One provided some preliminary information on intergovernmental relations. 
This next section provides a more detailed overview. 
 
What is It? 
 
Nation states are territorially bound, and within each nation state territory further 
defines a citizen’s political, economic and social life. Territorial spheres of 
government operate within a single polity, affecting the same citizens as the nation 
state. Intergovernmental relations connect these spheres of government; at its most 
basic conception, intergovernmental relations can be defined as “an important body 
of activities or interactions occurring between government units of all types and 
levels” (Anderson 1960, p. 3). The term originated in the 1930s in the United States 
with the advent of the New Deal, the federal government’s massive effort to combat 
the Great Depression. Intergovernmental relations are the hidden dimension of 
government, and at its roots are concerns with how concrete programs get conceived 
and delivered (Wright 1982). 
 
Intergovernmental relations operates at the interface between what the 
constitution provides and what the practical reality of the country 
requires…it is the ‘workhorse’ of any federal system- the privileged 
instrument by which the job any job gets done (Cameron 2001, p. 121). 
 
The term intergovernmental relations is often used as a substitute for federalism. 
Speaking from an American perspective, Wright identifies that federalism 
emphasizes national-state relationships, whereas the concept of intergovernmental 
relations is much broader, encompassing not only national-state and interstate 
relations, but also national-local, state-local, national-state-local and interlocal 
relations. In the 1970s, the term intergovernmental management emerged, focused on 
problem solving, coping capabilities, and networking among policy professionals 
(Wright 1990, p. 170). Johns, O’Reilly, and Inwood (2006) drew upon this 
classification to differentiate between intergovernmental relations (focused on the 
interaction between administrative officials working in intergovernmental Ministries 
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and central agencies in Canada) and intergovernmental management (focused on the 
interaction between policy area professionals and intergovernmental specialists). 
Although this thesis does indeed focus on the interactions between policy area 
professionals and intergovernmental specialists (as opposed to central officials), the 
term intergovernmental relations is used throughout, as this was the term used by 
those directly involved.  
 
Who is Involved?  
 
Determining which actors play a key intergovernmental role is significantly shaped 
by a country’s unique constitutional and political context. However, the literature 
provides consistent themes in this regard. In 1989, Watts undertook a comparative 
analysis of nine parliamentary and non-parliamentary federations and concluded that, 
in all of the parliamentary federations examined, the locus for intergovernmental 
consultation and negotiation was between executives (and their representatives) 
within each government. In federal political systems using a separation of powers 
model (such as the United States), inter-institutional relations are dispersed, and 
members of both the executive and legislative branches in both orders of government 
interact in a web of relationships, including through second chambers such as 
Senates. In contrast, in federal political systems featuring a fusion of powers model 
(such as Canada’s and the UK’s), power is concentrated in the executive, that is, in 
the elected and appointed officials of both orders of government11. 
 
This concentration of power in the executives of each order of government has been 
dubbed executive federalism, and is a dominant feature of intergovernmental 
relations in Canada and the United Kingdom. Almost all government business in 
these countries gets done through executive federalism, from the harmonization of 
environmental, security, trade or labour standards to the implementation of 
international commitments; from ensuring access to similar health, education and 
                                                 
11 For example, in the United States the chief executive (the President) is elected independently from 
the members of the legislature; the defeat of legislation proposed by the President does not result in 
the dismissal of government. In parliamentary systems the executive does not have an independent 
mandate but relies upon the maintenance of its parliamentary majority. 
 45
social services across the country to deciding on amendments to the constitution. 
Fiscal issues involving how money is raised and shared between the component parts 
of a country are at the core of intergovernmental relations. Depending on the issue, 
the actors involved include elected First Ministers and Cabinet Ministers from each 
order of government, as well as the senior civil servants who support them. These 
civil servants range from intergovernmental specialists to policy or program 
professionals. What is noteworthy about this executive dominance of 
intergovernmental relations in parliamentary federations is that it leaves a minimal 
role for legislatures, because Prime Ministers and Ministers can conclude deals with 
each other that are binding on their governments, without having to return to their 
respective legislatures. Executive dominance also leaves a minimal role for the 
judiciary and citizenry. 
 
The concept of executive federalism has come under extreme criticism in Canada as 
contributing to undue secrecy, a low level of participation by citizens, legislatures, 
and political parties (sometimes identified as the ‘democratic deficit’), weakened 
government accountability, and intergovernmental conflict (Brock 2003). This 
criticism came to a pinnacle in 1987 around the Meech Lake Accord, where 
constitutional changes to accommodate Quebec took place largely in secret, public 
mobilization was carefully avoided, and decisions were made by 11 First 
Ministersall men making a deal, under extraordinary pressure, behind closed 
doors (Simeon 1988). Ultimately, the accord was defeated by two provincial 
legislatures, brought down by the process of ‘executive federalism’, as well as the 
substance of the proposed constitutional changes. 
 
Despite this criticism, in the ensuing 20 years little has changed in Canada; instead, 
accommodation through executive federalism has moved back to non-constitutional 
techniques (Brock 2003). Executive-dominated relations also appear to be a feature 
of the emerging intergovernmental relations system in the United Kingdom. In a 
detailed examination, Horgan concluded that the marriage of UK cabinet-
parliamentary traditions with shared governance makes executive focused inter-
institutional relations inevitable, despite the desire of the Scottish Parliament to be 
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more democratic through open parliamentary committees. Even though there are 
greater consensual elements in the legislatures of the devolved administrations, in his 
view these have not moderated the exclusivity characteristic of executive-focused 
intergovernmental relations (Horgan 2003).  
 
Why Do Governments Interact? 
 
Interdependence is ever present in a federal political system with concurrent 
authority. Even in systems with divided authority, where much of what governments 
do is done independently, there are some areas and some issues where entanglement, 
overlap, and interdependence are inevitable, either through funding, administration, 
or because of the ‘transversal’ nature of the policy area.  
 
There are a variety of reasons why governments need to interact because of their 
interdependence. These include: 1) to shape a policy direction together either 
strategically or operationally in order to solve an agreed-upon problem, because 
neither government has the necessary constitutional powers or financial resources; 2) 
to implement or uphold a policy direction and account for action; 3) to exchange 
information for policy learning; 4) to prevent surprises from unilateral action or to 
adjust actions; 5) to share  resources to act in a mutually beneficial way to achieve 
common goals; 6) to coordinate action to ensure overall coherence and 
harmonization, to clarify roles and responsibilities and reduce overlap and 
duplication; 7) to influence behavior or persuade a party to act in a certain way; 8) to 
challenge the behavior and action of a party; 9) to prevent certain actions and 
subsequent negative consequences; 10) to protect or advance jurisdiction; or 11) to 
resolve conflicts and disputes. Many (but not all) of these intergovernmental 
objectives are motivated by a strong concern for the effective delivery of public 
services to citizens. 
 
Interdependence is not the only reason why governments need to connect. Agranoff 
(2004) suggests that intergovernmental relations also provide a mechanism for 
broader political accommodation not adequately achieved through existing 
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institutions (including parliaments and political parties), as well as the foundation 
whereby the autonomy of sub-state governments to govern themselves is facilitated. 
This requires a reasonable measure of political strength on the part of the sub-state 
government, as well as willingness by the centre to accommodate these interests. 
Without a meaningful intergovernmental relations system that respects self-rule and 
power-sharing, the political system would tip over into a unitary system.  
 
Borzel provides an example of the importance of intergovernmental relations in her 
examination of the impact of Europeanization on cooperation and competition 
between the 17 autonomous communities and the centre in Spain. In her assessment, 
Europeanization drove the emergence of multilateral cooperation when the 
autonomous communities realized that they seriously risked losing competencies 
through their uncompromising behaviour. As a result, multilateral intergovernmental 
cooperation in the 23 sectoral conferences in Spain is more effective around 
European issues than on domestic issues (Borzel 2000, p. 41).  
 
When Do Governments Interact? 
 
Interaction between governments is continuous and handled on an ongoing basis by a 
wide variety of politicians and officials working at various levels and in different 
policy areas of their respective organizations. In examining intergovernmental 
relations in the United States in the 1980s, Wright concluded that there were nearly 
80,000 governmental units, governed by almost half a million popularly elected 
officials (Wright 1982, p. 11). This points to how intergovernmental relations are 
structured. Government-to-government relations at the nation and sub-state level can 
be conceptualized as multilateral, involving all of the sub-state governments and the 
central government or just all of the sub-state governments12; regional, involving 
only some of the sub-state governments, with or without the central government; or 
bilateral, involving the central government and one of the sub-state governments or 
two of the sub-state governments working together. As previously mentioned, 
intergovernmental interaction within the scope of this research takes place between 
                                                 
12 In Canada, the former is called federal-provincial while the latter is called interprovincial. 
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14 governments in Canada, while in the UK it takes place between four. Each 
government divides its work by policy area into different departmental structures, 
making for a substantial amount of intergovernmental traffic. Every day there are 
countless interactions between governments on a continuing basis over a wide range 
of issues. 
 
How is the Interaction Managed? 
 
When comparing intergovernmental relations between countries, some key 
dimensions are structures, intergovernmental machinery and dispute resolution 
techniques. Intergovernmental machinery varies by the degree to which it is 
institutionalized (i.e., formal or informal), the extent to which it is decision-making 
in character, and the degree to which deliberations are open and transparent 
(Cameron 2001).  
 
There are a variety of mechanisms used to manage intergovernmental interaction. 
Executive mechanisms include informal contacts between officials through telephone 
calls, fax, e-mails and letters; unstructured encounters among politicians and 
officials; formal meetings, committees, and conferences between officials and 
Ministers; high profile summit meetings of First Ministers, as well as written 
agreements between governments. 
 
The most basic form of intergovernmental relations is voluntary mutual adjustment 
or ad hoc coordination through informal means. This does not require regular 
meetings, a bureaucratic structure or decision-making rules, and allows for maximum 
flexibility and autonomy of the participating partners. Informal mechanisms are 
important for exchanging views and information, and have been found to contribute 
to the development of the mutual trust and respect necessary for effective 
collaboration (interview with Canadian federal official November 7, 2006). On the 
other hand, more formal mechanisms provide a more rigorous approach that 
‘routinizes’ the interaction and is more reliable. Noël (2001, p. 13) suggests that 
establishing institutional rules mitigates power, and may be more constraining on the 
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central government, the actor least likely to demand formal constraints. Reflecting on 
the Canadian experience, in his view the federal government in Canada uses their 
power to cultivate uncertainty by deliberately not putting formal intergovernmental 
institutional structures in place. 
 
Greater formality or institutionalization becomes more of a norm in multilateral 
relations, because there is greater complexity. Dennison (2005) suggests that the 
following variables in ascending order can contribute to the institutionalization of 
intergovernmental relations and make intergovernmental relations more fruitful: an 
established pattern of meetings, shared or rotating chairmanship, a permanent 
secretariat, a funding formula, a founding agreement, legal incorporation, 
establishment by common legislation, and constitutional entrenchment. Bolleyer 
(2006a, p. 4) identified similar criteria but also added the density of contacts, 
majority rule, and internal functional differentiation (specification of offices and 
specification of sub-units). Greater institutionalization does not imply greater 
compromise and consensus; according to Simmons (2004, p. 287), the more 
important factors at play are the will of governments, the personalities of the 
intergovernmental actors, and the developments and pressures external to the 
intergovernmental deliberations.  
 
Depending upon their purpose, governments will select different institutional 
structures, as well as different strategies and tactics. Strategies involve choices about 
which arenas to use (the courts, Ministerial meetings, political parties, quiet 
diplomacy), and whether the issue will be pursued on a bilateral or multilateral basis 
(Bakvis, Baier, and Brown 2005). With bilateral relationships there are fewer players 
and resolution may be easier; on the other hand bilateral relationships between the 
centre and one sub-state government may arouse envy and resentment from other 
sub-state governments. Some issues cannot be solved through bilateral negotiations 
because of their spillover impacts on other sub-state governments or because they are 
considered as issues of national importance. Securing multilateral agreement is also 
more difficult; as a result, forming an alliance or coalition between sub-state 
governments is a strategy which assumes that a united front will put pressure on the 
 50
central government. This is frequently attempted in the Canadian context, and 
federal-provincial meetings are often preceded by meetings that involve just 
provincial governments.  
 
Dispute resolution techniques in intergovernmental relations range from informal 
through political channels, to dispute avoidance through meetings and agreements, to 
judicial resolution through the courts, to using the electoral system (Crommelin 
2001). 
 
In examining the relationship between the institutionalism of intergovernmental 
relations and decision-making rules Bolleyer (2006b, p. 393) noted that: 
A core feature of strong institutionalization of intergovernmental relations is 
a formal decision-making rule which deviates from unanimity because the 
capacity to bind the sub-states to common positions or plans to which they do 
not agree demonstrates that [intergovernmental relations] is thought to 
represent more than the sum of its parts.  
 
There are a variety of decision-making rules in intergovernmental relations. Some 
require the consent of all participants, effectively giving each government a veto; 
others require qualified or simple majorities. Occasionally the votes of all the sub-
states are weighted according to regional population; sometimes they all count the 
same. Another approach is to allow sub-states to opt out, allowing the other sub-
states to proceed without requiring unanimity. Aside from the decision-making rules, 
the impact of intergovernmental decisions varies from one country to another. For 
example, in Canada the most common decision making rule is consensus and 
generally regions can opt out if they are not satisfied with collective decisions. In the 
United Kingdom, the decision rule is hierarchy, with the UK Government in the 
dominant role. In Switzerland, the decision-making rule varies across sectors from 
majority rule to unanimity. When a Conference of Cantonal Directors fights over 
responsibilities, the Conference of Cantonal Executives is responsible for conflict 
resolution (Bolleyer 2006a, p. 20). Although the European Union has an extremely 
complex decision-making process that includes unanimity and qualified majority 
voting, there is a highly ingrained culture of consensus (Cini 2002, p. 156). 
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A final consideration is the degree of secrecy or transparency in intergovernmental 
relations. This applies in particular to inter-ministerial conferences when decisions 
are taken that are binding on all parties. Often this requires bargaining and trade offs 
which may only be possible behind closed doors. However, not only does this reduce 
citizen understanding of the process of government, agreements are presented as ‘fait 
accompli’, which can erode the legitimacy of parliamentary institutions. 
 
This review of the intergovernmental relations literature has provided insight into 
who is involved in intergovernmental relations, why and when governments connect, 
the arenas utilized, and the structures employed. These considerations vary from one 
country to another. This raises the question as to how intergovernmental relations can 
be organized so that comparisons and assessments can be made, as without some sort 
of organizing framework an analysis will be more descriptive than analytical. The 
next section of this chapter provides a synthesis of how various academics have 
approached assessing intergovernmental relations. It focuses primarily on the 
Canadian, British, and European literature due to the insight this provides into the 
case study countries. 
 
Assessing Intergovernmental Relations  
 
One of the seminal case studies assessing intergovernmental relations in Canada was 
undertaken by Simeon in relation to the federal-provincial process that led to 
pension, equalization, and constitutional reform in the 1960s and 1970s. For his 
purposes he developed the following approach to organizing his material: 
There is a set of interdependent actors, or partisans; they operate within a 
certain social and institutional environment; they share some goals but differ 
on others it is a mixed motive game; they have an issue or set of issues on 
which they must negotiate; none has hierarchical control over the other; they 
have varying political resources; they use these political resources in certain 
strategies and tactics; they arrive at certain outcomes; and these outcomes 
have consequences for themselves, for other groups in society and for the 
system itself. The problem now becomes how each of these elements is related 
to the others, and how together they provide a ‘satisfying’ explanation of the 
adjustment process (Simeon 1972, p. 11-12). 
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Simeon concluded that the pattern of intergovernmental decision making resulted 
from the interaction of three factors: the social and cultural setting; the institutional 
and constitutional framework; and the goals, attitudes, and behavior of actors in 
relation to the demands facing the system.  
 
Drawing on Simeon’s work, Bakvis, Baier, and Brown (2005) identified the 
following elements for understanding a given set of intergovernmental negotiations 
in a Canadian context: actors (whether negotiators are with central or line 
departments); issues (their salience and divisiveness); interests, goals and objectives 
(these can vary between and within governments and over time); strategies and 
tactics (the use of courts, alliances, media); resources (jurisdiction, staff expertise 
and capacity, fiscal freedom to decline federal funding, public opinion); arenas 
(courts, formal or informal meetings); interactions (multilateral or bilateral); and 
outcomes (what happened?). Not only does this update Simeon’s work, it draws on 
more recent work on bargaining, as well as the literature on negotiation, strategy, and 
policy making.  
 
Trench has undertaken extensive work on intergovernmental relations in the 
devolved UK, writing annually about the developing intergovernmental relations 
system in the State of the Nations volumes, published by University College London 
(Hazell and Trench 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005). Reflecting over time on the 
complexity of assessing intergovernmental relations, he ultimately considered the 
following factors as key: the Constitution, the mechanics and processes of 
intergovernmental relations, the courts, political parties, and the impact on 
democracy. Despite the difficulty in making sense of intergovernmental relations 
theoretically, he concluded that it works in substantially similar ways in many, if not 
most, federal systems (Trench 2006). 
 
The academic literature has paid particular attention to the significance of two key 
concepts impacting power relationships between governments. These are the degree 
of hierarchy and the degree of interdependence between governments. The key 
concept behind interdependence is the need to exchange resources. Working before 
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devolution when the only intergovernmental relationship in the United Kingdom was 
between national and local governments, Rhodes developed a ‘power-dependence’ 
model of intergovernmental relations (1981). Here, the availability, distribution, and 
substitutability of resources underpin the power-dependence relationship, as these are 
central to the relative power of the interacting organizations. He defined ‘resources’ 
broadly to include money (financial resources from taxes, charges, or borrowing); 
authority (mandatory or discretionary right to carry out the function); political 
(legitimacy from elections); information (possession of data and control over its 
collection or dissemination); and organization (possession of people, skills, lands 
and buildings) (Rhodes 1986, p. 17). For Simeon (1972), all resources were political, 
and he identified these as legal authority, political support, skills and expertise, 
objective information, size and wealth, procedures and rules of the game. Neither 
mentioned public opinion, a very important resource. 
 
When studying inter-organizational interactions in Europe, Scharpf postulated that 
all durable interactive relationships, including those with hierarchical authority, were 
based on power and the exchange of resources, even when the exchange relationship 
was of advantage to only one of the partners, as it could include the avoidance of an 
evil which would otherwise be inflicted (Scharpf 1978, p. 354). Like Rhodes, he 
asserted that interactions between governments were motivated by the need to obtain 
scarce resources and that the key factors influencing this were the importance of the 
resource and whether or not it could be substituted. He placed relationships into a 
typology characterized as mutual dependence, mutual independence, or unilateral 
dependence. Situations of mutual dependence presented opportunities for the 
application of influence, and those of unilateral dependence facilitated policy 
coordination: 
Even when a dominant party may exercise hierarchical authority or control 
over monetary resources, it may, at the same time, be fully dependent on the 
specialist skills, the clientele contacts and the information available only to 
subordinate units (Scharpf 1978, p. 359). 
 
A similar framework for assessing power in intergovernmental relations comes from 
Lazar and McIntosh in Canada (1998). Wishing to assess the kinds of 
intergovernmental regimes that prevailed in three specific social policy sectors 
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(health, disability and labour market), they developed a typology with reference to 
the extent to which the intergovernmental relationship entailed either independence 
or interdependence, and the extent to which a hierarchical relationship prevailed. 
Like Rhodes and Scharpf, they identified the need to exchange resources as being at 
the heart of interdependence, while hierarchy related to the degree to which 
governments were sovereign and free to act in their jurisdiction.  
 
The literature also identified a wide variety of terms used over time to characterize or 
describe intergovernmental relations, especially in federal systems. Watts’ (2006) 
concepts of cooperative and competitive federalism and its historical development 
are relevant. After the post-war reconstruction periods, the classical federations (the 
United States, Switzerland, Canada, and Australia) moved from the ‘dual federalism’ 
of separate general and territorial governments to ‘cooperative’ federalism where 
government activities became increasingly intermingled. The term ‘cooperative’ has 
a positive connotation, involving words like communication, coordination, 
collaboration and consultation. But it also implies domination by central 
governments. In Canada the period of ‘cooperative federalism’ during the 1950s built 
the Canadian welfare state, with most policy design ideas and funding coming from 
Ottawa. 
 
Many academics criticized this period of cooperative federalism, suggesting that it 
undermined democratic accountability, led to ‘joint decision traps’, constrained the 
role of legislatures, and negatively impacted on the autonomy of sub-state 
governments because central governments, with their superior financial resources, 
came to dominate the process (Breton 1985, Scharpf 1988, Watts 1989, Kincaid 
1990, as referenced in Watts 2006). Instead, a more ‘competitive’ federalism was 
advocated, with a greater emphasis upon autonomy and competition between 
individual governments.  
 
While Cameron and Simeon agreed that intergovernmental relations in Canada were 
cooperative in the 1950s and became competitive in the 1970s, in their view, in the 
21st century intergovernmental relations have moved into a phase they call 
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‘collaborative’. Here, national goals are achieved, not by the central government 
acting alone or by the central government shaping provincial behavior through its 
spending power, but by some or all governments acting collectively (Cameron and 
Simeon 2002, p. 54). In their view, the key characteristic of collaborative 
intergovernmental relations is the notion of equality between governments. A more 
recent concept is ‘deliberative’ federalism. Core elements of the deliberative 
approach involve close collaboration among governments, supplemented by 
agreements with social groups and associations that allow them to directly engage in 
all stages of policy making (Prince 2006).  
 
A final consideration in assessing intergovernmental relations is how it impacts 
governance. Having more than one order of government responsible for a policy area 
increases complexity and has governance consequences. Governance is the process 
whereby societies or organizations make their important decisions, determine who 
they involve, and how they render account (Plumptre 2005). Governance is not 
synonymous with government, and in the case of labour market policy during the 
period of this research, central and sub-state governments in Canada and the United 
Kingdom were not the only actors involved. However, governments play a key role 
in setting [labour market] goals and priorities and putting mechanisms in place to 
coordinate resources to support the pursuit of these goals (Pierre and Peters 2000, p. 
78). 
 
Lazar and McIntosh (1998) assessed intergovernmental regimes using public interest 
as their governance criteria. They selected three variables: policy, democracy and 
federalism. Bakvis and Skogstad (2002) used performance, effectiveness, and 
legitimacy to assess the Canadian federal system. Watts (2006) used democratic 
accountability, effective governance in the development of policies, the preservation 
of diversity through genuine autonomy for the constituent units, and ensuring 
continued cohesion and stability of the political system. 
 
From this review of the literature, a number of themes emerge to assess 
intergovernmental relations in the context of this research. These include the context 
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in which intergovernmental relations operates (factors such as the social, political, 
constitutional and institutional structures in each country); the need to focus on 
actors and their goals, perceptions and attitudes; the significance of power 
relationships; the balance between cooperative, competitive and collaborative 
relationships; and that assessing intergovernmental relations needs to consider 
governance concepts such as performance, effectiveness, legitimacy, and democracy. 
 
None of the frameworks as presented above were considered suitable in themselves 
for this particular thesis. Some assessed intergovernmental relations factors but did 
not focus on governance (Simeon, Rhodes, Scharpf, Trench). The Bakvis, Watts and 
Lazar frameworks, while useful in assessing governance, did not provide enough 
detail, could not be readily translated outside of their Canadian context, and 
neglected important considerations such as the social and political context. The 
analytical framework which follows draws upon this literature and thinking, but has 
been developed to address this particular thesis and the research questions outlined in 
Chapter One. 
 
Framework for Analysis 
 
The purpose of an analytical framework is to identify and classify the elements and 
key features to be explored through a body of research. The analytical framework for 
this thesis is depicted below and described in the pages that follow. 
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1. Central and Sub-state Intergovernmental Actors 
 
Drawing on the actor-centered institutional approach outlined earlier in this chapter, 
administrative actors involved in intergovernmental relations have been placed at the 
heart of the analytical framework. Given the dominance of executive federalism in 
Canada and the United Kingdom, the focus of analysis is on civil servants from the 
line departments of the central and sub-state governments who are involved in labour 
market policy. Key considerations were to identify who these actors were, who they 
represented, and what their interests, expectations, values, experiences, and capacity 
to act were. ‘Interests’ refers to the stake they have in increasing control over their 
organization; ‘expectations’ refers to the behavior expected of them in relation to 
their particular position in the organization; ‘values’ refers to the standards they use 
to interpret their environment and their relationship to it (Rhodes 1981, p. 104). 
‘Experiences’ come from their professional expertise, their historical involvement in 
the sector and with intergovernmental relations, as well as where they have lived in 
their country. ‘Capacity’ takes into account the resources that are available from their 
government to support labour market policy initiatives. 
 
A key factor influencing intergovernmental actors is how many people are involved 
and how they relate to each other. This is determined by the number of sub-state 
units interacting in the intergovernmental policy making process, and whether 
relationships are bilateral or multilateral.  
 
2. Overall Country Context 
 
The actor-centered institutional approach also highlighted how administrative actors 
are influenced by the institutional context in which they work. The primary influence 
is the overall country context of how their society is organized. This includes the 
constitutional context in terms of ultimate authority; the role and importance of 
regional identities and the power base of sub-state governments; the relationship 
between the executive, legislators, and the courts; the impact of parliamentary 
systems; the role of the party system; citizen expectations in terms of nation-wide 
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programming; the number, size, and geographic distribution of sub-state units and 
the degree of asymmetry between units; the financial arrangements between the 
centre and sub-state governments and sub-state government access to own-source tax 
revenue; the ‘rules of the game’ and how these set the limits within which bargaining 
takes place; the operation of the civil service and its overall reporting relationship, 
plus any other relevant circumstantial factors (e.g. coalition or minority government, 
threat of secession). It also includes the norms of the country-wide overarching 
intergovernmental structure or process that has been developed.  
 
3. Policy Domain 
 
The second institutional influence on intergovernmental administrative actors is 
rooted in the specific policy sector and includes the historical development of the 
policy sector over time; the policy levers that have been used by the different orders 
of government to intervene in this area and their legitimacy to act; the constitutional 
division of powers and who has the authority to do what; and the institutions that 
have been put in place to facilitate intergovernmental interaction. These institutions 
can be formal with written agreements and standing committees, or informal and ad 
hoc. Of great significance is the nature of the issues that governments are trying to 
resolve and the complexity of these issues, the forces that are driving resolution 
within an intergovernmental context, and the overall goals that each government has 
in the policy area that is driving a need to exchange resources. 
 
4. External Actors 
 
Issue identification and policy goals often come from the third influence on the 
intergovernmental actors: the views of business, labour unions, educational 
institutions, voluntary and charitable organizations, service delivery agents, industry 
trade groups, professional associations, advocacy groups, practitioners, employees, 
citizens and political parties. Collectively these are identified in this research as 
‘stakeholders’, meaning a party that affects, or can be affected by, government 
actions. Experts (academics, think tanks, the media, and public-opinion polling 
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agencies) can also play a significant role. Sometimes the influence of stakeholders 
and experts is channeled through formal advisory groups: at other times, informal 
networks prevail. Legislators (including legislative committees), other governments 
(including local, aboriginal and supranational governments such as the European 
Union), and other departments within each individual government (especially central 
agencies responsible for the management of their government’s overall 
intergovernmental relations) also play a key influencing role.  
 
The influence that other actors have on intergovernmental relations varies by policy 
area. In terms of labour market policy, business and labour groups must be involved 
to some degree in order for outcomes to meet the needs of workers and employers. 
Advocacy groups generally become more involved when changes touch on benefit 
entitlement or when conditionality is applied. Related to the involvement of non-
governmental actors is the issue of transparency, and whether intergovernmental 
relations take place behind closed doors with little in the way of popular knowledge 
and opportunity for input, or are open to public scrutiny and influence. Citizens and 
the media are generally less engaged in labour market policy during times of 
economic prosperity; this contrasts, for example, with health policy which impacts 
all citizens at all times. 
 
5. Power Relationship Dynamic 
 
The influence that these three overriding factors (and the more detailed variables that 
have been described) bring to bear on intergovernmental administrative actors was 
assessed through a process that has been identified in this research as the ‘power 
relationship dynamic’. This was determined by a combination of the degree of 
interdependence between governments in the specific policy area, the degree of 
hierarchy, and the operation of the intergovernmental machinery. 
 
Interdependence refers to the requirement of one order of government for actions by 
another to ensure that policy is successfully developed and implemented (Wilson, 
McCrea-Logie, and Lazar 2004). As already identified, the key concept is the 
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exchange of resources. Hierarchy relates to issues of equality, the freedom of 
governments to act, initiate policy making and operate without fear of oversight, and 
the degree to which they are sovereign within their own jurisdiction. It also relates to 
the degree to which governments find themselves cast in a reactive role in terms of 
issue identification and resolution. A hierarchical system demonstrates the presence 
of authority, control and compliance, including the use of policy instruments such as 
accountability frameworks, reporting, inspection and audit.  
 
These factors combined with the actual operation of the intergovernmental relations 
machinery determine the power relationship dynamic between governments. They 
also influence the access that stakeholders and others have to the intergovernmental 
process. 
 
6. Character of the Intergovernmental Relationship 
 
Not all activities that governments undertake are interdependent, and in many areas 
governments operating independently are the norm. But when interdependence was 
present, relationships examined through this research were characterized as 
cooperative, collaborative, competitive or coercive. Given executive dominance in 
the two case study countries, the possibility of deliberative relationships was 
eliminated.  
 
Relationships were assessed as cooperative when there was evidence that 
governments were actively working together to coordinate their actions, but central 
governments dominated. A collaborative relationship was non-hierarchical and 
assumed more equality between the partners in terms of joint decision-making and 
approaches. Here, parties sought win-win solutions that provided mutual gains for 
each. Other actors may have been consulted but were not directly involved. A 
competitive pattern of intergovernmental relations was also non-hierarchical, but in 
this case was characterized by a lack of communication, unilateral action, and a 
tolerance for win-lose outcomes. Governments may be trying to ‘one up’ each other 
with respect to the policy process or outcome; it might also imply incompatibility 
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between policy objectives (Harrison 2000, p.13-15). Competition between 
governments is rooted in ideological diversity, difference of interests, and the 
electoral imperative to gain credit and avoid blame (Simeon 1972). A coercive 
relationship was deemed to occur when governments acted as if they were 
independent and failed to coordinate their activities, even when the actions of one 
forced the other to do something without their agreement. This could be a purposeful 
strategy or just forgetfulness or lack of attention.  
 
7. Workability of the Intergovernmental Relations System  
 
From the literature review, various authors identified a number of factors that could 
have been used to assess governance in intergovernmental relations for this research. 
These included outcomes (the extent to which the intergovernmental relations system 
assisted governments to achieve their policy goals [e.g., reducing unemployment]), 
democracy (the extent to which the intergovernmental relations system promoted 
legislative and citizen participation, as well as accountability and transparency),  
respect for federal values (the extent to which the intergovernmental relations system 
respected the division of powers and sub-state autonomy) or  institutionalization (the 
extent to which formal intergovernmental structures and processes had been put in 
place). Although all of these approaches have considerable merit, workability as a 
measure of performance has been chosen as the key criteria for this research. The 
author was particularly interested in understanding the process by which 
governments agreed (or not) on the norms, rules and institutions that shaped the 
manner in which they related to one another and managed their policy differences. 
Not only had this concern been highlighted in Canada through the work of the 
Advisory Panel on Fiscal Imbalance (2006), it addressed the author’s interest in 
determining why intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in Canada 
continued to be so difficult in comparison to other policy areas.  
 
Workability in Intergovernmental Relations  
 
The term workability is commonly used in the context of preparing cement or mortar 
for spreading. It also has a more every day use which suggests that something is 
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workable if it is capable of being dealt with or handled, put into effective operation, 
or is practicable/feasible within the means at hand and prevailing circumstances. 
There is not the notion of a ‘grand design’: instead, workable implies a sense of 
making best use of the available material to function perhaps not ideally, but 
adequately to serve the purpose desired. 
 
Workability as a political concept was initially developed by Stefan Dupré in relation 
to executive federalism in Canada: 
Whether executive federalism works involves not whether governments agree 
or disagree, but whether it provides a forum (or more accurately a set of 
forums) that is conducive, and perceived to be conducive as the case may be, 
to negotiation, consultation or simply an exchange of information (Dupré 
1985, p. 233). 
 
In Dupré’s view, one of the most important factors impacting workability in 
intergovernmental relations is whether there are ‘trust ties’ between senior officials 
of both orders of government. Trust ties between officials occur more readily when 
these officials share professional training and norms and geography, and when 
governments resist the tendency to frequently reorganize. Other factors relating to 
enhanced workability are choosing a narrow enough agenda where issues can be 
limited; seeking agendas that show promise of early success; and routinized and 
regular engagement (Dupré 1985). Shared objectives, a positive history, an ability to 
minimize past grievances, and recognition of mutual interdependence also impact 
workability. These characteristics are often found more easily among policy officials 
in line departments than between officials in central agencies. Relationships between 
central agency officials may be more adversarial as they are often focused on 
protecting jurisdiction (Pollard 1986). 
 
Trust ties between senior officials are felt to be important because these can be 
transmitted to Ministers, whose time in their Ministerial posts can be much more 
fleeting. They are essential for the handling of the inevitable interactions and 
disputes that arise between governments. Ministers may or may not respond 
positively to the recommendations and views of their officials, especially when there 
has been a change of government and a new political party is in charge. As a result, 
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the presence or absence of trust ties between senior government officials does not 
imply that a workable relationship between governments exists. There are many 
other factors that impact this, including the overall context within which the policy 
sector operates, and potentially conflicting goals between governments13. 
Nevertheless, the presence or absence of trust ties between senior officials is an 
important aspect of any intergovernmental relationship. 
 
Dupré’s work built on the analysis of bureaucratic conduct undertaken by Breton and 
Wintrobe (1982). In their view, bureaucratic behaviour is influenced by exchange 
and competition. Since exchange in a bureaucratic context cannot be supported by 
legal institutions, it must instead be supported by trust14. Trust is produced and 
accumulated by individuals. It is not something that either exists or not, but operates 
on a continuum where volume can be increased or reduced continuously depending 
upon intensity (the amount invested in a single relationship) and extent (the number 
of relationships invested in). Trust need not be mutual, and its benefits accumulate 
over time. 
 
A number of other authors have identified the significance of trust ties within an 
intergovernmental context. Agranoff (1994) suggests that trust relationships between 
intergovernmental actors are nurtured by common values and vocabulary, relative 
departmental autonomy to make key intergovernmental decisions, continuous 
contact, the effect of government to government grants, and special interest or 
associational ties. Banting (1998, p. 36) maintains that consistency, openness, and 
predictability are as critical to building trust in politics as they are to our personal 
lives. In their work on linking officials across governments in Canada, Johns, 
O’Reilly, and Inwood found that the world of intergovernmental officials is held 
together largely by friendships and trust, but can also be delineated or limited by ego, 
competition and resentment. Personality, enmity, and culture were also identified as  
                                                 
13 For example, it can be hard for policy officials to have a positive relationship when First Ministers 
are openly criticizing each other in the media. 
14 Individual (A) trusts another individual (B) whenever A is confident in some degree that B will 
undertake what B has promised to. Fukyuama suggests that trust is not based on explicit rules and 
regulations, but on ethical habits and reciprocal moral obligations that are internalized by each of the 




important, as is the need for trust to be earned and the players to be candid, whilst 
able to deliver on their commitments. In their view: 
The resources of the informal realm are relationships. It is a world where 
trust-ties and leadership play key roles, as do their opposites of enmity, 
distrust and lack of leadership (Johns, O’Reilly, and Inwood 2007, p. 37). 
 
In examining processes that central and sub-national governments used to cooperate 
and coordinate their decisions and actions, the OECD developed a contractual 
approach to multilevel governance which also highlighted the importance of trust 
ties. Trust between governments is important because, unlike private contracts, levels 
of government are locked into relationships by their institutional context and have no 
option but to deal with one another. Since relationships must be repeated over time, 
coordination mechanisms must be built to manage a cooperation that is unavoidable 
(OECD 2007). 
 
Workabilitydefined as the degree to which intergovernmental institutions and 
processes provide a forum to foster cooperation and collaboration, accommodate 
conflict, and resolve disputes that impede the effective functioning of the 
systemwas chosen to assess intergovernmental performance in this research. The 
key factor impacting workability is the presence or absence of trust ties between 
senior government officials. As described above, although many authors have 
identified the importance of trust ties to workability in intergovernmental relations, 
there have been no attempts to actually measure it. This thesis wanted to explore 
whether it could be measured, reflecting on the notion that trust operates on a 
continuum, impacted by the intensity of individual relationships, as well as the 
number of relationships. 
 
The degree of workability in the intergovernmental relationship was assessed by 
reflecting on the evidence provided through interviews as to the presence or absence 
of the following relationship factors: shared goals and objectives, routinized and 
regular engagement, stability among the key players, geographic proximity, honesty 
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in terms of information sharing, willingness to engage, capacity to engage and 
autonomy to decide, leadership in the development of processes to work through 
differences, choosing a narrow enough agenda where issues can be delimited, and 
seeking agendas that showed promise of early success. The interview data was also 
combed for evidence of the presence or absence of mutual respect, civility and 
tolerance, predictability, fairness, a positive history, an ability to minimize past 
grievances, recognition of mutual interdependence, and shared professional training 
and norms.  
 
Variants of high, medium, or low workability were assigned to a variety of 
relationships in each of the case study countries. Relationships were considered from 
the point of view of participants at the centre and in the sub-state, as described to the 
author. When there was evidence that a number of the factors outlined above were 
present and positive, an assessment of high workability was assigned. When there 
was evidence that these were significantly lacking, an assessment of low workability 
was selected. Moderate was somewhere in between. Civil servants instinctively 
know the degree to which an overall relationship with their counterparts in the other 
order of government is positive, negative or neutral. Workability was simply a 
labeling device chosen for this thesis to classify intergovernmental relationships.  
 
In addition to the factors identified above, comments from those interviewed with 
regard to the role of personality and an individual actor’s values, expectations, 
interests, and experiences were also examined in terms of how they influenced 




This concludes the preliminary work for this thesis. The research questions, the case 
parameters, how the evidence was collected, what the literature suggests about 
intergovernmental relations, and an analytical organizing framework have all been 
identified. In the pages that follow, this analytical framework will be used as the 
basis for assessing each variable in the intergovernmental relations system in the case 
study countries, and for answering the ‘how’, ‘what’, and ‘why’ research questions. 
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It will also be used to allow for a point by point comparison between the two 
countries. 
 
The chapter started with a quote, from Jean Monnet, about the interplay between 
people and institutions in politics. In Monnet’s view of the development of the 
European community, nothing was possible without men, but nothing was lasting 
without institutions that evolved and developed over time (as quoted in Pierce 1996). 
All three of these dimensions (people, institutions and history) will be examined 
through this research.  
 
The analysis starts in the next chapter by examining the first element of the analytical 
framework: the overall social, constitutional, political and institutional context under 
which labour market intergovernmental administrative actors in Canada and the 
United Kingdom worked during the period of this research. 
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CHAPTER 3: COUNTRY CONTEXT FOR 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS  
 
WHEREAS the Provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have 
expressed their Desire to be federally united into One Dominion under the 
Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with a 
Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom…(BNA Act 
1867, preamble). 
 
The analytical framework outlined in Figure 2 of Chapter Two placed an 
examination of the overall country context as a key consideration in assessing 
intergovernmental relations. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the basic 
characteristics of Canadian and British societyconstitutional, social, political, and 
institutionaland consider how these shape intergovernmental power dynamics and 
intergovernmental institutions and processes. This overall context shapes 
intergovernmental relations within any policy sector.  
 
Canada has the advantage of having an intergovernmental relations system that has 
had over 140 years to develop and mature. The chapter starts with an examination of 
federalism in Canada, including the constitutional arrangements chosen, views of 
social citizenship, and the influence of other institutions (for example second 
chambers, the civil service, and the judiciary) on managing the interface between 
federal and provincial governments. The role of political parties and the impact of 
finances on federal-provincial relations are also considered. This is followed by an 
analysis of the Canadian intergovernmental relations system, including the actors 
involved, the institutional structure and processes that have evolved, and the 
intergovernmental dynamics surrounding the key issues dealt with during the time 
period of this research, 1996 to 2006.  
 
Using the same parameters the constitutional, social, political and institutional 
characteristics of the United Kingdom are assessed, including to what degree these 
changed with devolution. A review of the intergovernmental institutional structure, 
post-devolution, is also provided, as well as an assessment of intergovernmental 
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dynamics. In keeping with the research questions, differences between Canada and 
the UK are highlighted throughout. 
 
The power of the intergovernmental partners, who the intergovernmental actors are, 
who their relationships are with, the key issues over which the interface is managed, 
and the parameters within which intergovernmental relations within a policy sector 
functions are all determined by this overarching social, constitutional, political and 
institutional structure. The chapter concludes with a summary of the key factors 
which shape intergovernmental relations in any policy sector in Canada and the 
United Kingdom, and highlights those factors where the differences between Canada 
and the United Kingdom are most significant. 
 
Federalism in Canada 
 
The Constitutional Context  
 
Canada is a federal system, set up in 1867 through a written constitution (the British 
North America Act) and expanded over the years to eventually incorporate ten 
provinces and three territories. As outlined in Chapter One, the key defining feature 
of a federation is that each order of government is sovereign within their area of 
jurisdiction and neither, acting alone, can change the constitution. The Canadian 
constitution divided powers, giving the federal government trade and commerce, 
foreign relations, defence, taxation, as well as the declaratory power, disallowance, 
and the residual power. Provincial governments were assigned health care, education, 
property and civil rights, and natural resources, and initially only had access to direct 
taxation. Immigration and agriculture were explicitly identified as concurrent; that is 
both orders of government were to govern. When the BNA Act was enacted, in 1867, 
it was expected that each government would work in ‘watertight compartments’; as a 
result there were no provisions for mechanisms of coordination and cooperation 




Over time, provinces became stronger through court interpretations (which gutted the 
federal disallowance and declaratory power), and because most of the things that 
mattered to citizens were within provincial jurisdiction. The activities of both orders 
of government in social, economic, cultural and other fields grew substantially, as 
each responded to its own political or ideological goals and perception of the 
interests of their constituency. Interdependence between governments increased 
significantly, resulting in the need for interministerial conferences and stronger 
relationships between officials within policy sectors (Simeon 1978b). During the 
later part of the 20th century, significant efforts were undertaken to amend the 
Canadian constitution to deal with Quebec nationalism and a variety of other issues, 
but significant dimensions of these attempts ultimately failed. 
 
The Social Context  
 
One of the most salient characteristics of Canada is regional diversitygeographic, 
economic, and cultural. In such a large country distances are great and there is a 
sense of remoteness (particularly in the west), from the capital Ottawa. There are 
considerable wealth disparities between regions which often result in competing 
interests. One of the greatest diversities in Canada comes from Quebec, which, in 
addition to language, has its own history, culture and religion. These differences 
between regions create conflict, which takes place within a federal institutional 
structure that privileges provincial governments and their executives (Premiers, 
Ministers and senior officials) as the protector of regional interests. As Simeon 
identifies: 
The effect of a weak sense of (national) identity, of strong and persisting 
regional identities, and of the divergent French and English identities, is to 
deny the federal government a large measure of authority and legitimacy 
(Simeon 1972, p. 25).  
 
One of the prime mechanisms that the Government of Canada used in its fight for 
legitimacy was the creation of the welfare state. Following the Second World War, 
flush from its success on the battlefield, and with the assistance of ceded provincial 
tax room and a strong bureaucracy, the Government of Canada began to lay out the 
main elements of the Canadian welfare state, undeterred by the fact that most social 
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policy areas were under provincial jurisdiction. Banting (2005a, p. 118-125) suggests 
that, over time, three distinct models of federalism developed in Canada: classical 
federalism and exclusively federal programs (achieved through constitutional 
amendments that allowed the federal government to deliver programs directly); joint-
decision federalism (where formal agreement of both orders of government was 
required); and shared-cost federalism (where the federal government offered 
financial support to social programs operated by provincial governments). The latter 
involved the use of what is called ‘the federal spending power’. Despite being 
challenged politically and judicially the federal government in Canada can spend or 
send its funds to any government, institution or individual it chooses, for any purpose 
it chooses, even in areas of provincial jurisdiction (Advisory Panel 2006). During the 
post-war period, provinces significantly expanded their social assistance, social 
services, health care, and postsecondary education programs with these federal 
transfers. 
 
This ‘nation building’ through the construction of a modern welfare state under 
federal leadership in the 1950s and 1960s (often called the period of ‘cooperative 
federalism’) soon gave way to a period of ‘province building’, a process through 
which provinces (with federal dollars) developed the political sophistication, civil 
service expertise, and financial power to begin challenging the federal government in 
a more assertive way (Simeon 1977). Nowhere was this more evident than in the 
Province of Quebec, when, after the 1960 election of the Jean Lesage government, 
nationalist forces started to grow and protecting provincial jurisdiction and upholding 
the division of powers became an article of faith of all Quebec provincial 
governments15.  
 
Banting (2002) suggests that in all multilevel polities there is a debate over ‘the logic 
of social citizenship and the logic of federalism’. The logic of social citizenship 
suggests policy uniformity and national standards and that citizens have a right to a 
                                                 
15 Dion (1992) maintains that Quebec nationalism is fuelled by three forces: fear (that the French 
language and culture will disappear), confidence (that they can manage their own state effectively) 
and rejection (that the rest of Canada refuses to constitutionally recognize their unique identity and 
need for autonomy). 
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common set of welfare programs and services wherever they live. The logic of 
federalism is regional diversitythat democratically elected governments may 
respond differently to the needs and priorities of their electorates. Although the post-
war welfare state was a centralizing force in Canada, since many policy instruments 
are under provincial control, the logic of federalism is extremely powerful. In 
Banting’s view, there is a spectrum of sharing communities in any federation, and in 
the Canadian context, health care, for example, reflects a “dual sharing community” 
(Banting 2005b, p. 46). The same may not be true in other policy areas (for example 
education), which lack the integrating forces of a Canada Health Act or federal 
financial transfers. 
 
The Institutional Context 
 
One approach to managing interdependence in a multilevel political system is 
through institutions such as legislatures, cabinets, second chambers, the judiciary and 
the civil service.   
 
A fundamental requirement of British parliamentary tradition is party unity and 
discipline. Members of Parliament lend their key loyalty to their party and their 
leader, not to their region; consequently, most federal Members of Parliament have 
only limited relationships with provincial politicians and governments. Canada’s 
Parliament is particularly executive and leader dominated even by Westminster 
standards (Franks 1999, Tanguay 2002). As a result, Members of Parliament 
belonging to the Liberal or Conservative parties16 find it almost impossible for them 
to push for policies favourable to their region if this clashes with the views of the 
party, the Prime Minister, or cabinet. Provincial legislatures are set up in a similar 
fashionthey are party and executive dominated, and have few crossover linkages to 
the national parliament. Since confederation, neither the federal parliament nor 
provincial legislatures have created ongoing committees or processes to consider 
intergovernmental issues. 
 
                                                 
16 Since confederation these are the only two parties that have held power nationally. 
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With respect to the role of cabinets, every Prime Minister since confederation has 
chosen his cabinet to represent all provinces and regions. Although these closed-door 
discussions play a vital role in accommodation and adjustment, the federal cabinet is 
governed by the same norms of unity and solidarity as parliament, and a cabinet 
member’s effectiveness in representing his or her region is governed by seniority and 
individual personalities. While cabinet members may represent regions and have 
regional bases of support, they do not represent provincial governments (Simeon 
1972). 
 
The judiciary is the ‘umpire’ of the Canadian constitution and, in the early days of 
confederation, the Joint Committee of the Privy Council, the highest court of the 
British Empire, made significant decisions that in effect reversed the plain meaning 
of the BNA Act and handed more power over to provinces. Since then Canadian 
governments have been reluctant to use the courts to resolve disputes between 
governments as it generally involves a zero-sum game with high costs that 
undermines parliamentary sovereignty. In Baier’s view (2002) they generally prefer 
the compromises of the bargaining table through executive federalism over litigation.  
 
Although the framers of the Canadian constitution intended that the Canadian Senate 
would represent regional views at the centre, it has never fulfilled this role because it 
lacks legitimacy. Senators are appointed by the Prime Minister and there is no sense 
of provincial equality (Simeon 1972).  Although there have been many attempts to 
change the Canadian Senate, they have ultimately failed.  
 
A final institutional force for accommodation in some countries is the civil service. 
In Canada, the federal government and each province and territory maintains its own 
civil service; as a result, the public bureaucracy does not provide an integrating role 
across regions. The presence of separate civil services, each loyal to its particular 
government, is rooted in the fact that Canada developed from individual British 
colonies, each with its own administration. 
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The Political Context 
 
Transplanted British institutions such as parliaments/legislatures, cabinets, the 
judiciary, the upper house, and the civil service have not provided effective 
mechanisms for intergovernmental adjustment in Canada. In many countries this 
facilitating role is played by political parties. In the early years of confederation, 
regional tensions were effectively contained within a competitive two-party system; 
however, the rise of regional protest parties (especially the Reform Party in the West 
and the Bloc Québécois in Quebec) shattered the ability of national political parties 
to be a locus of accommodation across regions in Canada (Tanguay 2002). With 
respect to accommodation between federal and provincial parties, the two main 
governing parties (the Liberals and Conservatives) are highly distinct and separate at 
the national level, and within each province, and have limited connections. In 
addition, some provincial governments are often led by other political parties. The 
logic of federal-provincial negotiations in Canada means that provincial governments 
must be able to deal with parties of any stripes at the national level and vice versa. In 
fact, the Canadian electorate has had a habit of choosing different parties to hold 
office in federal and provincial governments (Jeffery and Hough 2003).  
 
Rather than an integrating force, the Canadian party system under a ‘first-past-the-
post’ electoral system actually exacerbates regional cleavages. In fact, this was the 
case during the time period of this research, when, after their return to power, in 
1993, the federal Liberals governed from “fortress Ontario” (Tanguay 2002, p. 302), 
first under two Chrétien majorities, then under a Martin minority. Albertans elected 
only two members to this federal Liberal caucus of 177 and 155 (in the 1993 and 
1995 elections respectively). At a provincial level, the Progressive Conservatives 
under Ralph Klein were in power during the entire period of this research. Although 
British Columbia and Ontario were under Liberal leadership during the last half of 
this research, during the late 1990s the Conservatives were in power in Ontario and 
the New Democratic Party in British Columbia. 
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The Role of Finances in Federal-provincial Relations  
 
Finances and how resources are shared are fundamental issues in any multilevel 
polity. In Canada, both orders of government have access to most tax fields, and 
provinces also have access to resource revenues. During the period of this research, 
provinces and local governments raised about 55 percent of total government 
revenues, and accounted for about 68 percent of total government spending 
(excluding intergovernmental transfers) (Lazar 2005, p. 11). 
 
As outlined above, over the years, a complex set of federal-provincial transfers 
developed in Canada, most of which have now become largely unconditional. 
Different provinces gain different amounts from provincial taxes and resource 
revenues; as a result, they have different needs in terms of federal transfers. 
Provinces are considered either ‘have’ or ‘have not’, depending on whether they 
receive federal equalization payments17. Alberta has access to resource revenues, 
and, with Ontario and British Columbia, these three were considered as ‘have’ 
provinces; all others at one time or another throughout the period of this research 
were considered as ‘have not’ jurisdictions. 
 
Financial differences pit one province against another, and were the key divisive 
issue in federal-provincial and interprovincial relations between 1996 and 2006. 
Finances also have a significant impact on the degree of freedom that provinces have 
to develop their own programs, depending upon the degree to which federal transfers 
are conditional. As will be examined in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five, the 
federal government was prepared to enter into labour market, disability, and 
immigration agreements with provinces which tied provincial hands in exchange for 
money. Some provinces were willing to do this while others felt it undermined 
provincial jurisdiction and autonomy. Arguments over funding are at the heart of 
much of the intergovernmental conflict in Canada; indeed, for many provincial 
                                                 
17 Equalization is a federal program, intended to provide funds to ‘have not’ provinces to ensure that 
they have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of public services at reasonably 
comparable levels of taxation. 
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participants interviewed through this research, securing federal money was the only 
reason why governments in Canada needed to connect at all. 
 
This review demonstrates that, unlike the United States or Germany, the mechanisms 
for regions in Canada to influence government decision making at the centre 
(referred to in the literature as intrastate federalism) are particularly weak. In 
Gibbons’ view (1998a), faulty national institutions have actually exacerbated 
regionalism in Canada, especially from the perspective of western Canadians. To 
combat the weaknesses of intrastate federalism, Canada has instead relied on 
interstate federalism, where the constitutional division of powers and the 
intergovernmental relations system protect regional interests.  
 
Intergovernmental Relations in Canada 
 
Intergovernmental Actors and Their Interests 
 
While, initially, intergovernmental relations in Canada were handled by ‘functional’ 
officials in each policy sector, the increasing number of intergovernmental meetings 
needed to build the welfare state, and the desire to bring a coordinated approach led 
to the establishment of specialist intergovernmental agencies within each order of 
government.  
 
In 1963, the Government of Canada established a Provincial Relations Secretariat 
within the Privy Council Office, the hub of public service support to the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet and its decision-making structures. This secretariat has played a 
key role in all aspects of federal-provincial relations and the evolution of the 
federation and Canadian unity, providing analysis, advice, liaison, and strategic 
planning. With about 300 staff reporting to the Minister of Intergovernmental 
Relations, the unit monitors policy files as well as individual provinces, and 
coordinates the efforts of the Government of Canada both within federal departments 
and with provincial governments. In Trench’s view, the Government of Canada 
requires specialists outside of line departments primarily because of the threat of 
Quebec separation, but also because measures intended to have a particular effect in 
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one province or region may have a different effect elsewhere (Trench 2003b, p. 25). 
Officials see their role more broadly, as protecting federal interests (interview with 
federal official November 6, 2006). 
 
Over time, all provinces established specialized intergovernmental units at the centre, 
including Alberta in 1972. The key goal of the Canadian Intergovernmental 
Relations Unit within International and Intergovernmental Affairs (IIR) is to 
“promote the interests of and to secure benefits for Alberta as an equal partner in a 
strengthened unified Canada” (IIR 2006, p. 9). In Gibbons’ view, Alberta’s 
intergovernmental relations have been driven by a desire to ensure a system of rules 
and institutionalized consultation within the federation because provincial elites feel 
that the province exercises little influence over federal institutions. Alberta 
opposition to special status for Quebec has deep roots, and Gibbons (1998b, 2006) 
suggests that it is embedded in the DNA of the region’s political culture. 
 
Alberta provincial officials interviewed through this research (September 28 and 
October 4, 2006) highlighted what they perceived as a consistent and ‘principled’ 
approach by their province to intergovernmental relations (in comparison to other 
provinces), rooted in a sense of grievance against the federal government when the 
province entered the federation without being given control over natural resources18. 
Unlike the Province of Ontario, which often cannot distinguish between its interests 
and those of the federal government, and Quebec which often absents itself from 
multilateral discussions because it lacks commitment to the federation, Alberta 
officials viewed the province as a strong player in intergovernmental relations, with a 
deep commitment to Canadian nation-building as long as Alberta interests were 
supported. Like Quebec, these interests focus on a strong defence of the 
constitutional division of powers. Over the past 20 to 30 years, these interests have 
been protected by a consistent nucleus of 15 to 20 civil servants in International and 
Intergovernmental Relations. These individuals participate directly in all federal-
provincial meetings, giving them credibility and connectedness, both within the 
                                                 
18 Alberta entered the Canadian federation in 1905 but did not gain control over natural resource 
revenues until the 1930s. 
 77
Alberta bureaucracy and with Alberta politicians. Connections between the Alberta 
bureaucracy and politicians were facilitated during the period of this research by the 
Alberta political system, characterized by longstanding governments and one-party 
domination19. 
 
Despite these dedicated intergovernmental agencies at both the federal and provincial 
level, much of what happens in intergovernmental relations in Canada is carried out 
by line departments, many of whom have developed their own intergovernmental 
capacity and expertise. Unlike officials who work in intergovernmental agencies who 
tend to be ‘process’ specialists, intergovernmental specialists in line departments 
have substantial expertise in the intergovernmental aspects of one policy field. This 
can lead to friction between the intergovernmental affairs agency and the line 
department. An Alberta official described the difference this way: “When we get IIR 
folks involved in something, it gets into a pissing contest. For them it’s a game; for 
program folks it’s about good programs” (interview November 8, 2006). 
 
Civil servants in Canada’s federal and provincial governments share similar values to 
those of civil servants in the UK, rooted in the British influence that has informed 
virtually every major development in the rise of the Canadian civil service (Savoie 
2003). But irrespective of whether one works for a federal or provincial government, 
in a central agency or line department, all civil servants in Canada align themselves 
with the interests of their government. Although there are common professional 
norms, Donald Smiley believes that this ‘new class’ of federal-provincial 
professional has only one important role- “to protect and extend the powers of the 
jurisdiction for which he works” (as reported in Simeon 1978a, p. 8). In Hunter’s 
view, “the system forces officials to defend their rival sources of power rather than 
cooperate for the fulfillment of a grand national purpose” (Hunter 1993, p. 64).  
 
                                                 
19 The Progressive Conservatives have ruled the provincial legislature since 1971. 
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Intergovernmental Institutional Structures 
 
Hundreds of meetings each year, millions of dollars worth of agreements 
negotiated monthly, countless informal contacts, and a varied and complex 
intergovernmental machinery this is the nature of intergovernmental 
administrative relations in Canada to-day (Johns, O’Reilly, & Inwood 2007, 
p. 22). 
 
First Ministers’ meetings are at the top of this intergovernmental structure, but were 
rarely called during the period of this research. Meetings between Premiers are more 
institutionalized and have been held annually since 1960. In 2003 Premiers created 
the Council of the Federation (C of F), to herald a “new era in collaborative 
intergovernmental relations…as Premiers  believe it is important for provinces and 
territories to play a leadership role in revitalizing the Canadian federation and 
building a more constructive and cooperative federal system” (C of F 2007).  
 
Of most significance to this research were meetings between sectoral Ministers, 
Deputy Ministers, and senior officials. In 2005, for example, there were 37 meetings 
involving federal-provincial Ministers (e.g. health, social services, transportation, 
agriculture, etc.) and 34 involving Deputy Ministers or senior officials. Some 
maintain that this is where the real work of the federation gets done; others just see it 
as travel junkets and ‘busy work’ for civil servants (interview with provincial official 
September 28, 2006). Each sector conference is usually supported by a secretariat 
funded by both orders of government and meetings are often co-chaired. Provinces 
usually hold interprovincial meetings to coordinate their positions before meeting 
with their federal counterparts, and many multilateral meetings conclude with the 
issuance of a joint press release. 
 
Much of the business of governing in Canada is done through intergovernmental 
agreements, many of which involve the transfer of money. Like intergovernmental 
meetings, these are negotiations between political elites with almost no legislative or 
citizen oversight. In 2001, Poirier counted over 1,000 federal-provincial agreements 
in force in Canada; in 2005, in Alberta alone there were over 150 agreements. In her 
view, agreements play five major functions: substantive policy coordination, 
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procedural cooperation, para-constitutional engineering, regulation by contract and 
quasi-legislation, or soft law. Most are generally considered to be of a political 
nature, and therefore non-justiciable. They can however, significantly impact the 
behavior of governments as they generally try to comply with their commitments 
(Poirier 2001). 
 
A key intergovernmental agreement relating to social policy is the Social Union 
Framework Agreement (SUFA), negotiated in 1999 between the Prime Minister and 
all Premiers (except Quebec’s). SUFA was initiated by provinces as an attempt to 
solidify agreement on the rules of the game and circumscribe the federal spending 
power. The five commitments under SUFA focus on procedural cooperation between 
governments20. Despite the hope that this might have actually changed 
intergovernmental behavior in Canada, it appears to have had little impact. Only one 
person interviewed through this research raised SUFA: “The ink wasn’t even dry on 
that before all those agreements and commitments to work together were blown out 
of the window” (interview with provincial official September 26, 2006). Likewise, 




During the ten-year period of this research there were many high-level 
intergovernmental issues that caused stress and friction between governments in 
Canada. These included the Kyoto Protocol, health care, the failure of SUFA, and 
international terrorism. But overwhelmingly the issue that energized all relationships 
was what came to be known as the ‘fiscal imbalance’. 
 
When the Chrétien Liberals came to power, Canada was mired in deficits and debts, 
and the Government of Canada, under the leadership of Finance Minister Martin, 
vowed to put its fiscal house in order. This included ‘shifting the spending power 
                                                 
20 This included: a set of principles that were felt to be fundamental to Canada's social union; 
removing barriers to mobility; informing Canadians through improved public accountability and 
public reporting; working in partnership for Canadians through joint planning and collaboration, 
reciprocal notice, consultation and equitable treatment; controls over the federal spending power; and 
processes of dispute avoidance and resolution.  
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into reverse’ by cutting provincial program transfers for health and social programs. 
This occurred at the same time as provincial costs, especially for health care, were 
spiraling out of control21. 
 
This unilateral federal action severely undermined provincial trust in the Government 
of Canada. When, five years later, the federal government was prepared to reinvest in 
social programming, provinces scrambled to get a piece of federal funding and a 
number of federal-provincial accords were entered into around key federal priorities 
such as health care and early childhood education. However, the preferred federal 
approach was to provide cash transfers directly to individuals or institutions. The 
Provincial-territorial Advisory Panel on the Fiscal Imbalance noted that “the federal 
spending power has been the source of nagging frustration and discontent that is at 
the heart of unproductive intergovernmental conflict” (2006). Reflecting on 
intergovernmental behavior over the period of this research, a former provincial civil 
servant and longstanding participant in intergovernmental relations in Canada 
commented: 
During the National Energy Program days and the constitutional wars you 
could always talk to other provinces and the federal government, there was 
an ‘esprit de corps’…this was different, in effect you had lost trust ties 
between jurisdictions as people refused to engage with each other…the Prime 
Minister was dismissive of the provinces and Premiers were weak…there was 
strain, pettiness, hostility and tension on a number of fronts at the highest 
levels and this trickled down to the sector level (interview May 23, 2007). 
 
Cameron and Simeon (2002) attribute conflict between governments in Canada to 
differences in interests. In their view, the more assertive provinces such as Quebec, 
Alberta, British Columbia, and Ontario seek to wrest the initiative from the 
Government of Canada, limit the federal government’s ability to ‘intrude’ on their 
programs and priorities, and increase their autonomy in areas of shared jurisdiction. 
For the smaller, poorer provinces, autonomy is less important than in ensuring the 
continued flow of federal dollars. The Government of Canada wants to retain 
influence and visibility, particularly in an era of budget surpluses. During the period 
                                                 
21 Alain Noël (2001, p.11) calculated that between 1992-93 and 1998-99, cash social transfers to the 
provinces decreased by 32 percent, while provincial expenditures for social services, education and 
health increased by 12 percent. 
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covered by this research all governments in Canada focused on guarding their turf, 
and used every opportunity available to win credit and avoid blame.  
 
Intergovernmental relations in Canada are ubiquitous, complex, and often 
confrontational. An elaborate structure has developed over the past 140 years, 
involving countless civil servants from both orders of government and many 
meetings between First Ministers, Ministers, and senior civil servants on both a 
bilateral and multilateral basis. Out of this process have come a multitude of 
agreements, many of them involving conditional funding transfers from the 
Government of Canada to individual provinces and territories. Despite this elaborate 
structure, when compared to other federations, Canada’s system of 
intergovernmental relations is relatively informal and under-institutionalized. 
Decision rules are consensus based, there are few mechanisms to resolve disputes, 
accountability provisions are ambiguous, meeting schedules are uncertain, 
intergovernmental secretariats are feeble, and there are unclear and overlapping 
structures (interview with academic April 12, 2007). Despite many attempts, no 
constitutional or legislative basis for intergovernmental relations in Canada has been 
established, and SUFA’s attempt to establish a politically-based ‘rules based regime’ 
(as Canada often seeks in international negotiations) was ultimately considered a 
failure. 
 
Devolution in the United Kingdom 
 
A conflicted overall intergovernmental environment as has been described in Canada 
certainly did not play out during the early days of devolution in the United Kingdom. 
The analysis which follows illustrates the significant differences between the two 
countries. 
 
Constitutional Context and Devolution 
 
Unlike Canada, where initially three separate colonies came together to form a single 
country, devolution in the UK occurred within the context of a well established state. 
Although significant, this new form of shared governance did not remake the social, 
 82
political, constitutional and institutional framework that had developed over a period 
of more than 500 years. As Jeffery and Wincott (2006, p. 3) observed:  
Devolution, in fact, was a deceptively simple thing to do…as it did little more 
than to democratize the distinctive administrative arrangements that had 
emerged over the centuries for delivering UK policies outside the core state 
territory of England in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.  
 
In Scotland, these distinct ‘administrative arrangements’ had been governed by the 
Scottish Office, which over time assumed responsibility for education, the courts, the 
health system, social services, and related areas (Gamble 2006). However, as an 
institution of the British state and a department of the British Government, the 
Scottish Office had no legislative autonomy and was unable to initiate distinctive 
policies (McEwen 2002, p. 72). 
 
The intention of devolution was to overcome these limitations by establishing sub-
state parliaments and assemblies to provide oversight of some public policies in 
those parts of the UK that desired more autonomy. It was viewed as a practical way 
forward to both maintain and strengthen the union. When Labour assumed office, in 
1997, they quickly held referenda on devolution in Wales and Scotland. With the 
required majority, Westminster legislation was passed in 1998 to create the new 
political institutions, and the first territorial elections were held, in 1999 (Gamble 
2006).  
 
The Scotland Act (1998) put in place a ‘retaining’ model, spelling out what the 
Scottish Parliament could not do, with the implication that it could do everything not 
explicitly reserved to Westminster22. The Scottish Parliament was given 
responsibilities that are similar to those of Canadian provinces: education and 
training, health, local government, police, prisons, social work, agriculture, 
environment and justice. These are carried out by the Scottish Executive, Scotland’s 
regional government23. Matters such as foreign affairs (including matters related to 
                                                 
22 Unlike Canada’s constitution, the Scotland Act can be changed relatively easily: by 2004 it had 
been amended eight times and there were ten orders to transfer more functions to Scotland. 
23 In 2007, the Scottish Executive was renamed the Scottish Government. 
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the European Union), defense, national security, immigration, employment 
legislation, and social security were reserved to Westminster. 
 
Even with the division of powers in the Scotland Act, the Scottish Parliament is 
subordinate because the UK Parliament is the highest law-making body in the UK. It 
is not autonomous within its area of sovereignty, as provinces are in the Canadian 
federal system, and could, in theory, be abolished by the UK Parliament. Bogdanor 
suggests that since devolution was endorsed by popular referenda, the Scotland Act 
did distribute, if not constitutional power, then certainly effective political power, 
between the two parliaments. He believes that it would be politically impossible, 
except under the most extreme circumstances, for the Westminster Parliament to 
overrule the Scottish legislature on devolved issues (Bogdanor 1999, p. 187-188). 
 
Compared to Canada’s powerful provinces, the devolved administrations in the UK 
are weak, with the UK Government holding most of the important cards. When 
relationships between governments in Canada occur, the federal government is 
facing ten provinces with relatively equal jurisdictional competence, whereas in the 
United Kingdom there are only three small devolved administrations. Since the UK 
Government must continue to act as both central and the largest regional government 
(for England), the demarcation between devolved and reserved issues is often 
unclear, allowing the centre to exert significant influence over policy (even in areas 
of devolved competence) as they must make these governance choices for England.  
 
Despite the listing of reserved items in the Scotland Act, in Cornes’ view (1999), 
devolution established mainly shared rather than divided competencies. Not only 
were many legislative powers devolved down to Scotland (e.g., agriculture, industry, 
economic development and training) they have also been passed upwards to the 
European Union in successive treaties. The UK Government’s fiscal dominance and 
executive powers, and the constraints of the Barnett funding formula point to shared, 
not divided competencies. Jeffery (2007) also highlights the significance of the three-
level game where, as a result of European integration, all central governments in the 
European Union get to exercise regional decision making power. Post-devolution, 
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the process of managing European issues in the UK has been done by relying on 
‘goodwill’ rather than law. This contrasts with Canada, where there is no North 
American equivalent to the pooled sovereignty of the European Union. Since the 
negotiation of the Canada-US free trade agreement, in 1989, governments in Canada 
have institutionalized the process by which provinces provide input into international 
trade negotiations (Skogstad 2008). 
 
Devolution has left the UK with a particularly ‘lopsided’ state, where the devolved 
territories comprising approximately 15 percent of the population have regional 
parliaments and assemblies, while England is still ruled directly by Westminster. In 
Hazell’s view (2006, p. 239), the English seemed relaxed with this and do not seem 
to want devolution for themselves24: “England is now the most centralized of all the 
large countries in Western Europe. Famously insular as well as pragmatic, the 
English remain unaware of that”. 
 
Compared to most federal political systems, the United Kingdom has very few 
devolved units of government. For example, Spain has 17 autonomous communities, 
Australia has six states and two territories; Canada has ten provinces and three 
territories. Because of different histories and differences in the degree of autonomy 
desired, devolution in the UK is highly asymmetrical, with Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland having different degrees of freedom to act (for example, Scotland 
has primary legislative responsibility while Wales has secondary responsibility25), as 
well as different areas of competence (for example, social security is devolved in 
Northern Ireland). Watts (2006, p. 222) characterizes devolution in the UK as 
‘double asymmetry’: not only are the devolved administrations asymmetrical in 
terms of their powers, but there is an additional asymmetry in the fact that devolution 
only applies to 15 percent of the population, with the other 85 percent living in 
England with no devolved governments. 
 
                                                 
24 In 2004, a referendum on devolution in the North East Region of England was defeated by 78 
percent of those voting. 
25 Even with the changes made to the Government of Wales Act in 2006, Welsh devolution is weaker 
than the Scottish model.  
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The fact that there are so few units and that devolution is so asymmetrical has a 
significant impact on intergovernmental relations, as it means that the different sub-
state governments have different responsibilities, making relations between the 
centre and the regions primarily bilateral (involving the centre and just one of the 
devolved administrations), as opposed to multilateral (involving all the devolved 
administrations and the UK Government). Although provinces in Canada may have 
different interests and some are more powerful than others, they share similar 
responsibilities and freedom to act, making information sharing and interprovincial 
coalition-building an important component of intergovernmental relations. A key 
consideration of the Government of Canada whenever it enters into relationships 
with one or several provincial governments is equity. 
 
Despite these constitutional limitations in the UK, these are early days of devolution, 
and, over time, Canadian provinces gained considerable power. When Agranoff 
assessed the political strength of a number of autonomous sub-states he used four 
dimensions: the power base of the autonomee, the vehicles of autonomee power, the 
channels of intergovernmental access, and a weighed assessment of the autonomee’s 
capacity to change the game at the national level. In Scotland’s case he viewed the 
fact of the Scottish Parliament as a new and important locus of power, and the fact 
that many Scots view themselves as a nation with an inherent right to self 
determination as powerful counterweights to the constraints in the autonomy act 
(Agranoff 2004, p. 54). Indeed, when asked whether Government Ministers in the 
Scottish Executive should always stand up for what they think is best for Scotland 
(even if it means having serious rows with the UK Government at Westminster), 
over 84 percent of Scots agreed (Scottish Election Survey 2007). 
 
The Social Context 
 
The concentration of state sovereignty in Westminster during the post-war years 
facilitated the development of a centralized welfare state where political decisions 
were made in Westminster and social benefits were distributed relatively evenly 
across the British state. Since the Scottish and Welsh offices were involved in 
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implementing these policies and there were different laws and spending levels, this 
did not mean that there was uniformity across the UK (Jeffery 2007). There were, 
however, similar public expectations, with the social citizenship rights of the British 
welfare state acting as a strong integrating force and a reason for citizen loyalty to 
the sense of being ‘British’ (McEwen 2002).  
 
During the period of time the author lived in Scotland, undertaking this research, 
from time to time there were citizen and advocacy group complaints reported in the 
media about the unfairness of what was perceived, post-devolution, to be more 
generous public policies in Scotland than in England (for example, free personal care 
for the elderly or the abolition of tuition fees for Scottish university students). These 
illustrate strongly felt views about the need for common social citizenship rights and 
common programs throughout the United Kingdom. 
 
On the other hand, the express purpose of devolution was to allow for these 
differences in those areas where the Scottish Parliament had been granted 
competence. Post-devolution these differences have been both celebrated and 
bemoaned, as both the Scots and the English come to realize that geography now 
matters more than it ever did before devolution. Canadians have lived with this kind 
of non-standardization of social programs and services across the country for over 
140 years. 
 
The Institutional Context 
 
Like in Canada, the Westminster parliamentary system provides little legislative 
scrutiny of intergovernmental relations by any of the UK parliaments or assemblies. 
In contrast to UK-European Union relations (where the Scottish Parliament 
established a European and External Relations committee), no legislative committees 
focusing on the Scotland-UK Government relationship have been established. When 
disputes with a territorial aspect arose, during the period of this research, they were 
treated almost as intragovernmental rather than intergovernmental. Hazell and Paun 
(2006, p. 13) argue that not only were confidentiality and access to information a 
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problem for legislatures, the greater problem was the informality and fragmentation 
of the system. 
 
Unlike Canada, the UK does have institutions specifically focused on territorial 
issues, and these have been retained, post-devolution. The House of Commons 
Scottish Affairs committee continues to examine substantive issues concerning 
Scotland. The Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland26 have 
continued and these members of the UK Cabinet are expected to play a role in 
intergovernmental relations and ensure that there are no breaches to the devolution 
settlement and neither party oversteps its boundaries (interview with Whitehall 
official December 8, 2005). With access to the UK decision-making process, the 
Secretary of State’s primary role is to represent territorial interests on matters 
reserved to the UK Government and ensure that it does not legislate in areas which 
are devolved.  These Ministers and their staff in the Scotland and Wales offices are 
also expected to encourage close working relations between UK departments and the 
devolved administrations, and act as intermediaries when necessary.  
 
Under the Scotland Act, the courts have the right to strike down Scottish legislation, 
and the ultimate court of appeal on these matters is the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council. Although either level of government can refer legislation for a ruling, 
since devolution there have been no referrals to the courts, with the UK Government 
preferring [as Canada does] to rely on political or administrative mechanisms 
(Keating 2005, p. 122). Post-devolution, there have been issues where it was more 
convenient for legislation on devolved matters to be passed by the UK Government, 
with the consent of the Scottish Parliament. As this practice became more common it 
also became more controversial, with critics suggesting that it undermined the 
Scottish Parliament’s ability to rule. In Keating’s view (2005, p. 113), this kind of 
easy accommodation “reflected a general practice in intergovernmental relations in 
the UK of not testing the division of powers legally, but going instead for a political 
compromise or accommodation”.  
 
                                                 
26 These responsibilities are carried out in conjunction with other portfolios. 
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As in Canada, the second chamber in the UK has had no effective role in 
intergovernmental accommodation. It is interesting, however, that unlike Canada, the 
idea of the Lords representing sub-state governments has not really been 
considered27. Although overall reform of the House of Lords is still in progress, there 
have been no parallel conversation to Canada, where Senate reform is motivated 
primarily by regional concerns. 
 
A significant institution that influences intergovernmental relations in the UK, post-
devolution, is the civil service. The decision to retain a unified civil service 
throughout Great Britain28, even with the establishment of the devolved 
administrations, was an explicit part of the Blair government’s devolution policy. 
Parry (2004a, p. 52) characterizes the UK model as one of “working within a 
different accountability but in the same service”. Although the Civil Service Code 
was changed to clarify that devolved officials are responsible to devolved Ministers, 
they still operate within a common personnel policy and code of behavior. In Parry’s 
view and that of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (2002), a 
unified civil service has been a major force for cohesion in intergovernmental 
relations in the UK post-devolution. This stands in significant contrast to Canada, 
where each government maintains its own civil service, and protecting jurisdiction is 
an expectation of civil servants across all governments.  
 
The Political Context 
 
A key mechanism for intergovernmental accommodation in the UK during the period 
of this research was the political party system, as until 2007 Labour controlled both 
the Westminster and Scottish Parliaments. 
 
Politicians may have incentives to behave in certain ways to enhance their power, but 
generally they do so within political organizations that have their own histories, 
                                                 
27 Jim Wallace, the former leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, suggested a partial 
‘federalization’ of the upper chamber, appointing the First Minister and other party leaders from the 
devolved administrations. 
28 Northern Ireland has a separate civil service.  
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ideological traditions, formal rules, standard operating procedures, and significant 
interpersonal relationships (Hopkin and Bradbury 2006, p. 136). For most of the 
post-1945 period Labour has been the dominant party in Scotland and Wales, and in 
1997 it also broke through in England. Devolution was the realization of an 
important objective of Labour’s political manifesto: indeed, ‘making devolution 
work’ trumped and guided almost all aspects of centre and regional relationships 
within the Labour Party during the period of this research29. 
 
Within the Labour Party the Scottish and Welsh parties operate as regional units of 
the British party; there is no separate structure or membership. Many decisions are 
under control of the centre (for example, candidate selection, leadership selection, 
political campaigns, and programs and policies in both Scotland and Wales). Post-
devolution, Labour took pains to adapt to a revised structure of power wherein the 
autonomy of sub-state governments to make their own policies in areas under their 
control was respected while the overall unity of the party was maintained (Hopkin 
and Bradbury 2006, p. 149). 
 
Personal relationships, including Gordon Brown’s30 being Scottish, were also 
important to intergovernmental relations following devolution. Jim Wallace (2006), 
the former leader of the Scottish Liberal Democrats, highlighted that personal 
relationships were invaluable in oiling relationships between the two administrations. 
Hazell and Paun (2006, p. 16) suggest that, under Labour domination, all participants 
had a shared interest in papering over serious differences of opinion. The main way 
that this was accomplished was through regular contacts between Labour politicians, 
who cleared matters through bilateral phone calls or meetings in various party 
contexts (Keating 2005, p. 126). 
 
An example of congruence of approach between Labour at the centre and in Scotland 
related to the adequacy of Scottish powers as outlined in the Scotland Act. Despite 
media and other political party calls for more powers or even independence, Labour 
                                                 
29 Prior to 1997, the Liberal Democrats were also committed to devolution. Although initially 
opposed, the Conservative Party has now accepted it as a fact of life. 
30 Gordon Brown was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1997. He became Prime Minister in 2007. 
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First Minister McConnell (2006) heralded the achievements of home rule, and the 
need to focus on making the fullest use of the powers the Scottish Parliament already 
had before demanding more. Labour politicians believed that accommodation of 
differences would always be possible as long as they remained in charge at both the 
centre and in the Scottish Executive. This changed in 2007, when the Scottish 
National Party (SNP) for the first time won a Scottish national election, effectively 
eliminating the party system as a means of intergovernmental accommodation. In her 
assessment McEwen (2007, p. 600) predicts that “the Canadian experience suggests 
we might also expect a rockier road in Scottish-UK intergovernmental relations”. 
 
The Role of Finances in Intergovernmental Relations  
 
Although the Scottish Parliament has access to some limited tax-raising authority, 
during the period of this research most funding was provided by the centre through a 
block grant guided by an arrangement called the Barnett formula. This predates 
devolution and largely removes the need to negotiate the overall allocation between 
the centre and the devolved administrations. Once allocated, the distribution of 
public expenditure between the services under the control of the devolved 
administrations is up to each of the devolved administrations to determine. Scottish 
Executive activities relating to labour market programs and services are part of this 
unconditional block. Historically, UK spending in Scotland has been higher than in 
England; as well, post-devolution, overall funding to Scotland has increased (ESRC 
2006).  
 
These financial arrangements in the UK have two direct impacts on 
intergovernmental relations. First, unlike Canada, there were no clashes between UK 
governments about the adequacy of fiscal transfers. Second, given that all funding 
was provided on a block basis, the Scottish Executive was able to control and 
manage its funds without having to account to or report in a detailed fashion to the 
UK Government. Although there are accounting processes for European Union 
funding, this does not impact relationships between governments within the United 
Kingdom. The fact that there were no major clashes over financial transfers, as there 
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were in Canada, significantly decreased intergovernmental tension and conflict. With 
respect to labour market policy, Scottish Executive budget increases enhanced not 
only the Scottish Executive’s motivation for collaborative working across orders of 
government, but also their capacity, credibility, and legitimacy. 
 
Intergovernmental Relations in the United Kingdom 
 
Given this overall context in the UK, the intergovernmental relations system set up 
post-devolution was very different from what has developed over time in Canada. 
Certainly there were no grand plans for intergovernmental relations in advance of the 
devolution settlement and much of the machinery was developed as a pragmatic 
response, as necessary (McEwen 2003, p. 12). Parry suggests that two working styles 
could have been chosenthe interdepartmental or the diplomatic modelwith the 
interdepartmental model the preferred choice with mechanisms for conflict resolution 
should the intergovernmental process turn diplomatic, especially if nationalist parties 
assumed office (Parry 2004a). This interdepartmental model focused around an 
overarching Memorandum of Understanding, supplemented by devolution guidance 
notes for civil servants, written concordats and service level agreements at the 
departmental and policy level, and an overriding expectation that informal relations 
between officials would dominate. 
 
Intergovernmental Actors and Their Interests 
 
Unlike Canada, during the period of this research there were almost no officials in 
any part of the UK whose job was dedicated to intergovernmental relations. At the 
centre, devolution was under the responsibility of the Department of Constitutional 
Affairs, whose various responsibilities included running the courts, the justice 
system, human rights, elections, modernizing the constitution, as well as devolution. 
From a UK Government perspective, most of the work in managing 
intergovernmental relations fell to officials in the Scotland and Wales offices. At the 
devolved level in 2003, the Scottish Executive established a new UK Relations Unit 
within the office of the Permanent Secretary to ensure that ongoing connections and 
networks between the UK Government and Scottish Executive officials at the 
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functional level were being maintained. This unit was set up as the First Minister felt 
that it was important to ramp up the devolution effort and make sure it was top of 
mind and coordinated across the Scottish Executive (interview with SE official 
March 4, 2005). Most contacts were expected to be handled between departmental 
officials. Although in the early days of devolution many Whitehall departments had 
key contacts handling devolution, by 2005 (when these interviews were undertaken), 
this liaison role had been largely disbanded (interview with Whitehall official April 
11, 2005). 
 
Even though civil servants in the devolved administrations now work for different 
political masters, they are still part of the Home Civil Service. As a result, their 
interests continue to be significantly alignedthey share common values, commonly 
understood rules of the game, and a common culture. In Rhodes’ view (1988) the 
‘rules’ governing intergovernmental relationships in the UK31 include pragmatism, 
consensus, fairness, accommodation, secrecy, depoliticization, summit diplomacy, 
and trust. A local government official interviewed through this research characterized 
the UK civil service as a hierarchical, centralizing, ‘one size fits all’ organization, 
with an identifiable chain of command with Treasury at the top (interview April 27, 
2005). An advocate for persons with disabilities used the word ‘understated’ to 
describe the UK civil service culture: 
They need to de-problematize everything…it only becomes a problem if they 
admit it. Civil servants have to hold the line, say that all is well or else the 
Minister will be upset. They don’t want to rock the boat as their role is to 
keep it steadytherefore if it starts rocking this can be seen by Ministers as 
due to the ineptitude of officials, and it would be up to officials to sort it out. 
For them, to rock the boat would therefore be tantamount to them shooting 
themselves in the foot (interview December 8, 2005). 
 
With common political direction and a common understanding of the role of a civil 
servant, during the early days of devolution covered by this research, there was no 
evidence of the type of jurisdictional power seeking that has been described in 
Canada. 
                                                 
31 Although these rules relate to relationships between the centre and local authorities, there is no 
reason to believe that these values would be any different with a regional layer of government.  
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Intergovernmental Institutional Structures 
 
A non-statutory, multilateral Memorandum of Understanding outlining relations 
between the UK Government and the devolved administrations, post-devolution, was 
developed in 2001 with the agreement of all parties. Although tabled with the 
European and External Relations committee of the Scottish Parliament, they did not 
discuss the substance of any of the issues raised (interview with Scottish Executive 
official November 24, 2005), reconfirming that, like in Canada, the executive 
dominates intergovernmental relations in the UK. 
 
This memorandum details principles relating to communication, consultation, 
cooperation, exchange of information, confidentiality, and correspondence, as well as 
the establishment of a key institution to manage the relationshipthe Joint 
Ministerial Committee (JMC). The JMC is intended to take stock of relations, 
generally (including the interface between devolved and reserved issues), and resolve 
disputes, meeting at the ‘First Minister’ level or in ‘functional’ format as necessary. 
However, the expectation was that the bulk of intergovernmental relations would 
occur at the level of officials (McEwen 2003). Devolution guidance notes were 
developed for civil servants, outlining that the principal channel of communication 
between administrations was expected to be through bilateral links between relevant 
departments of each administration, at officials or Ministerial level. Working 
practices between individual departments of the administrations were set out in 
concordats, internal guidance notes, and working level documents32. Although quite 
elaborate and detailed in some cases, these gave the last word to central government 
(Keating 2005, p. 122). 
 
The overall message across all governments in the UK during the period of this 
research was that there should be ongoing informal communications and ‘no 
surprises’. This was to occur through informal sharing of policy work in progress 
between Whitehall officials in line departments and the devolved administrations, 
                                                 
32 In November 2007, there were 22 written concordats posted on the Scottish Government website. 
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ongoing dialogue on issues, mechanisms to identify cross impacts between devolved 
and reserved issues, and internal processes to resolve any concerns. 
 
The Joint Ministerial Committee involving First Ministers has not met since October 
2002 and, according to a UK official at the centre interviewed through this research, 
there were no plans or interest on the part of any of the administrations to convene 
one (interview April 11, 2005). Multilateral JMC meetings were felt to be a poor use 
of Ministers’ time; with each devolved administration having different interests, an 
agenda was sparse. The only Joint Ministerial Committee held related to this research 
was a series of meetings, in 2000 and 2002, on poverty. Despite a commitment to 
action by all governments and a list of follow up activities from the 2002 meeting, no 
further meetings were held.  
 
Although Ministers had met for a while on health and the knowledge economy, 
Woods commented that “JMCs on health have been little more than friendly 
discussions among political allies” (Woods 2004, p. 336). At the functional level, 
only the Joint Ministerial Committee for Europe met regularly33 to act as the venue 
for negotiations and consultations on the UK line in EU negotiations. The most 
common practice was bilateral, ad hoc Ministers’ meetings on problematic policy 
issues as needed. There were also regular conversations and meetings between 
Scotland’s First Minister and the Secretary of State for Scotland to ensure open and 
meaningful dialogue (interview with Whitehall official December 8, 2005). 
 
In conclusion, processes to manage government to government relationships in the 
UK during the period of this research were often incidental, ad hoc, and mostly 
invisible. The formal intergovernmental arrangements that had been developed, post-
devolution, were not widely used in practice, and the informal arrangements between 
civil servants and politicians in place pre-devolution continued to dominate. In 
comparison to Canada, one could even question whether relationships between the 
centre and the devolved administrations in the UK could be considered as 
‘intergovernmental’ at all. 
                                                 




A number of assessments of intergovernmental relations in the UK have been 
undertaken (House of Lords 2002, McEwen 2003, Parry 2004, Horgan 2004, Keating 
2005, Trench 2005, Cairney 2006, Jeffery and Wincott 2006, ESRC 2006). These 
authors used similar words to describe intergovernmental relations in the United 
Kingdom immediately following devolution: ‘low key’, ‘understated’, ‘relaxed’, and 
‘harmonious’. The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution (2002) and 
the response of the UK Government (2003) were particularly illuminating. The 
House of Lords committee suggested more use of the formal mechanisms for inter-
governmental relations including the Joint Ministerial Committee, greater openness 
with respect to the concordats, more attention to the machinery of intergovernmental 
relations at the centre, and the establishment of processes to review the Barnett 
formula by an independent and impartial body. In its response, the UK Government 
claimed that most of these suggestions were unnecessary (UK 2003). The common 
refrain on the part of UK officials was, “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” (interview 
April 11, 2005). 
 
There are a number of explanations as to why there were so few disputes in the UK 
during the period of this research. In the ESRC’s view (2006), Labour dominance 
meant relatively little ideological difference between the various parts of the UK, and 
a common electoral interest in presenting a united front. There have been generous 
increases in public spending in the devolved administrations, and flexibility was built 
in so that the division of powers could be easily adjusted if the parties agreed. In 
addition, extensive work was done behind the scenes by officials and Ministers to 
minimize and diffuse disputes, reinforced by ingrained habits of cooperation between 
officials and departments. Certainly, the absence of compelling financial issues and 
how resources were shared across the country (as was evident in Canada during the 
period of this research) eased intergovernmental relations in the UK, post-devolution. 
 
Another reason for the lack of disputes in the UK is suggested by Robertson (1978), 
based on the Canadian experiencehierarchical control from the centre. This control 
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was implicit, not explicit, and required a careful balancing act by Labour politicians 
as well as UK Government officials. There appeared to be great discomfort in even 
acknowledging that the Scottish Executive was the Scottish Government, and during 
the period of this research UK officials were very careful to describe sub-states not 
as governments but as the ‘devolved administrations’34. This issue will be explored 
in greater detail as part of the analysis of intergovernmental relations in labour 




This chapter has considered a wide variety of overall factors which influence 
intergovernmental relations, and compared these factors in the Canadian federal 
system to similar factors in the devolved UK over the period 1996 to 2006. Figure 3 
which follows provides a summary of the key country features in Canada and the 
United Kingdom outlined in this chapter that impact intergovernmental relations 
within any policy sector. 
                                                 
34 Presentation by UK Government official at ESRC conference March 18, 2005.   
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Figure 3: Comparison of Key Country Features Impacting IGR 
 
Factor Canada United Kingdom 
Time frame 140 years 8 years 
Name Provincial governments  Devolved administrations 
Constitution Each government sovereign UK Government in control 
Asymmetry  11 governments considered 
equal within their jurisdiction
3 small administrations vs. 
powerful centre 
Structure of IGR Bilateral and multilateral Bilateral 




State of national 
transfers  
Decreasing to provinces Increasing to devolved 
administrations 
Transfer technique Historically cost shared Historically block 
International 
influence  
Minimal  Medium through EU 
Degree of regional 
diversity 
Strong across entire country Strong in only 3 regions 
Social citizenship Diversity often trumps UK state historically trumps 
Public opinion Canadians seek IGR 
collaboration  
Scots open to disagreement 










Influence of second 
chambers 
Weak Weak 









Actors interests & 
values 
Diverse Similar 
Presence of central 




Medium Mostly unused 
Multilateral  
institutions 
Generally strong  Mostly unused 
IGR Agreements Primarily substantive Primarily procedural  
Conflict Ubiquitous Contained 
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The shear number of overall country variables impacting intergovernmental relations 
within any policy sector is extensive. When examined in summary form, it is evident 
that, with respect to the overall constitutional, social, political and institutional 
structures, this is indeed a most different comparison. Despite the desire of the 
Canadian Fathers of Confederation to unite under a constitution “similar in principle 
to that of the United Kingdom”, the analysis in this chapter confirms that the 
differences between federal Canada and the devolved United Kingdom are 
substantive and significant.  
 
In terms of key differences impacting intergovernmental relations, Canadian 
provinces are more powerful that the UK devolved administrations (they are more 
diverse, there are more of them, they are constitutionally protected, and have the 
ability to raise their own funds); relationships in Canada are multilateral, 
interprovincial and bilateral, whereas in the UK they are only bilateral; political 
parties and the civil service in Canada provide no integrating mechanism, as was 
present in the early years of devolution in the UK; and over the years more formal 
intergovernmental structures and processes have emerged in Canada than in the UK 
to handle the inevitable conflict. The only similarities between the two countries 
consistent with the themes in this chapter were with respect to the Westminster 
parliamentary system, where legislatures, cabinets, the judiciary, and second 
chambers in both countries played similar but minor roles in intergovernmental 
relations. This re-confirms the initial assumption of this thesis that intergovernmental 
relations in each country are executive dominated.  
 
This concludes the preliminary assessment of the overall context under which the 
intergovernmental relations system in labour market policy operated in the two case 
study countries. Although these contextual factors may influence intergovernmental 
relations at the sector or functional level, they do not predetermine it. There may be 
other elements relating to the policy sector itself that influence intergovernmental 
relations. These are considered in the next chapter of this thesis starting with the 
Canadian case study. 
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CHAPTER 4: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND 
LABOUR MARKET POLICY IN CANADA 
 
It would not be possible [he argued] to follow the British example and have 
Ottawa implement a national [labour market] system because, unlike 
Canada, the British are not afflicted with the federal system (Bryce Stewart 35 
as quoted by Hunter 1993, p. 15). 
 
In Chapter Three the broad social, political, constitutional and institutional structure 
of the case study countries was explored, setting the overall context for 
intergovernmental relations within any policy sector. This chapter starts the 
exploration of intergovernmental relations within the labour market policy domain, 
and, as in Chapter Three, the analysis starts with the Canadian case study. In order to 
capture all relevant information, federal-provincial relations are examined not just 
within what is considered ‘labour market’ policy, but also, to some degree, within 
social services, immigration, and postsecondary education. This is necessary because 
labour market programs in Canada are segmented by client group and 
intergovernmental interaction is often dealt with by the forum responsible for the 
client group. 
 
Three key elements of the analytical framework outlined in Figure 2 are assessed in 
this chapter: central and sub-state intergovernmental actors, the influence of external 
actors, and the policy domain. The analysis starts with the labour market policy 
domain and the intergovernmental dynamics that have played out in the sector over 
time, particularly with respect to the division of powers. As will be evident from this 
historical review, ‘path dependency’ is significant, with federal-provincial conflict 
evident over a sustained period of time. Devolution, and federal-provincial relations 
post-devolution, are examined next considered within the context of the issues that 
governments grappled with between 1996 and 2006. The analysis of the policy 
domain concludes with a review of what has been discovered about the 
intergovernmental machinery used in Canada in this policy field, and the degree to 
which this has been institutionalized. 
                                                 
35 Bryce Stewart was the Director of the Canadian Employment Service between 1918 and 1922; he is 
considered the key architect of the Canadian Unemployment Insurance program. 
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The analysis then focuses on the intergovernmental labour market actors, and 
considers how their interests, expectations, values, experiences and capacity 
motivated them to take the actions described. This is followed by an assessment of 
actors external to government who are involved in the policy sector, and the 
influence they brought to bear on intergovernmental actors during the period of this 
research. The chapter concludes with a discussion of some of the key factors that 
have resulted in continuing intergovernmental conflict in this particular policy 
domain. 
 
As outlined in Chapter One, it was not possible to examine relationships between the 
central government and all provinces in Canada. Instead, the primary focus is on the 
relationship between the Government of Canada and the Government of Alberta36. 
Alberta has been chosen as the key sub-state comparator to Scotland in the United 
Kingdom because it is considered a ‘strong’ province and, during the period of this 
research, it remained fully committed to Canadian federalism. It was also the first 
province to sign a devolved Labour Market Development Agreement (LMDA). 
Neither Ontario nor British Columbia had implemented devolved agreements during 
the period of this research. However, relationships between the centre and these 
provinces will also be examined, restricted by more limited information gathering 
than was carried out in Alberta. 
 
The Policy Domain 
 
Historical Developments and Battles over Jurisdiction  
 
There is no mention of labour market policy in the division of powers under the 
British North America Act, and from the country’s beginning both federal and 
provincial governments have been involved. Although the federal government has 
responsibility for overall macro-economic policy, post-confederation most policy 
instruments relating to human resource development were considered to be under 
                                                 
36 For brevity the terms ‘Canada’ and ‘Alberta’ are sometimes used to mean ‘Government of Canada’ 
and ‘Government of Alberta’. 
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provincial jurisdiction37. As a result, the various employment centers, labour 
exchanges, relief measures, and vocational and technical education programs 
established before the Second World War were set up by provinces and supported by 
federal conditional grants (Hunter 1993). 
 
Over time, these provincially delivered employment services came under increasing 
criticism, with failings attributed mostly to divided jurisdiction and joint 
administration. There was also federal-provincial wrangling over federal relief funds 
(Royal Commission 1940). Concerned over the mobility of labour and capital in a 
federal state, pressure built on the federal government to intervene directly in the 
labour market. However, it took the extraordinary conditions of the Depression and 
the inability of cash strapped provinces and municipalities to provide adequate relief 
to the unemployed to convince provinces and all political parties to agree to an 
amendment to the British North America Act38. By the end of the 1930s, all 
provinces had agreed to strengthen federal jurisdiction in labour market policy by 
allowing the Government of Canada to run a contributory Unemployment Insurance 
(UI) scheme and a national employment service. Alberta was the final holdout. At 
the time, it was felt that these two functions were inextricably linked, with an 
efficient employment service providing the foundation for the Unemployment 
Insurance scheme. With the passage of the UI Act in 1940 all provinces, except for 
Quebec, disbanded their employment services (Hunter 1993). 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s the Government of Canada created a system of federal 
offices across the country providing Unemployment Insurance benefits as well as 
employment services. These federally-run offices expanded their services to include 
not only those eligible for UI, but also other groups facing labour market barriers: 
recent immigrants, people of aboriginal descent, visible minorities, people with 
disabilities, women, older workers, and youth (Haddow and Klassen 2006). The 
federal government also used their spending power to encourage provincial 
                                                 
37 Under Section 93 of the 1867 BNA Act, making laws with respect to education (and, by inference, 
training), hospitals, asylums, charities, and eleemosynary institutions are exclusive powers of 
provincial legislatures. 
38 In 1933, nearly a quarter of the country’s labour force were unemployed and an estimated 15 
percent of the population were on some form of relief (Banting 2005a, p. 97).  
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expansion of labour market programs, as vocational education, training and last 
resort social assistance remained under provincial jurisdiction. Cost-sharing financial 
incentives were the key mechanism, including the Technical and Vocational 
Assistance Act (1960), the Canada Assistance Plan (1966), and the Vocational 
Rehabilitation for Disabled Persons Act (1962). 
 
Good working relationships developed between the federal government and the 
provinces over these initiatives (Bakvis and Aucoin 2000, p. 4). On the manpower 
training side, a number of mechanisms were put in place between officials to manage 
this federal-provincial interaction, building on an Advisory Commission and a 
Vocational Training Council that had been started in 1942 (Doern 1969). 
 
The conditional-grant approach was not without problems. Not only were some of 
the poorer provinces unable to come up with their matching contribution, many 
provinces felt that the federal ‘appetite-whetting grants’39 distorted provincial 
priorities. Quebec, in particular, objected on the basis that conditional grants 
constituted a federal trespass, via the spending power, on provincial legislative 
responsibility. Likewise, federal officials became concerned over a lack of visibility 
and an inability to adequately control provincial programs and priorities. This led to 
dramatic changes in how the federal government intervened in the labour market, and 
how they coordinated their activities with provincial governments. 
 
In 1965, the Government of Canada “staked its claim in the vocational-manpower 
field” (Doern 1969, p. 70) by setting up the Department of Manpower and 
Immigration, a fully-fledged and integrated manpower development department with 
an extensive network of Canada Manpower Centres across the country. In 1966, 
Prime Minister Pearson unilaterally asserted that employment was a matter of federal 
responsibility and jurisdiction. That same year, the federal government also 
announced that it would withdraw from the vocational education of young people, 
and assume full responsibility for the training of adults, providing in its mind some 
                                                 
39 Comments by Alberta Premier Manning at the Dominion-Provincial Conference, 1960 (Ottawa, 
Queen’s Printer, 1960, pg. 75).  
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semblance of constitutional clarity and consistency regarding education (Doern 1969, 
p. 67). 
 
They also decided that they would purchase training from whatever seller they 
preferred, including not only provincial institutions but also employers and private 
schools. With the passage of the Adult Occupational Training Act in 1967, provincial 
operating officials found the entire structure of federal-provincial liaison in a 
shambles. Negotiating the changes required by the new federal legislation led to 
lengthy, difficult, and acrimonious exchanges between federal and provincial 
officials, who often held conflicting value sets, with provincial ‘educationist’ 
officials pitted against the ‘economists’ in the federal service (Dupré 1973, p. 198). 
Having encouraged provincial expansion through conditional grants, the Government 
of Canada was now withdrawing from the use of the provincial infrastructure they 
had helped create. 
 
During this time, two new structures for intergovernmental relations emerged: the 
Federal-Provincial Meeting of Officials on Occupational Training for Adults, and the 
Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC). In Dupré’s view (1973, p. 201), 
CMEC was set up by provinces in 1967 as a ‘counter-structure’ to federal 
domination following the difficult negotiations over adult occupational training. 
 
In the 1970s, some provincial governments re-established their own employment 
services for groups that were not well served by federal programs or that were 
viewed as strategic. In Alberta, the Employment Opportunities Program was set up in 
1970 by the Social Services Department to provide rehabilitation, training, and job 
placement services for social assistance recipients. The province also increased its 
focus on basic skills training for the disadvantaged, and set up a network of Career 
Development Centres to provide labour market information and counseling services. 
In 1977, Alberta was booming, and labour market issues, competitiveness, and the 
importance of a skilled labour force were high on the provincial agenda. Provincial 
elites did not feel that the province was being adequately served by federal programs 
(interview with former Alberta civil servant May 16, 2007).  
 104
 
Throughout the 1980s, the federal Department of Manpower and Immigration made 
further changes to its employment programs and policies through the National 
Training Act (1982), the Canadian Jobs Strategy (1985), and the Labour Force 
Development Strategy (1989), continuing its efforts to reassert control over the 
sector by moving purchases from provincially run community colleges to the private 
sector, and by increasing the involvement of business and industry as a 
counterbalance to federal-provincial bargaining. To control spending, active 
measures were shifted from a charge to the Consolidated Revenue Fund (funded by 
general taxes) to the Unemployment Insurance account (funded by employer-
employee contributions), and budgets that served non-UI clients were reduced 
overall. To strengthen the involvement of other labour market partners, national 
Sector Councils were formed, providing opportunities for employers, employees, 
educators and other stakeholders to address skill development issues within specified 
sectors40. Drawing on the European experience with ‘corporatist’ forms of decision 
making, in 1991 the Canadian Labour Force Development Board involving business 
and labour stakeholders was established nationally, and efforts were made to expand 
this provincially and locally. Following the election of the Chrétien Liberals, in 1993, 
the Government of Canada also embarked on a high-profile review of 
Unemployment Insurance, as well as social assistance and training, and many 
longstanding federal-provincial cost-sharing arrangements were questioned (Bakvis 
and Aucoin 2000, Haddow 2000, Haddow 2003, Haddow and Klassen 2006). 
 
These mostly unilateral federal actions were met with considerable provincial 
resistance. Shifting training purchases from community colleges to the private sector 
undermined the viability of provincial institutions. Reduced federal spending on 
active measures and tightened eligibility for federal Unemployment Insurance meant 
that some people were forced to rely on provincial, not federal programs, increasing 
provincial social assistance caseloads and costs. Provinces were suspicious that 
national and provincial Labour Force Development Boards under federal control 
would try to influence provincial policy making. Many provinces (including Alberta) 
                                                 
40 By 2006, these had expanded to 32 industry-specific partnerships.  
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refused to participate or set up their own provincial boards with no federal 
involvement (Ontario, British Columbia, and Quebec). Haddow suggests that 
federal-provincial relations in labour market policy throughout this period were 
‘chilly’ (Haddow 2003, p. 248). 
 
Provinces were also dealing with their own broader problems, exacerbated by the 
recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s. Social assistance caseloads had increased 
significantly, and as a result welfare to work programs became a very significant 
feature of all provincial social assistance programs. As provincial caseloads 
increased, the federal government in 1990 unilaterally made changes to the Canada 
Assistance Plan, and then in 1995 eliminated it completely with the establishment of 
the Canada Health and Social Transfer, integrating all federal contributions for 
health, postsecondary education, social services, and social assistance into a block 
grant. Provincial funding allocations were slashed in exchange for fewer federal 
conditions. This left provinces free to reform their social assistance programs as they 
saw fit, resulting in what some advocates characterized as “the hardening of the 
welfare system towards the people it was set up to serve” (National Council on 
Welfare 1997, p. 7). 
 
In addition to benefit reform, provinces became increasingly involved in active 
labour market policy. As the role of the welfare recipient was redefined from passive 
receiver to active job seeker, welfare workers became career navigators, with 
provincial bureaucracies a key provider of labour market programs, either directly or 
through third-party delivery agents. By 1996, every province had restructured its 
social assistance delivery system, often amalgamating their welfare and employment 
bureaucracies provincially and sometimes also with federal manpower offices 
through various co-location and single-window initiatives (Gorlick and Brehour 
1998). In Alberta, co-location experiments were implemented, providing one stop 
services for people that had previously been served by two provincial government 
departments and the federal Manpower Department, now renamed Human Resources 
Development Canada (HRDC). 
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Although federal and provincial Ministers responsible for labour market matters had 
met, from time to time, since 1983, it was not until 1993 that they committed to 
establish the Forum of Labour Market Ministers (FLMM), promising to meet at least 
annually to set and implement an agenda of intergovernmental labour market projects 
(FLMM 1993). Social Services Ministers also had a history of collaboration, and it 
was through this forum that federal-provincial labour market issues for persons with 
disabilities were considered. 
 
Part of the rationale for these forums was to deal with federal-provincial overlap and 
constitutional grey areas: training, in particular, was an area of ongoing debate. 
Provinces had long maintained that this was an area of exclusive provincial 
jurisdiction since training is a form of ‘education’41. Federal involvement in adult 
training was particularly sensitive in the province of Quebec, and the ‘Quebec 
consensus’ of 199042 asserted that all policies respecting labour force adjustment, 
including labour market training, were within provincial jurisdiction. On the other 
side, the federal government marshaled many arguments to counter these claims, 
asserting that labour market training and adjustment were a natural extension of 
federal economic development and Unemployment Insurance responsibilities. They 
also pointed to their involvement in the sector, since confederation, through the 
spending power, and that many aspects of labour market policy and training were not 
only in the national interest, but required coordination across and beyond provincial 
borders. 
 
By the early 1990s, Quebec had concluded that harmonization with federal programs 
was impossible, and sought a transfer of federal responsibilities to eliminate overlap 
and duplication and make labour market services more efficient, economical, and 
coherent (Quebec 1993). Quebec succeeded in getting this on the First Ministers’ 
agenda, and, as part of the mega-constitutional negotiations of the early 1990s, all 
                                                 
41 Conceptually, education and training have few differences, although training is generally viewed as 
being more job-focused. Today the word ‘learning’ is often used, seen as even broader and to occur 
throughout the life cycle. 
42 This involved the Government of Quebec and representatives of management, labour and the 
cooperative sector and was affirmed in the Quebec National Assembly on December 13, 1990. 
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First Ministers agreed to the Charlottetown Accord, and a rebalancing of federal-
provincial roles in the labour market: 
[Notwithstanding exclusive federal responsibility for Unemployment 
Insurance]… labour market development and training should be identified as 
a matter of exclusive provincial jurisdiction…At the request of a province, the 
federal government would be obligated to withdraw from any and all training 
and labour market development activities, except Unemployment 
Insurance,…and provide reasonable compensation to provinces requesting 
that the federal government should withdraw…There should be a 
constitutional provision for an ongoing federal role in the establishment of 
national policy objectives for the national aspects of labour market 
development (Charlottetown Accord 1992, section 28). 
 
Federal manpower officials were not involved in these negotiations, as it would have 
undermined the objectives they had historically pursued; instead, it was negotiated 
by federal and provincial intergovernmental officials (Haddow 2003, p. 250). In any 
event, the Accord was ultimately defeated by the Canadian electorate in the fall of 
1992. 
 
This historical review of labour market policy in Canada, pre-devolution, 
demonstrates periods of federal-provincial cooperation, overshadowed by conflict 
and continuing disputes over jurisdiction. When, in 1940, provinces reluctantly 
agreed to a constitutional amendment authorizing the Government of Canada to run a 
contributory Unemployment Insurance Program and a national employment service, 
the labour market policy instruments that remained under provincial control became 
even more jealously guarded, especially by the province of Quebec. During both the 
1960s and 1990s, the federal government unilaterally dismantled the cost-sharing 
arrangements with provinces that they had put in place, exacerbating federal-
provincial discord. Over time, provinces expanded their role in the policy domain, 
stimulated first by federal funding, but in later years by unique provincial 
imperatives. The province of Alberta, for example, increased its involvement because 
it perceived that the centrally-run federal employment service was not responsive 
enough to its needs; the province also entered the field because of its social 
assistance responsibilities. In Quebec the dynamics were different, attuned more to a 
desire to gain control over as many policy levers as possible.  These 
factorsjurisdiction, efficiency and retrenchmentcame together in the mid 1990s 
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when the continuing domination of the labour market policy domain by the 
Government of Canada became a lightening rod for the Quebec sovereignty 
movement. 
 
Devolution and Transfer to the Provinces: Conflict Resolved? 
 
In the lead-up to the second Quebec referendum on sovereignty, in 1995, Prime 
Minister Chrétien felt that he needed to demonstrate flexibility in recognizing the 
legitimacy of some of Quebec’s complaints. During the final week of a campaign 
which the federal government appeared to be losing, in what one provincial official 
called “a fit of panic” (interview October 4, 2006), Chrétien, in a speech in Verdun, 
Quebec, explicitly recognized that provinces had primary jurisdiction over labour 
market training. The next year, the federal Liberals brought in changes to the 
Unemployment Insurance legislation, including a broad-based offer to all provinces 
and territories to transfer responsibility for the design and delivery of active labour 
market programs. Non-constitutional reform became the overall Liberal approach to 
renewal of the federation. 
 
The Government of Canada objectives for what were to become known as Labour 
Market Development Agreements (LMDAs) were outlined in its December 1995 
announcement of a new Employment Insurance (EI) plan to replace Unemployment 
Insurance (UI): 1) to recognize provincial responsibility for education and labour 
market development; 2) to harmonize the design, management, and delivery of 
federal employment benefits with provincial programs, eliminating overlap and 
duplication and coordinating services wherever possible; 3) to improve the 
effectiveness of employment programs; and 4) to improve program flexibility and 
address local labour market needs (HRDC 1995). These were federal objectives and 
a federal plan: there was no evidence that either the Forum of Labour Market 
Ministers or any particular province were involved in determining the parameters of 
the offer or how it was to be implemented43. 
                                                 
43 The offer was certainly informed by the provisions of the Charlottetown Accord, a previous offer to 
Quebec that had been turned down, and by general FLMM discussions.   
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Although these were the articulated reasons for the offer, the main motivator was the 
reduction of intergovernmental conflict in light of the Quebec sovereignty 
movement. A secondary motivation was to reduce federal costs and staffing, given 
the overall cutbacks the federal government was undertaking in order to bring the 
federal deficit and debt under control (interview with provincial official October 4, 
2006). Since the federal government could not be seen to be making ‘special deals’ 
for Quebec, Alberta was targeted as the province that would go first (interview with 
provincial official October 2, 2006). All negotiations were handled bilaterally 
between the Government of Canada and individual jurisdictions, and Alberta signed 
the first agreement on December 6, 1996. By 1998 agreements had been negotiated 
in all provinces and territories except for Ontario. 
 
Authorized through Part 11 of the Employment Insurance Act, 1996, LMDAs were 
administrative arrangements concerned with the funding and delivery of active 
labour market programs44. The agreements prescribed how much money was 
available, how funds could be used, and who could be served. Since the funding for 
all services came from the Employment Insurance account (paid for through 
employer and employee contributions), most of the program funding could only be 
used to serve people with a significant workforce attachment. People who had not 
contributed to the EI account but who may be most in need of active measures (e.g., 
immigrants, disabled people, youth, and aboriginal persons) could not be served 
through these agreements. In fact, funding for active measures for these groups was 
specifically not part of the offer to provinces, as the federal government fully 
intended to continue to serve these groups either directly by federal employees or 
through various partnership arrangements45 (Klassen 2000b). 
 
                                                 
44 These are referred to in the EI legislation as ‘Employment Benefits and Support Measures’. 
45 During the period of this research Canada served disabled people through the Opportunities Fund 
Program; aboriginal persons through the Aboriginal Human Resource Development Agreements 
(AHRDAs); adult learners through the National Literacy Secretariat; youth through the Youth 
Employment Strategy; immigrants through the Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation Program; and 
employed people through the Workplace Skills Strategy.  
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Through the negotiation process, two types of agreements emerged: transfer and co-
management. The full transfer model (or what came to be dubbed by academics and 
civil servants as the devolution model) involved provinces (and territories) assuming 
responsibility for the design and delivery of active measures within the federal 
funding and eligibility constraints. Transferred federal staff became provincial 
government employees, and provinces and territories agreed to account for results 
according to three specific indicators. Full transfer agreements were negotiated in 
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec, New Brunswick, Northwest Territories, 
and Nunavut, representing 43 percent of Canada’s population. Under the co-
management model, there was no transfer of resources (either funds or staff) to the 
province or territory, but instead a process of joint management of policy, program 
design and delivery. Co-management agreements were put in place in British 
Columbia, Yukon, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador. Nova 
Scotia’s agreement was termed a ‘strategic partnership’ and was similar to the co-
management model; these models represented 18 percent of Canada’s population 
(Klassen 2000b). After eight years of acrimony, a full transfer agreement was finally 
concluded with Ontario in November 2005, representing almost 39 percent of the 
Canadian population. 
 
Alberta was motivated to sign a LMDA agreement because it provided an 
opportunity to have full control, with federal funding, over the design, management, 
and delivery of active measures within the province (interview with provincial 
official October 2, 2006). Not only did the agreement remove an irritant (because the 
Government of Canada officially recognized labour market training as a provincial 
responsibility), it also enabled Alberta to assume an expanded role and align federal 
programs with provincial priorities and programs. Within the context of a stable 
political environment, Alberta officials were confident that they had the capacity to 
deliver the federal programs, given their existing policy expertise and regional 
networks in the Social Services and Career Development departments. In their view, 
a transfer of federal responsibilities would improve services to the public, eliminate 
overlap and duplication, and increase flexibility by allowing more decisions to be 
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taken at the provincial and local level (interview with provincial official June 22, 
2006). 
 
While Alberta had no significant problems in acknowledging a continuing federal 
role in the national aspects of the labour market or the reporting and accountability 
requirements, the province wanted to ensure that they were not seen simply as a 
contractor delivering federal programs, but as a government exercising its 
jurisdiction (Bakvis and Aucoin 2000, p. 18). Following the transfer of federal staff 
and resources46, in 2001 Alberta reconfigured its departmental structures, integrating 
both active and passive labour market measures, as well as employment standards, 
workplace health and safety, and labour relations into a new department Alberta 
Human Resources and Employment (AHRE). All in all, the transfer went smoothly, 
as intergovernmental relationships within the province were already strong, given the 
collaborative work through the Canada-Alberta Service Centre experiments. 
Reflecting back on this experience, provincial researchers concluded that these 
experiments “contributed to the trust, flexibility and positive working relationships 
required for the successful integration of former federal staff into the provincial 
operation” (AECD 1999, p. 12). Speaking in 2006, an Alberta Assistant Deputy 
Minister attributed the successful implementation of the LMDA to extensive 
communications, respect and goodwill between the partners, ongoing staff 
consultation processes, and a federal willingness to demonstrate flexibility47. 
 
During this period, responsibility for labour market policy was not the only area that 
the Government of Canada was devolving: they also took action on services to 
immigrants and aboriginal persons. Starting in 1996, authority to meet the labour 
market needs of aboriginal persons48 was moved from direct delivery by Human 
Resources Development Canada staff and delegated to aboriginal organizations 
across Canada through Regional Bilateral Agreements, then Pathways, then the 
                                                 
46 By 1999-2000 in Alberta, 204 federal employees and $112m annually had been transferred. A total 
of $1.85 billion from the EI account was available nationally to provinces/territories.  
47 Presentation by Alberta ADM to the Ontario Labour Market Symposium November 24, 2006. 
48 Under the constitution, the Government of Canada has responsibility for ‘Indians and lands reserved 
for Indians’.  This has created contested and complex arrangements between federal, provincial and 
aboriginal governments in a wide range of policy areas. 
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Aboriginal Human Resource Development Strategy (AHRDS). Constitutionally 
immigration is an area of shared federal and provincial jurisdiction. In 1991, the 
Government of Canada signed a comprehensive agreement with the province of 
Quebec49, and, in 1996, it offered to devolve settlement services to interested 
provinces. These included reception, referral, and employment services; language 
training; and a host program to match volunteers with newcomers. Manitoba and 
British Columbia were the only provinces that entered into devolved settlement 
agreements with the federal government; during the period of this research, Alberta 
operated under a co-management model. In 2007, a more comprehensive agreement 
was signed. 
 
Settling In: Conflict Re-emerges 
 
A number of authors have examined the implementation and initial operation of the 
Labour Market Development Agreements and the impact this had on both federalism 
and labour market policy in Canada (Bakvis and Aucoin 2000, Klassen 2000b, 
DiGiacomo 2001, Bakvis 2002, Critoph 2003, Haddow 2003). The period 1996-1998 
(when most Labour Market Development Agreements were negotiated and 
implemented) was a time of classic executive federalism, with federal and provincial 
officials and individual Ministers working intensely behind closed doors. The federal 
offer of ‘maximum devolution, an accountability framework and funding’ was 
specifically constructed so that it would be difficult for Quebec’s Parti Québécois 
Government, as well as other provincial governments, like Alberta and New 
Brunswick, to turn down. The overriding goals of both partners was to ‘make it 
happen’, given the high-profile nature of the offer and provincial acceptance. 
Following the narrow defeat of the Quebec referendum, there was a sense of political 
crisis, and a willingness on the part of the federal government to demonstrate 
flexibility and goodwill in federal-provincial relations (Bakvis and Aucoin 2000). 
 
                                                 
49 Through the Canada-Quebec Accord, Quebec sets immigration targets, selects immigrants and 
provides orientation, integration and settlement services. 
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While the offer had the support of the Prime Minister and Quebec Ministers, it had 
not been discussed either in cabinet or in the social and economic development 
committees of cabinet (Bakvis and Aucoin 2000). Pre-devolution federal Members of 
Parliament had been regularly involved in the implementation of active measures in 
their constituency. When details of the offer became known, many Members of 
Parliament, especially in Ontario (the heartland of federal Liberal support), became 
concerned over reduced federal visibility. By the time these concerns had been 
identified, high-profile agreements had already been concluded in all provinces 
except Ontario. Ontario negotiations got bogged down when the Ontario Government 
was unwilling to guarantee jobs to the 1,000 federal employees to be transferred at a 
time when provincial employees were being laid off. They were also concerned over 
‘fair share’, that is the inadequacy of the funds being offered in light of the 
comparatively large contributions that Ontario workers and employers made to the 
Employment Insurance fund (Bakvis and Aucoin 2000). 
 
This delay gave the Ontario Liberal caucus and key federal ministers in Ontario time 
to mobilize against an agreement for Ontario. In addition to a loss of visibility, 
partisan politics became a factor, with federal Liberal Members of Parliament 
extremely reluctant to see federal programs being placed in the hands of a provincial 
Conservative Government that they “hated and loathed” (interview with former 
federal official November 9, 2006). With the federal Liberals divided on devolution 
to begin with, Ontario became the battleground. 
 
Devolution had also not been discussed with key business and labour stakeholders, 
including those on the federal Canadian Labour Force Development Board. Rather 
than a diminished role in training, this organization wanted the federal government to 
play a stronger role (DiGiacomo 2001). When they considered the possibility of a 
transfer of responsibility for training to the provinces in the early 1990s, the board 
expressed concern over provincial capacity to assume federal responsibilities, the 
balkanization and fragmentation of programs, and the loss of access and funding for 
vulnerable groups (Critoph 1998). The views of this national organization and its 
provincial counterparts were ignored, and eventually, by the end of the 1990s these 
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organizations were closed50, burdened by an unwillingness on the part of federal 
Ministers and officials to involve them in the policy making process, an inability of 
the boards to attract prominent members from the business community, and conflicts 
among the many constituencies represented (Haddow 2000, p. 39). There was also a 
chorus of disapproval from other interest groups, concerned about federal 
abandonment of a national labour market, the development of a patchwork of 
programs, and impediments to mobility (stakeholder interview November 10, 2006). 
 
Despite the passage of ten years, there have been few assessments of the impact of 
devolution of labour market policy in Canada. Most information is anecdotal, 
including comments made through this research. Former federal officials in Alberta 
who transferred to the province remarked: 
The province can tailor programs to meet the needs of Albertans much more 
quickly…we are more in touch with our constituents now, we are able to 
respond better……devolution streamlined the service, having one main 
funder simplifies things…provinces are more connected to the people…on 
balance the LMDA was a good thing for the province and the client (separate 
interviews with two former federal personnel October 6, 2006).  
 
In conclusion, it is highly unlikely that, without the Quebec sovereignty referendum, 
the federal government would have devolved labour market measures. This was a 
policy area of high federal expertise and presence, supported by an extensive 
network of field offices that connected directly with Canadians. The offer and 
implementation of the LMDAs was a case of classic executive federalism, with the 
Prime Minister’s Office acting with selected insiders without consulting other 
members of the party, let alone Canadians or labour market policy stakeholders 
external to government. The required legislative changes were pushed through the 
House of Commons by the Liberal majority, overshadowed by controversial changes 
to EI benefits.  
 
Although the LMDAs were identified as administrative (not constitutional) 
agreements, for the provinces that signed devolved arrangements they represented a 
                                                 
50 Only Saskatchewan and Quebec have continued to operate provincial boards. Ontario continues to 
operate local boards. Newfoundland set up a provincial labour market board in 2006. 
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fundamental reordering of federal-provincial responsibilities in this policy domain 
(Klassen 2000b). However, from a federal perspective, as administrative agreements, 
control was retained over who could be served, how success was determined, and 
how much money was allocated from the EI account. Since the federal government 
did not relinquish control over non-EI client groups such as youth, older workers, 
aboriginal persons, immigrants, and disabled persons, jurisdiction in the policy area 
remained divided. Despite devolution, the federal department responsible for labour 
market matters retained 320 regional offices and 22,000 regional employees51. The 
Government of Canada still provided labour market services directly in the five 
jurisdictions without devolved LMDAs. Bakvis (2002) characterized the 
arrangements that evolved over this period as “checkerboard federalism”, with 
differential funding agreements, differential program delivery, and no cohesive 
national framework. Certainly the arrangements put in place, post-devolution, did not 
realize the objectives that the federal government had itself set for devolution in 
1995. These asymmetrical and haphazard arrangements between federal and 
provincial governments created the context for a renewed bout of federal-provincial 
conflict.  
 
Post-devolution Issues and Intergovernmental Relations  
 
In the run-up to devolution the key labour market issue of concern to Canadians was 
unemployment. Devolution did not deal with the substance of this or any other 
labour market issue. Instead, it shifted some governance responsibilitiesin some 
provinces and territoriesfor some unemployed peoplefrom federal to provincial 
government oversight. In the ten years since devolution the labour market in Canada 
has changed: 
We don’t lack jobs in Canada, we lack people…we’ve got 30-year civil 
servants who have spent their whole lives saying ‘how do I create a job’? 
And now they should be asking, ‘How do I create a skilled worker? And, 
quite frankly, an unskilled worker’ (Snyder as quoted in Saunders 2007). 
 
                                                 
51 Comments by A. Treusch, Assistant Deputy Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development 
Canada at Employability Study hearing June 8, 2006. 
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A range of different issues emerged during the period of this research, including 
skills shortages, labour shortages, poaching workers across provinces, job retention 
and advancement, credential recognition, inadequate access to labour market 
measures for non-EI clients, inappropriate use of the Employment Insurance account, 
employer underinvestment in workplace training, and incoherence across 
jurisdictions and between labour market and immigration policy52. A common call 
was for federal leadership to solve these problems53. Those seeking federal 
leadership seemed unaware that with devolution the federal government had ceded 
key policy tools to provincial governments. The analysis which follows provides an 
overview of federal-provincial relations around key issues dealt with during the 
period of this research, organized around the themes of collaborative and unilateral 
action. 
 
Collaborative Action  
 
Given the complexity of Canada’s federal system, intergovernmental collaboration 
can occur on a multilateral basis, involving the federal government and all provinces, 
on an interprovincial basis, involving just provinces, or on a bilateral basis, 
involving the federal government and one province. There may also be instances 
where two or more provinces connect. 
 
A logical mechanism for governments to plan and coordinate actions around labour 
market issues would have been through the Forum of Labour Market Ministers. But 
instead of more multilateral FLMM Ministers’ meetings post-devolution, there have 
been fewer. Between 1985 and 1995, FLMM Deputy Ministers met 21 times and 
Ministers 13 times. Between 1996 and 2006, federal-provincial Deputy Ministers 
met eight times and Ministers only seven, a significant decrease. There have been no 
federal-provincial Ministers’ meetings since June 2003. The last FLMM press release 
was in 1999, when all Ministers (except Quebec’s) agreed to “an ambitious work 
                                                 
52 These were highlighted through hearings of the Parliamentary Study on Employability held across 
Canada between June 2006 and March 2007. 
53 This was the key conclusion from a forum on Employer Investment in Workplace Training 
sponsored by Canadian Policy Research Networks held November 9, 2006, in Ottawa.  
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plan to address the labour market challenges facing all Canadians” (CICS 1999). 
Despite their commitment to urgent action at that meeting, no multilateral federal-
provincial work has been forthcoming. 
 
Without direct interplay between federal and provincial political actors, it is difficult 
to attach momentum to the work of officials. Nevertheless, post-devolution, some 
work continued. In June 1999, the federal government announced that it would 
provide funding to provinces for the Older Worker Pilot Projects Initiative, and some 
provinces entered into bilateral agreements. Through the federal-provincial Labour 
Market Information Working Group all jurisdictions share information and undertake 
collective projects, and, since 2000 service delivery guidelines, best practice sharing, 
and resource guides have been implemented 54. FLMM Ministers are responsible for 
implementation of Chapter Seven of the Agreement on Internal Trade; this work is 
managed through the Labour Mobility Coordinating Group. In July 2001 and May 
2005, reports were released outlining progress towards mutual recognition of 
qualifications in 51 regulated occupations managed by over 400 regulatory bodies 
across Canada (FLMM 2001, 2005). 
 
There was also a strong history of federal-provincial cooperation in employment 
programs for persons with disabilities (interview with federal official November 8, 
2006). In 2003, the Benefits and Services for Persons with Disabilities Working 
Group developed a multilateral framework to guide bilateral federal-provincial 
arrangements. In this area, agreements have evolved from the Vocational 
Rehabilitation for Disabled Persons program, established in 1962, to the 
Employability Assistance for Persons with Disabilities Agreement in 1999, to the 
Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities in 200355. Unlike 
jurisdictional conflict in labour market policy more generally, Prince suggests that 
provinces accept continuing federal involvement in disability policy due to a mixture 
of fiscal prudence, political philosophy, policy pragmatism, and clientele politics 
(Prince 2002, p. 53).  
                                                 
54 These can be found at http://www.flmm-lmi.org/english/index.asp. 
55 Details on the work of this committee are available at http://www.socialunion.ca/pwd_e.html.  
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Although older worker, labour market information, labour mobility and disability 
issues were important, by 2002 the key issue that provinces wanted to discuss with 
the federal government was improving LMDA agreements (interview with provincial 
official October 4, 2006). Jurisdictions with no agreement or co-managed agreements 
wanted devolved agreements, and jurisdictions with devolved agreements wanted 
additional funding and the flexibility to serve non-EI clients. But the Government of 
Canada was reluctant to engage. Hoping to achieve their LMDA goals, provincial 
FLMM senior officials worked with federal officials on a Labour Market Framework 
Agreement in 2004, outlining how governments could work together on labour 
market policy priorities. When agreement could not be reached on the extent and 
nature of federal funding that would be needed to realize this vision, the work stalled 
and was never presented to Ministers (interview with federal official November 7, 
2006). 
 
As relations with Quebec eased in the years following the highly charged political 
atmosphere of the referendum, federal Liberal politicians and civil servants became 
convinced that not only had the LMDAs taken away federal visibility and a way to 
connect with Canadians, they had also “ossified” the labour market system, removing 
the tools the federal government needed to intervene around emerging issues 
(interview with federal official November 6, 2006). When the decision to devolve 
was taken it was highly controversial, and, for many federal bureaucrats, their heart 
was never in it. Self-preservation and a concern about transferring 5000 employees to 
provincial governments that were perceived to lack capacity were additional issues 
(interview with former federal official November 3, 2006). By 2002, with Quebec 
separatism at a low point, Quebec workers expressing concerns over the 
ineffectiveness of  programming through their provincial LMDA, and the continuing 
protracted fight with Ontario over ‘fair share’, the idea of negotiating more devolved 
LMDAs and transferring additional federal authority to provinces became a dead 
letter. In fact, under the Liberal Party, the Government of Canada moved in the exact 
opposite direction; every time a policy initiative came forward for consideration a 
key criterion for success was whether the initiative allowed the Government of 
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Canada to recapture influence (interview with former federal official November 3, 
2006).  
 
Provinces made many attempts to engage federal politicians and officials on LMDA 
issues. In January 2002, provincial Labour Market Ministers released Skills 
Investments for All Canadians: the Future of the Labour Market Development 
Agreements. This was a detailed request for strengthened LMDAs, increased 
Government of Canada transfers for active measures through both the Employment 
Insurance and Consolidated Revenue Fund, broadened client eligibility for services 
funded under the LMDAs, lower EI premiums, and a return to the negotiating table 
in selected jurisdictions without a devolved LMDA56. To support this provincial 
position, in February 2002 Alberta Human Resources and Employment hosted a 
conference to review the experience with LMDAs (interview with provincial official 
October 4, 2006). Although the conference report, Shifting Roles: Active Labour 
Market Policy in Canada under the Labour Market Development Agreements (Lazar 
2002), suggested both a short and long-term agenda for governments as well as other 
labour market partners, no federal-provincial follow-up action was undertaken. 
 
Later that year provincial labour market Ministers joined forces with their 
postsecondary colleagues in the Council of Ministers of Education Canada and 
released a joint report Working Together to Strengthen Learning and Labour 
Market Training (CMEC/FLMM 2002)calling upon the federal government to 
support key provincial skills and learning priorities through flexible federal financial 
support. Over time the issue was raised to the Premiers’ attention through the 
Council of the Federation. In February of 2006, Premiers sponsored a Postsecondary 
Education and Skills Summit, inviting over 300 stakeholders from across Canada 
including students, colleges, universities, business, and labour to discuss the key 
issues and challenges in postsecondary education and skills training. The summit was 
followed, in July 2006, by the release of an interprovincial strategy, Competing for 
                                                 
56 British Columbia, Nova Scotia and Ontario had requested negotiations on an initial or different 
LMDA, but by 2002, the Government of Canada had not responded; hence, this public collective 
statement. 
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Tomorrow. The document was provocative on jurisdictional issues. While 
acknowledging that each order of government had a role to play, it nevertheless 
asserted that “provinces and territories have exclusive jurisdiction over the design, 
planning, and delivery of their postsecondary education and skills training systems” 
(C of F 2006, p. 2). It further noted how the reduction of federal transfers and the 
fiscal imbalance made it difficult for provinces and territories to improve 
postsecondary education and skills training programs.  
 
During the period of this research, individual provinces also implemented their own 
labour market initiatives, supported wherever possible with bilateral federal-
provincial agreements. As skills and labour shortages increased and employers 
pressed the provincial government for action, Alberta developed a series of labour 
market strategies, including Building and Educating Tomorrow’s Workforce (AHRE 
2006). As employers looked to immigrants, in particular, to solve their labour 
shortages, the provincial government entered into agreements with Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada, on a provincial nominee program, temporary foreign workers, 
and international students (interview with provincial official October 2, 2006). With 
a renewed focus on bringing underrepresented groups into the workforce, Alberta 
also renegotiated and renewed its longstanding federal-provincial agreement on 
employment programs for persons with disabilities. In 2006 Alberta and British 
Columbia also entered into a bilateral Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility 




The lack of federal response to provincial lobbying on LMDAs did not mean that the 
Government of Canada was inactive in the labour market field, post-devolution. 
Harking back to the mid-1960s, instead of acting through provinces, it acted on its 
own and expanded direct federal programming for client groups not included in the 
devolution offer. One can understand federal retention of the Aboriginal Human 
Resources Development Strategy, given the existing network of agreements with 
aboriginal organizations and federal constitutional responsibility for aboriginal 
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persons57. Harder to understand is how federal officials and Ministers squared a 
willingness to devolve active measures for EI recipients but not youth. In 1997 a 
renewed federal Youth Employment Strategy was launched. Since the federal 
government had committed that they would not do ‘training’, it characterized its 
youth programming instead as ‘learning’ (McBride and Stoyko 2000). That same 
year it also launched a new annual direct spending program for the disabledthe 
Opportunities Fund58despite its longstanding cost-sharing arrangement with 
provinces through the Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities.  
 
One of the most significant post-devolution Liberal initiatives was the Innovation 
Strategy, a federal commitment to human capital development. In 2002, the 
Government of Canada released a green paper Knowledge Matters: Skills and 
Learning for Canadians (HRDC 2002), and held a series of regional events, subject-
specific roundtables, and a national summit on skills and learning. None of this 
directly responded to provincial requests for strengthened LMDAs. Since skills and 
learning are primarily under provincial jurisdiction, a federal green paper suggesting 
reforms, accompanied by a high-profile federally-led consultation process, was not 
well received by provinces. Provinces were also concerned over direct federal 
spending on university research which set provincial priorities and agendas without 
consultation (interview with provincial official October 2, 2006). However, from a 
federal perspective all of these initiatives were perceived as both good politics and 
good policy. Not only did direct spending avoid the jurisdictional trap, it also 
increased federal visibility and ensured that spending was directed towards its 
desired goals59. Reflecting back over this period, Bakvis (2008, p. 216) suggests that 
provinces were prepared to accept federal support for universities as long as it was 
cast as support for research and development. However, there was little tolerance for 
                                                 
57 By 1996 Canada had concluded almost 80 AHRDA agreements in over 400 locations across 
Canada. In this context, federal-aboriginal agreements are considered ‘government-to-government’ 
arrangements.  
58 Details are available at 
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/disability_issues/funding_programs/opportunities_fund/index.shtml#1. 
59 This direct federal spending included the Canadian Foundation for Innovation, the Canadian 
Millennium Scholarship Foundation, the Canadian Research Chairs, the Canadian Institutes of Health 
Research and the Canada Graduate Scholarships. 
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an enhanced federal role in other aspects of skills and learning (interview with 
provincial official October 4, 2006). 
 
After the federal Innovation Strategy consultation, the Government of Canada 
unilaterally established the Canadian Council on Learning, a Foreign Credential 
Recognition program, and a Workplace Skills Strategy. The Canadian Council on 
Learning60 was set up in 2004 with $100 million in funding over five years as an 
arm’s length, not-for-profit organization to promote knowledge and information 
exchange among learning partners, inform Canadians of Canada’s progress in 
learning, and address knowledge gaps. Despite two rounds of dedicated consultation 
in 2003 soliciting provincial support (Levin and Seward 2003, Public Policy Forum 
2003), many provinces (especially Alberta) expressed doubts about the efficacy of a 
federal agency’s judging an area of provincial jurisdiction (interview with provincial 
official June 12, 2007). With stakeholder support, the federal government proceeded 
on its own, establishing what Boismenu and Graefe (2004) characterized as ‘expert 
interlocutors’ with which the federal government could debate policy options under 
provincial jurisdiction. In their view, this technique of ‘creating expertise’ was part 
of a new federal approach to rebuilding leadership in social policy. 
 
Although credential assessment and licensing for the trades and most regulated 
occupations are under provincial control, the Government of Canada set up a federal 
Foreign Credentials Recognition Program in 200361 with a $68 million budget 
allocation over six years. The following year, they announced the Workplace Skills 
Strategy62, intended to support increased skills capacity and improved productivity in 
the workplace. A provincial official agreed that a focus on the workplace did not 
raise the same jurisdictional red flags as a focus on training and adjustment measures 
(interview October 2, 2006). The federal government saw workplace initiatives as the 
way, post-devolution, to recapture a meaningful role in the labour market. When 
Quebec wanted to use its LMDA funding to do workplace training, federal officials 
                                                 
60 Details are available at http://www.ccl-cca.ca/CCL/AboutCCL/WhatWeDo?Language=EN.  
61 Details are available at http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/cs/comm/hrsd/news/2005/050425bb.shtml. 
62 Details are available at http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/en/ws/index.shtml. 
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refused to allow the charge. A formal federal official quoted the federal Minister as 
saying at the time: 
Hey wait a minute, we’re going to do workplace; we gave the provinces the 
unemployed. We had the plans for training the unemployed. We’re going to 
deal with employers and we’re going to deal with the workplace (interview 
November 9, 2006). 
 
These examples all provide evidence that, post-devolution, the federal government 
regretted its devolution decision, were jealous of provincial jurisdiction in the labour 
market, and were following many different routes to re-establish relevancy in the 
policy domain. On the other hand, ways to resolve the continuing federal-provincial 
irritants needed to be found. 
 
In November 2005, in the dying days of the Martin minority Liberal government, the 
federal government signed bilateral Labour Market Partnership Agreements 
(LMPAs)63 with Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, involving over $275 million 
annually. At the same time, Canada and Ontario signed a devolved LMDA 
agreement and an immigration agreement. Although these LMPA agreements were 
spun off from the stalled multilateral work undertaken on the Labour Market 
Framework Agreement, in 2004, the hasty funding offer over a weekend to these 
select three provinces and its subsequent acceptance by these jurisdictions was seen 
by other provinces as a break in trust that damaged not only federal-provincial 
relations, but also interprovincial relations (interview with provincial officials June 6, 
2006, October 4, 2006, October 2, 2006). 
 
The LMPA agreements provided for 50 percent of the funding to go to the province 
as a transfer and 50 percent to be spent directly by the federal government within the 
province, accompanied by a commitment to joint planning around all labour market 
programming within the province. Alberta officials felt that their sister provinces had 
given too much away by sanctioning the re-entry of the federal government into 
labour market program delivery, recreating a ‘two faced system’. Increased federal 
funding for immigrant settlement services in Ontario but not in Alberta also raised 
                                                 
63 These were focused on increasing workplace-based training and enhancing the participation of non-
EI clients such as aboriginal people, immigrants, and persons with disabilities. 
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concerns over fairness (interview with provincial official November 8, 2006). When 
the Liberal government fell two months later in January 2006, the Conservatives felt 




This review of post-devolution events demonstrates continuing intergovernmental 
tension, competition and limited coordination of labour market programs in Canada. 
Despite some collaborative multilateral activity in labour market information and 
labour mobility, federal-provincial competition dominated, particularly in the areas 
of youth and disability programming, foreign credential recognition, workplace 
issues and through the Labour Market Partnership Agreements. The period was also 
dominated by increased tension between the federal and Ontario governments over 
their failure to negotiate a devolved Labour Market Development Agreement. This 
negatively impacted all multilateral intergovernmental relationships across the 
country.  
 
Reference has already been made to a variety of intergovernmental institutions that 
were set up over the years in Canada to manage intergovernmental relations in labour 
market policy. The final component in the organizing framework relating to the 
policy domain is an examination of these intergovernmental institutions and 
processes, and an assessment of how they functioned during the period of this 
research. 
 
Intergovernmental Machinery  
 
Institutions matter because they constrain social actors. They specify what is 
permitted and what is not, who is involved, the sequence of moves, the choices of 
actors, and the information they control. Rules and institutions also reduce 
uncertainty; as a result, actors create them as a way to achieve their goals. The higher 
the degree of institutionalization, the more likely it is to affect the behavior of actors 
independent of their interests.  
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Federal-provincial and Interprovincial Committees 
 
During the period of this research there were four federal-provincial or 
interprovincial forums managing a piece of the multilateral work in labour market 
policy in Canada. Face-to-face meetings and teleconferences organized by these 
forums provided federal and provincial Ministers, Deputy Ministers and officials 
with an opportunity for consultation, negotiation and coordination with respect to 
their labour market programs and issues. 
 
The Forum of Labour Market Ministers (FLMM) was the most relevant to this 
research. When formalized in 1993, Ministers adopted the following objectives: 
 To promote inter-jurisdictional cooperation on labour market issues and to 
provide a forum to establish and meet common goals.  
 To promote a highly skilled workforce with portable qualifications through 
the development and expansion of interprovincial standards.  
 To facilitate Canada's adaptation to changes in economic structure and skill 
requirements.  
 To provide an inter-jurisdictional link to participatory structures such as 
labour force development boards 
 
This description was extracted from HRSDC’s website in February 2007, and is 
obviously out of date given that labour force development boards no longer existed. 
There is no dedicated website for the forum as, for example, exists with the Council 
of Ministers of Education, the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment, or 
the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers. 
 
During the period of this research the FLMM was co-chaired by the Federal 
Government and a lead province where the lead rotated every two years on an east-
to-west basis64. A modest, provincially-managed, secretariat funded 50 percent by 
the federal government and 50 percent by provinces, provided support. Most 
activities were carried out under the overall supervision of a committee of senior 
officials at the Assistant Deputy Minister level from the federal government and all 
                                                 
64 During the period of this research lead roles rotated as follows: Alberta (1997), Newfoundland 
(1999), Manitoba (2001), Nova Scotia (2003) and Ontario (2005). British Columbia assumed lead 
province responsibility in April 2007. 
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provinces. Agendas were set by mutual agreement and most work was done via 
teleconference. Standard processes were in place for interprovincial discussions 
before deliberations with the federal government took place. Although cautious, 
Quebec was an active participant. When work advanced to a certain stage, Deputy 
Ministers became involved, and then Ministers, either through teleconference or 
face-to-face meetings supported by the Canadian Intergovernmental Conference 
Secretariat (CICS). The two ongoing sub-groups (the Labour Mobility Coordinating 
Group, and the Labour Market Information Coordinating Group), also made up of 
officials from the relevant federal-provincial departments and co-chaired by the 
federal government and a willing lead province have already been mentioned. Other 
sub-groups were set up from time to time around selected issues; for example, an 
interprovincial sub-group on LMDAs and a federal-provincial sub-group on career 
development were also set up during the period of this research (interview with 
provincial officials September 20, 2006 and October 4, 2006). 
 
In addition to the FLMM, other Ministerial committees were relevant. Labour market 
issues impacting persons with disabilities were managed by the Benefits and Services 
for Persons with Disabilities Working Group under federal-provincial Social Services 
Ministers. Arrangements were similar to the FLMM, with Social Services Ministers 
supported by a small provincially run secretariat that rotated annually. The Social 
Services Forum was more active than the FLMM, with ten sub-committees and 
Ministers who often met twice a year (interview with federal official November 8, 
2006). Over the past ten years Social Services Ministers have collectively designed 
and successfully implemented a number of pan-Canadian initiatives: the National 
Child Benefit, Early Childhood Education/Child Care Accords, and the Labour 
Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities65. 
 
Immigration Ministers started meeting in 1999 and, since then, have met twice a year 
to set immigration targets and discuss other immigration issues. Unlike the FLMM 
and Social Services tables, intergovernmental relations in immigration during the 
period of this research were managed by the federal government, who also provided 
                                                 
65 Details of these initiatives are available at http://www.socialunion.ca/menu_e.html.   
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secretariat support. Although there was a co-chaired officials’ planning table, the 
federal Immigration Minister chaired the meeting. There were no processes for 
interprovincial discussion, and in this forum Quebec acted as an observer, not as a 
participant (interview with provincial official October 4, 2006). 
 
The Council of Ministers of Education Canada (CMEC) was the longest-running 
established institution related to this research and Ministers generally met twice a 
year. Funded 75 percent by levies on provincial governments and 25 percent by the 
Government of Canada, provincial Education Ministers are supported by 40 staff and 
a permanent secretariat located in Toronto. CMEC is the vehicle used by provinces 
to consult and cooperate on education matters (including postsecondary education) 
with each other, as well as with national education organizations, the federal 
government, foreign governments and international organizations66. The Government 
of Canada is not a standing member of CMEC and, during the period of this research, 
provincial Education Ministers remained adamant that CMEC be retained a strictly 
interprovincial forum (interview with provincial officials October 2, 2006, November 
2, 2006)67.  
 
Over the years, there have been many attempts by the federal government to 
transform CMEC into a federal-provincial forum (including bribery through federal 
funding), but provinces have rebuffed these efforts every time (Cameron 2005). 
Instead, as is appropriate, federal Ministers are invited to select meetings to discuss 
specific issues that concern provinces. Not having standing at the CMEC table 
irritated federal officials interviewed through this research, who thought that a 
multilateral Ministerial forum to deal with postsecondary issues on an ongoing basis 
would be helpful. In the absence of a formal institutional structure they tried to 
influence provincial action through the CMEC Secretariat and through informal  
 
                                                 
66 Although CMEC’s mandate is identified as ‘education’, it also plays a role in labour market issues, 
especially with respect to international vocational education and training and as host for the Canadian 
Information Centre for International Credentials. See http://www.cmec.ca/international/indexe.stm. 
67 As an exception to this all agreed that ongoing federal-provincial discussions on student assistance 
were required, and there was a F/P/T Deputy Ministers’ table in this area. 
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connections at a variety of levels. The contradictions in this forum were described in 
this way by a provincial official: 
Much of what CMEC does is paid for by the feds, it’s really amusing. They 
annoy the heck out of the feds as the feds want to come to meetings and 
provinces insist on this fiction that they are not members by having them to 
lunch instead of to meetings, or by convening after lunch for a pseudo 
meeting that’s not really CMEC. But at every CMEC meeting the federal 
Deputy Minister or federal Minister is generally lurking somewhere in the 
building.  So the institutional arrangements are a bit weird, as CMEC is 
provincial-territorial only (interview November 2, 2006). 
 
There was considerable issue overlap between these four multilateral forums, and 
coordination was dealt with in an ‘ad hoc and organic’ fashion. When skills and 
learning became a joined interprovincial issue this meant that the FLMM and CMEC 
institutional structures needed to find ways to coordinate, and joint Ministers and 
Deputy Ministers’ meetings evolved. Similarly, Social Services and FLMM had joint 
meetings on labour market issues relating to persons with disabilities (interview with 
provincial official October 4, 2006). 
 
In addition to these pan-Canadian multilateral committees involving political and 
administrative actors, there were a number of ongoing bilateral federal-provincial 
meeting structures at an officials’ level. In Alberta there was the Canada-Alberta 
Liaison Committee, where labour market officials at the Assistant Deputy Minister 
level from Alberta and the Regional Director-General level from Canada met semi-
annually to coordinate their policies and exchange information. Although there was 
no standing federal-provincial committee to coordinate the LMDA within Alberta, 
there was a joint committee responsible for the LMDA Evaluation. On immigration 
matters a standing Canada-Alberta committee on Temporary Foreign Workers was 
set up in 2006 to look at ways to speed up federal processing, given the backlog in 
the federal system. Although there was no structure at the provincial level to 
coordinate federal-provincial disability or youth programs, these structures existed if 
they were perceived as helpful at the regional level. For example, in Calgary there 
was a Funders’ Table on Immigration that, in addition to the provincial and federal 
governments, also included the City of Calgary and the United Way. In Calgary there 
was also a dedicated federal-provincial group to coordinate programs for persons 
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with disabilities. Federal and provincial officials often participated directly in the 
other party’s contracting decisions (interviews with federal and provincial officials 
working in Alberta October 2006). 
 
What was noteworthy about all of these structures (with the exception of the Calgary 
Funders’ Table) was that they were all strictly intergovernmental in nature; none 





Even more so than federal-provincial committees, federal-provincial agreements 
codify and bind partners to concessions that may have been accepted in the heat of 
conflict or commitments undertaken on a mutual basis. There were a number of 
agreementsboth substantive policy coordination and procedural cooperation 
(according to Poirier’s (2001) classification)that codified and structured 
intergovernmental relations in labour market policy. The following Canada-Alberta 
agreements were significant during the period of this research. 
 
The Canada-Alberta Labour Market Development Agreement is a detailed 33-page 
bilateral agreement outlining the terms and conditions of devolution. The agreement 
is indeterminate and there is an ‘equality of treatment’ clause that would allow 
Alberta to re-open the agreement if another province negotiated a more beneficial 
LMDA. 
 
Although the Canada-Alberta Labour Market Agreement for Persons with 
Disabilities is a bilateral arrangement, it is based on a multilateral framework 
negotiated between all federal-provincial governments (except Quebec). The two-
year bilateral agreement is a continuation of a longstanding federal-provincial 
partnership in this area68. 
 
                                                 
68 The agreement was due to expire March 31, 2008. 
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Although no funds were exchanged, there were also substantive policy agreements 
relating to the labour market integration of immigrants. The Canada-Alberta 
Agreement on Provincial Nominees was signed in March 2002 and allowed the 
province to actively participate in the immigration process by identifying and 
designating an agreed-upon number of nominees who met specific labour market and 
economic needs. In 2003, agreements were also signed relating to information 
sharing and international students. Since 2001, settlement programs and services for 
immigrants have been governed by a six-page Canada-Alberta Statement of 
Understanding. Through this process, both governments actively coordinate the 
settlement funding and services they each provide to immigrant serving agencies 
within the province. 
 
There was one agreement providing ‘procedural cooperation’. In 2005, federal and 
provincial Social Services Deputy Ministers felt the need to develop an 
Intergovernmental Cooperation in Social Services Matters Protocol, emphasizing 
courtesy, respect, honesty, transparency, and timeliness. 
 
There were also interprovincial agreements; the key agreement related to this 
research was the BC-Alberta Trade, Investment, and Labour Mobility Agreement, 
which gave investors, businesses, and workers in both provinces access to a large 




Outside of these processes, coordination of many labour market activities between 
the Government of Canada and the Government of Alberta was handled on an 
informal and ad hoc basis, if at all. While ad hoc and informal connections allow for 
easy adaptation to changing circumstances and provide maximum autonomy and 
flexibility, reliability is a problem. 
 
At the political level, given that Canada’s federal and provincial political parties are 
not integrated on a national basis, there were no structured processes and few 
 131
opportunities for federal and provincial politicians from the same party to connect 
informally. In any case, intergovernmental relations must routinely cross party lines 
and for Alberta this was difficult during the period of this research. This was because 
Alberta was ruled by a Progressive Conservative Party which had very little in 
common with its Ottawa Liberal counterparts.  
 
In youth programming attempts were made in 2000 and 2001 to develop a Canada-
Alberta youth protocol (based on a multilateral framework developed in 1999), but, 
when this failed, informal coordination arrangements continued. In the view of a 
provincial official, governments competed through their contracting arrangements 
and overlapped in the services they provided to youth in Alberta and a more 
formalized protocol would have been helpful (interview October 6, 2006). For 
persons with disabilities, the implementation of Service Canada69 and the transfer of 
administrative responsibility from the Alberta region to Ottawa for the Labour 
Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities broke some of the informal trust ties 
used to coordinate federal-provincial relations (interview with federal official 
September 28, 2006). Despite the significance of labour market issues for aboriginal 
persons, it was only through informal connections that any coordination took place. 
There were no federal-provincial-aboriginal committees or agreements at the national 
or provincial level concerned with how federal labour market funding through Indian 
and Northern Affairs Canada or HRSDC coordinated with provincial programming. 
 
Also of significance was how some of the key organizations working in the labour 
market policy area on behalf of the Government of CanadaSector Councils, the 
Foreign Credential Recognition Secretariat, and the Canadian Council on 
Learningrelated to provincial governments. None had a formal process for 
engaging with provinces, and, as a result, often did not do so. In general, Sector 
Councils did not reach out to provinces, although they had recently been encouraged 
to do so by federal officials (interview with Sector Council official November 10, 
2006). In the absence of formal institutional structures between the federally funded 
Sector Councils, the Foreign Credentials Recognition Secretariat and the Canadian 
                                                 
69 Service Canada consolidated delivery staff from many federal departments into a single structure.  
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Council on Learning, informal relationships with each provincial government 
prevailed. None of the Alberta officials interviewed through this research commented 
on these federal agencies, calling into question their effectiveness when the order of 
government responsible for program delivery was not engaged. While informal 
relations are the backbone of any relationship, the problem with relying on them 
exclusively is that they are dependent upon the knowledge, skills, and initiative of 
individuals. In today’s environment of changing governments and changing people 
this provided many opportunities for issues to fall between the cracks or remain 
unresolved. 
 
Interests, Values, Expectations, Experiences and Capacity of Intergovernmental 
Actors 
 
The stage has now been set to examine central and sub-state intergovernmental 
administrative actors in Canada in more detail, in order to determine what motivated 
their actions (both substantive policy and process procedural) during the period of 
this research. Returning to the analytical framework in Figure 2, in this part of the 
chapter their interests, expectations, values, experiences and capacity to act are 
examined, starting with the views of actors at the centre, followed by actors in 
Alberta, and then in Ontario and British Columbia. 
 
 133





Figure 4 portrays the actors that were involved with labour market policy in Canada 
during the period of this research. Reflecting on the actor-centered institutional 
approach outlined in Chapter Two as well as executive dominance, 
intergovernmental actors working in labour market policy for the Government of 
Alberta and the Government of Canada have been placed at the centre. In Alberta 
this function was assigned to the department of Human Resources and Employment 
(AHRE), with some involvement from Alberta Learning and International and 
Intergovernmental Relations (IIR). Although IIR oversaw intergovernmental 
relations for the province, direct responsibility was carried out by the applicable line 
department. During the period of this research AHRE was responsible for the Forum 
of Labour Market Ministers as well as Immigration Ministers70, and shared 
                                                 
70 AHRE assumed responsibility for Immigration Ministers in 2003.    
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responsibility for Social Services Ministers with Alberta Children’s Services and 
Alberta Seniors and Community Supports. As Alberta Learning had responsibility 
for education at the primary, secondary and postsecondary levels, its Minister sat on 
the Council of Ministers of Education Canada. Given the significance of federal and 
interprovincial relationships to the activities of AHRE, a dedicated unit headed by an 
Executive Director with nine staff coordinated all departmental intergovernmental 
activity. This unit provided support to the Minister, Deputy Minister and Assistant 
Deputy Ministers (as well as the rest of AHRE staff), as they interacted with their 
colleagues from across Canada. 
 
From a federal perspective the key department responsible for labour market issues 
during the period of this research was Human Resources and Social Development 
Canada (HRSDC)71, with Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) taking the lead 
on matters relating to immigrants. The Privy Council Office oversaw all 
intergovernmental relations but, as in Alberta, key responsibility was assigned to line 
departments. Service Canada and Indian and Northern Affairs Canada were 
important interdepartmental partners. Since intergovernmental relations were an 
important focus for both HRSDC and CIC, each had dedicated intergovernmental 
staff units (37 in HRSDC and nine in CIC, including stakeholder relations). HRSDC 
was responsible for the Forum of Labour Market Ministers, Social Services 
Ministers, and the Council of Ministers of Education Canada72. Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada carried responsibility for the Forum of Immigration Ministers. 
 
Relationships between governments consist of individual relations between people 
from different governments; these individuals relate primarily to colleagues who 
occupy a similar role within their respective organizations, (for example Minister to 
Minister, Deputy Minister to Deputy Minister, etc.) The complexity of policy files 
                                                 
71 For a brief period between 2003 and 2005 Human Resources Development Canada was split into 
two Ministries: Social Development Canada and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. 
They were recombined in 2006 under a new name Human Resources and Social Development 
Canada. 
72 Although it did not participate directly, HRSDC closely monitored developments in CMEC. It was 
also involved in intergovernmental Ministers’ forums related to seniors, housing, homelessness, and 
labour. 
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and the number of individual relationships was particularly challenging for the 
federal Minister of Human Resources and Social Development. When Minister 
Solberg took over his new portfolio, in the spring of 2007, he commented that he had  
“55 provincial-territorial counterparts in my new job”, dealing with issues relating to 
children, seniors, unemployed, women, disabled, aboriginal persons, social services, 
education and postsecondary education73. His predecessors who covered these files 
during the period of this research faced similar challenges in terms of the sheer 
volume of relationships. 
 
View from the Centre 
 
In order to advance in the federal civil service in the National Capital Region 
(Ottawa), the ability to speak both official languages (French and English) is 
essential74. Since the only places in Canada where one is exposed to both languages 
while growing up is Quebec, New Brunswick, and parts of eastern Ontario, most 
senior federal civil servants involved in labour market policy originated from a small 
geographic area of the country, effectively excluding central, eastern and western 
Canadians from advancement. This language requirement also meant that most 
provincial civil servants (except from Quebec and New Brunswick) were excluded 
from joining the federal public service (interview with provincial official September 
28, 2006). 
 
As previously mentioned, during the period of this research the Government of 
Canada was routinely called upon by international organizations, other countries, 
stakeholders, and citizens to demonstrate national leadership, set national 
frameworks and standards, and ensure that similar services were provided throughout 
the country. As a result, federal actors were encouraged to protect, expand, and 
advance federal jurisdiction wherever possible, regardless of the constitutional 
division of powers (interview with former federal official November 9, 2006). The 
                                                 
73 Testimony at Human Resources, Social Development and Status of Persons with Disabilities 
Parliamentary Committee May 15, 2007. 
74 Although only 65 percent of all positions in the National Capital Region are designated bilingual, at 
senior levels this increases to 100 percent. Although French-language training is available, it is very 
difficult to learn a second language as an adult. 
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Government of Canada also had deep historical roots and expertise in labour market 
policy due to its management of the Employment Insurance program and the public 
employment service. All of these factors led federal officials to seek consistency in 
programming across the country, and visible Government of Canada red flags to 
ensure that Canadians saw the relevance of their national government. The instinct of 
federal officials and Ministers was to act directly whenever possible; when blocked 
by the division of powers they used the federal spending power to smooth out 
federal-provincial relations and influence provincial action. When federal money was 
transferred to provinces federal officials wanted targeted conditional funding, with 
accountability mechanisms to ensure that Canadians saw the federal contribution and 
that the money was spent as intended (interview with federal official November 7, 
2006). 
 
The withdrawal of the federal government from labour market policy through the 
Labour Market Development Agreements went completely against this expansionary 
federal tendency, and both through their implementation and subsequent actions 
federal actors demonstrated their desire to stay in the game and re-assert control. It is 
noteworthy that the LMDAs were set up under federal legislation, making provinces 
the agents (in law) of the federal crown. This ensured that the federal government 
retained some control over the public employment service as a safeguard should 
Employment Insurance caseloads start to increase. A former federal official noted 
that HRSDC officials did not regard these arrangements as devolution: “that is the 
wrong word, as it implies a constitutional transfer of responsibilities…the LMDA is 
a contribution agreement, a transfer of resources” (interview November 9, 2006). 
 
Once the initial transfers were done and the immediate political imperative eased, 
self-preservation reasserted itself, with no desire on the part of federal officials or 
politicians to transfer additional responsibilities. Although keen to engage with 
provinces on a variety of issues, federal officials found the provincial ‘mantra’ of 
only wanting to talk about more federal money for provincial programming (with no 
strings attached) unappealing (interview with federal official November 6, 2006). On 
the other hand, they knew that ‘money talked’, and when it was offered provinces 
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would usually engage. However, this willingness varied from one province to 
another. Federal officials viewed Alberta as professional in its approach to 
intergovernmental relations, coming to the table with a solid understanding of the 
issues it faced. In terms of labour market policy Alberta was considered “a good 
solid promoter, ally and actor” (interview with federal official November 6, 2006). 
This contrasted with the biggest player, Ontario, who in the opinion of federal 
officials, (two separate interviews November 6, 2006) were generally loath to 
cooperate with the federal government on labour market policy, impacted by larger 
political grievances and the ongoing ‘melodrama’. Post-LMDA, federal officials 
perceived an ongoing useful relationship in labour market policy with the province of 
Quebec (interview with federal official November 6, 2006). 
 
In terms of personal experiences, many federal officials involved in labour market 
policy had had longstanding involvement first with the Quebec-Ottawa dispute over 
labour market jurisdiction, and then with the eight-year highly politicized Ontario-
Ottawa fight over ‘fair share’. In 2000 HRSDC took a highly publicized beating 
through the media over an audit scandal that made federal officials extremely 
sensitive to accountability issues and media attention (Sutherland, 2001). 
 
View from Alberta 
 
Alberta officials involved in labour market policy during the period of this research 
could be described as confident, combative, and assertive in terms of their 
relationships with their federal counterparts. As Canadians moved west after the 
Second World War, the province became populated with transplanted easterners, 
many of whom joined the provincial civil service. As a result, Alberta officials saw 
themselves as committed to Canada and nation-building, but not at the expense of 
giving up provincial jurisdiction (interview with provincial official October 4, 2006). 
Like the Government of Canada, provincial government elites were comfortable with 
expanding provincial jurisdiction (even if it rubbed up against the division of 
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powers) if it was perceived to be in the provincial interest75. One provincial 
stakeholder characterized Alberta political direction as “anywhere, anytime, anyhow 
where you can get more control from the federal government, do it” (interview 
October 5, 2006). Over the previous 20 years, Alberta had invested significantly in 
building civil service capacity and expertise in the labour market policy domain, and 
was viewed as a leader in labour market information in particular (interview with 
federal official September 28, 2006). Although Alberta intergovernmental actors 
were concerned about protecting provincial jurisdiction (particularly in education 
matters), they conceded the legitimacy and usefulness of a federal role in the labour 
market (interview with provincial official October 2, 2006). 
 
The Government of Alberta wished to be a key player in shaping and defining 
Canadian labour market policy, and was willing and able to play a leadership role 
(interview with provincial official October 4, 2006). In the context of stable political 
leadership over the entire period of this research, when the province emerged from 
the 1995-1997 cutbacks in provincial staff, not only did AHRE have the financial 
capacity to assign civil service resources to intergovernmental files, AHRE staff 
participated directly in four intergovernmental forums, providing them with 
expertise, credibility, and an ability to connect intergovernmental issues across 
forums76. 
 
Particularly given the robust financial health of the province, there was no interest or 
need to exchange provincial jurisdiction for money, and Alberta would not have 
agreed to the federal re-insertion into labour market program delivery through the 
Labour Market Partnership Agreements signed by its sister provinces of Ontario, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan (interview with provincial officials October 4, 2006 and 
November 8, 2006). Alberta officials actively engaged in intergovernmental dialogue 
not only to shape national interests, but also to prevent federal actions perceived to 
                                                 
75 Immigration provides an example of provincial interests. Until 2003, immigration was viewed as a 
humanitarian issue. It was not until immigration became a labour market issue that the province 
desired additional jurisdiction (interview with provincial official October 4, 2006).  
76 During the period of this research AHRE staff supported the FLMM, Social Services Ministers, 
Immigration Ministers and Labour Ministers. The only forum related to this research that they did not 
participate in directly was CMEC. 
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be contrary to provincial interests. If federal money was on the table, Alberta 
officials negotiated for the province’s ‘fair share’ and objected to the ‘special deal’ 
and funding arrangements negotiated between the Canadian and Ontario 
Governments with respect to immigration and labour market issues. The Alberta 
Government fought the strongest for as few strings as possible to be attached to 
federal transfers; the provincial view was that the Government of Alberta reported to 
Albertans, not to the Government of Canada (interview with provincial official 
November 8, 2006). The Department of International and Intergovernmental Affairs 
ensured through their interdepartmental linkages that all provincial departments were 
aware of this provincial position in their intergovernmental negotiations (interview 
with provincial official September 28, 2006).  
 
Alberta civil servants had a strong institutional memory over the unilateral federal 
funding cutbacks in the mid 1990s, and a lingering distrust of the Government of 
Canada: 
Federal officials are like an onion, you never trust them, and you are never 
sure what they are up to and what hand they are playing… the fiscal issues, 
those federal cuts created without consultation and any sense of common 
cause were devastating… I learned that lesson many have not but other 
provinces havethat when you get in bed with the federal government you 
need to think where you might end up in the morning, you may end up on the 
floor (interviews with provincial officials September 28, 2006 and October 2, 
2006). 
 
Alberta officials were concerned over special favours for Quebec and wondered 
whether, given its smaller population numbers and the way the political system 
operated, it would ever win the Ottawa political game. It was for this reason that ties 
were being strengthened with other western Canadian provinces through initiatives 
like the Alberta-British Columbia Trade, Investment and Labour Mobility 
Agreement (interview with provincial official September 28, 2006). 
 
View from the Rest of Canada 
 
Unlike Alberta and Canada where political direction had been relatively stable, 
Ontario saw two changes of government over the ten-year period of this research, 
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and had experienced two more in the preceding ten years. An Alberta official 
suggested that, as a result, Ontario officials were more conflicted and sometimes 
even muted in their approach to federal-provincial relations, as they did not always 
know where their political masters were coming from (interview November 8, 2006). 
 
Irrespective of political party control, over the period of this research Ontario-federal 
relations were dominated by the ongoing battle over ‘fair share’77, expressed through 
regular sniping back and forth between the Prime Minister and the Ontario Premier 
through the media. A former Ontario official characterized Ontario disagreement 
with the federal government as “homeostasis, the natural order of things” (interview 
November 1, 2006), and that when the Ontario Premier got too close to the federal 
government the party suffered defeat at the polls. In his view Ontario, along with 
Quebec, suffered from “big province disease”, wanting to do everything itself and 
refusing to cooperate with federal officials even on more routine matters. Over most 
of the period of this research, in both immigration and labour market matters, Ontario 
officials refused to even talk to federal officials, with “everyone off doing their own 
thing, resulting in some very bad things happening” (interview with provincial 
official November 8, 2006). 
 
In addition to the more general ‘fair share’ issue, a considerable element of this 
animosity came from federal refusal to resume negotiations around an Ontario 
LMDA. When the offer was first made to all provinces and territories in 1996, 
Ontario negotiations broke down over the adequacy of federal funding and the 
employment guarantee to federal staff. By 2001, when Ontario indicated that they 
would agree to the federal conditions, Canada refused to return to the table 
(interview with provincial official November 2, 2006). An Ontario stakeholder 
suggested that: 
The failure to negotiate a LMDA in Ontario caused instability in the labour 
market development system, tenuous funding arrangements with community 
organizations, instability in the delivery system, no sense of where 
governments were going, and growing gaps in services. There is a bad 
                                                 
77 Although initially focused on the use of the EI account, the term ‘fair share’ extended to Ontario 
grievances about any kind of financial sharing within the federation.  
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relationship between the province and the feds and a lack of trust overall 
(interview spring 2003). 
 
All Ontario interests were consumed by this federal refusal, and various routes were 
attempted to make progress. One approach was to link issues such as labour mobility 
and foreign credential recognition, where Ontario non-cooperation slowed down 
multilateral negotiations (interview with provincial official November 2, 2006). 
Linkage was not the only reason for Ontario’s reluctance to cooperate on these 
issues: notwithstanding provincial commitments to the Agreement on Internal Trade, 
cooperation on mobility issues was generally not in Ontario’s interest when it meant 
that people could more easily leave the province to work in other parts of Canada. 
 
Ontario labour market officials interviewed through this research distrusted the 
federal government and were relieved when the linked LMDA-LMPA-immigration 
agreements were finally negotiated at the highest levels in late 2005. It is noteworthy 
that it took the unusual circumstance of Liberal governments being in charge in both 
Ontario and Ottawa before LMDA, LMPA, and immigration agreements could be 
finalized, highlighting the importance of the political party system (when available) 
in overcoming seemingly intractable intergovernmental problems. Although Ontario 
labour market officials agreed with Alberta officials that they had ‘given up’ too 
much by sanctioning a continued direct federal role in labour market programming 
through the LMPA, for Ontario this concession was worth the chance to resolve this 
longstanding federal-provincial fight (interview November 2, 2006) 78. 
 
In the rest of Canada a number of provinces that had initially negotiated co-managed 
agreementsBritish Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and 
Labradoreventually wanted devolved arrangements, but, like in Ontario, the 
federal government refused to engage. British Columbia had entered into a co-
                                                 
78 For Ontario these three interrelated agreements resolved many long standing concerns. Ontario 
finally got a devolved LMDA so it could develop a coherent labour market system; through the 
LMPA it got the ‘fair share’ money it perceived it was owed to serve non-EI clients; through the 
Immigration agreement it got increased per capita federal spending on immigration services within the 
province (interview with Ontario provincial official November 2, 2006). In exchange the federal 
Liberals got peace in Ontario in the middle of a highly contested political campaign. 
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managed arrangement while under New Democratic Party rule. Although officials 
would have preferred a devolved agreement (especially when they saw the 
advantages in Alberta), when the provincial Liberals came to power, in 2001, the 
Premier refused to spend political capital on disputes with the Government of 
Canada (interview with provincial official September 20, 2006). Officials from these 
provinces hoped that their multilateral cooperative work on the Labour Market 
Framework Agreement would provide the means by which federal-provincial 
working relations could be restored, devolved LMDAs could be secured, and 
additional federal funding for non-EI clients could flow. Like Alberta, although 
officials in these other provinces may have been annoyed at the behind the scenes 
bilateral deals around the Labour Market Partnership Agreements with Ontario, 
Manitoba, and Saskatchewan, if the federal Liberal government had not fallen, each 
would have been prepared to enter into negotiations to secure their share of the 




This review demonstrates that the interests, expectations, values, experiences and 
capacity of intergovernmental administrative actors in key Canadian jurisdictions 
were highly divergent. Alberta officials were satisfied with their Labour Market 
Development Agreement, and given, the province’s prosperity, did not need the extra 
funds that Labour Market Partnership Agreements would have provided. Although 
they supported multilateral activities, they did not need them to achieve their 
objectives. Alberta’s main concern during the period of this research was in securing 
federal help on immigration issues, and this could be reasonably accomplished on a 
bilateral basis. They did not share their sister province Ontario’s grievance around 
federal refusal to negotiate an initial LMDA agreement, and the need for additional 
federal funding to settle the ‘fair share’ issue. These issues could only be settled 
bilaterally. Since British Columbia at least had a co-management agreement, they 
were more willing than Ontario to cooperate around multilateral issues. Federal 
officials were mainly motivated by the need to protect the continuing legitimacy of 
the federal government in the policy field, and not give away any more responsibility 
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and money than was necessary. To demonstrate legitimacy, they sought ways to play 
a leadership role, even if this meant stepping on provincial jurisdiction by spending 
directly. If forced to channel money through provinces, it was in their interest to 
retain as much control as possible through detailed accountability arrangements. 
 
In all cases, both federal and provincial officials were a combination of policy 
specialists, program managers, and more senior officials, like Deputy Ministers and 
Assistant Deputy Ministers, who were primarily knowledgeable about labour market 
policy, not intergovernmental relations. Most had lived in one province their entire 
lives, and until they had become engaged in intergovernmental relations may have 
had little exposure to Canadian constitutional issues. These officials were supported 
by intergovernmental specialists from within their jurisdiction whose key focus as 
outlined in Chapter Three was on protecting jurisdiction. Although 
intergovernmental issues were pervasive and often engaged Deputy Ministers, 
Ministers, and First Ministers on an ongoing and regular basis, what mattered most 
were issues close to home and the need to respond to their particular constituency. 
This left the ongoing business of intergovernmental relations in the hands of 
officials. 
 
There were no national or even provincial conferences on labour market policy that 
drew labour market specialists from across the country together on a regular basis. 
Federal and provincial officials in Canada existed in separate worlds and generally 
did not share similar experiences except through involvement in their professional 
associations, or when they came together to engage in intergovernmental relations. 
Living in these separate worlds meant that, for provincial officials in particular, there 
was little imperative for them to consider pan-Canadian labour market 
issuesinstead they focused on their particular provincial needs and engaged with 
the federal government only when it was perceived to be in their province’s interest. 
 
Involvement of Actors External to Government 
 
A concern over pan-Canadian labour market issues often originates with stakeholders 
external to government. The role and the influence they brought to bear on 
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intergovernmental actors is considered in the final part of this chapter, as well as the 
influence of legislators, experts and other governments. This is examined first from 
an Alberta perspective, and then with respect to influences on the Government of 
Canada and governments in other parts of Canada. 
 
The Influence of External Actors on the Government of Alberta 
 
In Alberta, actors external to government played a fairly limited role in labour 
market policy during the period of this research. There were no legislative 
committees open to public view that considered matters relating to Alberta Human 
Resources and Employment activities. There were no Alberta government 
committees dedicated to intergovernmental relations. The most important external 
actors involved in labour market policy were postsecondary institutions, professional 
associations, and regulatory bodies, as well as business and labour groups from 
within the province. Unlike other provinces, Alberta did not establish a corporatist 
labour market board in the 1990s. Instead it used the Alberta Labour Congress as an 
informal mechanism for labour market actors to engage in a degree of dialogue 
(Haddow and Klassen 2006, p. 195). Big industry was particularly privileged through 
these informal channels, given the importance of the oil industry to the province’s 
prosperity. With a low unionization rate and a history of marginalizing labour, there 
were more limited connections with unions. Alberta had no provincial sector 
councils; however, its apprenticeship program has historically had ongoing 
mechanisms for industry input into trades training. The disability, immigrant and 
aboriginal communities in the province were well organized and generally heard with 
respect to public policy. Private for-profit small business service delivery providers, 
as well as the 13 AHRDA holders operating in the province also provided a degree of 
influence over provincial labour market policy (interviews with provincial officials 
October 2, 2006, October 4, 2006). 
 
When external conversations were deemed necessary, the Alberta Government 
preferred consultations that were targeted, focused, and carefully managed. For 
example, Building and Educating Tomorrow’s Workforce (AHRE 2006) started with 
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a Minister’s Forum on Developing a World Class Labour Force and the release of a 
draft strategy. Responses to this draft strategy were solicited through the internet and 
in written submissions. With this input the strategy was reworked and then taken 
back out to stakeholders through government presentations (interview with 
provincial official June 12, 2007). A common complaint of Alberta stakeholders was 
that Alberta consultations were “more like announcements than consultations” 
(interviews with Alberta aboriginal and union stakeholders October 3, 2006 and 
October 5, 2006). There was limited media coverage of the intergovernmental 
dimension of labour market policy in Alberta. The issues of concern were skills and 
labour shortages, which most Albertans and the Alberta media viewed as a provincial 
(not federal) responsibility (interview with provincial official September 2, 2006). 
 
The Influence of External Actors on the Government of Canada and Other 
Governments 
 
In contrast to the low key involvement of external actors on the Government of 
Alberta, during the period of this research the Government of Canada faced a 
multitude of actors wanting to be heard on labour market policy. Most professional 
associations, postsecondary institutions, advocacy, industry, and labour groups from 
across Canada had national organizations operating out of central Canada whose 
express purpose was to lobby government, especially the Government of Canada and 
the Government of Ontario. Stakeholders living within the confines of the Ontario 
border were, by definition, not only national stakeholders, but also Ontario 
stakeholders. 
 
Although there were no federal legislative committees that focused exclusively on 
intergovernmental relations, federal politicians from all parties were involved in 
subject specific legislative committees (including the Standing Committee on 
Citizenship and Immigration and the Standing Committee on Human Resources, 
Social Development, and the Status of Persons with Disabilities) that openly engaged 
with stakeholders. The Human Resources committee’s Study of Employability in 
2006-07 has already been highlighted, where they heard from over 100 organizations 
through written submissions, and over 200 people appeared as witnesses at their 
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cross-Canada hearings. Many commented extensively on intergovernmental 
relations, concerned over a diminished federal role and the need for federal 
leadership. Others called for a pan-Canadian approach to labour market policy and 
for governments to do more to coordinate their efforts. What was noteworthy about 
the work of this committee was that no officials (either federal or provincial) who 
were interviewed for this research commented on its work, calling into question the 
significance of federal legislative committees to the policy making process. 
 
The Canada Employment Insurance Commission was initially set up, in 1940, to 
assist government with the management of the Unemployment Insurance Program. 
During the period of this research, it still played a role in assisting HRSDC to 
manage the Employment Insurance Program79. Although two members of the 
Commission represent the interests of employers and workers, the Chair and Vice 
Chair are HRSDC employees and the Commission is required to comply with any 
directions given to it by the Minister of HRSDC. Given government dominance, 
labour groups in particular were frustrated as their input was generally ignored 
(interview with stakeholder October 5, 2006). HRSDC also had ongoing structured 
processes for dialogue with other significant players in the labour market policy 
domain, among them the five national aboriginal organizations (with regards to the 
Aboriginal Human Resources Development Agreements), the 32 Sector Councils 
(and their umbrella organization the Alliance of Sector Councils), and the Canadian 
Council on Learning (interview with federal official November 6, 2006). 
 
The Influence of External Actors on Federal-provincial Relations 
 
Although Canadian governments may have individually reached out to labour market 
partners, during the period of this research they generally did not do this together. An 
exception was the federal-provincial working group on Benefits and Services for 
Persons with Disabilities, which met with national disability stakeholders from time 
to time (interview with provincial official October 29, 2006). A federal official 
conceded that engaging with stakeholders was a “high risk strategy”, especially when 
                                                 
79 Details are available at http://www.ei-ae.gc.ca/en/ceic/ceic_home.shtml.  
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one order of government did it on its own; in his view, governments collectively 
needed to find new ways to enter into dialogue with the public (interview November 
7, 2006). Federal officials who were interviewed through this research (November 7, 
2006, and November 8, 2006) expressed irritation that provinces refused to engage 
with them in national stakeholder consultation. Provincial governments were 
generally only willing to engage with stakeholders within their province, and through 
processes that they determined. In the view of a provincial official, the federal 
government was: 
very stakeholder sensitive…in the provinces the stakeholders we are working 
with also have a day job…provinces are not captive to our stakeholders in the 
same way…the federal government uses stakeholders to browbeat provinces 
(interview September 28, 2006). 
 
Most external stakeholders (interviews October 3, 5, 6, 2006, November 7 and 10, 
2006) had limited knowledge of federal-provincial relations, indeed they had limited 
information about any aspects of labour market policy since few reports, evaluations 
or data were publicly available. There was limited knowledge of the annual EI 
Monitoring and Assessment Report, which every year since devolution has presented 
(with provincial input) a detailed analysis of the impact of the 1996 Employment 
Insurance Reform on income benefits as well as active measures. Media coverage 
was limited or non existent, and only a handful of researchers followed the work (e-
mail from stakeholder November 19, 2007). Despite almost ten years since the first 
Labour Market Development Agreement was implemented, summative evaluations 
have been slow to emerge and only British Columbia’s was publicly available on the 
federal website. While a national report on the previous Employability Assistance for 
Disabled Persons Program had been released in 2002, it was largely descriptive with 
limited results measures. For the Labour Market Agreement for Persons with 
Disabilities, there was no national report, but an agreement that each jurisdiction 
would individually release their report on the same day December 3, the International 
Day of Disabled Persons (interview with provincial official October 29, 2006). If a 
person wanted to know what was happening with disability labour market 
programming across Canada, they would have to know to go to each individual 
provincial website on this day. In Kershaw’s view (2006), citizens are not equipped 
to be accountability watchdogs in the same ways as auditors or policy bureaucrats in 
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federal departments. Citizenship and Immigration Canada in their annual report to 
Parliament (CIC 2006) did highlight federal-provincial activities through a dedicated 
chapter outlining immigration agreements across the country and activities at the 
Ministerial level. Similar evidence from HRSDC covering the period of this research 
could not be located. 
 
‘Experts’ (the national media, think tanks, and academics) focused most of their 
attention on the Government of Canada, as opposed to individual provinces. This is 
because these organizations are primarily concerned about national issues, and very 
few are physically located outside the centre of Canada80. During the period of this 
research, the Canadian Council on Learning and Canadian Policy Research Networks 
attempted to mobilize stakeholders across Canada through networks, roundtables and 
knowledge exchange on issues related to adult learning and work and learning. This 
resulted in further calls on governments to create a pan-Canadian vision for adult 
learning and training81. 
 
As intergovernmental relations are an important component of politics in Canada, 
every day the national media covers many elements of government-to-government 
interaction; however, by the time this research was undertaken the ‘high politics’ 
coverage of labour market policy had significantly diminished. For the past ten years 
media and expert attention has been focused on the intergovernmental dynamics of 
health policy, the environment, and finances. The intergovernmental dimensions of 
postsecondary education and immigration policy in Canada only started to emerge 
towards the end period of this research. 
 
International governments or organizations influenced governments in Canada to a 
very minor extent. Despite sharing a continent, there were no structured processes for 
governments in Canada to relate to either the United States or Mexican Governments 
on labour market policy matters. Although Canada signed an International Labour 
                                                 
80 Of 14 think tanks in Canada that focused on social policy issues, the author identified that seven 
were located in Ottawa, three in Toronto, two in Vancouver, and one each in Montreal and Calgary. 
81 See their websites: http://www.ccl-cca.ca/CCL/Home/index.htm?Language=EN and 
http://www.cprn.com/doc.cfm?doc=1792&l=en  
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Organization recommendation in 2004 with an explicit reference to the right of 
adults to learn, there was no evidence that federal and provincial governments had 
developed concrete plans for its implementation (Canadian Policy Research 
Networks 2007b). The most significant connection with foreign governments was 
through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
which includes 30 countries dedicated to democracy and the market economy. 
During the period of this research the OECD undertook two reviews relevant to 
labour market policy in Canada, including assessments of Canada’s social assistance 
(1999) and adult education (2002) systems. In their case study report on adult 
education82, they commented on federal-provincial relations in Canada: 
There is no subject more contentious than the relationship between the 
federal government and the provinces. We were reminded, more times than 
we needed to hear, that education (including adult education) is a provincial 
responsibility, not a federal responsibility, and there is no federal Minister of 
Education. Nonetheless, in the realm of adult education, there are a number 
of clear federal roles (OECD 2002, p. 44). 
 
One of their key recommendations was that provinces and the federal government 
should cease defending their prerogatives so fiercely, and instead work towards a 
more constructive federalism that would benefit all adult education participants 
(OECD 2002, p. 49-50). No one interviewed through this research mentioned the 
OECD or any international governments or organizations as having relevance to 




Labour market stakeholders in Canada interviewed through this research complained 
that federal values trumped everything, leaving substantive policy issues shunted 
between governments, effectively preventing forward movement on many 
compelling issues (interview with advocates November 7 and November 3, 2006). 
The checkerboard labour market system in Canada meant that programs and services 
were different in each province for different client groups; as a result, citizens were 
                                                 
82 This involved information gathering from federal and provincial governments, as well as in-country 
visits. Similar detailed reviews were done in 17 OECD countries between 1999 and 2004.  
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not clear on who did what. Stakeholders were aware of the Forum of Labour Market 
Ministers but perceived it as unimportant and ineffective (interviews undertaken in 
Ontario and British Columbia spring 2003). Although the Canadian Labour and 
Business Center had provided a bridge for informal relations between federal and 
provincial Deputy Ministers (as all were on the Board of Directors), this was shut 
down by the new Conservative Government in the fall of 2006 (interview with 
stakeholder November 10, 2006). Sector Councils were involved to some degree 
with the Labour Market Information Working Group, but had no formal connections 
either with provinces or the Forum of Labour Market Ministers (interview with 
stakeholder November 10, 2006).  
 
This review of the involvement of actors external to government confirms that, 
during the period of this research, labour market policy in Canada was executive-
dominated. Stakeholders were usually not engaged with governments on an ongoing 
basis on either bilateral or multilateral committees. There were no national bodies 
that provided advice on labour market matters, and only Quebec and Saskatchewan 
had provincial mechanisms. Individual government stakeholder consultations 
appeared like tactics put in place to ‘browbeat’ the other order of government83. 
Stakeholders external to government were aware that their governments could not 
seem to work together to solve the labour market problems facing the country, but 
there was no collective agreement on ways forward to improve the relationship. The 
lack of institutional structures between governments and with actors external to 
government solicited this community stakeholder comment: 
It is very frustrating for us as a community to find ourselves frequently in the 
position of acting as marriage brokers between different levels of 
government84. 
 
There were no international organizations that played this bridging role. Some 
stakeholders suggested that nationally-funded Sector Councils could facilitate 
interaction between the federal government and provinces. Others thought that the 
                                                 
83 The federal consultation on the Innovation Strategy in 2002 and the Council of the Federation 
Postsecondary Education and Skills Summit held in February 2006 were key examples during the 
period of this research. 
84 Transcript from Study on Employability November 9, 2006 Calgary.  
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Canadian Council on Learning might be able to play this role (comments at the 
Workplace Training Conference in Ottawa November 2006). Since neither of these 
federally funded organizations had any formal linkages with provinces, this would be 




This chapter has demonstrated waves of federal-provincial cooperation and 
competition in labour market policy over time. Post-confederation, conditional 
federal funding produced positive intergovernmental relations; as the federal 
government expanded its jurisdiction and started to spend directly outside of 
provincial transfers, federal-provincial conflict increased. To reduce conflict, in 1995 
the federal government agreed to recognize provincial jurisdiction over training and 
withdraw from some areas through Labour Market Development Agreements. For 
those provinces that took on a larger role in labour market policy, this eased federal-
provincial conflict; for other provinces that wanted a devolved LMDA and could not 
get one, federal-provincial conflict remained. What is noteworthy about this federal-
provincial conflict is the degree to which it was contained within the bureaucracies of 
each order of government. Although devolution muted conflict between the 
Government of Canada and the Government of Quebec, any media reporting on 
intergovernmental labour market issues focused primarily on the Canada-Ontario 
dispute. 
 
The checkerboard approach to labour market policy did not satisfy the federal 
government which wanted to get back into the game, nor did it sit easily with 
provinces wanting a devolved Labour Market Development Agreement or groups 
advocating federal leadership. In keeping with their different approaches, 
intergovernmental actors undertook a variety of actions, both on a multilateral and 
bilateral basis to meet their needs. None of these involved external actors to any great 
extent, leaving labour market policy in Canada highly executive-dominated. Despite 
an elaborate multilateral intergovernmental institutional structure involving four 
separate Ministerial forums, informal and ad hoc bilateral relations carried a 
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significant portion of the intergovernmental load, often to the neglect of important 
issues and the exclusion of key players. 
 
One of the continuing threads in the Canadian labour market story is conflict over 
jurisdiction. Part of the explanation lies in the fact that there is no consistency or 
agreed-upon understanding of the words used to describe labour market policy. In 
this chapter alone, employment, adult education, manpower, training, active 
measures, welfare to work, rehabilitation, skills, employability, vocational training, 
learning, labour force adjustment and labour market development were all used to 
describe roughly equivalent functions. There was little clarity on what these words 
meant, and certainly no agreement on how jurisdiction was divided between 
governments. Both the UI Act in 1940 and devolution in 1995 were stated attempts 
by the federal government to clarify jurisdiction, but outstanding issues remained. 
Additional complexity came about as most labour market services in Canada were 
organized by client group, with the most common groupings being youth, older 
workers, disabled persons, Employment Insurance recipients, social assistance 
recipients, immigrants, and aboriginal persons. This meant that for some client 
groups (for example aboriginal people or EI clients) it was acceptable for the federal 
government to be directly involved, while for other groups (for example, social 
assistance recipients) it was not. There was less clarity about older workers, youth, 
immigrants, or persons with disabilities where jurisdiction continued to be contested.  
 
Over time, both orders of government in Canada expanded jurisdiction in the labour 
market domain, based upon its individual policy imperatives and its understanding of 
its respective roles and authorities. The initiators of the Unemployment Insurance 
Program in 1940 saw the provision of federal UI benefits as inextricably linked to a 
national employment service, yet with the LMDA offer the federal government 
effectively severed this link. Despite this, not only were new or renewed 
intergovernmental structures not put in place to manage the interface, but the 
institution that already existed (the Forum of Labour Market Ministers) was allowed 
to decay and deteriorate. The Council of Ministers of Education could not be used as 
the federal government did not participate. Although labour market partners external 
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to government and the media were becoming increasingly aware of growing skills 
and labour shortages, they were unsuccessful in getting these issues onto the public 
agenda. There were no traumatizing events to highlight the neglect of federal-
provincial relations in this policy domain. 
 
This concludes the examination of the policy domain and the influence of external 
actors on intergovernmental actors in labour market policy in Canada. As Bryce 
Stewart noted in the opening quote, Canada’s ‘affliction’ with a federal system has 
greatly increased complexity in this policy area, not only between governments but 
across policy domains. The next chapter of the Canadian case study examines the 
power relationship dynamic between governments in labour market policy, and the 
effect this has had on the character and workability of the intergovernmental 
relations system.  
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CHAPTER 5: EXPLAINING INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS IN CANADA 
 
One of the reasons Canada leads on many fronts is because we don’t have a 
national office running the show. What you get with a national office is a 
vanilla-flavoured system that runs to mediocrity. What you get when 
provinces compete is the best-run education system. Provinces compete like 
little countries: competition breeds improvement as each province wants to 
be better than the other and they are pushed to do things better (interview 
with Maria David-Evans September 29, 2006)85. 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to assess the power relationship dynamic 
between governments in Canada over the period 1996-2006, and determine how this 
has influenced the character and workability of the intergovernmental relations 
system in labour market policy. Although most of the information in the chapter 
comes from interview data, it draws extensively on the documentary and secondary 
material outlined in Chapter Four. This has provided evidence of federal-provincial 
expansion in the policy field, continuing conflict over jurisdiction, divergent interests 
among the key intergovernmental players, and an inability by external stakeholders 
to productively engage. It has also highlighted some of the inadequacies of the 
intergovernmental institutional structures in place to manage federal-provincial 
relations, especially on a multilateral basis. 
 
An assessment of the power relationship dynamic between governments will help to 
explain these outcomes. Using the analytical framework outlined in Chapter Two, the 
key concepts used are interdependence and hierarchy, mitigated by how the 
intergovernmental structures and machinery were used. This dynamic is examined 
primarily with regard to the Government of Canada-Government of Alberta 
relationship, expressed from the point of view of each party. However, relationships 
between the Government of Canada and provincial governments in the rest of 
                                                 
85 During the period of this research Maria David-Evans was Deputy Minister of Alberta Children’s 
Services and Alberta Learning. As Deputy Minister, Maria had been involved with all 
intergovernmental forums that this research examined: Social Services, FLMM, CMEC and 
Immigration. Her comments relate to education, which in Canada is provincial jurisdiction.  
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Canada are also considered, from the perspective of officials with the Ontario and 
British Columbia Governments. 
 
The concepts of ‘character’ and ‘workability’ are assessed using the criteria outlined 
in the analytical framework in Chapter Two on pages 60-65. Cooperative relations 
were deemed to occur if governments actively worked together to coordinate their 
actions, but central government was the dominant player. When the partners were 
considered more equal in terms of joint decision-making and approaches, the 
relationship was considered collaborative. Competitive relationships demonstrated 
conflict, mistrust, duplicating efforts and attempts by one side or the other to increase 
their power. Coercive relationships were deemed to occur when the actions or 
inaction of one government forced the other to do something they would not 
otherwise have done. 
 
To determine if workability was high, medium, or low, evidence was sought from the 
interview data on the following factors, especially those that facilitated the 
development of trust ties between senior officials: shared goals and objectives, 
routinized and regular engagement, stability among the key players, geographic 
proximity, honesty in terms of information sharing, willingness to engage, capacity 
to engage and autonomy to decide, leadership in the development of processes to 
work through differences, choosing a narrow enough agenda where issues can be 
delimited, and seeking agendas that showed promise of early success. The interview 
data was also combed for evidence of the presence or absence of mutual respect, 
civility and tolerance, predictability, fairness, a positive history, an ability to 
minimize past grievances, recognition of mutual interdependence, and shared 
professional training and norms. 
 
Workability was also impacted by individual personalities, because “trust builds 
person to person, not government to government” (interview with provincial official 
June 22, 2006). Given the actor-centered institutional approach on which this 
research is based, particular attention was paid to the role of individuals in 
intergovernmental relationship-building. Certainly the actors interviewed through 
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this research thought that personality was a very significant factor in 
intergovernmental relations. Over 25 times, intergovernmental actors specifically 
mentioned that, in their view, outcomes had been directly affected (both positively 
and negatively) by specific individuals. Only two people did not think that 
personalities were significant. One informant said “I have seen tables where no one 
likes each other and nothing gets done, no matter whether or not their governments 
want something to happen or not” (interview with former provincial official 
December 17, 2006).  
 
Given that labour market activity in Canada during the period of this research was 
siloed by client group, a number of different relationships needed to be examined. 
The following categories were used for the analysis: labour market policy, (relating 
to Employment Insurance-labour mobility-labour market information issues as dealt 
with by the Forum of Labour Market Ministers), immigration policy (as dealt with by 
Immigration Ministers), and disability policy (as dealt with by Social Services 
Ministers). Whether the relationship was bilateral or multilateral was also an 
important consideration. 
 
Power Relationship Dynamic  
 
The first section of this chapter considers how intergovernmental officials working 
for governments in Canada, Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia viewed their 
colleagues with respect to the degree to which they considered the relationship to be 
hierarchical, the degree to which they believed that governments were interdependent 
in the policy domain, and their satisfaction with the operation of the 
intergovernmental machinery in place to manage their relationship. This is followed 
by an analysis of the similarities and differences between the views of these officials, 











Federal officials saw themselves as the senior partner in the federation. Although 
provinces were ostensibly equal, given their different populations, wealth, and threat 
to national unity federal officials did not view them as equal (interviews with federal 
and former federal officials November 6 and 7, 2006).  Saskatchewan, Manitoba, 
Newfoundland and Labrador, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward 
Island were considered the usual federal allies, mostly because of their smaller 
populations and more dependent financial situation. Quebec and Ontario were the 
traditional adversaries, while Alberta and British Columbia were considered bridging 
partners. Territorial governments were marginal players. Most federal attention was 
paid to Quebec (because of the threat to national unity) and Ontario (with vote-rich 
seats). 
  
The Liberals under Jean Chrétien came to power following the constitutional crises 
of the Conservative years. In order to reduce the temperature in intergovernmental 
relations, the Prime Minister rarely engaged on a multilateral basis with his 
provincial colleagues; according to one provincial official, federal-provincial 
relations during this period became subject to the ‘whim’ of the Prime Minister 
(interview October 4, 2006). “Sometimes on Monday I feel like giving the provinces 
more money, and then on Tuesday not” (Chrétien, as quoted in Noël 2001, p. 19). 
According to the OECD (1997), Chrétien cabinets were ‘departmentalized’ (not 
institutionalized), with individual Ministers (as opposed to central agencies) in 
control. This shift from the Conservative years trickled down to HRSDC civil 
servants, who were confident of Ministerial and overall government support for their 
intergovernmental negotiations. 
 
It was much easier for the federal government to be strategic and exert power and 
control than for ten provinces and three territories to resolve their differences and act 
collectively. The Government of Canada had the power to act when they perceived it 
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to be necessary, or not to act, as the case may be. The absence of strong 
intergovernmental structures (like regular FLMM meetings) put many cards in the 
hands of the federal government. 
 
The most significant evidence of federal hierarchical control was in relation to 
financial matters. The Government of Canada controlled key revenue sources and, 
since the early 2000s, had run a substantial surplus. They could choose to allocate 
this surplus as they wishedto debt reduction, tax cuts, or new spending. They could 
also choose how they would spend, either directly or through provincial transfers. If 
the Government of Canada chose to restructure how much (and how) they 
contributed to provincial postsecondary education and skills-training programs, they 
were completely free to do so, subject to notification constraints in the existing 
agreements. 
 
The key resource that the federal government had was the Employment Insurance 
(EI) account, which was under their exclusive control. Here they continued to collect 
substantially more money than was required to operate the programwith the 
accounting practices used during the period of this research, the EI account was 
routinely used to balance the government’s books (interview with stakeholder 
November 3, 2006). Within the existing Labour Market Development Agreement 
and Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities there were negotiated 
reporting and control mechanisms, and federal monitoring of provincial actions. 
Although provinces had repeatedly pressed the federal government to replace the 
contribution arrangement under the Labour Market Agreement for Persons with 
Disabilities with some sort of block transfer (in recognition of provincial autonomy 
in this area), the Government of Canada refused, on the basis that the uneven 
reporting records of different provinces needed to be corrected (interview with 
federal official November 8, 2006). This created intergovernmental tension as 
provinces were uncertain whether federal funding would be renewed and whether 
existing provincial programming could be continued. In the view of federal officials, 
these two labour market agreements with provinces were merely the means used by 
 159





Despite considering themselves the senior order of government, federal officials 
interviewed through this research recognized that in reality there was very little they 
could do in labour market policy that did not also involve provinces. They could not 
show national leadership on skills and learning without the explicit cooperation of 
provincial governments who controlled most of the policy levers that helped 
Canadians prepare for, find, and keep jobs. In provinces with devolved LMDAs the 
public employment service had effectively been placed under provincial control. On 
a pan-Canadian basis, the Government of Canada retained strength and delivery 
control only in youth and aboriginal programming. 
 
With the Consolidated Revenue cutbacks that were put in place in the mid-1990s, 
federal resources for non-EI clients became slim on the ground in co-managed 
provinces, and almost non-existent in provinces with devolved LMDAs. In Alberta, a 
postsecondary stakeholder viewed the federal withdrawal to be so significant that, in 
his view, the Government of Canada had slowly but surely “slipped out of the game” 
and now only “dabbled around the edges” in labour market policy (interview October 
6, 2006). The federal government could create awareness of problems, but did not 
have the tools to fix them. Even when federal officials acted unilaterally and created 
such agencies as the Foreign Credential Recognition Secretariat, Sector Councils, 
and the Canadian Council on Learning, for their action to be credible and meaningful 
they needed the active support and involvement of provinces. The Government of 
Canada could not force provincially mandated professional associations to recognize 
the credentials of out of province or out of country workers. It could not direct 
provincially-funded technical and vocational schools to use curricula developed by 
Sector Councils or train workers in particular trades or occupations. Given that most 
federal contacts with employers were electronic through the National Jobs Bank and 
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the EI system, the federal government no longer had the resources to connect 
individually with employers on their workplace training needs. 
 
The federal government did retain important levers to influence choices made by 
provinces, workers and employers. The key mechanism used to influence provinces 
was conditional grants, the presence of which then greatly increased federal-
provincial interdependence. The federal government could also spend directly on 
workers and employers through the tax system or issue grants through ‘individual 
learning accounts’; however during the period of this research these were viewed as 
high-cost initiatives with limited efficacy (interview with former federal official 
November 3, 2006). The Government of Canada was regularly pressured by 
stakeholders and employers to use the EI account for workplace based training or 
even citizen training; however, they were very reluctant to open up the account and 
refused to engage.  
 
From an immigration perspective, the federal government needed provinces to 
provide welcoming communities for newcomers, as well as jobs and advancement. 
They also needed provinces to help them deal with the backlog of over 800,000 
candidates seeking to immigrate to Canada. Through the Provincial Nominee 
Program, provinces were able to pre-select overseas candidates that met their labour 
market needs, saving federal time and processing. In the view of an Alberta official, 
the federal government was “keen, keen, keen to work with Alberta and get some 
positives here” (interview September 28, 2006). 
 
Federal officials interviewed through this research acknowledged that there was 
significant interdependence around a variety of fronts in labour market policy, yet 
were generally reluctant to work with provinces to clarify roles and responsibilities 
in the labour market. In their view, this was too simplistic, that putting 
responsibilities into water tight boxes and “sorting out the grey was a kind of fool’s 
game” (interview with federal official November 6, 2006). They believed that since 
each order of government had responsibilities in the area, the focus should not be on 
sorting out the boxes but on figuring out how to collaborate. This contrasted with the 
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view of provincial officials, who believed that the key reason the National Child 
Benefit had been a success was because federal and provincial governments first 
agreed on who did what (interview September 28, 2006)86. 
 
Operation of Intergovernmental Machinery 
 
There were a number of elements to consider in terms of intergovernmental 
structures and machinery: bilateral vs. multilateral; informal vs. formal; federal-
provincial vs. interprovincial processes. How secretariats were structured and under 
which forum issues were managed was also relevant. 
 
For the Government of Canada multilateral processes, if successful, could 
demonstrate national leadership on issues of concern to Canadians. For example, in 
2005, federal-provincial Immigration Ministers (except Quebec’s) agreed to a 
Strategic Direction on Immigration that identified a vision statement, principles, 
goals and objectives, and shared priorities (CICS 2005). Similarly Social Services 
Ministers (except Quebec’s) agreed to the National Child Benefit (1998), the 
National Children’s Agenda (2000), Early Childhood Development (2000), Early 
Learning and Child Care (2003), and a Labour Market Agreement for Persons with 
Disabilities (2003).  
 
If it had succeeded, the work undertaken in the summer of 2004 on a federal-
provincial Labour Market Framework Agreement would have provided the federal 
government with many positives. It would have demonstrated Government of 
Canada leadership on an issue of national concern and relevance. If implemented as 
the federal government had wished, it would have sanctioned a continuing federal 
role not only in labour market program funding, but also in program delivery. A pan-
Canadian or national framework would have made it easier for the federal 
government to negotiate bilateral arrangements with each province, and ensure some 
level of consistency in programming across the country. It was also more efficient to 
                                                 
86 With the National Child Benefit, it was agreed that the federal role would be income support, while 
provinces would be responsible for services and supports such as child care and supplementary 
medical.  
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have one large conversation than 13 separate individual conversations. Through the 
contacts and intelligence federal officials gained through multilateral working 
groups, they stayed on top of developments and played a meaningful facilitating and 
coordinating role. There were also some issues like labour mobility and credential 
recognition that for efficiency reasons could only be dealt with through a multilateral 
forum. 
 
On the other hand, multilateral forums could be high-risk, especially for federal 
Ministers and Deputy Ministers. One against 13 in the same room put federal 
political and administrative actors in the position of getting ‘beaten up’ by provinces. 
The federal Minister of Human Resources and Social Development Canada 
(HRSDC) stopped coming to FLMM meetings after 2003 to avoid confrontations 
with provinces over more devolved LMDAs, more money, and flexibility in terms of 
who could be served, preferring unilateral federal initiatives or bilateral arrangements 
(interview with provincial official October 4, 2006). Bilateral approaches had been 
successfully used with the initial Labour Market Development Agreements.  
 
Many bilateral arrangements entered into were specific to each province’s needs. As 
identified in Chapter Four, Canada and Alberta entered into a number of 
arrangements that were viewed as a success, particularly around immigration 
matters. Most of these were managed by federal officials who lived and worked in 
Alberta through ongoing positive interactions with their provincial colleagues. Some 
of these arrangements were institutionalized in the form of ongoing committees or 
agreements, while others were informal. 
 
Multilateral forums required significantly more institutional structure than bilateral 
arrangements. On labour market and social services issues the federal government 
recognized provinces as equal partners and meetings were co-chaired and secretariat 
costs co-funded. On immigration matters, however, the federal government saw itself 
in the dominant role, and federal officials were loath to make changes, as the existing 
institutional structure allowed them to control the agenda and process to their 
advantage.  
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This kind of federally dominated structure was not common; the FLMM structure of 
a rotating provincial co-chair and a provincially-managed secretariat was the norm. 
Every Ottawa-based federal official interviewed through this research considered the 
Forum of Labour Market Ministers to be the most dysfunctional federal-provincial 
forum that they had ever been involved with; suggestions ranged from “blow it up 
and start over” to “put in a permanent neutral secretariat” (interviews November 6, 7 
and 8, 2006). This view predated devolution; one federal official felt that, in her 
experience, during the mid to late 1990s: 
There was a lot of testosterone there, it was all men: and these were people 
with very stubborn positions who hadn’t been able to come to agreement for 
a very long time. They were very focused on their differences rather than 
what brought them together (interview November 8, 2006). 
 
Things seemed to get better during the early 2000s, but federal officials suggested 
that the intergovernmental climate deteriorated again when, in 2005, Ontario 
assumed the FLMM Secretariat role, and were unable to separate Ontario interests in 
securing a devolved LMDA from their role as neutral chair (interview November 6, 
2006). 
 
How and whether issues got assigned to multilateral forums was also significant. 
Some officials felt that the traditional federal-provincial cooperation on disability 
issues under Social Services Ministers would have been destroyed if the work were 
to move to the FLMM, a clearer policy match (interview with federal official 
November 8, 2006). Despite the importance of foreign credential recognition to the 
Government of Canada, there was no defined forum dealing with the issue. When a 
senior federal official was asked which table it should be assigned to, he suggested 
that every formal table should be avoided as none had clear jurisdiction and some 
(especially the FLMM) had longstanding federal-provincial animosity and 
dysfunction. In his view, the best approach was an informal one; instead of assigning 
the work to an existing forum, the federal government should use a “virtual network” 
of consultation (interview November 7, 2006). In the view of this federal official, all 
formal tables should have some element of informality, providing a ‘safe space’ for 
frank and open conversations. 
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Privy Council officials kept track of the wide range of structures in place to manage 
intergovernmental relations in different policy areas, and could not conclude that one 
worked better than another. While Social Services was considered a productive 
forum and the FLMM was not, it was not how they were organized or the people 
who were involved that made the difference. In the view of this official, it was some 
combination of federal dollars and a consensus on what needed to be done that made 
federal-provincial forums productive (interview November 6, 2006). Another federal 
official suggested it was a combination of the longevity of the forum, the experiences 
of the people at the table, the clarity of jurisdiction, and finding some safe space for 
frank conversations (interview November 7, 2006). 
 
Federal officials acknowledged the need for provinces and territories to meet 
separately from them and build common positions; however, this caused 
consternation when they were deliberately excluded, as was the case with 
postsecondary education. Although they found the informal linkages that they had to 
use with respect to the Council of Ministers of Education Canada frustrating, they 
did not expect it to change. They acknowledged that the successful coalition building 
that provinces had undertaken through the Council of the Federation made it much 
more difficult for the federal government to ignore provincial views. However, some 
questioned the usefulness of a ‘Council of the Federation’ that deliberately excluded 
the senior partner (interview November 6, 2006). 
 




Alberta officials considered the province to be constitutionally equal to the 
Government of Canada, and officials carefully used the term ‘order’ rather than 
‘level’ of government when referring to Canadian governments. In their view, when 
referring to social policy, the national government in Canada was the federal 
government and the provinces (interview October 4, 2006). With respect to labour 
market programming and devolution through the Labour Market Development 
 165
Agreements, Alberta officials did not believe that they were delivering federal 
programming as a delegated agent. In their view, they were a government exercising 
their jurisdiction and delivering the labour market programming that suited 
Albertans. They then charged the Government of Canada for those expenditures that 
fit within the parameters of the agreement.  
 
Not only was the Government of Alberta meeting federal LMDA reporting 
requirements, in the view of officials, they had gone beyond them by putting a 
provincial skills outcome and indicators initiative in place87. When the LMDA 
agreement was negotiated, Alberta refused to set up a joint management committee, 
fearing that this would result in a continuing federal role in overseeing provincial 
programming (interview with provincial official October 2, 2006). Although Alberta 
agreed to a joint federal-provincial LMDA evaluation committee, it refused to sign 
off the evaluation during 2005 when provincial officials could not account for the 
results. Insisting that the data be rerun, this delayed the evaluation release. Alberta 
expected its competence and expertise to be respected, and reacted negatively when 
federal officials belittled or ignored them (interview June 22, 2006).  
 
Alberta expected intergovernmental relations to be conducted in a way that reflected 
the equality of the federal government and provinces. It expected meetings to be co-
chaired and secretariats co-funded. It sought processes through which provinces 
could air their views and reach consensus before sitting down with the federal 
government. AHRE officials found the absence of these processes with respect to 
immigration issues frustrating. Alberta was reluctant to sign new agreements with the 
federal government (either through a renewal of the Labour Market Agreement for 
Persons with Disabilities or with respect to immigration matters) unless these 
changed from the past practice of contribution agreements to a new instrument that 
recognized provincial autonomy (interview with provincial official October 2, 2006). 
Whether this would extend to refusing federal money was unclear.  
 
                                                 





As far as Alberta officials were concerned, implementation of the LMDA 
significantly reduced interdependence in labour market matters between the federal 
and provincial governments as the LMDA allowed Alberta to assume the prime 
delivery role. After LMDA implementation, there were fewer reasons for federal and 
provincial officials to talk, and most conversations to ensure coordination 
(particularly with respect to youth, disability, and aboriginal programming) were 
handled at regional and local levels. Post-LMDA, the federal presence in labour 
market policy within the province had significantly diminished and the Government 
of Canada was only involved “at the margins” (interview with provincial official 
October 2, 2006). As far as Alberta officials were concerned, this resulted in 
significantly reduced irritants. 
 
Alberta had been involved to a considerable extent at the officials’ level in the 
development of the draft multilateral Labour Market Framework Agreement in 2004. 
Alberta did not object in principle to the idea of pan-Canadian frameworks88 in areas 
of provincial or shared jurisdiction. If this framework had been finalized and the 
federal funding parameters had been acceptable, Alberta would have participated as 
it would have provided the province flexibility in the use of its existing LMDA 
allocation, and additional federal resources for priority investments within the 
province (interview with provincial official October 4, 2006).  
 
There were many other areas where Government of Alberta officials recognized their 
interdependence with the Government of Canada around labour market matters. With 
skills and labour shortages, the province needed Citizenship and Immigration Canada 
to speed up processing of temporary foreign workers so that industry could find 
workers for available jobs. Changes needed to be made to CIC rules so that 
international students could be retained within the province. Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada needed to implement activation measures on reserve so that 
                                                 
88 Alberta played a leadership role in the development of similar frameworks in the children’s, 
disability, and health care areas. 
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aboriginal people in the province became more engaged in the labour market. With 
worker shortages Alberta needed to ensure that barriers to mobility were reduced to 
the greatest degree possible; here, they acknowledged that this required federal 
leadership89. Alberta was also interested in federal research, expertise, and 
facilitation capacity for best-practices information sharing to help the province learn 
about experiences in other provinces and other countries. Alberta was willing to 
allocate provincial resources to federal-provincial and interprovincial partnerships, in 
recognition of the value of joint work (interviews with provincial officials October 2 
and 4, 2006).  
 
Operation of Intergovernmental Machinery  
 
Alberta supported both multilateral and bilateral intergovernmental processes, and 
used each as deemed appropriate to serve its interests. While one Alberta official 
admitted that the FLMM “had not lived up to its promise when the feds won’t come 
to the party” (interview October 2, 2006), and that it had not been as productive as 
other forums like Social Services, there was no suggestion from Alberta officials to 
change or eliminate it. Alberta did not bring to the FLMM table the grievances of 
provinces without devolved LMDAs who wanted them. On the other hand, Alberta 
officials felt that developments with the Labour Market Partnership Agreements in 
2006 had destabilized the FLMM (interview October 4, 2006). They agreed with 
federal officials that the Government of Ontario had had difficulty in its FLMM 
Secretariat role, diverted from the collective interest first by its attempts to secure a 
LMDA, and later by its efforts to implement it. In response, Alberta officials 
informally took a stronger leadership role, in concert with officials from British 
Columbia, Nova Scotia, and Quebec (interview with provincial official September 
20, 2006). Since AHRE officials participated in many overlapping forums, this 
provided Alberta with expertise and a breadth of knowledge that was sometimes 
absent in other provinces. 
 
                                                 
89 Unlike Ontario, Alberta had not invested in the infrastructure to upgrade foreign trained workers to 
Canadian standards. In this regard, Alberta was viewed by other provinces in a negative light, as 
poachers of workers from their jurisdictions, which led to shortages in those provinces. 
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For example, it was not until AHRE took over the Immigration Ministers’ forum and 
immigration issues became a labour market concern that Alberta officials became 
dissatisfied with the existing multilateral arrangements. AHRE officials were 
accustomed to federal-provincial forums that were equal and collaborative, with 
routine processes for provinces to air their views and discuss approaches before they 
met with the federal government. In the view of an Alberta official: 
Immigration is a good example of when you don’t have an institutional 
structure. You get into more ad hoc issues, more [federal] unilateral decision 
making…there was no attempt on the part of the provinces to try and find a 
common position so federal-provincial conversations tended to be more 
about our differences so there was lots of squabbling at the table between 
provinces. There was not even a marginally united front so instead of federal-
provincial discussions there were 13 discussions going on. It’s a forum that 
allows the feds to do whatever they want, as they say we can’t get our act 
together (interview October 4, 2006).  
 
Given this frustration, Alberta officials found the informal and indirect tactic of 
supporting other provinces (especially British Columbia) to advocate for institutional 
change more fruitful than acting directly90. They also placed considerable emphasis 
on bilateral arrangements with the Government of Canada on immigration matters, as 
this provided them with more control. There were very positive longstanding 
relationships with federal officials working within the province. At the national level, 
Alberta convinced Ottawa officials that bilateral immigration ‘pilot’ projects to suit 
Alberta needs were warranted and could pave the way for changes on a national level 
(interview with provincial official October 2, 2006). 
 
Alberta officials saw the Council of the Federation as a way to facilitate 
interprovincial consensus. On the other hand, the institutional arrangements to deal 
with transversal issues such as skills and learning as identified by Premiers became 
challenging as the issue cut across two forums (CMEC and FLMM), one of which 
was interprovincial while the other was federal-provincial. Each forum secretariat 
tried to coordinate the work of their 13 respective provincial-territorial Ministries, 
some of whom were the same people. In Alberta, they were not the same people, 
                                                 
90 Alberta’s financial strength and poaching of skilled workers from other provinces had created 
tension, especially with the Maritimes and Saskatchewan. 
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creating greatly increased complexity. Since in many jurisdictions the CMEC 
Minister was also the FLMM Minister, labour market issues became just ‘add-ons’ to 
the more robust CMEC agenda, making it inefficient for jurisdictions whose Minister 
or Deputy Minister was not on CMEC to participate in discussions91. Since the 
federal government was not part of CMEC, provinces sometimes forgot to involve 
them in decision-making (interview with federal official November 6, 2006). The 
difficulty in separating labour market from postsecondary issues and their handling 
primarily within a CMEC context was another reason why there had been no federal-
provincial FLMM Ministers’ meetings since 2003. 
 
Alberta Learning preferred the existing informal, ad hoc arrangements for 
engagement with the federal government around postsecondary issues, and did not 
support any institutional changes that would have allowed direct federal participation 
in CMEC.  On the other hand, they admitted that there had been occasions when 
federal Ministers who had been invited (e.g., with respect to copy-write and 
aboriginal issues) refused to attend, characterizing Ottawa engagement with CMEC 
as like “pinning Jell-O to a wall” (interview October 2, 2006). A further complicating 
factor for Alberta Learning officials was the size and permanence of the CMEC 
Secretariat, which external stakeholders often considered the voice of provincial 
education. In Alberta Learning’s view, the secretariat should not be assuming this 
role; this was the responsibility of the CMEC Ministerial chair or the applicable 
provincial Minister.  
 
The Government of Alberta’s official position on the Canadian Council on Learning 
undermined the overall legitimacy of this federal agency: 
There is a concern that advocacy for a national agenda and involvement in 
pan-Canadian issues may lead to an imposition of federal priorities in areas 
of provincial jurisdiction (interview with provincial official June 12, 2007). 
 
This did not necessarily mean, however, that provincial officials refused to 
participate in activities hosted by the Canadian Council on Learning. In the view of a 
                                                 
91 For example, no Alberta nor British Columbia officials participated in a Deputy Ministers’ meeting 
in October 2006 because traveling all the way to St. John’s, Newfoundland for a two hour meeting 
was not worthwhile.  
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former provincial official, provinces were so protective of jurisdiction in education 
that it had immobilized the Council of Ministers of Education Canada, their own 
mechanism for interprovincial cooperation on education matters. When external 
reviewers commissioned by CMEC recommended more formal mechanisms for 
dialogue with the federal government (CMEC 2003), no action was taken because 
Alberta officials and Ministers did not want to change the status quo (interview with 
former provincial official May 16, 2007). In the view of this official, Alberta’s 
opposition to the Canadian Council on Learning was even stronger than Quebec’s, as 
Quebec was neutral whereas Alberta was obstructive. In her view, Alberta’s strength 
on holding the line on protecting provincial jurisdiction in education and 
postsecondary education from federal intrusion fluctuated according to the provincial 
budget surplus. Personality also played a role, with officials from International and 
Intergovernmental Affairs the most determined to exclude the Government of 
Canada. This supports Pollard’s earlier views that intergovernmental specialists 
concerned primarily with protecting jurisdiction make negotiations more difficult and 
conflict more likely (1986, p. 94). 
 




The federal cuts to provincial transfers in the mid-1990s were undertaken unilaterally 
and had a very negative impact upon provincial programming across Canada. From a 
provincial perspective this eroded the Government of Canada’s credibility, 
legitimacy, and hierarchical control over provinces in most aspects of social policy. 
 
The degree to which a hierarchical relationship existed between the Government of 
Canada and different provinces depended upon each individual province and the 
cards they held. Although Quebec and Ontario considered themselves as equals to 
the federal government, a provincial official thought that, if Labour Market 
Partnership Agreements had been implemented all around, the federal government 
would never have insisted on direct delivery of federal programs in Quebec like they 
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did in Ontario, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan (interview November 2, 2006). The 
‘have-not’ provinces were the most willing to admit the presence of a hierarchical 
relationship with the federal government. In the view of a provincial official 
interviewed through this research the smaller provinces were more than willing to 
give up jurisdiction for money, and cynically suggested that what they argued most 
about was “how to hold the begging cup” (interview November 2, 2006). Other than 
in Ontario and Quebec, there had been no high-profile federal-provincial disputes in 
the labour market policy domain. Although British Columbia had desired a devolved 
LMDA since it signed its co-managed agreement, in 1997, officials had relied on 
multilateral discussions and a hope that an Ontario breakthrough would kick-start the 
stalled LMDA negotiations in their province (interview with provincial official 




Interdependence on labour market matters varied considerably depending upon 
whether the province had devolved LMDA and immigration agreements. For 
provinces without a devolved LMDA, the main source of interdependence with the 
Government of Canada was that both governments operated parallel labour market 
programs, with overlap and duplication and an inability for the provincial 
government to create a coherent labour market system. For example, British 
Columbia, with a co-managed LMDA agreement, had had only a moderate amount 
of success in influencing federally run programs (interview with provincial official 
September 20, 2006). In the view of a British Columbia stakeholder, federal labour 
market programs designed in Ottawa did not work in their province. However, they 
perceived that there was very little they could do to alter federal directions (interview 
spring 2003). In the view of British Columbia officials, the lack of communication 
between federal and provincial officials within the province had been hugely 
exacerbated since the establishment of Service Canada, as provincial officials no 
longer saw the value in trying to influence their federal colleagues working in British 
Columbia when HRSDC Ottawa made all the decisions (interview with provincial 
official September 20, 2006). Officials in provinces with co-managed agreements 
 172
were hopeful that with Canada and Ontario agreement on a devolved Labour Market 
Development Agreement that multilateral federal-provincial relations through the 
FLMM would improve significantly, and this would provide them with the ability to 
also negotiate a devolved arrangement (interview with provincial official September 
20, 2006).  
 
Operation of Intergovernmental Machinery 
 
Like Alberta, other provinces used both multilateral and bilateral arrangements with 
the federal government to meet its needs. Quebec was generally reluctant to enter 
into any multilateral arrangements, preferring in most cases to negotiate exclusively 
bilateral agreements with the Government of Canada. Whereas other provinces were 
willing to negotiate national strategic frameworks with the federal government, 
Quebec generally required the addition of a paragraph or a footnote identifying that 
Quebec would not sign on to the arrangement and, if they participated at all, it would 
be on a bilateral basis (Noël 2000). Quebec participated (at least at a preliminary 
level) in the development of the multilateral Labour Market Framework Agreement, 
wanting to ensure its fair share of any funding allocated though a bilateral deal. On 
other issues it was a full participant. For example, during some of the period of this 
research, Quebec was co-chair of the Labour Mobility Coordinating Group and 
participated actively in both the Labour Market Information and Benefits and 
Services for Persons with Disabilities Working Groups (interview with provincial 
official November 8, 2006). 
 
In the words of a provincial official, the multilateral “group grope” (interview 
September 20, 2006) through the FLMM was clumsy, difficult, slow, and often sub-
optimal because prolonged debates ensued between 14 jurisdictions. Resolving 
issues bilaterally was often easier, quicker, and better suited to individual needs 
given provincial differences. However, the problem with bilateral deals was a sense 
of unfairness (as was illustrated with the Labour Market Partnership Agreements); in 
addition some issues could not be dealt with on a bilateral basis. Multilateral 
processes were made even more complex by provincial organizational changes, often 
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necessitating the participation of more than one Ministry on a multilateral forum92. 
This made authority to commit on behalf of their government more challenging.  
 
Ontario and British Columbia officials agreed with Alberta that joint processes 
through the existing FLMM-CMEC structures were too complex, including 
consideration of where issues were assigned93 (interviews September 20, 2006 and 
November 2, 2006). Although officials from these provinces acknowledged that the 
strength of the CMEC Secretariat was its expertise and ability to sustain work over 
the long term, having a similar permanent FLMM Secretariat would not have been 
supported for fear that it would take over leadership from provinces, as CMEC was 
perceived to have done (interview with provincial officials September 20, 2006, and 
November 2, 2006).  
 
In the absence of robust multilateral institutional structures to manage interaction in 
labour market policy, bilateral coordination (like in Alberta) was the norm, although 
this varied from one province to another and from one location to another. For 
example, Ontario was the only province where social assistance and welfare to work 
programs were under municipal jurisdiction. Given federal-provincial squabbling 
during the period of this research, some Ontario municipalities felt compelled to 
provide leadership. With over 5000 human service agencies, the City of Toronto 




From this summary it can be seen that there was general agreement between officials 
from the Governments of Canada, Alberta, Ontario, and British Columbia on some 
elements of how hierarchy, interdependence and the operation of the 
intergovernmental machinery impacted their relationship. On the other hand, there 
were also significant differences of opinion. 
                                                 
92 For example, Alberta and British Columbia each had three Ministers who sat on the Social Services 
Ministers’ Forum.  
93 For example, international vocational education and training issues were managed by CMEC, not 
the FLMM. 
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There seemed to be no disagreement that Canadian governments were interdependent 
in labour market policy, and that both orders of government had the legitimacy to 
act. Interdependence was particularly evident with respect to labour market 
information, labour mobility, as well as services provided to EI clients, employed 
workers, and those who were experiencing problems in accessing the labour market 
(immigrants, the disabled, aboriginal people, older workers etc.). There seemed to be 
nothing from a constitutional perspective that would have precluded agreement by all 
parties (except perhaps Quebec) on some sort of a pan-Canadian federal-provincial 
labour market framework (as had been identified by stakeholders and as had been 
attempted through the Labour Market Partnership Agreement), as long as this did not 
touch on postsecondary education and training issues. These were viewed by 
provinces as areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction, and had been jealously 
protected from federal involvement for the past 50 years. 
 
There was also no disagreement on the need for both multilateral and bilateral 
mechanisms of accommodation, and that jurisdictions should have the flexibility to 
use whatever mechanisms best suited. That provinces needed space for 
interprovincial accommodation and consensus building before negotiations were 
undertaken with the federal government also seemed to be acknowledged and 
accepted.  
 
It was in terms of hierarchy and control over the sector where differences between 
governments in Canada were most evident. This was rooted in fundamental 
differences of opinion about the nature of Canadian federalism, and the degree to 
which each government could be considered sovereign within its area of jurisdiction.  
 
Of the three provinces examined through this research, Alberta was the most insistent 
on provincial autonomy. This came from the province’s sense of continuing 
grievance against Canadian governments at the centre, and was exhibited in 
disagreements over reporting, evaluation and audit requirements for labour market 
agreements. Alberta successfully resisted federal requests for a joint management 
committee to manage its devolved LMDA, and insisted the loudest of all 
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jurisdictions that its government reported to Albertans and not to the Government of 
Canada (interview with provincial official October 2, 2006). To protect and promote 
its autonomy it was willing and able to provide leadership on pan-Canadian issues, 
and invested considerable civil service time, energy, and expertise in supporting the 
work of multilateral intergovernmental forums. Alberta officials often found that 
supporting other provinces (especially its neighbour British Columbia) was the most 
effective approach, given the sensitivities of other provinces with more limited 
resources. Bilateral arrangements with both the federal government and other 
provinces were also pursued if these were perceived to be better suited to provincial 
needs. 
 
The federal government used its own particular techniques to assert power and 
control over the sector. On federal transfers to provinces it insisted on reporting 
mechanisms that were common across the country, ensuring some level of 
consistency and transparency so that citizens could see how federal funding was 
being spent. Unlike the multilateral action that Alberta preferred, federal officials 
preferred bilateral or unilateral action, sometimes sidestepping established 
multilateral forums if these were perceived as not meeting their needs. Federal 
preference for a ‘virtual forum’ to manage foreign credential recognition was a good 
example of this approach, demonstrating how, as Noël (2002) suggests, not investing 
in formal institutional structures was a prerogative of power. Instead of using or 
modifying existing institutional structures like the FLMM or CMEC, the federal 
government chose to establish its own stand-alone organizations like the Canadian 
Council on Learning, providing (like the Canadian Labour Force Development Board 
in the 1980s) an institutional mechanism under federal control for stakeholders to 
engage in conversations with governments on labour market policy. In addition, by 
keeping Labour Market Development Agreements highly asymmetrical and refusing 
to enter into further devolution arrangements, federal officials ensured that provincial 




The fact that provincial interests were not aligned was primarily because, during 
most of the period of this research, six jurisdictions (including the powerful 
provinces Ontario and British Columbia) did not have devolved LMDA agreements. 
As a result of the incomplete devolution arrangements, these provinces had reduced 
strength and capacity in the labour market policy domain because the federal 
government still directly delivered labour market services to its citizens. The key 
priority for these jurisdictions during the later period of this research was to wrest 
this control from the federal government by securing devolved LMDA agreements, 
allowing them to acquire the tools they felt they needed in order to implement a 
coherent labour market system under provincial (not federal) control94.  
 
Character and Workability of the Government of Canada-Government of 
Alberta Relationship 
 
All of these factors influenced how the intergovernmental machinery in the labour 
market policy domain operated. In the final section of this chapter, the character and 
workability of intergovernmental relations in the labour market, immigration and 
disability areas are assessed in turn. This was done by seeking evidence from the 
interview data on the degree to which trust ties between government officials were 
evident. The analysis starts with an assessment of the relationship between the 
Government of Canada and the prime case study province, Alberta. 
 
Labour Market Issues  
 
For trust ties to develop people must be willing to engage, have the authority to 
engage, and engage regularly, either face-to-face, through e-mail 
correspondence/letters, or in telephone conversations. People need to know whom to 
                                                 
94 For example, at a Skills through Partnerships Symposium held in Toronto in 2006, Alberta and 
Quebec officials provided Ontario stakeholders and government officials with reflections on their 
positive experiences with devolved LMDAs. Quebec in particular highlighted the importance of their 
unique partnership arrangements, including a provincial Commission, 17 regional councils, sector 
based committees, and advisory job retention committees for disadvantaged groups. These were all 




engage with and the process under which this engagement takes place. When they do 
engage, values like honesty, integrity, and mutual respect then come into play.  
 
Trust ties are also facilitated by a sense of shared objectives and goals, and during 
the early years covered by this research the Government of Canada and the 
Government of Alberta clearly shared similar goals. They both wanted to reach an 
LMDA agreement and implement it in the most expeditious fashion possible. They 
were also both committed to their partnership working, in order to achieve the best 
possible labour market outcomes for Albertans. As the first province off the mark, 
Alberta was keen to demonstrate its capacity to assume the new labour market 
responsibilities and integrate federal programming and staff into the provincial 
system. Before devolution, the bilateral relationship between federal and provincial 
officials working within the province had been collaborative. A senior federal 
official working in Edmonton provided this perspective: 
I believe that the Alberta Government runs the devolution arrangements 
better than anyone else in Canada. Going back to 1996, when Alberta first 
signed on as the first province with an LMDA, I see no animosity from my 
staff around this…there may have been in the early years, I don’t 
know…that’s probably because we learned to partner with them as opposed 
to compete with them (interview October 2, 2006). 
 
On a bilateral basis the relationship on labour market issues between the Government 
of Canada and the Government of Alberta was assessed as collaborative and highly 
workable. From the interview information there was no indication of hierarchy on a 
bilateral basis. Instead, there was evidence that Alberta and federal officials 
geographically located within the province shared similar goals involving both the 
negotiation and implementation of the LMDA agreement, and there was routinized 
engagement post-LMDA through the Canada-Alberta Liaison Committee (as well as 
on an informal basis), all built on the positive history that had been put in place 
through the Canada-Alberta Service Centres. Civil servants shared professional 
values and norms as they had worked in the policy field for many years, there was 
stability among the key players, and evidence of mutual respect, civility and 
tolerance. With the implementation of the LMDA interdependence had been 
substantially reduced, allowing each order of government to focus on their core 
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responsibilities. The only area where there was evidence that workability was 
somewhat diminished was in youth programming, where a more competitive 
relationship prevailed. Regional HRSDC officials had no capacity to enter into a 
more formal arrangement with Alberta that might have reduced some of this 
competitiveness, as the parameters for these type of agreements were determined in 
Ottawa.  
 
The story was quite different on a multilateral basis. Post-LMDA goals were not 
shared either between orders of government or between provinces, given the 
checkerboard arrangements across the country. But even more significant to the 
development of trust ties was organizational ‘churn’ in both federal and provincial 
governments, making it very difficult for people to form enduring relationships. 
Changes at the federal level in Ottawa were considerable, particularly after 2003, 
when Human Resources Development Canada was split into Social Development 
Canada and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada and then re-
combined two years later to become Human Resources and Social Development 
Canada. Many new staff came on board in Ottawa and provincial officials often did 
not know who to engage with (interview with provincial official September 26, 
2006). The political transition from Prime Minister Chrétien to Prime Minister 
Martin (with revolving door Ministers) and later the presence of a minority Liberal 
government made securing political direction more difficult. In addition, the spin off 
of Service Canada95 from HRDC disrupted many longstanding federal-provincial 
relationships within each province, centralized policy making in Ottawa, and made 
relationships between federal officials at the regional and central levels more 
complex (interview with federal official September 26, 2008). Provinces were not 
immune to similar dynamics, with regular elections and changes in political 
direction, organizational structures, and political actors96: A provincial official 
described the challenges involved when multilateral intergovernmental work takes 
place over a long period of time with constantly changing actors: 
                                                 
95 While Service Canada delivered HRSDC programs, they did not deliver CIC programs.  
96 For example, over the period of this research Alberta went from having one Ministry responsible 
for Social Services Ministers to three. 
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Every time you meet, a quarter of the crowd is new and two provinces are 
represented by people who are sitting in for them who either pursue their own 
personal interests or just say that they are there to take notes as they are not 
senior enough to participate in the discussion (interview November 2, 2006).  
 
With respect to the Forum of Labour Market Ministers, since there had been no 
Ministers’ meetings since 2003, most business was conducted through 
teleconferences between Senior Officials or face-to-face Deputy Ministers’ meetings 
tacked onto CMEC meetings. The lack of regular face-to-face meetings at all levels 
weakened already tenuous trust ties caused by a historical lack of success for the 
forum, exacerbated by events such as the failure to negotiate devolved LMDAs in all 
jurisdictions that wanted them after 1998, the failure to negotiate a federal-provincial 
Labour Market Framework Agreement in 2004, and unilateral federal action on these 
agreements in three jurisdictions that “broke ranks and knifed the others in the back” 
(interview with provincial official June 26, 2006). With a weak institutional structure 
involving a rotating secretariat led after 2005 by distracted Ontario Government 
officials and additional organization churn at both the federal and provincial levels, 
building and sustaining trust ties among government officials on a multilateral basis 
became extremely challenging.  
 
This did not mean that relationships between officials involved with the Labour 
Market Information Working Group or the Labour Mobility Working Group were 
not positive. These groups continued to operate underneath the radar and produced 
some positive work. However, in the absence of political will, action on labour 
mobility was particularly difficult, and it took the involvement of Premiers and the 
Internal Trade Ministers to kick start this work again (interview with provincial 
official October 4, 2006). 
 
The widening of the intergovernmental agenda to straddle two intergovernmental 
forums also impacted workability. When ‘skills’ more broadly defined emerged as a 
key issue at both the federal and provincial levels, it included both postsecondary and 
labour market issues, necessitating the involvement of the Council of Ministers of 
Education Canada as well as the Forum of Labour Market Ministers. In Alberta, 
responsibility for these forums was divided between the Learning Ministry (CMEC) 
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and Human Resources and Employment (FLMM), whereas in many other provinces 
the same Minister and officials were on both forums.  
 
Split responsibility made managing the work in Alberta particularly difficult, not just 
organizationally but also strategically. Alberta Learning was loath to work with the 
Government of Canada, whereas AHRE accepted the need for federal-provincial 
cooperation (interview with provincial official October 4, 2006). It is difficult to 
build trust ties when interdependence between governments is not acknowledged, 
and some parties within one government do not wish to engage with the other 
government at all.  
 
On the basis of this evidence, it was concluded that multilateral relationships 
between the Government of Canada and the Government of Alberta with respect to 
labour market issues dealt with through the Forum of Labour Market Ministers were 
competitive, with a low degree of workability. Almost all of the features of a 
competitive relationship were evident, especially when the federal government 
refused to implement further LMDAs after the initial round, and acted on their own 
through the Innovation Strategy. These included lack of communication, unilateral 
federal as well as provincial action, as well as governments trying to ‘one-up’ each 
other, gain credit and avoid blame. The only area where this behaviour did not occur 
was with respect to labour market information and, to a lesser extent, with respect to 
labour mobility. 
 
In terms of workability, there was evidence of a lack of shared goals, unwillingness 
by both partners to engage at the Ministerial level, an inability to minimize past 
grievances, and ‘churn’ among the key players. An expanded agenda which brought 
a new actor (CMEC) into the relationship was also problematic. Not only were the 
interdepartmental processes within Alberta challenging, the interprovincial processes 
to manage the agenda became more complex when key Alberta players in AHRE 
were excluded from deliberations as they did not participate in CMEC. Without an 
acceptable mechanism for both CMEC and the FLMM to connect with the 
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Government of Canada, federal officials also felt excluded from discussions that 




From the interviews undertaken for this research, the bilateral relationship between 
the Governments of Canada and Alberta on disability issues managed within the 
province of Alberta was, overall, considered collaborative and highly workable. 
Officials from both orders of government considered themselves as equal in the 
relationship, and sought mechanisms to coordinate disability programming within the 
province. Although the implementation of Service Canada had some negative 
impact, staff continuity within both governments and the presence of ongoing 
institutional structures such as the Labour Market Agreement for Persons with 
Disabilities and the Canada-Alberta Liaison Committee supported positive ongoing 
federal-provincial interaction for most of the period of this research. 
 
There was also a generally positive relationship on a multilateral basis on disability 
issues. Here, Social Services Ministers (not the FLMM) played the leadership role, 
and the interview evidence indicated that trust ties remained strong throughout most 
of the period of this research. In the view of a federal official, “the personal 
commitment of the Deputies makes a huge difference…there is so much goodwill 
despite all the problems” (interview November 8, 2006). This goodwill was 
attributable to shared past successes that had benefited both orders of government 
(e.g., the National Child Benefit and Early Childhood Education initiatives), a 
commitment to relationship-building, and perhaps also to the fact that social services 
attracted more women at senior levels (interview with provincial official September 
20, 2006). Trust ties were also more intense because there were more opportunities to 
engage, and Deputy Ministers specifically committed themselves to the importance 
of federal-provincial relationships, addressing problems that had occurred through 
the 2005 Intergovernmental Cooperation in Social Services Matters Protocol 
(interview with provincial official September 29, 2006). This experience in the 
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Social Services sector demonstrates the role that individuals and personality played 
in facilitating intergovernmental relationships.  
 
Julie Simmons reached a similar conclusion in her examination of the workings of 
the Social Services Ministers’ forum with respect to the development of the National 
Child Benefit. When compared to the Canada Wide Accord on Environmental 
Harmonization (through the Council of Ministers of the Environment) and the 
National Forest Strategy (through the Canadian Council of Forest Ministers), in her 
view: 
The agency of individuals was a factor contributing to compromise and 
consensus in the case of the NCB, where the approach of Minister Pettigrew, 
and the personalities and ideas of key federal and provincial officials helped 
establish a sense of trust and camaraderie at the Ministers’ table and within 
the working group (Simmons 2004,  p. 305). 
 
Although this research did not examine the National Child Benefit, since the Benefits 
and Services for Persons with Disabilities Working Group was under Social Services 
Ministers, the fact that the relationship context was generally positive was 
significant. With respect to the working group itself, under the leadership of Alberta, 
British Columbia and key federal officials, trust ties in the earlier period of this 
research were strong and the group produced a number of deliverables (interview 
with provincial official October 29, 2006). However, in the later period of this 
research organizational churn at both the federal and provincial levels impacted 
relationships as people and responsibilities changed. An Alberta official commented 
on the differences between the Social Services and FLMM forums and the 
significance of personalities to intergovernmental work: 
Social Services was always the nice collaborative table where things got 
done, whereas the FLMM was dysfunctional and nothing got done…The [new 
federal Deputy Minister] came to Social Services with a strong 
confrontational FLMM approach and it was amazing how in a few short 
meetings the table got poisoned …the disability file [has become] all games 
(interview October 2, 2006). 
 
Despite these recent changes, the author concluded that overall the multilateral 
relationship between the governments of Canada and Alberta with respect to 
disability labour market issues was collaborative and moderately workable during 
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the period of this research. There was a willingness to engage, routinized and regular 
processes for engagement, relative stability for most of the period among the key 
players, a sense of shared policy goals and directions through the agreements that 
had been entered into, and few past grievances. In this file, personality, as well as a 
lack of shared goals in an important area (that is, differences of opinion as to how 
provinces accounted to the Government of Canada for federal funding), seemed to be 
key factors that negatively impacted workability. 
 
Immigration Issues  
 
As outlined in Chapter Four, there were a variety of formal agreements and 
committees that supported federal-provincial interaction on a bilateral basis around 
immigration issues in Alberta, involving settlement services, temporary foreign 
workers, a provincial nominee program and international students. Although initially 
these arrangements were worked out between Alberta officials and federal officials 
living in the province, as immigration issues became a higher priority on the 
provincial agenda, federal officials living in Ottawa also became involved. There was 
no indication of hierarchy in the relationship, with both orders of government 
acknowledging their interdependence and the need to work together if immigration 
was to assist with Alberta labour shortages. On a bilateral basis, there was evidence 
of a collaborative and highly workable relationship, even with the change over in 
provincial staff when Ministerial responsibility shifted from Alberta Learning to 
Alberta Human Resources and Employment in 2003.  
 
Consistent with what has been found in employment and disability issues, once 
relationships became multilateral the character and workability changed. The federal-
provincial relationship in immigration matters was quite different from skills or 
social services as in this area the Government of Canada played a more dominant 
role, chairing Ministers’ meetings, deciding agendas, and controlling the secretariat. 
Given federal control of the sector, on a multilateral basis, this was a cooperative, as 
opposed to a collaborative, relationship.  
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In terms of workability, the presence or absence of trust ties within the multilateral 
Immigration Ministers’ Forum was more difficult to judge. It was only in the past 
few years of this research that provinces started to seriously engage on a multilateral 
basis and Ministers started to meet, so there was neither a positive nor a negative 
history. Engagement became more regular as skills shortages enhanced provincial 
interest in this policy area. Generally speaking, there were shared goals and 
objectives, given Ministers’ 2005 agreement on strategic directions, but not 
necessarily agreement on how to get there (interview with provincial official October 
4, 2006). The Canada-Ontario agreement which had provided more money than what 
was available to Alberta caused concern. Quebec did not participate on a multilateral 
basis. There was no shared view on ongoing institutional structures, with the 
Government of Canada’s view of a “virtual forum” for dealing with foreign 
credential recognition at odds with Alberta’s more formal co-chaired preferences. 
Although trust ties appeared to be strong on a multilateral basis, the interviews 
undertaken for this research provided evidence that, unless a more equal federal-
provincial institutional structure was put in place, provinces like Alberta would 
disengage on a multilateral basis and focus, like Quebec, on exclusively bilateral 
arrangements (interview with provincial official October 4, 2006). For these reasons 





Figure 5 summarizes the Government of Canada-Government of Alberta 
relationships that have been outlined above. 
 
Figure 5: Character and Workability of Canada-Alberta Relationships 
 
Relationship Character of IGR Workability of IGR 
Labour market issues bilateral Collaborative High 
Labour market issues multilateral Competitive Low 
Disability issues bilateral Collaborative High 
Disability issues multilateral Collaborative Moderate 
Immigration issues bilateral Collaborative High 
Immigration issues multilateral Cooperative Moderate 
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All bilateral relationships between the Government of Canada and the Government 
of Alberta were considered collaborative and highly workable, based on evidence of 
a lack of hierarchy and strong trust ties. This included interaction between Alberta 
officials and their federal colleagues who worked within the province, as well as 
Alberta interaction with federal officials living in Ottawa. The interviews elicited 
comments providing evidence of mutual respect, recognition of interdependence, 
civility, and tolerance. This could be attributed to shared goals, a historically positive 
relationship, the capacity of Alberta and regional federal officials actors to engage, 
and to positive experiences with various agreements, including the devolved LMDA, 
the Labour Market Agreement for Persons with Disabilities, and Canada-Alberta 
Statement of Understanding on immigration matters. These were all supplemented 
with informal engagement at all levels. The only exception to this appeared to be 
with respect to youth programming, where competition between governments 
continued. 
 
It was noteworthy that none of the relationships in the policy areas reviewed were 
characterized as coercive. Here the actions or inaction of one government force 
another to do something that they would not otherwise have done. During the period 
1996-2006, the federal government certainly took some unilateral actions that the 
province did not like, but these did not force the Government of Alberta to change 
what it was already doing. What provincial governments complained most about 
during this period was federal inaction. While provinces may have taken action in 
the absence of federal funding, these were provincial responsibilities to begin with97. 
 
No multilateral relationships were assessed as highly workable, with both 
immigration and disability issues considered moderate and labour market considered 
low. What was particularly noteworthy was the highly competitive government-to-
government relationship in the labour market area that prevailed during the period of 
this research, continuing the pre-devolution legacy in this policy area. 
                                                 
97 An example of coercive action outside the scope of this study was when Canada extended maternity 
benefits through EI from six to 12 months. Provinces were forced to decide whether to change their 
employment standards legislation to coincide with the extended benefit period, and eventually all did.  
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Workability of Government of Canada Relationships with Other Provinces  
 
Given that interviewing in British Columbia and Ontario was not extensive, 
conclusions on the workability of intergovernmental relationships in those 
jurisdictions were more tentative and could only be drawn in the labour market 
policy area (i.e. not in disability or immigration policy). For the same reasons as 
outlined for the Canada-Alberta relationship, on a multilateral basis the relationship 
was characterized as competitive and workability was assessed as low. However, on a 
bilateral basis there were differences, rooted in the specifics of the LMDA 
negotiations that had occurred in each province.  
 
British Columbia had voluntarily agreed to a co-managed LMDA agreement in 1997, 
while under New Democratic Party rule. When the Liberals assumed power in 2001, 
although there may have been a desire at the officials’ level to change the terms of 
their agreement, Premier Campbell refused to engage in federal-provincial fights. In 
contrast, no LMDA agreement had been concluded in Ontario, and governments had 
publicly disagreed at the highest level over the agreement terms. A former Ontario 
official suggested that the longstanding disagreement between Ontario and Ottawa 
over ‘fair-share’ was exacerbated by a lack of personal chemistry between Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien and Premier Mike Harris (interview November 1, 2006). 
Certainly relationships in that province did not begin to heal until Paul Martin 
became Prime Minister, in 2003, and the Liberals in Ontario under Dalton McGinty 
took over from the Conservative Harris government.  
 
The bilateral relationship in British Columbia was assessed as moderately workable 
whereas in Ontario bilateral workability was assessed as low. As a result of the 
Canada-Ontario agreement to a devolved LMDA and a new immigration agreement 
late in 2005, relationship tension began to ease during 2006. A stakeholder in Ontario 
thought that it would take time and effort for federal and provincial labour market 
officials working in Ontario to overcome the previous ten years of animosity and 
rebuild trust ties (interview November 10, 2006).  
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This research did not extend to examining federal-provincial relations beyond these 
three provinces. As already outlined, federal officials commented that, in their view, 
devolution eased the tension in the Canada-Quebec relationship, leading to improved 
collaboration and increased workability. Provincial officials who were interviewed 
through this research suggested that workability in other provinces without devolved 
LMDAs (Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland and Labrador) was 
similar to that experienced in British Columbia, and that relationships in provinces 
with devolved LMDAs (Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and New Brunswick) were similar 
to the Alberta and Quebec experience (interview October 2, 2006). Additional 




The actor-centered institutional approach adopted for this thesis suggests that 
intergovernmental administrative actors are constrained not only by the institutional 
structures within which they work, but also by history. These constraints are 
mitigated by the ability of these actors to change institutional rules and arrangements 
to those that might suit them better. In the course of this examination of 
intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in Canada, evidence has been 
provided of the role played by institutions (or lack thereof); however, the analysis 
also demonstrates the difficulty that actors have had in changing the game that has 
been historically set. 
 
These constraints were more keenly felt with respect to multilateral, as opposed to 
bilateral relations, where there are more jurisdictions involved and individual actors 
can exert less control. It is extremely difficult for one jurisdiction to attempt to 
change an existing multilateral forum, such as the FLMM or CMEC, given path 
dependence and the presence of multiple veto points. The siloed nature of the work 
also meant that officials in one forum were not always aware of what other forums 
were doing and how their work overlapped. Given the organic nature of the work and 
how these forums had evolved over time, in general participants tried to do the best 
they could with the structures available to them. 
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While workability and the presence of trust ties on a multilateral basis through the 
Forum of Labour Market Ministers were generally at a low ebb over the period of 
this research, this contrasted with more collaborative relationships in the Social 
Services and Immigration sectors. However, at least in these three policy areas 
institutional structures existed to support intergovernmental dialogue. In 
postsecondary and skills matters, provinces refused to develop structures to facilitate 
federal-provincial dialogue, despite longstanding federal involvement in the policy 
domain.  
 
As identified in Chapter One of this thesis, the author was particularly interested in 
discovering why the federal-provincial relationship through the Forum of Labour 
Market Ministers was so much more competitive than that of Social Services or 
Immigration Ministers. This question was posed to all Canadian officials who were 
interviewed for this study. Weighing the evidence, the author concluded that the 
prime reason for continuing intergovernmental conflict and competition in this policy 
area was due to jurisdiction and money. Personality played a very minor role. 
 
In immigration policy there was an understanding and acceptance of federal and 
provincial roles and responsibilities. In general, provinces were not about to open 
missions overseas to select immigrants. Similarly, in social services the federal 
government realized that it could only become involved through its spending power 
or the tax system. According to a federal official: 
We know that if we want to be active in any area of [social services], because 
of the role of provincial governments, we have to work with provinces…there 
is a symbiotic relationship (interview November 8, 2006). 
 
In contrast, in labour market policy jurisdiction remained unclear, with both orders of 
government confident that they could, from a constitutional perspective, act 
legitimately on their own. Federal legitimacy to act in this policy area was not only 
through the federal spending power, it also came from the 1940 constitutional 
amendment giving the Government of Canada a role in unemployment insurance and 
the public employment service. Provincial legitimacy was through constitutional 
responsibility for education and training. There were certainly nuances around all of 
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this given the use of words such as ‘training’, ‘labour force development’, and 
‘learning’. That there were so many words available to describe labour market 
policy, and that they were all subject to interpretation, made jurisdiction even more 
unclear.  
 
Most of the conflict over jurisdiction had been in relation to the federal government 
intruding on what was perceived to be provincial jurisdiction. This was what the 
LMDA offer was designed to address. If Labour Market Development Agreements 
had been implemented as offered, it could be speculated that this provincial concern 
would have eased and the battle over jurisdiction turned down. Instead, the federal 
government almost immediately had second thoughts and it took another eight years 
after the initial offer before the Government of Canada finally agreed to resume 
negotiations with Ontario.  
 
There was no evidence from this research that provinces claimed exclusive 
jurisdiction over labour market policy, as they did over postsecondary education and 
skills training. All seemed to agree that there was a legitimate federal role, especially 
as it related to passive labour market policy (through Employment Insurance), as 
well as labour mobility and labour market information. On the other hand, there was 
no evidence of any conversations between governments about what role the 
Government of Canada could productively play in the labour market policy field 
beyond these areas. Federal officials in particular were unwilling to engage in 
dialogue around jurisdiction or attempt to clarify roles and responsibilities.  
 
There were only a few policy documents with some measure of legitimacy that dealt 
with this issue. The Charlottetown Accord asserted that the federal government 
would have a role in “the establishment of national policy objectives for national 
aspects of labour market development” (Charlottetown Accord 1992), but it was 
never passed. The Alberta LMDA articulated a federal role in “national emergencies, 
activities in support of interprovincial labour mobility, national sectoral councils, the 
operation of the national labour market information, and national labour market 
exchange systems, and innovative projects” (Alberta LMDA 1996). Whether there 
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were other useful federal roles that all could agree on, and how these could be 
operationalized (beyond the existing work underway on labour market information 
and labour mobility) was never raised through the interviews conducted for this 
research. Conversations between governments on pan-Canadian issues perceived to 
be in the national interest, national policy objectives or targets, or how Canadian 
labour market performance overall might be improved through federal action were 
not held, despite multiple calls from stakeholders. During the period of this research, 
the problems of skills shortages, labour shortages, poaching workers across 
jurisdictions, credential recognition, employer underinvestment in workplace 
training, and inadequate access to active measures for vulnerable workers were only 
minimally dealt with in the context of what should be done, and focused almost 
exclusively on who should do it. This inevitably led to squabbles over how things 
should be done, including the use of federal money. 
 
Conflict over money has dominated federal-provincial discourse in this policy area 
every since labour exchanges and training facilities were set up in the early 1900s 
and was pervasive throughout the period of this research. Since the federal 
government believed it had jurisdiction, if it was going to spend it then asked itself 
whether it should spend directly or through provincial transfers. When it spent 
directly, provinces got annoyed and accused the Government of Canada of not 
respecting provincial jurisdiction. When it tried to cooperate with provinces, the 
largest and most powerful refused to participate unless money was put on the table, 
and then the issue was how much and under what conditions would provinces trade 
provincial jurisdiction for federal money. 
 
This debate was further exacerbated by provincial differences. Some provinces 
wanted the money to be shared equally (on a per capita basis), while others 
maintained that equity and provincial need must be taken into account. Not only was 
the division of the money problematic, the presence or absence of federal conditions 
was another divisive issue. Labour market policy was not covered by the historic 
transfers, which have now become largely unconditional. Financial transfers in 
labour market policy have historically been conditional and remained so during the 
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period of this research, a stance that was resisted by provinces like Alberta which 
insisted on block funding that respected its autonomy as a separate order of 
government. This in turn conflicted with federal imperatives around accountability 
for federal spending.  
 
A variety of other reasons contributed to FLMM conflict during the period of this 
research: a weak stakeholder community; ambivalence about any government role in 
this policy area; inconclusive reports on the effectiveness of labour market 
interventions; lack of shared federal-provincial success; and the complexity and 
opaqueness of the policy area. The presence of close connections to postsecondary 
education policy, an area historically considered by provinces as off-limits for 
federal-provincial cooperation, was another reason for FLMM conflict. Certainly 
changing organizational structures at both the federal and provincial levels were also 
a factor, as well as the lack of compelling issues, given that unemployment was at its 
lowest level in decades. But these reasons do not account for the fact that conflict in 
labour market policy has been a fact of Canadian political history since the early 
1900s. Given that both orders of government can legitimately operate in this policy 
domain, and provinces fight for their share of federal money, labour market policy in 
Canada continues to be competitive, despite devolved Labour Market Development 
Agreements. When the policy area is competitive, the institutional structure set up to 
manage federal-provincial relations (the FLMM) struggles to succeed.  
 
One could ask why any of this is important. It is important because the order of 
government responsible for labour market policy and how relations are managed on a 
pan-Canadian basis inevitably impacts labour market policy outcomes, either 
positively or negatively. Alberta and Quebec officials (as well as provincial 
stakeholders) were convinced that having the province responsible for labour market 
policy had improved provincial and local decision-making, allowing labour market 
actions to mesh with local problems and local institutions. Certainly the quote by 
Maria David-Evans at the beginning of this chapter summarized the provincial view 
that interprovincial competition in education was positive and national management 
bred mediocrity. Federal officials did not seem as convinced, and suggested that 
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there was no particular evidence through the LMDA evaluations that devolution had 
had either a positive or negative impact on local labour market outcomes (interview 
with federal official November 6, 2006). It was hard for others to judge this except 
anecdotally, given the lack of data, research and evaluation information in this area. 
 
Although local outcomes may have improved with devolution, the trade-off that was 
made was any sense of the national aspects of the labour market and Canadian 
performance overall. Rodney Haddow has written extensively on labour market 
issues in Canada. In his view, federalism and labour market policy in Canada have 
been “bad for each other”: 
The presence of both levels of government in the labour market field has 
rendered policy making in the field sub-optimal by fostering service 
duplication, hindering policy change and limiting program coordination. 
Shared jurisdiction has also aggravated intergovernmental conflict, thereby 
undermining Canadian federalism in general (Haddow 2004, p. 259). 
 
Canada’s experience with federalism is unique, as is how federalism operated in 
Canada in the labour market policy domain during the period of this research. In the 
view of Marie Bernard-Meunier (reflecting on the role of Quebec in Canada), for a 
federation to succeed, the constituent units need to commit to the federation as a 
whole. “What will not work is to claim to want to remain within Canada while at the 
same time pursuing only one’s own interests” (as quoted by Johnson 2007). The 
evidence from the Canadian case study in this thesis demonstrates that it was not 
only the Province of Quebec that focused only on its own interests over those of 
Canada as a whole. 
 
There was no intent through this research to assess the impact of devolution on 
labour market outcomes in Canada. However, using the comparative analysis in 
Chapter Eight, consideration will be given to UK governance arrangements and the 
capacity of the central government to act in that country. This exploration starts in 
the next chapter through the case study examination of intergovernmental relations in 
the newly devolved United Kingdom. 
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CHAPTER 6: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND 
LABOUR MARKET POLICY IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
People in Scotland want a degree of government for themselves. It is not 
beyond the wit of man to devise institutions to meet these demands 
(Mackintosh, as quoted by McConnell 2006)98. 
 
Chapters Four and Five of this thesis provided a detailed assessment of 
intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in Canada. This chapter starts the 
exploration of the United Kingdom case study, using the same analytical framework 
as was used for the Canadian case. By using a consistent framework similarities and 
differences can be identified. Chapter Three has already provided a preview of key 
differences in the overall social, constitutional, political and institutional context in 
Canada and the UK. The purpose of this chapter is to go one level down, into an 
actual policy domain, allowing for a more refined comparison between the two 
countries. In order to ensure that like is compared to like, elements of the labour 
market policy domain in the UK were matched to what has already been considered 
in Canada. The analysis in this chapter and the next therefore focus on what is known 
in the United Kingdom as ‘welfare to work’ or ‘skills’ policy, as well as some 
dimensions of immigration policy.  
 
Three key elements of the analytical framework outlined in Figure 2 are considered 
in this chapter: central and sub-state intergovernmental actors, the influence of 
external actors, and the policy domain. Like the Canadian case study, the analysis 
starts with the policy domain, including a historical review of how active labour 
market policy developed in the UK, and how it was managed before devolution by 
the Scottish Office. This is important, as institutional structures from the past frame 
the choices facing intergovernmental actors in the present. An overview of Labour’s 
UK-wide commitment to welfare to work and skills reform post-devolution is 
provided next, including how central and sub-state policies interact and the 
                                                 
98 John Mackintosh was the Labour Member of Parliament for Berwick and East Lothian who led the 
campaign for a Scottish Parliament. These words are engraved in the stone floor at the entrance to the 
Donald Dewar Room in the Scottish Parliament in Holyrood. 
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contributions expected from one government to the other’s reform initiatives. Here 
the key determinant is how powers are divided: as a result, national and sub-state 
competence in labour market policy is examined in some detail. The formal and 
informal machinery put in place to manage interaction in labour market policy 
between the UK Government and the Scottish Executive, post-devolution, is also 
reviewed. 
 
This sets the stage for considering intergovernmental administrative actors, including 
an assessment of how their interests, values, expectations, experiences and capacity 
motivated them to take the actions outlined. Actors external to government are 
another important influence on intergovernmental actors and these are considered in 
the concluding section of the chapter, including an external actor of particular 
significancethe European Union. In this context, the chapter includes a brief 
assessment of the impact of the European Employment Strategy (EES), the European 
Social Fund, and the European Strategy on Social Inclusion on UK and Scottish 
Executive actions in this policy domain.  
 
The key focus of the analysis is on relationships between administrative actors with 
the UK Government and the Scottish Executive. In order to place these relationships 
within a broader UK context, consideration is also given to how these relationships 
differed from the management of central-regional-local relationships in England, 
where there were no devolved parliaments or assemblies. Particular attention is paid 
to the North East Region of England, chosen as illustrative due to its proximity to 
Scotland, and because, during the period of this research, devolutionary forces there 
were the strongest of any English region. 
 
The Policy Domain 
 
The Development of a Centralized Welfare State 
 
The modern day British social security system traces back to the 16th century 
Elizabethan Poor Laws, where the statethrough local parisheswas given the 
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authority to raise taxes and deliver assistance to people in need.  It was not until the 
late 19th century, when unemployment became a serious issue, that direct 
government intervention was deemed necessary.  One of the first forms of active 
labour market policy in the UK was the introduction of work schemes and the 
establishment of labour exchanges. These were brought under central government 
control and funding in 1910 (DSS 1998). 
 
Over the intervening war years and the Depression, a series of unemployment, poor 
relief, sickness, and pension schemes were introduced across the UK, administered 
primarily by local authorities, and in Scotland and Wales, overseen by the Welsh and 
Scottish Offices. After the release of  Social Insurance and Allied Services 
(Beveridge 1942), these various programs were consolidated into a coherent scheme 
funded by contributions from employees and employers and administration was 
transferred to a central Government Ministry operating out of London. Local 
authorities across the UK retained responsibility for a broad range of social services, 
but subsequently had no involvement in social security or in implementing a ‘work-
test’. Although questions were raised about “whether such a high degree of 
centralization of the new Department [of social security] is either necessary or 
advisable” (1943 Scottish Records Office as quoted in McEwen 2002, p. 71), the 
Scottish Office ceded its administrative responsibility for poor relief and pensions in 
exchange for an expansion of responsibility over health care (Kellas 1989, p. 37-38). 
This change did not, however, impact the Scottish Office responsibility for 
education, including vocational education.  
 
Over time, labour exchanges became Unemployment Benefit Offices and, in 1974, 
were transferred to a modernized public employment service called the Employment 
Service Agency. A national network of about 1,100 Jobcentres, located in ‘high 
streets’ across Great Britain, were introduced. In 1973, the Manpower Services 
Commission was established to plan workforce skills needs, but was later abolished 
by the Thatcher Conservatives. Concerned about increased dependency and 
unemployment, in the 1980s and 1990s the Conservatives implemented a stricter 
benefit regime and began a massive long-term diversion of claimants onto Inactivity 
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Benefits (Convery 2007). Other radical institutional changes to the welfare and skills 
systems were made, including transferring the delivery of training programs for the 
unemployed to local, private sector-led Training and Enterprise Councils in England 
and Wales, and to Local Enterprise Companies in Scotland (Finn, Knuth et al. 2004). 
In England these agencies were later transformed into Learning and Skills Councils. 
 
There have been vocational training institutions of one kind or another in Scotland 
for well over 200 years, matching the development of industry. These expanded 
considerably in the 1960s; in the 1980s and 1990s, they became self-governing, and 
in 1997 came under the supervision of the Scottish Qualifications Authority (SE 
2003a). Volume schemes for training the unemployed in Scotland were under the 
administration of Local Enterprise Companies, with many elements unique to 
Scotland, including Skillseekers and Modern Apprenticeships. Although overseen by 
the Scottish Office, funding for many of these initiatives came from the European 
Social Fund and the European Regional Development Fund (Fairley and McArthur 
1999). 
 
In the UK, the provision of vocational education and training for sectors of the 
economy has historically been overseen by National Training Organizations. In 
2002, these were replaced by Sector Skills Councils, licensed by the Secretary of 
State for Education and Skills, in consultation with Ministers in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland. These independent, UK-wide organizations are employer-led and 
actively involve trade unions, professional bodies and other stakeholders in the 
sector. During the period of this research their work was coordinated by the Sector 
Skills Development Agency (SSDA), which supported the development of National 
Occupational Standards that underpinned both Scottish and National Vocational 
Qualifications. 
 
Fairley maintains that the UK’s historic approach to vocational education and 
training has been to promote ‘volunteerism’ in vocational training with employers 
and individuals, not government, having the key responsibility. In his view, this 
contrasts with the historic approach taken by the Scottish Office in which vocational 
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education and training were viewed as important government roles in order to 
improve competitiveness, compensate for market failure, regenerate urban 
neighbourhoods, and train the unemployed (Fairley and McArthur 1999, p. 87). Pre-
devolution, operating within the context of a UK-wide system, the Scottish Office 
ensured, to the degree that it could, that vocational education and training in Scotland 
were distinct. However, without legislative authority it was significantly limited in 
the extent to which it could develop and implement distinctive policies. This 
limitation was specifically what devolution was intended to address. 
 
Labour Market Issues Post-devolution 
 
When Labour came to power, in 1997, one of its flagship commitments was to 
reverse the Conservative legacy of long-term citizen dependence on government 
financial benefits99. Welfare reform was intended to provide work for those who can 
and support for those who cannot, and was realized through the implementation of a 
variety of New Deal programs aimed at moving people from welfare to work by a 
mixture of incentives, opportunities, and encouragement/compulsion (DSS 1998). 
Over the period of this research, the UK Government issued numerous green papers 
and white papers on welfare reform (DWP 2002, DWP 2004a, DWP 2005, DWP 
2006b). Through this process they also reframed the debate from ‘unemployment’ to 
‘worklessness’, in recognition that there were large numbers of lone parents and 
disabled people collecting state benefits at the same time as skills shortages were 
emerging. Previously these individuals had had little contact with employment 
services and were likely to remain on benefits long-term.  
 
The public employment service in the UK was placed at the heart of the UK welfare 
reform strategy. To improve coordination, in 2002 the Employment Service Agency 
was merged with the Benefit Agency to form Jobcentre Plus, a national executive 
                                                 
99 During the period of this research there were three separate but related benefit programs: Job 
Seeker’s Allowance (for the unemployed), Income Support (for lone parents) and Incapacity Benefit 
(for the disabled).  
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agency covering all of Great Britain, including Scotland100. As part of the UK 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), this agency operates in partnership at the 
local level with a wide variety of private, government and non-governmental 
organizations, each with their own training, advice, and employment initiatives. 
These organizations expanded across Great Britain during the 1980s and 1990s with 
the support of local and regional authorities, regeneration programs, charitable trusts, 
government agencies and the European Commission (Finn 2000, p. 46). 
 
On the other side of the coin to the welfare system is the skills development system. 
In 2004, these two separate policy worlds officially merged when the National 
Employment Panel published a report, Welfare to Workforce Development, 
suggesting ways to increase collaboration between the welfare to work and skills 
development agendas. Like welfare reform, a variety of skills policy directional 
papers were issued by Labour during the period of this research (DfES 2003, DfES 
2005, HM Treasury 2006). These UK-wide welfare to work and skills initiatives are 
all nestled within Labour’s commitment to the European Union (HM Treasury 2005, 
2006) that the country would reach an 80 percent employment rate (the highest of 
any major country) and eliminate child poverty by 2020. Meeting these UK-wide 
targets requires considerable effort by all who deliver services to these groups. 
Employment rate targets were quantified and included reducing the number of people 
on Incapacity Benefits by 1 million, helping 1 million older workers into the 
workforce, and helping over 300,000 lone parents into work (DWP 2006b).  
 
All of these reform initiatives were conceptualized in a top-down fashion by UK 
Ministers and officials, and were expected to be implemented in a relatively uniform 
fashion across the country. Welfare reform was placed under the leadership of 
Jobcentre Plus; as it became increasingly evident over time that more local autonomy 
was needed to improve outcomes, their partnership strategy was formalized, and 
increased local flexibility was granted (DWP 2004a). Pilot projects allowed for more 
                                                 
100 In April 2004 Jobcentre Plus employed approximately 80,000 people in 1,400 locations including 
Jobcentres, Social Security offices and newly integrated Jobcentre Plus offices. It operated through 
nine English regions, plus Scotland and Wales. There were different arrangements in Northern 
Ireland.  
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local decision-making in selected locales, and a new ‘Cities Strategy’ in 2006 
“devolved the welfare state down to the doorstep” (DWP 2006a, p. 1). The devolved 
administrations were also expected to work with Jobcentre Plus and play their role in 
achieving these UK-wide targets and objectives. 
 
In the early years of devolution, Parry commented that, despite devolution and the 
previous responsibility of the Scottish office for vocational education and training, 
the New Deal had been piloted and rolled out in Scotland in the same way as in 
England, with no attempt for even a cosmetic Scottish brand name (Parry 2004b, p. 
172). But as devolution became more entrenched and the Scottish Parliament and 
Scottish Executive developed increased capacity, they began to show a willingness to 
play a leadership role on issues touching the UK based New Deal. An overarching 
strategy, called ‘Closing the Opportunity Gap’, developed explicit Scottish targets 
against a range of activities that mirrored UK-wide targets (SE 2004a). Those closest 
to welfare to work included: reducing the number of workless people on benefits; 
tackling aspects of in work poverty by providing employees with the opportunity to 
develop skills and progress in their career; ensuring ‘looked after’ young people 
leaving care could enter education, training or employment; and reducing the 
proportion of 16 to 19 year olds not in education, training, or employment. 
 
Demonstrating Scottish Executive commitment to Westminster objectives in welfare 
reform, Workforce Plus: an Employability Framework for Scotland (SE 2006b) 
focused on reducing the number of Scots receiving UK benefits and making better 
use of the estimated £500 million spent each year by all governments on 
employability services in Scotland: 
Overall, we see the framework as an opportunity for Scottish Ministers to 
drive forward action on the devolved areas of employability in Scotland and 
to have a closely informed influence on the direction of UK policies on 
benefits and welfare to work.  
 
The Scottish Executive’s refreshed economic development strategy Smart, 
Successful Scotland (SE 2004b), and Scotland’s Life through Learning, Learning 
through Life: A Lifelong Learning Strategy for Scotland (SE 2003c) included key 
skills and learning objectives. Post-devolution, the Scotland Executive also placed 
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considerable emphasis on social inclusion and social justice, and funded social 
inclusion partnerships to tackle poverty and disadvantage (SE 2003b).  
 
Wales had similar initiativesfor example its approach is called the Skills and 
Employment Plan for Wales (Welsh Assembly Government 2005). Jobcentre Plus 
does not operate in Northern Ireland; instead, a Social Security Agency that reports 
to the Northern Ireland Executive manages similar programs under a policy 
framework derived from UK-wide policy set by the Department for Work and 
Pensions. Despite these different organizational arrangements, all sub-state, regional, 
and local governments and their agents across the UK are expected to contribute to 
and realize overall UK-wide skills directions and targets, even though, for example, 
these might be “packaged in a Scottish way” (interview with SE official April 15, 
2005).  
 
Of particular interest, post-devolution, were sub-state initiatives that went beyond or 
diverged from the overall UK line, a situation that emerged in Scotland when the 
Scottish Executive launched Fresh Talent, designed to address demographic 
challenges as well as ensure a more skilled and diverse workforce. Recognizing that 
Scotland’s demographic concerns were unique to that part of the country, in 2005 the 
Scottish Executive, in cooperation with the Home Office, introduced the Fresh 
Talent: Working in Scotland Scheme (SE 2005a). This enabled international 
graduates from a Scottish Higher or Further Education Institute to stay and work in 
Scotland for two years after the end of their course without the need for a work 
permit. In the opinion of a Scottish Executive official interviewed through this 
research, this type of initiative would never have been launched pre-devolution, and 
it involved considerable effort on the part of the Scottish Executive to persuade the 
UK Government to make adjustments to immigration policy and provide the 
necessary flexibilities (interview June 6, 2007). 
 
The issues and responses identified abovereducing benefit dependency, increasing 
the employment rate, reducing poverty, enhancing skill development, increasing 
social inclusion, integrating students from other countriesprovided the policy 
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substance over which intergovernmental interaction in labour market policy occurred 
in the UK during the period of this research. What is noteworthy about these issues is 
their complexity. Not only were the issues being tackled transversal (that is, they 
crossed policy domains from economic development to immigration to education to 
social security), responsibility for addressing them was shared among many partners: 
government, industry, civil society, and individuals.  
 
This thesis is concerned with how governments shared power and responsibility in a 
policy area. Prior to devolution, in 1999, all of the welfare reform and skills activities 
described would have been decided by and carried out under the overall authority of 
the UK Government, and implemented, as appropriate, by the Scottish Office, a UK 
Government department that would have been considered subordinate to the 
powerful Department for Work and Pensions and the Department for Education and 
Skills (interview with Whitehall official December 6, 2005). Pre-devolution, 
relationships between officials in these departments were clearly interdepartmental. 
With the Scottish Parliament assuming legislative authority for policy making in 
defined areas, the structure of government in the UK fundamentally changed, making 
relationships between executives no longer interdepartmental but intergovernmental.  
 
The Division of Powers  
 
When power is shared between governments, a key issue is to identify what each 
level of government is responsible for, and actors usually look to the founding 
legislation or constitutional arrangement to assist. In any political system where 
legislative competence is divided, the powers of each government are generally set 
out in a written document, in order to prevent one government from trespassing into 
the legislative competence of the other. In the vast majority of countries, this is their 
constitution. However, since the UK does not have a constitution contained in a 
single document, the powers of the two levels of government were set out in a UK 
Act of Parliament, the Scotland Act 1998. 
 
As identified in Chapter Three, a ‘retaining’ model was chosen for Scotland, spelling 
out what the Scottish Parliament could not do, with the implication that it could do 
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everything not spelled out. Reserved issues were set out in considerable detail, and 
the most important reserved issues that linked with labour market policy were set out 
in Chapter 46 Schedule 5 (reserved matters) of the Scotland Act (1998) as follows: 
1. Head F Social Security. This was defined as schemes supported by central 
or local funds which provided benefits to individuals. Benefits include 
pensions, allowances, grants, loans and any other form of financial assistance 
paid to individuals who qualified by reason of old age, survivorship, 
disability, sickness, incapacity, injury, unemployment, maternity or the care 
of children or others needing care. 
2. Head H Employment.  Employment rights and duties and industrial 
relations were reserved, as was health and safety. Job search and support was 
also reserved, but the duties that Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and 
Islands Enterprise had to assist people seeking work to obtain training were 
excepted. Careers Services was also excepted. 
 
The Act identified training as a shared power in Section 56. The Hansard debates 
provide insight through the following statement from Mr. McLeish: 
…although most training for employment in Scotland is carried out through 
the Enterprise Network, the activities of the Employment Service in Scotland 
will also need to remain under the control of the [UK] Secretary of State. I 
shall table an amendment to provide that the powers under Section 2 of the 
1973 Act on training for employment can be exercised concurrently in 
Scotland by the Secretary of State for Education and Employment. That is the 
right way in which to deal with the problem of genuine overlap (March 31, 
1998). 
 
It was challenging to determine what was devolved and what was reserved in labour 
market policy through a simple reading of the legislation as it required an 
understanding of the intersection of two sections of the 1998 Scotland Act (reserved 
matters Schedule 5 and shared powers Section 56), as well as an understanding of the 
1973 Employment and Training Act, the 1944 Disabled Persons (Employment) Act, 
and the 1990 Enterprise and New Towns (Scotland) Act (Scottish Enterprise and 
Highlands and Islands Enterprise). Clarity was only available by seeking 
explanations from those directly involved. 
 
All those interviewed through this research were asked to comment on the division of 
responsibilities in the labour market policy domain. Based on these comments, as 
well as an examination of government documents, the following interpretation was 
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derived. There seemed to be a common understanding that ‘social security’ meant 
financial benefits (and any compulsion or obligation in exchange for benefits), and 
that these were reserved to the UK Government and administered through Jobcentre 
Plus. There also seemed to be a clear understanding that skills, defined as 
“capabilities and expertise in a particular occupation or activity”, were a devolved 
responsibility (HM Treasury 2006). 
 
On the other hand, there was no clear understanding over which level of government 
was responsible for training, and little distinction made between training for 
employment and any other kind of training. Most believed that training was a fully 
devolved responsibility, not a shared responsibility as identified in Mr. McLeish’s 
comments and the text of the Scotland Act. Although ‘job search and support’ were 
identified as reserved and ‘career services’ as devolved, overlap in this function was 
never commented on. The issue that was most unclear was ‘employment’. Because 
Jobcentre Plus used to be called the ‘Employment Service’ and the term 
‘employment’ is the heading of Section H in the Scotland Act, many thought that 
anything related to employment was reserved rather than the narrower concepts in 
the legislative text of ‘employment rights and duties and industrial relations’. These 
involve relationships between workers and employers once someone has a job and 
include collective bargaining, workplace health and safety, and labour laws (e.g., 
minimum wage, parental leave, holiday pay etc.). 
 
As identified in Chapter One, the concept of ‘employability’ is also relevant. For the 
purpose of Workforce Plus (SE 2006b), the Scottish Executive used the following 
definition: 
Employability is the combination of factors and processes which enable 
people to progress towards or get into employment, to stay in employment 
and to move on in the workplace. 
 
Factors which determine a person’s ability and motivation to be employed include 
education, money advice, training, health, child care, social work, criminal justice 
and housing. These are all devolved responsibilities. Both Scottish Executive 
documents and the interviews undertaken with Scottish Executive officials through 
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this research (April 15 and 21, 2005 and December 2, 2005) demonstrate that 
‘employability’ supports were considered primarily as devolved competence. 
 
A Scottish Executive official identified that, when differentiating between devolved 
and reserved, the most important issue was the ‘purpose test’ (interview March 29, 
2005). Irrespective of an issue being identified as reserved, the Scottish Parliament 
could legislate and spend in a reserved area if it was for a devolved purpose. An 
example was when the Scottish Executive decided to pay compensation to Hepatitis 
C sufferers who had received contaminated blood. Although health was devolved, 
this involved a social security scheme and the UK Government could have 
challenged this on the basis that social security was reserved. In the end, the UK 
Government was prepared to allow the Scottish Executive to proceed, given its 
strong views about the issue and willingness to spend political capital to act in this 
area (interview with SE official March 29, 2005). 
 
In conclusion, during the period of this research, labour market policy in the UK cut 
across devolved and reserved responsibilities; as a result, dealing with the most 
important issues required the direct involvement of both levels of government. What 
was particularly significant, in contrast to the Canadian case study, was that in the 
UK many more policy instruments, funding allocations, and responsibilities in the 
labour market policy domain were under the control of central, not sub-state or even 
local governments. When Labour came to power, in 1997, and came to realize the 
extent of the ‘worklessness’ problem that they had inherited, welfare and skills 
reform became a government priority at the highest levels. As a national 
responsibility, a national response was required. This contrasts with Canada, where 
government responsibility for income support is split between orders of government, 
and action to reduce citizen dependence on government benefits had occurred several 
years earlier, initiated primarily by provincial governments concerned with increased 




Lack of Conflict over the Division of Powers 
 
If it is unclear or ‘grey’ about who does what, who should do what, or if some actors 
think that additional responsibilities should have been assigned to sub-state 
governments in the first instance, this has great potential to impact the 
intergovernmental relationship. This was certainly the case in Canada with Quebec 
and other provinces maintaining that training and labour market development were 
areas of exclusive provincial jurisdiction. A key question this research sought to 
answer was whether responsibility in labour market policy was contested, and 
whether with devolution Scottish citizens, bureaucrats, or politicians sought 
additional responsibilities in this area. 
 
There was not much debate about this at the time of devolution, primarily because 
devolution in effect transferred responsibilities that had already been administratively 
devolved to the Scottish Office and social security and employment had been 
centrally led and delivered since the expansion of the British welfare state after the 
war. According to Parry, social security was viewed as a “low-value political issue 
for Scottish Ministers and officials. Generating a vast caseload and with no basis for 
pursuing distinctive policies, social security promised nothing but trouble if it were 
to be devolved” (Parry 2004b, p. 170).  
 
Most stakeholders interviewed through this research (March 10, 2005, April 25, 
2005, November 14, 2005) expressed little interest in moving social security 
responsibilities and the conditionality associated with the payment of benefits to the 
Scottish Parliament. In their view, British citizens view social security as a central 
tenet of the welfare state, and expect benefits and obligations to be uniform across 
the country. There appeared to be little interest on the part of the devolved 
administrations in becoming directly responsible for a “program that picks up the 
pieces when people fail or fall out” (interview with SE official April 25, 2005). 
There were exceptions to this view. A Scottish Enterprise official acknowledged that, 
without accountability and a sense of local ownership, solutions to the problem of 
worklessness in Scotland would remain elusive (interview February 14, 2005). A 
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Jobcentre Plus official thought that Scottish local authorities might prefer the social 
security and welfare to work remit to be devolved from the centre, although not 
necessarily to the Scottish Executive (interview March 16, 2005). On a more 
informal basis, a professional delivering medical services to those receiving UK 
benefits suggested that “Scotland will never have a grown up Parliament until we 
take responsibility for social security” (comment September 22, 2004). As 
devolution beds down, Scottish citizens seemed increasingly willing to consider that 
possibility, with 53.2 percent stating a preference for the Scottish Parliament over the 
UK Government at Westminster to make decisions on the level of welfare benefits 
(Scottish Election Study 2007). 
 
At the time of devolution, welfare to work and skills were not high-profile policy 
initiatives, and job placement services focused only on those on JobSeeker’s 
Allowance. Like in Canada, before devolution the primary issue of concern was 
unemployment, not benefit dependency, skills or labour shortages, or overall UK 
competitiveness. There were few UK-wide services provided to people considered 
‘hard to employ’ (e.g., Income Support or Incapacity Benefit recipients), nor were 
there any obligations or expectations on them to seek work. The key government 
response was to passively pay benefits. Before Labour was elected, in 1997, most 
services to help the hardest to employ were provided on a discretionary basis by 
interested local authorities using funding available from the European Social Fund. 
There were no national or UK-wide strategies (interview with JC+ official December 
5, 2005). 
 
Under Labour, the UK Government completely altered the focus and organization of 
the UK-wide public employment service and gave it an entirely new mandate to help 
a brand new client group into work. As a result of this UK-wide direction, the 
programs and services of Scottish local authorities, the Scottish Enterprise Networks, 
and Jobcentre Plus converged and competition for the same client started to emerge 
(interview with Scottish Local Authority official April 27, 2005). During the period 
of this research more joined-up working became necessary as welfare to work 
crossed the line into workforce development and even into economic development as 
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the imperatives of skills shortages and increasing the overall employment rate came 
to dominate the UK and Scottish discourse. 
 
Despite these concerns, during the period of this research, there was limited public 
discussion in the UK on expanding the devolution settlement to provide the Scottish 
Executive with more powers in labour market policy, or in considering whether some 
programs might be more appropriately developed and delivered on a local (as 
opposed to a national) basis. In Keating’s opinion, “while there is a lot of support for 
devolving active labour market policies, neither side of industry has ever shown 
support for devolving labour law or regulation” (Keating 2005, p.26). The Liberal 
Democrat commissioned Steel Commission report (2006) Moving to Federalism- a 
New Settlement for Scotland, suggested new tax powers and other significant 
changes to the devolution settlement, but made no suggested changes to labour 
market policy. On the other hand, Steel did suggest new ways of managing the 
interface between reserved and devolved issues of significance to this research: 
Asylum and immigration remain reserved but should be subject to formalized 
partnership working…social security should also remain reserved but the 
Scottish Government should have a role in the strategic planning of welfare 
services through a formalized system of partnership working (Steel 2006).  
 
In June 2007, the Local Government Association (responsible for promoting the 
interests of English and Welsh local authorities) issued a policy paper challenging 
uniform national rules for employment and skills programs, using the OECD logic 
that since labour markets are local, local governments should assume these 
responsibilities. After all, before Labour assumed power, in 1997, it was local 
authorities, primarily using European Union funding, that took initiative on poverty 
and deprivation as central government was generally disinterested (interview with SE 
official December 2, 2005). The Local Government Association called upon central 
government to “devolve, localize, and incentivise welfare” by fully devolving 
responsibility for employment and skills to local-authority led sub-regional and local 
partnerships (LGA 2007, p. 5-6). In a similar vein, after taking over the Scottish 
Executive in 2007, the Scottish National Party released a policy paper suggesting 
social security and employment services as areas where the Scottish Government 
might assume greater responsibilities within the context of an expanded devolution 
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settlement (SE 2007). Expanding the devolution settlement or considering whether 
Scotland should become an independent country have been put forward as part of a 
national ‘conversation’ around options for Scotland’s constitutional future.  
 
The interviews for this research were undertaken primarily in 2005, when calls for 
greater autonomy for Scotland were more muted, as Labour was in control of both 
the UK and Scottish Parliaments. Poverty and disability advocates interviewed did 
not make a distinction between what was reserved and what was devolved in welfare 
to work. In their view, both governments were involved and needed to be there when 
conversations were taking place on what needed to be done to improve people’s 
circumstances. They did not perceive that the problems facing disadvantaged people 
in Scotland would be solved by having the Scottish Executive assume more 
responsibility for either social security or welfare to work (interview November 14, 
2005).  
 
Likewise, civil servants at both the centre and with the Scottish Executive expressed 
no particular views on the division of responsibility; all were aware that the dividing 
line between reserved and devolved competence in welfare to work was ‘grey’ and 
unclear and there was a high degree of interdependence between UK and Scottish 
policies (interviews April 15 and 21, 2005, December 2, 6 and 16, 2005). For them, 
in the end it ‘didn’t really matter’; their key priority was to make the devolution 
settlement work and issues were thrashed out between officials on a continuing basis, 
and no real disagreements over jurisdiction between governments had emerged. 
There was, however, a growing sense that the Scottish Executive was taking more 
initiative and willing to assume a greater measure of accountability and responsibility 
in this area: 
When we first had devolution there was a reluctance to address almost any 
issue to do with employment as it was felt that employment overall was not a 
devolved issue, even though it’s really only benefits and employment law that 
are not devolved. There is a whole host of ways that the Executive can 
influence the way that we employ people in Scotland. The Employability 
Framework does show more assertiveness on the part of the Executive 
(interview with poverty advocate November 14, 2005). 
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Despite this Scottish initiative, on an ongoing basis the UK Government articulated 
labour market problems and solutions, and this need for a UK-wide approach was 
generally accepted and expected. Despite the establishment of sub-state 
governments, during the period of this research there was little defense of ‘turf’ or 
jurisdiction in the labour market policy domain, nor a concerted push for more sub-
state responsibility. Instead, governments at all levels focused on resolving issues, 




In order to facilitate coordination, a number of institutions and processes were put in 
place between governments, some of which also involved stakeholders external to 
government. Although both formal and informal channels were chosen, the informal 
tended to dominate. These were all guided by the overarching Memorandum of 




During the period of this research, the Department for Work and Pensions 
maintained a liaison position in Scotland to ensure open communications with the 
Scottish Executive on all departmental issues. In addition, officials with the Scotland 
Office worked behind the scenes to oil the wheels and facilitate relationships and 
communications, playing an intermediary role as the “conscience of Scotland in the 
UK Government” (interview December 8, 2005). They also provided an in house 
consulting service, advising UK Ministers and officials on how the Scots might view 
UK-wide initiatives. There were defined processes for the Scotland Office to be kept 
in the loop on policy issues perceived to be of significance to both governments; for 
example, Scotland Office officials were significantly involved in examining 
Scotland’s Workforce Plus (SE 2006b) in the context of UK-wide policy (interview 






In the early days of welfare reform, a multilateral Welfare to Work Liaison 
Committee chaired by a senior official from the Department for Work and Pensions 
met monthly with senior officials from the devolved administrations in Scotland, 
Wales, and Northern Ireland to ensure that UK welfare reform and the integration of 
the Employment Service and Benefits offices were sensitive to devolved issues. 
According to the Whitehall official involved, “as time went on the need for these 
meetings fell away as it became clear that national policy development was good for 
the devolved administrations and they became comfortable that the UK Government 
was playing fair” (interview December 6, 2005). The meetings became little more 
than information sharing on the part of the UK Government as the devolved 
administrations had little to contribute. This process was replaced by invitations to 
Scottish Executive officials to participate directly as appropriate on interdepartmental 
committees established by UK Government departments. 
 
A Welfare to Work Advisory Task Group (consisting of officials from both levels of 
government, as well as stakeholder representatives) was set up in Scotland in the 
early years, post-devolution. Over time it was replaced by the Welfare to Work 
Planning Group, consisting of a small group of senior civil servants chaired by the 
Head of Group in Scottish Executive Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong Learning 
(SEETLLL), plus officials from DWP, Jobcentre Plus Scotland, the Enterprise 
Networks and relevant officials of the Scottish Executive and the Scotland Office. 
Key responsibilities of the group as outlined in its terms of reference were to consult 
on arrangements for partnership working with the key social and economic agencies 
in Scotland; support Jobcentre Plus on the coordination of welfare to work programs 
in Scotland; undertake joint working where necessary; and resolve issues arising. 
Although the group generally met monthly, during 2005 many regular meetings were 
suspended as work groups involving both governments as well as other stakeholders 
developed the Scottish Employability Framework. After Workforce Plus (2006b) 
was finalized, the Welfare to Work Planning Group was transformed into the 
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National Workforce Plus Partnership Board, jointly chaired by the Scottish Executive 




Post-devolution, a number of written agreements or concordats related to labour 
market policy were entered into, all signed by officials (not Ministers), indicating 
that they were considered administrative, not political agreements. What was 
noteworthy was that none of these agreements, in contrast to the Canadian accords, 
involved intergovernmental funding transfers. 
 
The relationship between the Department for Work and Pensions, Jobcentre Plus and 
the Scottish Executive was outlined in a concordat, an agreement, and a Partnership 
Accord. The Concordat between the Department for Work and Pensions and the 
Scottish Executive (written initially just after devolution and then revised and 
updated in June 2004) set out ground rules between DWP and the Executive for 
consultation, exchange of information, finance, access to services, resolution of 
disputes, and review of relations. It committed both parties to working jointly on 
welfare to work initiatives, job search and support, job-related training and wider 
life-long learning policies. 
 
The Working Level Agreement relating to Job Search and Support and Job Related 
Training (including the New Deal and Welfare to Work Generally) (undated) went 
beyond just a procedural arrangement to identify shared objectives and detailed 
processes for how governments would work on welfare to work activities. Shared 
objectives included helping people not in work to obtain and remain in work. 
 
The Scottish Partnership Accord- Helping the Hardest to Reach into Work, signed in 
February 2005 between the Scottish Executive, the Department for Work and 
Pensions, and Jobcentre Plus, reconfirmed these objectives but, since it was signed 
with the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, it officially brought in Scottish 
local governments. The Accord explicitly linked the UK-wide objectives of 
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increasing the employment rate, reducing poverty, and encouraging social inclusion 
with the Scottish Closing the Opportunity Gap objectives. There was also a detailed 
tool kit plus an action plan for local authority implementation. The Scottish 
Partnership Accord was modeled after similar accords developed and implemented in 
England and Wales (interview with Jobcentre Plus official April 28, 2005). 
 
There were separate arrangements between the Scottish Executive and the 
Department for Education and Skills. The Concordat between the Scottish Ministers 
and the Secretary of State for Education and Skills (undated) provided a framework 
for cooperation on a variety of areas of devolved competence related to school 
education, lifelong learning, training, qualifications, careers advice and guidance. It 
primarily outlined principles for consultation, exchange of information and 
correspondence. 
 
There was also a Protocol between the Scottish Executive and the Sector Skills 
Development Agency (SSDA) on Sector Skills Councils in Scotland (2004). Since 
the SSDA had a UK-wide remit and reported to the Department for Education and 
Skills, the protocol was intended to ensure that Scottish skills and training policy 
were fully reflected in SSDA Board discussions and decisions. The protocol spelt out 
in detail the various relationships between the SSDA and key Scottish stakeholders, 
including the Scottish Qualifications Authority, the Enterprise Networks, Careers 
Scotland, Futureskills Scotland, learndirect Scotland and the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress.  There was also a related co-sponsorship agreement between all 
government departments (Department for Education and Skills, Department of Trade 
and Industry and the devolved administrations) with the SSDA and the Skills for 
Business Network. 
 
Poirier (2001, p. 28-30) examined a number of these first concordats developed after 
devolution in the UK and assessed them as primarily focusing on procedural 
cooperation, rather than substantive policy coordination, para-constitutional 
engineering or regulating by contract, as could be found in other countries with 
federal political systems. She saw these ‘soft law’ UK concordats as an effective 
 213
process to ensure collaboration and continuity between the Scottish Executive and 
Whitehall in policy delivery, and to minimize and manage conflict. In her opinion, 
they provided important guidance to public officials who had to make devolution 
work and were a significant improvement over the way agreements were concluded 




Many officials living in Scotland interviewed for this research had worked in training 
and employment policy for many years, knew each other well, and had considerable 
experience in collaborative working, leading to the development of mutual 
understanding and trust. Many of these relationships predated devolution. Fairley and 
McArthur (1999) attributed this positive working relationship to the ‘regional 
partnership’ element required in order to access European Social Funds (ESF). In 
their view, the ESF contributed significantly to the development of the institutional 
infrastructure for economic development and vocational training in Scotland, 
capacity building between Scottish officials, politicians, and their organizations to 
manage these funds, and a significant measure of independence from the UK 
Government through this process. 
 
These informal networks lay beneath the more formal ongoing committee and 
agreement structure outlined. They included relationships at all levels, including 
bilateral Minister-to-Minister relationships. For example, the Scottish Deputy 
Minister Allan Wilson participated directly with Jim Murphy the UK Minister of 
State for Employment and Welfare Reform in the 2006 launch of the UK green paper 
on welfare reform. Minister Wilson described relationships with his UK counterparts 
as follows: 
I have been actively engaged with three successive Department of Work and 
Pensions Ministers on [coordinating reserved and devolved powers] during 
                                                 
101 Given the details provided in Chapter Four on the substance and use of Canadian agreements in 
facilitating collaboration in labour market policy (especially on a bilateral basis), one can only assume 
that Poirier’s derogation of Canadian agreements related to multilateral procedural arrangements such 
as the Social Union Framework Agreement, and neglected to examine agreements structuring both 
financial arrangements and government roles and responsibilities. 
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the past two years. I have found them to be responsive and happy to work 
with us on developing new strategies and approaches to the problems to 
ensure that the partnership of which I speak involves them102. 
 
In the context of welfare to work policy, there were no disagreements requiring 
Ministerial action; this contrasted with differences of approach around policy issues 
such as top-up fees for postsecondary education where, according to a Scottish 
Executive official, the ad hoc and reactive approach on both sides created 
disgruntlement and a commitment to “do better next time” (interview April 21, 
2005). Processes for connecting and smoothing over relationships included follow up 
Minister-to-Minister meetings, as well as party networks. The Fresh Talent initiative 
provided a good example of the importance of informal connections between the UK 
Home Office Minister and the Scottish First Minister: 
You need political will to make these things happen…Mr. McConnell 
engaged directly with Minister Blunkett who was willing and happy to 
help…both directed officials to make it happen, in recognition of Scotland’s 
unique demographics (interview with SE official June 6, 2007). 
 
Many commentators in the UK have expressed concern about the over-reliance on 
informal intergovernmental mechanisms, post-devolution. The House of Lords report 
concluded “we are concerned by the sheer extent of the reliance on goodwill as the 
basis for intergovernmental relations in the UK” (House of Lords 2002, p.15). With 
respect to the role of the civil service, Parry reflected “the image is that of traffic 
management and partisan mutual adjustment to avoid collisions…there is a risk that 
officials are placing too much reliance on the afterglow of the implementation of 
devolution in 1999” (Parry 2004, no page). Trench (2003, p. 166) took this a step 
further, expressing concern that informality would diminish the autonomy of the 
devolved administrations as it “enabled the UK Government to take the initiative to 
an excessive degree”.  
 
On the basis of this research it is clear that informality prevailed at the Ministerial 
level. Officials did not want to use the formal intergovernmental framework of JMC 
meetings or multilateral meetings among Ministers, as that would have demonstrated 
                                                 
102 Testimony by Allan Wilson at the Scottish Enterprise and Culture Committee meeting January 23, 
2007. 
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failure. Since skills and welfare reform issues differed by nation, Ministers 
themselves did not see a need for more formality, or that multilateral relationships 
involving all the devolved administrations would be helpful. 
 
On the other hand, at the administrative level considerable efforts were made, post-
devolution, to formalize relationships via committees, concordats, protocols and 
agreements. Although important in the early days of devolution, according to a 
Scottish Executive official these concordats and working level agreements were 
rarely used. Despite the effort involved in their negotiation “today they just sit in my 
drawer and are rarely referred to” (interview with SE official April 15, 2005).  
 
However, the significance of these more formal efforts and other defined processes 
should not be discounted. Early post-devolution agreements provided the foundation 
for the structured and defined meeting and agreement processes that emerged over 
time such as those undertaken for the development of Workforce Plus (2006b). 
Agreements also substantially structured the relationship between the UK-wide 
Sector Councils and the Scottish Executive and their agencies, ensuring that Scottish 
concerns were taken into account by these UK-wide agencies. In contrast, in Canada 
there were no similar types of agreement to facilitate connections between federally 
mandated Sector Councils and provincial governments. 
 
Relationship Management between the Centre and the North East Region of England 
 
The intergovernmental machinery and the division of powers that have been 
described in this chapter apply only in Scotland. As outlined in Chapter Three, 
devolution in the UK is highly asymmetrical. Although Wales and Northern Ireland 
have different powers and governing structures to Scotland, there were similarities to 
Scotland in terms of how the relationship with the centre was managed. On the other 
hand, arrangements in England were very different, as there are no sub-state 
governments. In order to put this Scottish experience into context, the final section of 
the policy domain analysis provides a brief overview of how relations were managed 
between the centre and government departments working in England, with particular 
reference to the North East Region of England. 
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During the period of this research each English region had a Government Office103, a 
Regional Development Agency104, and a Regional Assembly of councilors105. This 
arrangement was relatively recent, and co-terminous boundaries had only been put in 
place in the nine English regions over the past five years. In addition, each region 
had a number of Jobcentre Plus offices, Learning and Skills Councils, and local 
authorities. 
 
On welfare to work issues at the local level, Jobcentre Plus’ key partners were local 
authorities. Partnership working was outlined in a Partnership Accord negotiated by 
DWP with the Local Government Association on behalf of all of the English local 
authorities106. Each local authority was expected to develop a Local Strategic 
Partnership to provide a framework for local coordination; this involved a number of 
local partners including government agencies like Jobcentre Plus, as well as business 
and voluntary organizations (interview with JC+ official December 5, 2005).  
 
There was also an expectation that central government, local authorities, and the 
Local Strategic Partnership would agree on Local Area Agreements. Welfare to work 
activities and Jobcentre Plus’ goal of helping the hardest to reach into work were 
contained within the ‘economic development and enterprise’ stream of Local Area 
Agreements. These were seen by Labour as a new approach to join up delivery of 
local public services and as a way to pool funding streams so that local authorities 
could deal with the multitude of separate funding streams they were expected to 
manage for a wide variety of UK initiatives. Through Local Area Agreements, the 
                                                 
103 Government Offices carried out work on behalf of ten Whitehall departments and staff remained 
part of the administrative hierarchy of sponsoring departments. 
104 Regional Development Agencies were funded by six Whitehall departments and agencies.  
105 Seventy percent of the councilors were nominated by local authorities, and 30 percent by social, 
economic and environmental partners in the region (Townsend 2006).   
106 The Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus met three times a year with the Local 
Government Association, to discuss a range of issues under DWP competence. Although the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) was invited to these meetings, it declined, 




centre also provided additional funding for targeted initiatives like poverty reduction 
(interview with Whitehall official December 6, 2005). 
 
With respect to skills issues, every region was expected to develop a Regional Skills 
Partnership; for example in the North East Region this was outlined in a document 
called Skills North East- the Regional Skills Partnership, Skills Action Plan 2005-
2006. While regional partnership working was outlined in this action plan, each 
player reported to its parent organization in London and was expected to implement 
departmental policies in its region, as well as what was outlined in the partnership 
arrangement.  
 
Jobcentre Plus in the North East Region was expected to ensure that its welfare to 
work policy directions were reflected in both the Regional Skills Action Plan and the 
Local Area Agreements and the mechanisms for accomplishing this were outlined in 
its internal Partnership Strategy and policy directives. This prescribed which partners 
were the most important in order to deliver on their welfare to work targets. 
Partnership working was a recent initiative for Jobcentre Plus; the Employment 
Service was much more accustomed to partnership working than the Benefits 
Agency who before they merged with the Employment Service did not work in 
partnership arrangements at all (interview with JC+ official April 28, 2005). 
 
Although actors and organizational structures in England had similar names and 
functions to those in Scotland, the key difference was in reporting relationships. With 
the exception of Jobcentre Plus, all Scottish initiatives were under the control of the 
Scottish Executive and Scottish Parliament. In contrast, in England each agency 
reported to its parent department, for example, the Learning and Skills Council 
reported to DfES, Jobcentre Plus reported to DWP, the Government Office for the 
North East reported to the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and the Regional 
Development Agency reported to the Department of Trade and Industry. There were 
a mixture of regional and local governance arrangements, all developed and tightly 
controlled by parent organizations at the centre. This suggests that, in labour market 
policy in England, the UK Government had not taken up the OECD (2007) 
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suggestion that outcomes in this policy domain would be improved if substantially 
controlled at the regional or local level. 
 
Interests, Values, Expectations, Experiences, and Capacity of 
Intergovernmental Actors 
 
As in the Canadian case study, the chapter turns now to consider the next element of 
the analytical framework depicted in Figure 2, that is the interests, values, 
expectations, experiences, and capacity of intergovernmental actors. This is 
considered first from the perspective of actors with the Scottish Executive and 
Whitehall, and then with regard to actors working in the North East Region of 
England. 
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Figure 6 portrays the actors involved in labour market policy in the United Kingdom 
during the period of this research. In Scotland responsibility for welfare and skills 
reform was assigned to the Scottish Executive Enterprise, Transport & Lifelong 
Learning department (SEETLLL), with some involvement from Communities 
Scotland and the Finance Department with respect to regeneration, housing, poverty 
and immigration. Unlike Canada, there were no departmental civil servants whose 
role was specifically dedicated to intergovernmental relations; relations with the UK 
Government formed part of the overall policy responsibilities of staff in the 
SEETLLL department. 
 
Two separate government departments managed the UK welfare to work and skills 
reform agendas: the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the Department 
for Education and Skills (DfES). Officials from Her Majesty’s Treasury and the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Group were also involved. Matters relating to immigration 
were managed by the Home Office. As already identified, of particular significance 
to this research was the role of Jobcentre Plus, the UK executive agency107 charged 
with implementing the welfare to work agenda across Great Britain. Pollitt 
characterized the relationship between the Department for Work and Pensions and 
Jobcentre Plus as a principal-agent relationship. Given a tumultuous history during 
the Thatcher years, in his view the management structure that had been put in place 
ensured the agency’s subservience to the Ministry (Pollitt 2004). 
 
Intergovernmental Actors with the Scottish Executive and Whitehall 
 
A strong element of continuity in the UK was provided by the civil service, with 
officials from both levels of government part of a unified Home Civil Service. From 
the beginning it was decided that there should not be a Scottish civil service, so that 
staff could move to and from Whitehall departments. However, in practice the 
Scottish Executive was dominated by Scots, with 70 percent of the senior civil 
service and three quarters of heads of departments having never worked in Whitehall. 
                                                 
107 From 1988 to 1998 over 80 percent of British civil servants were transferred to over 120 executive 
agencies, still considered part of the UK Crown. The intention was for agencies to focus on delivery, 
leaving the parent department to concentrate on policy development.  
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According to Keating (2005, p. 102), most civil servants in both governments were 
from upper middle class families and male; many had been educated at private 
schools and elite British universities.  
 
As a result, civil servants in both levels of government shared similar values and 
interests. According to Sloat  (2002, p. 161), their most important shared interest was 
in making devolution a success; civil servants from both governments saw their role 
as making the settlement operational while  preserving the unity of the UK. 
Maintaining goodwill and positive working relationships were an important part of 
achieving that objective (interview with SE official April 15, 2005). This goal was 
shared even by those who had not been working in their role when devolution was 
implemented; indeed, a number of those interviewed had joined the civil service 
post-devolution.  Certainly the importance of devolution was most keenly felt by 
people living in Scotland; those living in the rest of the UK were aware of devolution 
but not as attuned to the differences it had made and how this might impact their 
work. A key role for officials in the UK Liaison Team in the Office of the Permanent 
Secretary in the Scottish Executive was to offer ongoing training sessions to 
Whitehall civil servants on the implications of devolution in the UK. Otherwise they 
found that UK departments forgot about devolved issues when making UK or 
English policy (interview with SE official March 4, 2005). 
 
Another shared interest of all civil servants was agreement on the overall direction 
and thrust of welfare to work and skills reform in the UK (interviews April 15, April 
21, December 6, December 12, and December 16, 2005). Although it was 
acknowledged that there might be differences in approach with the Scottish 
Executive “preferring a carrot to a stick approach” (interview December 6, 2006), 
civil servants and politicians of all political stripes demonstrated a firm commitment 
to the UK-wide directions of reducing citizen dependence upon government benefits, 
increasing the employment rate, and reducing child poverty. That reform should 
focus on improved coordination, as opposed to increased funding or adjustment of 
remits, was also agreed. 
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As members of the same club, Scottish Executive and Whitehall officials shared 
many common values. A desire to ‘de-problematize’ meant a focus on working 
together to come up with solutions to problems, avoiding Ministers and the use of the 
party political system (interview with SE official April 21, 2005). This approach was 
reinforced by practice at the European Union table, where the necessity of holding to 
a ‘UK line’ when negotiating on European matters was highlighted (interview with 
SE official December 2, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, there were differences in expectations and experiences between 
civil servants at the centre and those in the devolved administrations.  For Scottish 
Executive civil servants their key loyalty was to the Scottish Executive, guided in all 
its activities during the period of this research by the ‘Programme for Government’, 
the Labour-Liberal Democrat political agreement entered into after each 
Parliamentary election (interview with SE official April 15, 2005). Scottish 
Executive officials also expressed more commitment to overall Scottish 
Parliamentary initiatives, not just to those of their individual department. A poverty 
advocate attributed this to the joined-up thinking that the Scottish Executive had put 
in place, post-devolution, given additional resources and the democratic 
accountability and legitimacy that came with having a Parliament that could impose 
a direction if necessary (interview November 14, 2005). 
 
For the Scottish Executive to consider different approaches, they needed policy 
capacity, and this required competent, stable civil service staffing resources. Since 
devolution, overall staffing resources assigned to the Scottish Executive had grown; 
at the same time, Department for Work and Pensions resources were being reduced. 
Between 1999 and 2006, the staff headcount of the Scottish Executive core 
departments grew from 3,800 to 4,400 while the headcount of other Scottish agencies 
grew from 4,200 to 6,300an overall increase of 25 percent. In contrast, the 
headcount of DWP staff in Scotland grew in the same period from 12,800 to 
13,100only 2 percent108 (SE 2006a). Looking towards 2008, Jobcentre Plus’ 
                                                 
108 This statistic also demonstrates the significantly larger role played by UK Government staff in 
labour market policy when compared to the Scottish Executive.  
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overall headcount across the UK was expected to be reduced from 80,000 in 2004 to 
65,000 by March 2008 (JC+ 2005). With increased resources the Scottish Executive 
was able to step in and contribute to joint working, whereas Jobcentre Plus with 
reduced resources was not. 
 
The most significant difference between intergovernmental actors at the centre and 
with the Scottish Executive, post-devolution, was in terms of expectations: if the 
Scottish Parliament did not deliver policies and programs that were more attuned to 
Scottish needs, what was the point of devolution? This could mean either changing 
policies, or maintaining the status quo in light of changes in England. During the 
period of this research the focus of Scottish Executive civil servants was on 
developing and delivering bespoke programs and policies that they perceived were 
desired in Scotland, while continuing to work within the constraints of devolution 
and a UK-wide political system. On the other hand, Whitehall civil servants, while 
recognizing Scotland as a nation and its need for some level of distinctiveness, were 
focused on the development of policies and programs for UK-wide implementation. 
According to an academic interviewed for this research, Whitehall is an English civil 
service and assumes that what is good for England (or indeed some would argue for 
London) is good for the UK (interview December 2, 2005). They have a traditional 
approach to doing business, with green papers, white papers, and consultations all 
leading to the development and implementation of UK-wide legislation. That there is 
now a territorial dimension to policy making is often an afterthought. 
 
Interdepartmental Actors in the North East Region of England 
 
The territorial dimension to policy making was an afterthought because, during the 
period of this research, 85 percent of the UK population were not governed by sub-
state parliaments and assemblies. Since England did not have regional governments, 
relationships between the centre and the English regions were by their very nature 
interdepartmental, not intergovernmental. Individual departments (e.g. health, police, 
and ambulance) each made their own plans on the extent to which they would 
regionalize (interview with JC+ official December 5, 2005). Pearce suggests that 
during the period of this research there was a deep-seated ambivalence in Whitehall 
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about the need for a regional perspective, with regional institutions viewed merely as 
an administrative convenience whose prime objective remained the delivery of 
national policies, rather than the management of territory (Pearce and Sayres 2006). 
While the new Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, acknowledged that power had 
become too concentrated at the centre, the way forward on how Britain should be 
governed remained unclear (Secretary of State for Justice 2007). 
 
Unlike in Scotland, the key loyalty of civil servants working in the North East 
Region of England was to their individual department, not to their region. A 
Jobcentre Plus official working in the North East Region thought that things must be 
different in Scotland as with the Parliament and Scottish Executive there was a single 
governing body that could direct people. From what he had seen: 
They seem to be better sorted in terms of the direction in which they are 
going…elected Regional Assemblies would have brought this regional 
leadership. Instead [the North East Region] has leadership by committee, 
with various vested interests trying to position themselves…in my view what 





The main difference between civil servants with the Scottish Executive and their 
colleagues working in England in labour market policy is that Scotland has a 
completely different political dimension, with everyday scrutiny of politicians by 
opposition politicians and the media, and easier access by stakeholders (interview 
with JC+ official December 16, 2005). On the other hand, as part of a unified Home 
Civil Service, civil servants at the centre, in the English regions, and in the devolved 
administrations in the UK share similar values, experiences, interests and 
expectations. Unlike Canada, there were almost no civil servants whose jobs were 
dedicated exclusively to intergovernmental, inter-institutional, or interdepartmental 
relations with a prime focus on protecting jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not an issue in 
the UK as all civil servants are part of the same organization. They share commonly 
understood ‘rules of the game’, a common culture, and the focus of policy making is 
on what needs to be done, not who would do it. 
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During the period of this research, civil servants at the centre and with the devolved 
administrations also shared a commitment to devolution, as well as a commitment to 
the UK-wide objectives for welfare and skills reform. Devolution was a Labour 
project and, since all were governed by the Labour Party, there were very few 
differences that caused discord. When issues came up, they were accommodated 
through the civil service networks that had been retained, post-devolution, or through 
the Labour Party system. Although devolution provided an opportunity for policy 
differentiation, during the period of this research civil servants throughout the UK 
were still exploring the parameters of this differentiation. In this context some of the 
key challenges came to their attention through the influence and involvement of 
actors external to government. 
 
Involvement of Actors External to Government  
 
Chapter Two of this thesis makes the argument that, due to the existence of 
Westminster systems, intergovernmental relations in both Canada and the United 
Kingdom are executive-dominated. Certainly the analysis of the Canadian case study 
confirms this to be true with respect to labour market policy. The purpose of the final 
section of this chapter is to explore this in greater detail and determine the extent of 
executive dominance in the UK. 
 
The Influence of External Actors on the UK Government and Scottish Executive 
 
Figure 6 provided an overview of some of the key external actors involved in labour 
market policy in the UK. The most important and influential actors at both levels of 
government were individuals who worked for ‘executive non-departmental public 
bodies’. These arm’s length bodies were established by governments to deliver a 
particular public service; they were overseen by a board rather than by Ministers, 
employed their own staff, and were allocated their own budgets109. Many elements of 
the UK and Scottish welfare to work and skills reform agenda were delivered by 
                                                 
109 In Canada these responsibilities were carried out by civil servants working in federal and provincial 
government departments. 
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these organizations: for example, Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise (in Scotland), and the Learning and Skills Councils and Regional 
Development Agencies (in England). Other non-departmental public bodies such as 
Qualification Authorities, Further and Higher Education Funding Authorities, and the 
Sector Skills Development Agency and Sector Councils were also important.  
 
There were also a wide variety of stakeholders not under direct government control. 
There included postsecondary institutions, as well as territory specific stakeholders 
such as the Trades Union Congress, business groups, and civil society 
representatives. The media was particularly influential. According to an academic 
interviewed through this research, the centralized nature of the media in the UK 
contributed to the centralization of UK policy making, as Westminster politicians 
were held to account for anything that went wrong anywhere in the country 
(interview December 7, 2005). In the view of this individual, the London-based 
media had little appreciation for the new complexity that territory had brought to 
policy making and implementation in the UK, and consistently failed to distinguish 
between policy issues which were UK-wide and those which were applicable only in 
England. Even the Scottish media found it difficult to understand the differences 
between devolved and reserved issues, and when a policy announcement came from 
Westminster they did not seem to want to listen to detailed arguments about why 
something was different in Scotland than in England (interview with SE official 
April 21, 2005). 
 
Experts (either from the academic community or policy research institutes) also 
influenced intergovernmental actors. For example, the Department for Work and 
Pensions viewed itself as a leader in evidence-based policy making, commenting on 
its recognition in this capacity by the OECD (DWP no date). Each month, new 
welfare to work related studies and evaluations were added to its website; for 
example, between January and September 2007 53 new research reports were 
posted.110. The UK research community in welfare to work and skills was extensive, 
                                                 
110 This contrasts with Human Resources and Social Development Canada, where only one report was 
published over the same period. 
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with government researchers maintaining close links with funding bodies such as the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation, the main funders of social security research external to government. 
 
The Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion111 also played a key role. Started as 
the Unemployment Unit, this long-standing UK-wide organization provides 
advocacy, advice, research and consultancy on welfare to work, learning, skills and 
workforce development issues. It offers over 50 events every year, from training 
courses to major conventions of over 1000 delegates.  In March of 2007 they 
launched Welfare to Work Scotland, a new annual convention focused on the 
uniqueness of Scotland’s labour market, employability and anti-poverty policies. 
These events provide an opportunity for policy makers and practice experts to meet 
face-to-face on a regular basis, and facilitates informal interaction between UK and 
Scottish Executive Ministers, civil servants and stakeholders external to government. 
 
The Influence of External Actors on the UK Government 
 
On a UK-wide basis, there were two House of Commons committees (the Education 
and Skills Committee and the Work and Pensions Committee) whose public 
proceedings routinely heard submissions on government legislation and held 
inquiries into welfare to work and skills issues. There were also a number of formal 
advisory committees112 that operated during the period of this research to provide 
UK Ministers with policy advice. The National Employment Panel was a Department 
for Work and Pensions managed but employer-led body that focused on the 
performance of the UK Government’s labour market policies. The Skills Alliance 
was a UK-wide partnership that brought together key economic and delivery partners 
under the leadership of UK Ministers. The Social Security Advisory Committee 
provided advice on social security issues. The Disability Employment Advisory 
Committee examined employment issues for disabled people. 
                                                 
111 Details are available at http://www.cesi.org.uk/site/aboutus.asp.  
112 Each committee has a website explaining its remit and activities:  
http://www.nationalemploymentpanel.gov.uk/; 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/skillsstrategy/index.cfm?fuseaction=content.view&CategoryID=7; 
http://www.ssac.org.uk/; http://www.deac.org.uk/;  
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All of these advisory groups provided advice on UK-wide policy, and there was no 
indication either through an examination of their documents nor the interviews 
conducted through this research that their policies or practices had changed since 
devolution. As in the past, the UK Government made appointments to try to ensure 
an equitable territorial mix and Scotland was normally represented. However, in the 
view of one stakeholder, deliberations and discussions, post-devolution, showed little 
appreciation for the fact that many of the issues being examined were, in fact, under 
devolved competence (interview with stakeholder March 10, 2005).  On the other 
hand, the 25 Sector Skills Councils under the coordination of the Sector Skills 
Development Agency were explicitly mandated to take Scottish and Welsh concerns 
into account. 
 
The Influence of External Actors on the Scottish Executive  
 
The establishment of the Scottish Parliament as the locus for decision-making in 
devolved areas provided a new institution for Scottish social partners to relate to. 
Issues relating to welfare to work and skills were considered by the Scottish 
Parliament’s Enterprise and Culture Committee and the Communities Committee. 
The Scottish Welfare to Work Advisory Task Force has already been mentioned, but 
wrapped up in March 2005. After devolution, Scotland also set up the Scottish Social 
Inclusion Network but over time it too was disbanded. In the opinion of a poverty 
advocate, it got the reputation of being a ‘talking shop’, taking a lot of civil service 
time and effort, with no tangible results (interview November 14, 2005). Instead the 
Scottish Executive substituted ongoing advisory committees with short lived task 
groups focused on specific issues. During the period of this research there was the 
Scottish Executive Disability Working Group113, as well as task groups led by 
members of civil society who developed Workforce Plus (2006b). In Scott’s view, 
the direct involvement of social partners in this kind of work demonstrated the 
Scottish Executive’s integrated thinking on social and labour market issues (2006, p. 
                                                 
113 Details were available at http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/People/Equality/disability/dwg.  
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676). In 2006, the Scottish Executive also established a statutory Skills Committee114 
under the Scottish Funding Council (SFC 2006). 
 
There were also ongoing institutional structures to coordinate and plan welfare to 
work activity at a local level in Scotland. Here, the most significant driver was local 
authority initiative and the perception of local need, often funded by the European 
Union. In 2003 the Welfare to Work Forum was established in Glasgow under the 
leadership of Jobcentre Plus and the city (interview with JC+ official March 16, 
2005). In Edinburgh, Joined up for Jobs was established in 2002, under the Capital 
City Partnership (interview with stakeholder April 25, 2005). In the rest of Scotland, 
similar work was coordinated through Community Planning Partnerships which were 
established by the Scottish Parliament in 2003. Post-devolution, the activities of all 
of these organizations came together on a geographic basis with accountability 
through the Scottish Executive. Legislative oversight and legitimacy came through 
the Scottish Parliament. 
 
The Influence of External Actors on Officials in the North East Region of England 
 
This contrasts with the English regions, where there was no legislative oversight. 
Instead, an assortment of non-departmental public bodies operated, with Boards of 
Governors accountable to various UK Ministers. For example, in the North East 
Region alone the number of quasi-autonomous government bodies operating was 
estimated at 176 (Robinson and Shaw, 2001). Many central government departments 
retained direct control of their activities in the regions through these bodies, 
including Jobcentre Plus. Some organizations (e.g., the Learning and Skills Councils 
which reported to the Department for Education and Skills) had a regional and sub-
regional structure. A significant number of labour market functions in the UK were 
managed by local authorities (single-tiered and two-tiered), with program parameters 
decided by central Whitehall departments. At a recent parliamentary hearing in 
London, the actors involved in the English skills system were described as follows: 
                                                 
114 Details were available at 
http://www.sfc.ac.uk/about/new_about_council_papers/about_papers_10nov05/paper_sfc0526.pdf.   
 229
It is true that one has the Learning and Skills Councils, the Regional 
Development Authority, the Regional Skills Partner and Jobcentre Plus, but 
in addition there is, with lots of different boundaries, a list of other 
organizations that take an interest in working with employers on skills. One 
has Fair Cities, City Strategy Pathfinders, core city skills and employment 
boards, adult learning option pilots and local strategic partners…If you are 
an employer out there the complexity is immense. We must tidy up the system 
115. 
 
This assessment of the influence of external actors on labour market policy in the UK 
has only considered the domestic situation. The final section of this chapter considers 
an additional dimension and complexity in relation to UK policy making in the 
labour market; that is, the impact and influence of the European Union. 
 
The Influence of Europe 
 
The European Union is an important influence on most elements of UK policy 
making, and labour market policy is no exception. There were three separate but 
increasingly related policy strands relevant to this research: the European Social 
Fund, the European Employment Strategy, and Social Inclusion. For over 40 years 
the European Social Fund has invested, along with member states, in programs to 
develop people’s skills and their potential for work. European funding was available 
to help regions, particularly those lagging behind, to upgrade and modernize the 
skills of their workforce. For Scotland, this funding has been significant, with over 
£1 billion allocated for the period 2000 to 2006 (interview with SE official December 
2, 2005). In 1997, a new employment chapter was included in the Amsterdam Treaty 
and the European Employment Strategy (EES) was developed to help solve member 
countries’ employment problems. This consisted of the development of European 
guidelines on employment, an annual joint report, national action plans by individual 
member states to implement the guidelines, and a system of benchmarking, 
reporting, monitoring, assessment, peer review, and dissemination. This process is 
known as the Open Method of Coordination (Goetschy 2003, de la Porte 2004, 
Radaelli 2004). There was also a European Strategy on Social Inclusion, with 
                                                 
115 Oral evidence taken from Linda Florance, chief executive of Skillfast-UK, before the UK 
Education and Skills Parliamentary Committee May 14, 2007. 
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national action plans developed by each member state to help achieve the overall EU 
long-term goal that there should be a decisive impact on the eradication of poverty 
by 2010 (HM Treasury 2005, 2006). 
 
European-based employment and social policies were integrated with 
macroeconomic and microeconomic policies into the Lisbon Strategy for Jobs and 
Growth, an integrated approach to the key challenges facing the EU as a whole. UK 
actions against this agenda were outlined in a single document called the UK 
National Reform Programme (HM Treasury 2005, updated 2006). Chapter Three’s 
‘Increasing/Delivering Employment Opportunity for All’ contained detailed 
references to UK Government commitments to welfare and skills reform within a 
European Union context. Whitehall officials interviewed through this research saw 
employment policy as the ‘heart’ of Lisbon. In their view, it was the key way to 
move member state policies so that Europe could become the most competitive 
trading block in the world (interview December 12, 2005). 
 
These initiatives exposed Scotland to European influences, imported new ways of 
thinking, and created a European consciousness (Keating 2005, p. 155). Post-
devolution, the Scottish Executive developed an extensive European strategy: 
Over three-quarters of the work of the Scottish Executive and the Scottish 
Parliament is, to a greater or lesser extent, influenced by decisions taken in 
Brussels. So we must continue to ensure that EU decision-making reflects 
Scotland’s interests (SE 2004b). 
 
A question consistently asked through this research was whether the Scottish 
Executive and Parliament influenced UK input into European policy making in areas 
of devolved competence and how their input was provided. 
 
As already identified, from a constitutional perspective anything relating to European 
matters is reserved to the UK Government. Nevertheless, from an examination of UK 
documents focused on their participation in the European Union and the interviews 
conducted through this research, it was clear that there were extensive consultative 
processes between the UK Government and the devolved administrations over 
European Union matters. When UK national action plans on employment or social 
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inclusion were developed, drafts were sent to the devolved administrations for their 
comments and input on the same basis as other UK Government departments, rather 
than the social partners (interview with Whitehall official December 12, 2005). 
When these requests were received, Scottish Executive officials reviewed the UK 
draft and assessed how their initiatives contributed to the overall UK approach and 
suggested Scottish-based examples that could be incorporated into the UK text. In 
Keating’s view (2005, p. 132) the Scottish Executive has generally taken a 
cooperative line in European matters, seeking to exercise influence behind the scenes 
by being an active player in the Whitehall networks. 
 
Given the importance of European matters, Scottish Executive responses required the 
approval of Scottish Ministers and were also sent to the Scottish Parliament’s 
European and External Relations Committee before finalization (interview with SE 
official December 2, 2005). What was noteworthy, however, was that this involved 
reporting, information sharing and consultation, not policy making. In the view of a 
Scottish Executive official, Scottish Enterprise was probably one of the Scottish 
Executive departments with the least contact on European issues, as in this subject 
matter European influences were felt to be minor (interview December 2, 2005). He 
was not aware of JMC Europe dealing with any of their issues, other than the 
working time directive. To him, JMC Europe provided an intergovernmental forum 
to deal with European regulatory issues that impacted the devolved administrations; 
for example, discussions relating to the European Social Fund were handled through 
another process. In the view of a Whitehall official, the devolved administrations had 
no role in shaping UK input into EU policy. JMC Europe was used primarily for 
strategy development and determining how to implement European policies across 
the UK, not for identifying UK directions (interview December 12, 2005).  
 
Another key question asked was to what degree EU policy making and directions 
influenced UK policies and the policy making process. In Ardy’s view (2004) the 
impact of the European Employment Strategy on national decision-making in the UK 
has been low; as well there has been no real impact on the media debate or national 
political deliberation, and no change in national employment policies. Officials 
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interviewed would agree with this assessment. Whitehall officials saw the UK 
Government as the driver of European employment policy, not the other way around. 
They have initiated extensive EU processes with other member states and invested 
considerable time and effort in this exercise as, in their view, the UK needs Europe to 
be successful and the European Employment Strategy is the key tool. UK officials 
and Ministers also wished to ensure that EU policy had a ‘light touch’ and did not 
intrude on UK policy as otherwise the European Commission tended to over-
regulate. They could see nothing that changed in UK policies, behavior or directions 
coming out of the EU except for processes to recognize professional qualifications116 
(two separate interviews with Whitehall officials December 12, 2005). A community 
representative saw the UK National Reform Programme (2006) as a response that 
merely compiled what the UK Government was going to do anyways, and did not 
feel that it moved the UK policy framework at all (interview April 25, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, without the consultation requirements arising from the European 
Union, UK policy making would not have been as inclusive; for example, UK 
Ministers were pleased with the civil society input that they had feared would be 
more confrontational (interview with Whitehall official December 12, 2005). EU 
processes provided opportunities for industry and the social partners to come 
together with Whitehall and Scottish Executive officials in a single forum to 
exchange views on Scottish and UK-wide policy, as well as EU policy. Some 
opportunities were one-of-a-kind, like the 2005 round table on poverty and social 
exclusion and the UK Skills Summit (both held as a result of the UK European 
presidency). Others were ongoing: for example, each year Employment Week brings 
together experts, policy professionals, and stakeholders from across Europe to share 
best practices and network on employment issues. The Social Policy Task Force was 
an ongoing committee that provided UK poverty advocates with a process for input 
into the UK National Action Plan on Social Inclusion (DWP 2006c). In the view of a 
poverty advocate, this UK-wide task force provided a “receptive institutional 
context” for regular dialogue with government officials on anti-poverty policy 
                                                 
116 In Canada this is referred to as labour mobility. Foreign credential recognition is also related. 
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(interview November 14, 2005). For advocacy groups, an ongoing process like this 




As has been demonstrated through this analysis, during the period of this research, 
UK civil servants interacted within an extremely rich network of external actors 
interested in UK labour market policy issues, ranging from dedicated industry and 
civil society advisory committees to provide advice, to parliamentary committees 
that received this advice, to national, local, and regional program and service 
delivery networks. They also interacted within a rich network of European actors, as 
well as EU processes that provided structured mechanisms for connections between 
the two governments in terms of initiating and reviewing documents that presented a 
unified UK position to Europe. These EU processes also provided a forum for both 
governments to hear and consider the views of relevant industry and social partners.  
 
Given these findings on the extensive role of actors external to government, 
questions could be raised about the earlier supposition in this thesis about the 
executive dominance of intergovernmental relations in the United Kingdom. This 
issue will be revisited in the concluding chapter of this thesis, in relation to the 




A number of factors impacting the intergovernmental relationship in labour market 
policy in the UK emerge from this chapter. Since its election in 1997, labour market 
policies have become one of Labour’s flagship policy initiatives, demanding a 
considerable amount of UK Ministerial time, attention and focus. Dealing with 
worklessness and Incapacity Benefit reform were highly sensitive political issues that 
determined overall government success or failure. No philosophical differences 
between the UK Government and the devolved administrations on the overall thrust 
of reform, nor on the strategies to be employed, were identified through this research. 
The UK Government remained in charge of most welfare to work policy instruments 
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through its reserved roles in social security and employment as administered through 
Jobcentre Plus across Great Britain (including Scotland). Although skills policy was 
considered devolved, the devolved administrations were generally supportive of 
overall UK directions, and no disputes had arisen over jurisdiction, funding, or 
overall direction. Despite considerable efforts put into the development of more 
formal intergovernmental machinery through concordats, agreements, and protocols, 
informal positive relationships between civil servants as well as Ministers dominated. 
 
How can this be explained? The first reason is that constitutionally most of the policy 
issues being examined through this research remained under the control of the UK 
Government, with the devolved administrations acknowledging that they were in a 
supporting as opposed to a leading role. Historically, labour market policy was 
controlled centrally, and limited differences have emerged, post-devolution. 
 
Second, when issues did arise they were easily accommodated through political party 
or civil service channels. This was the way that business had always been done in the 
UK, and with the same party in charge in both the Scottish and Westminster 
Parliaments during the period of this research there was no need to change the ‘path 
dependent’ direction that had served admirably in the past. The interests, values, 
expectations and experiences of intergovernmental actors were also significantly 
aligned. With the growing capacity of the Scottish Executive to take on policy 
development through additional staffing resources and the legitimacy of a Parliament 
to provide direction, their increased desire for engagement was welcomed by the UK 
Government officials. 
 
Given the rich network of external actors involved in labour market policy in the UK, 
there were numerous opportunities for governments (both executives as well as 
politicians) to engage with each other, as well as with external actors such as 
industry, stakeholders, experts, and civil society. The European Union expanded this 
engagement beyond the UK borders to also include other countries in Europe. 
Connections such as these provided informal opportunities to facilitate common 
understanding and promote collaboration and accommodation. 
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As identified in the opening quote in this chapter, the analysis just undertaken seems 
to question the degree to which the people of Scotland desire “a degree of 
government for themselves” in relation to labour market policy. The exploration 
continues in the next chapter through an examination of the power relationship 
dynamic between governments in the UK, and the impact that this has had on the 
character and workability of intergovernmental relations in labour market policy. 
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CHAPTER 7: EXPLAINING INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
 
…the Review Team has assessed the Scottish Executive against our own high 
aspirations. In presenting their findings to us, the Team explicitly recognized 
that the journey we are on (and on which we have made considerable 
progress) is one of evolution from the pre devolution inheritance of a single 
Government Department into a fully integrated Government (Elvidge 2006, 
p.2)117.  
 
This chapter turns to the final component of the UK case studythat is, an 
examination of the power relationship dynamic between governments in the UK, and 
the character and workability of intergovernmental relations in labour market policy. 
Unlike the Canadian case study, where there was evidence of continuing conflict in 
the policy domain, in the early days of devolution more harmonious relationships 
prevailed in the UK, especially around the division of powers, an acceptance of 
central government dominance over the policy domain, and recognition of the need 
for a UK-wide approach. Any differences were smoothed out on a bilateral basis 
through informal civil service and political channels. Connections between 
intergovernmental actors were significantly enhanced by the relationships they had 
with external actors who delivered labour market programs, as well as those who 
provided advice through advisory committees and task forces. Many of these 
processes were put in place to manage UK relations around employment policy with 
the European Union.  
 
The key purpose of this chapter is to explain these outcomes through a detailed 
examination of the power relationship dynamic between the UK Government and the 
Scottish Executive. Using the analytical framework as outlined in Chapter Two and 
following the same approach as the Canadian case study in Chapter Five, this 
dynamic is assessed using three inter-related concepts: hierarchy, interdependence, 
and the operation of the intergovernmental machinery. These are examined from the 
point of view of officials at the centre, from the Scottish Executive, and then 
                                                 
117 John Elvidge became Permanent Secretary to the Scottish Executive in 2003, and was still in this 
position into 2007.  
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compared. Relationships between the centre and the North East region of England 
are also examined, highlighting the asymmetry of devolution in the United Kingdom. 
 
The chapter then assesses the character and workability of the UK Government-
Scottish Executive relationship in labour market policy according to the criteria 
outlined in pages 60-65 of this thesis. Since there were no multilateral relationships 
in the UK in this policy area during the period of this research, only bilateral 
relationships are considered. Relationships were characterized as cooperative, 
collaborative, competitive, or coercive. The workability of the relationship was 
assessed as high, medium, or low dependent primarily upon the degree to which trust 
ties were evident between senior officials. Most of this information was drawn from 
the interviews conducted for this research, and transcripts were reviewed for 
evidence of shared goals and objectives, routinized and regular engagement, stability 
among the key players, geographic proximity, honesty in terms of information 
sharing, willingness to engage, capacity to engage and autonomy to decide, 
leadership in the development of processes to work through differences, choosing a 
narrow enough agenda where issues can be delimited, and seeking agendas that 
showed promise of early success. The interview data was also combed for evidence 
of the presence or absence of mutual respect, civility and tolerance, predictability, 
fairness, a positive history, an ability to minimize past grievances, recognition of 
mutual interdependence, and shared professional training and norms. 
 
As different actors and processes were involved in different dimensions of the policy 
domain, a number of relationships were examined. In Canada the work was 
organized according to which multilateral forum dealt with the issue. With no 
multilateral forums in the UK, instead relationships were segmented by UK central 
department responsibility. Three categorieswelfare to work policy, skills policy, 
and immigration policyare identified and separate assessments made.  
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Power Relationship Dynamic 
 
The degree of power that one government has over another is influenced by the 
hierarchy in the relationship (who is in charge, the freedom to act, and the 
instruments used to control), the degree to which governments are interdependent 
(the need they have to exchange resourcesfor example money, information, 
authority, political support, information, organization, skills, and expertise) and the 
operation of the intergovernmental machinery (institutional structures, bilateral vs. 
multilateral, access by actors external to government). As in the Canadian case study, 
the views of each partner in the relationship on these three dimensions are recounted 
and then compared. 
 




Assessing hierarchy in the relationship and the degree to which this had changed 
with devolution was carried out by examining selected government documents and 
by seeking the views of civil servants and external stakeholders. 
 
As identified in Chapter Six, after its election in 1997, welfare to work became a 
flagship policy of the Labour Party, and, over the period of this research, merged into 
workforce development with the addition of a robust national skills agenda. 
Decisions on the overall parameters of welfare reform took place at the highest levels 
of government, involving politicians and civil servants from HM Treasury, the 
Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), the Department for Education and Skills 
(DfES), the Department for Industry and Trade (DFI), the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. UK Government directions 
were influenced by advisory councils and task groups such as the National 
Employment Panel and the National Skills Alliance that operated on a UK-wide 
basis. They found their way into green papers, white papers, strategy documents and 
legislation.   
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From the perspective of Scottish Executive and Whitehall civil servants interviewed 
through this research (April 21 and 15, December 6 and 8, 2005), the Department for 
Work and Pensions had the authority to make policy in any area relating to welfare to 
work, as anything it did to achieve its objectives was for a reserved purpose. No one 
interviewed through this research questioned this authority, even though these UK-
wide policies obliging people on benefits to access training, health, child care and 
addictions counseling imposed demands and directions on devolved services. DWP 
clearly acknowledged that implementation would need to be different in Scotland 
and Wales, as each respective administration had responsibility for funding and 
delivery of support services. For example, Building on the New Deal (DWP 2004, p. 
33) identified that the Department for Work and Pensions would need to: 
…work with colleagues in Scotland and Wales and their partner 
organizations to establish the implications for each devolved administration 
and to plan for implementation, in order to achieve our policy objectives.  
 
Clearly these were UK set policy objectives (not Scottish) and the devolved 
administrations were seen as having a role in implementing UK-wide policy. DWP 
officials expected their policies to be implemented by their executive agency, 
Jobcentre Plus, through partnership arrangements with the nine English regions and 
the two countries Scotland and Wales. Although it was acknowledged that these 
partnership arrangements could vary (given the different actors and institutional 
structures in each nation), in essence the strategy was expected to be the same across 
the UK (interview with Whitehall official February 8, 2005). 
 
The Department for Education and Skills had a much more nuanced task as all 
aspects of skills except sector councils and qualifications were considered as 
devolved. The white paper Skills: Getting on in Business, Getting on at Work (DfES 
2005) set out ‘the Government’s plans’ to make the UK a world leader in skills but it 
was not until Point 26 on page 10 in the Overview Document that the statement was 
made: 
The Skills Strategy is primarily a strategy for England, reflecting the 
devolution of responsibility for education and training to Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Each has developed its own strategy for skills and lifelong 
learning. However, some elements of this Strategy have implications for the 
Devolved Administrations, notably the work of the Sector Skills Councils 
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(which have a UK-wide remit) and the Sector Skills Agreements (DfES 2005, 
p. 10). 
 
This divided responsibility was clearer in the separate part two document which was 
‘the technical explanation and how it will be implemented’ where a footnote 
appeared on the bottom of the first page. When questioned as to why the paper was 
not identified as an ‘English’ Skills Strategy, given that it really only applied to 
England, officials explained that “things are not branded that way and this point is 
hardly mentioned as the sector/audience are familiar with this being a devolved 
competence” (interview with Whitehall official December 12, 2005). 
 
Improving the Life Chances of Disabled People (PMSU 2005) was developed by the 
Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in cooperation with the Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister, the Department for Work and Pensions, the Department of Health, and the 
Department for Education and Skills. This far-reaching strategy was intended to 
bring disabled people in the UK into the ‘opportunity society’ and touched on many 
devolved areas such as advice services, direct supports, health, childcare, early 
education, work focused training and in work supports. There were no references at 
all to devolved responsibilities in the executive summary; however in the full report 
there was a statement early on that: 
The report has been accepted by the UK Government and there is a 
commitment to implement the project’s recommendations in England and, 
where appropriate, across the UK…the devolved administrations may wish to 
consider if the actions identified are appropriate for them and, if so, how to 
take them forward. More work will be needed to identify the implications of 
some of the proposals within the devolution context (PMSU 2005, p.  23). 
 
From a review of these three documents and discussions with civil servants at the 
centre, responsibility for strategic policy making in the UK remained a 
Westminster/Whitehall role, even in areas of devolved competence. For England 
there was no other alternative, but when applied to the devolved administrations it set 
up a clear hierarchical relationship. Whitehall officials said that they tried to be 
sensitive and careful to make sure that what was written did not cross anything that 
was a devolved responsibility, and that there were processes in place for civil 
servants from the devolved administrations to review drafts of documents and 
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provide comments (interview with Whitehall official December 12, 2005). There was 
no sense from any of those interviewed at the centre that comments from the 
devolved administrations changed any directions; however words may have been 
nuanced to reflect Scottish sensitivities.  
 
The only real change to central policy making in welfare to work and skills since 
devolution was in ensuring the inclusion and appropriate wording of a short footnote 
or statement in government documents which identified that some issues might be 
handled differently in the devolved administrations. It was often hard to find and 
easy to miss. None of the documents examined provided any details on how policies 
or implementation would be different in Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland, leaving 
an impression that the policy directions outlined applied equally across the UK. The 
practice by the UK Government of minimizing or virtually ignoring the territorial 
dimension of policy making, post-devolution, has led to both citizen and media 
confusion about the role and powers of the devolved administrations (interview with 
SE officials April 15 and 21, 2005). 
 
Civil servants at the centre were not concerned over this practice as they did not 
perceive that the devolved administrations disagreed with overall UK policy 
directions. In their view, the devolved administrations had developed directions that 
were similar to UK-wide policy, and, in any case, these UK-wide directions were 
“good for the devolved administrations” (interview with Whitehall official December 
6, 2005).  
 
Particularly with regard to policies coming from the Department for Work and 
Pensions, Westminster/Whitehall made the rules. In the view of a Jobcentre Plus 
official, DWP and Jobcentre Plus had strict Treasury wide targets to achieve and 
would not be distracted from achieving them by partnership working with the 
devolved administrations (interview April 22, 2005). The way to manage the 
relationship around the targets was to ensure that they were clearly visible to 
everyone down to the district office level by being published on the internet, and 
communicated early enough so they could be incorporated into Scottish Executive 
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targets (interview with JC+ December 16, 2005). All officials interviewed with both 
the Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus welcomed the initiative 
being taken through the Scottish Workforce Plus (SE 2006b), and were pleased to 
see that Closing the Opportunity Gap explicitly committed the Scottish Executive to 
reducing DWP caseloads. Scottish Executive initiative in this area was also 
welcomed given cutbacks in Jobcentre Plus offices.  
 
On skills issues there was not the same notion of hierarchy: for the Department for 
Education and Skills the focus was on achieving targets in the English regions and its 
main interaction with Scotland was in incorporating Scottish activities into EU 
initiatives. There were no formal accountability arrangements for ensuring that the 
Scottish Executive took actions that supported the overall UK skills strategy, as the 
Scottish Executive was not subject to the public service agreements used by HM 
Treasury in the rest of the UK. Except from a European perspective, there were no 
reporting requirements to the UK Government from the Scottish Executive 
(interview with Whitehall official December 12, 2005). Instead data was collected on 
a UK-wide basis, and Scottish performance was included (as had always been done), 
within the context of performance across the whole of the United Kingdom. 
However, if the media wished to query Scottish results in a UK-based report, these 
inquiries were directed to Scottish (not UK) Ministers (interview with Whitehall 
official December 6, 2005). 
 
This exploration of UK policy documents and interviews with civil servants at the 
centre provides clear evidence of the continued dominance of the UK Government in 
policy making and reporting, even in areas where competence has been devolved. 
Although Whitehall officials saw the impact of devolution in policy implementation, 
they did not perceive that this also meant a different approach to developing policy 
or reporting on outcomes, which in their view remained a UK Government 
prerogative.  
 
There are many explanations for this. Under the devolution settlement, Westminster 
was still in charge. In welfare to work policy, DWP controlled the public 
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employment service across the UK, and anything they needed to do to achieve their 
objectives was viewed as reserved. Although skills policy was considered devolved, 
Whitehall still made policy for England and since some skills issues (e.g., sector 
councils and qualifications) were reserved, it was hard to disentangle devolved and 
reserved competence. Many strategic issues were expressed in a European context 
where competence remained reserved. In addition, many Whitehall officials did not 
perceive any divergence between UK-wide and devolved directions. For Whitehall 





Even if the devolved administrations did not have a role to play in strategic policy 
formulation, it was clearly acknowledged that there was a significant degree of 
interdependence in policy implementation and coordination, and that many UK-wide 
objectives could not be achieved without the assistance of the devolved 
administrations. However, this varied from one issue area to another. 
 
Officials with the Department for Work and Pensions clearly acknowledged that their 
welfare to work objectives in Scotland could not be achieved without the active 
consent and involvement of the Scottish Executive. From its perspective, the 
relationship was one of mutual dependence. The concordat between DWP and the 
Scottish Executive and the supplementary working level agreement acknowledged 
that: 
DWP and the Scottish Executive are dependent upon each other’s services… 
to deliver their respective responsibilities…the coordination and 
implementation of policy in this area is necessary if the programs of the UK 
Government and the Scottish Executive are to be delivered effectively and 
coherence of provision for people not in work is to be ensured (DWP and 
Scottish Executive 2004).  
 
Not only did the Scottish Executive control training through the Enterprise 
Networks, they were also responsible for the variety of support services needed by 
people with significant barriers to employment (e.g., drug addiction services, money 
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services, supports for prostitutes and the homeless, condition management services, 
motivational courses, careers services for young people, housing and regeneration) 
through Communities Scotland, local authorities or health authorities. In addition, 
Scottish Executive Agencies, local authorities and health authorities employed 
hundreds of thousands of people and Jobcentre Plus wanted to ensure that they were 
the recruiter of choice (interview with JC+ official April 28, 2005). This 
interdependence was reflected in the Department for Work and Pensions active 
collaboration and assignment of staff to work on Workforce Plus (SE 2006b) and in 
both DWP and Jobcentre Plus membership on the Welfare to Work Planning Group. 
It was also evident from the working level agreement between the two governments 
and a Partnership Accord with Scottish local authorities, who reported to the Scottish 
Executive.  
 
Chapter Two highlighted the exchange of resources as the key dimension impacting 
interdependence. DWP and Jobcentre Plus were seeking the following resources 
from the Scottish Executive: overall political support for their policies; the skills, 
expertise, and organizational capacity of Scottish Executive officials, including the 
legitimacy they held to direct their agents to cooperate with DWP; and the funding 
they controlled to provide training and other support services to persons dependent 
upon DWP benefits. The Scottish Executive also had labour market information 
sources of use to DWP and, as one of the largest employers in Scotland, the capacity 
to make job vacancies available to people on benefits (interview with Whitehall 
official December 6, 2005). Given its constrained mandate, DWP lacked the 
legitimacy to provide or purchase the services it needed to fulfill its objectives and, 
in Scotland, had to secure the cooperation of Scottish Executive officials.    
 
With respect to skills issues, there was not the same sense of interdependence or a 
need to exchange resources in order to achieve objectives, instead the view from the 
Department for Education and Skills was one of parallel management, almost one of 
mutual independence. For DfES the prime purpose of the relationship was 
information sharing; there was no reason for the Scottish Executive to implement its 
policies and little attempt was made to even coordinate action (interview with 
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Whitehall official December 12, 2005). There were separate but unrelated advisory 
bodies (the National Skills Alliance in the UK and the Skills Committee in Scotland), 
and no ongoing working group of officials. The overarching protocol between the 
Department for Education and Skills and the Scottish Executive focused primarily on 
communication and consultation and had not been updated or refined since it had 
been put in place shortly after devolution. However, when interdependence impacted 
Scottish policy making and Scottish partners beyond the Scottish Executive, a more 
focused written agreement was developed and implemented, for example, with the 
UK-wide Sector Skills Development Agency (interview with SE official April 15, 
2005).  
 
An area where there was a high degree of interdependence in both policy areas was 
with respect to European Union matters. There were extensive processes within the 
UK involving the devolved administrations, other government departments and civil 
society partners to develop UK-wide national action plans, report on outcomes, and 
feed these into the overall European process (interview with SE official April 21, 
2005). This involved drafting documents, sending them to the devolved 
administrations for comments, integrating their views, and placing devolved 
examples into the UK-wide text.  
 
IGR Structures and Machinery 
 
Using the words set out in the Memorandum of Understanding supplemented by 
policy specific concordats and working level agreements as context and direction, the 
interaction between the Scottish Executive and UK departments working on the 
range of welfare to work and skills issues was primarily handled on a day-to-day 
basis through informal working relationships between officials. This was 
supplemented by informal, ad hoc Ministers’ meetings and conversations where it 
was felt that there was an issue and a need to connect. Generally it was left up to 
officials working with both governments to identify where they needed to connect 
and communicate items that might have an impact on each other, or where joint 
working would be positive. This communication was based on goodwill, trust, an 
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enthusiasm and knowledge of devolution, and the presence of positive interpersonal 
relationships. It was also trusting in the Scotland Office to share documents and 
facilitate the process where necessary. However, a Scotland Office official 
acknowledged problems with this approach: 
Devolution has created so much more work…we have gone from a 
Westminster sovereign Parliament to devolution settlements in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland that are all different…you can easily understand 
why some Whitehall departments really get confused about what they can do 
in which particular area. The main issue is staff turnover and churn, there 
are new staff coming into Whitehall departments that haven’t had experience 
with devolution…and there is such complexity, there is murkiness in terms of 
competence in different subject matters, different settlements in different 
territories, and then with staff turnover it can make things very difficult 
(interview December 8, 2005). 
 
For the Department for Work and Pensions a key assist to managing relationships in 
Scotland was the presence of approximately 13,000 Jobcentre Plus staff working 
throughout Scotland and staffing resources available for coordination through a 
Scottish national office. The Welfare to Work Planning Group meetings were the 
primary institutional mechanism at the Scottish level for managing the relationship, 
and the Community Planning Partnerships and special organizational arrangements 
in Glasgow and Edinburgh performed a similar role at the local level. 
 
The Department for Education and Skills had no staff located in Scotland; as a result 
all interactions were through phone, letter, and e-mail, with meetings arranged as 
necessary. However, all devolved administrations and the centre connected face-to-
face on skills issues through quarterly meetings held with the Sector Skills 
Development Agency. Here, the focus was not on broadly based skills issues, but on 
interactions with the Sector Skills Councils. 
 
A question that was consistently asked through this research was how the 
relationship between the UK Government and the Scottish Executive could be 
characterized: Was it intergovernmental, interdepartmental or inter-institutional? 
Most Whitehall officials felt uncomfortable with the term ‘intergovernmental’; one 
stated that in her view there was only one ‘government’ in the UK, despite the 
Scottish Executive’s considering itself the ‘devolved government for Scotland’ 
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(interview December 8, 2005). Upon reflection, many Whitehall officials 
acknowledged that interactions between civil servants were more ‘interdepartmental’ 
than intergovernmental, with central departments expected to liaise with the Scottish 
Executive in the same way as with other UK departments. Some suggested that once 
Ministers became involved the relationship became intergovernmental, as then it had 
a political dimension. During the period of this research, Whitehall civil servants did 
not question the legitimacy of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive to act 
in areas of devolved competence; however, there seemed to be little reflection or 
realization that English or UK-wide directions might constrain or push the Scottish 
Executive or Scottish Parliament to act in ways they might not choose and impact the 
autonomy promised through devolution.  
 




Senior Scottish Executive officials interviewed through this research felt generally 
powerless to influence UK overall strategic direction, and that they were just one 
player among many (separate interviews with four officials April 15 and 21, 2005). 
Not only were UK-wide strategic directions and policies decided at the highest level 
of government, they were also significantly impacted by factors such as the 
economic state of the world, inward migration, the European Union, monetary 
policy, etc. In their view, the best that they could hope for was that UK-wide 
documents reflected the reality of devolution and were sensitive to Scottish issues.  
 
Overall direction for Scotland’s strategic policy agenda during the period of this 
research was set by the Labour- Liberal Democrat Programme for Government. With 
respect to welfare to work issues, the Scottish Executive wished to do something 
about market failure and the 300,000 people in Scotland who were not working but 
wished to work, and officials concluded that the solution, as in the UK, was to 
support these people into work (interview April 15, 2005). Its agenda and approach 
in this policy area just happened to coincide with that of Westminster; in other policy 
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areas there may be differences. Scottish Executive officials felt that if the economy 
fell back and Scotland lost employment against England, the only thing they could 
do was to encourage skills as they did not have other policy levers like inward 
investment (interviews April 15 and 21, 2005).  
 
Even though Scottish Executive officials acknowledged the overall leadership role of 
the Department for Work and Pensions on welfare to work issues, there were areas of 
rub and tension, particularly around Public Service Agreement targets, and the 
Scottish Executive refused to incorporate them within Closing the Opportunity Gap 
targets (interview with SE official April 25, 2005). In their view, although many of 
the directions and targets were shared, this may not hold true into the future. In some 
areas the Scottish Executive went beyond UK-wide targets, for example in Closing 
the Opportunity Gap they added a target that related to low-wage, low-skilled work.  
 
Skills policy sat on the cusp of reserved and devolved responsibilities. When the first 
UK Skills Strategy was developed, in 2003, it contained many sweeping statements 
about Sector Skills Councils that had not been cleared with Scottish officials or 
Ministers: 
Scotland is forgotten because UK officials developing policy think of English 
needs only, they do not think through the implications of their policies on 
Scotland, they share information too late, and then get frustrated when they 
have to work very hard to find solutions acceptable to both sides (interview 
with SE official April 15, 2005).  
 
For Scottish Executive officials it had been a major accomplishment to be able to 
review UK documents as they were developed and ensure that these included some 
kind of reference or footnote to indicate that directions did not necessarily apply to 
Scotland or would be implemented differently there. In 2003, DfES officials made a 
major concession when they agreed to recognize this as a strategy for England, and 
that policies were different in Scotland and Wales. This did not mean, however, that 
they were willing to label it as an English Skills Strategy, as it contained reference to 
policies which were reserved: 
In reality, it’s an English Skills strategy: it’s a DfES document and DfES is 
an English department that does not have authority in Scotland, Wales, and 
Northern Ireland. But because of Treasury involvement and budget 
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references people think of it as a UK strategy. There is lots of confusion. 
Scotland knows it’s an English strategy but it does refer to policies that DWP 
and Sector Skills Councils implement that are UK-wide (interview with SE 
official April 15, 2005). 
 
When the Scottish Executive was caught short by a lack of notice on policy changes 
that impacted them, every effort was made to resolve the issue within the civil  
service and not involve Ministers: 
Yes, there is avoidance behavior as the direction coming from the First 
Minister’s office is that he doesn’t want to end up having dust ups with his 
Westminster counterparts, he wants this to be resolved…he doesn’t want to 
dust up with people from the same party (interview with SE official April 21, 
2005) 
 
An inability to resolve things would not be good for the relationship…we 
would be accused of mismanagement, being stubborn, difficult, and causing a 
breakdown in the relationship and would be deemed as being 
unhelpful…everybody wants to be sure that things work, as both governments 
are Labour right now and there is a commitment to devolution and to the UK 
as a nation and the commitment is to make things work (interview with SE 
official April 15, 2005). 
 
These comments highlight the significance of maintaining harmony within the party, 
even on the part of civil servants. This included letting some issues go and being 
very careful about the issues chosen to fight. However, as devolution progressed and 
the Scottish Executive grew in confidence, officials indicated that they were 
becoming more willing to take on issues that they felt were important (interview 
December 2, 2005). 
 
An important illustration related to labour market policy occurred when the Scottish 
Executive challenged UK immigration policies. Concerned over the demographic 
‘time bomb’ of a declining population, the Scottish Executive developed New Scots: 
Attracting Fresh Talent to Meet the Challenge of Growth (SE 2004c). Not only is 
immigration reserved (with all policy instruments acknowledged as being in the 
hands of the UK Government), the Home Office did not feel the same imperatives as 
Scotland about the need for change. This required a persuasive intergovernmental 
approach on a number of levels. 
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In the initial stages the plan hoped to boost Scotland’s population by doing three 
things: retain Scots already in Scotland; encourage expatriated Scots to return; and 
attract new comers to Scotland. The centerpiece of the plan was to encourage 
overseas students to stay and work in Scotland with a two-year visa extension and a 
further application for permanent residency based upon permanent employment, and 
in this the Scottish Executive succeeded (interview with SE official June 6, 2007). 
However, correspondence between the Home Office and the Scottish Executive 
(released under the Freedom of Information Act) 118 demonstrated Whitehall’s 
reluctance to make the broader range of changes in UK policy sought by the Scottish 
Executive. The Home Office refused to consider proposals to extend rights of 
members of the Scottish Diaspora to return to Scotland, to lift the UK-wide ban on 
asylum-seekers being allowed to work in Scotland, and to extend post-study work 
visas to include Higher National Certificates and Higher National Diplomas. Davis 
(2007) concluded that the failure to secure agreement on the full range of objectives 
was due to Scottish Labour’s unwillingness to challenge the party strongly and 
publicly on this issue. In his view, this exposed Scotland’s lack of leverage and 
dependence upon Westminster. 
 
Scottish Executive officials clearly acknowledged that they were the junior partner in 
the relationship. In welfare to work they tried to influence UK-wide policy through 
their ‘insider status’ and extensive contacts with DWP and Jobcentre Plus. In skills, 
they were reluctant to press for labeling changes to identify that UK documents 
really only applied in England, pleased that they had at least gained an opportunity to 
insert appropriate footnotes implying different directions in Scotland. In immigration 
matters, they pressed only so far to achieve their objectives, unwilling to challenge 
the political party system to a greater degree to realize their objectives. All of these 
actions provide clear evidence of a hierarchical relationship and a desire to test the 
boundaries of devolution only in a step-by-step and cautious fashion. With the 
exception of immigration matters, there were no issues covered through this research 
where the Scottish Executive under Labour domination felt compelled to challenge 
                                                 
118 Official correspondence from Scottish Executive to Home Office January 29, 2004, and Home 
Office correspondence April 16, 2004.  
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the hierarchy embedded in the devolution settlement. Instead, avoidance behavior 




With respect to interaction with the Department for Work and Pensions and 
Jobcentre Plus, Scottish Executive civil servants viewed the relationship as one of 
mutual dependence. They acknowledged that DWP was in the lead and they were in 
a supporting and implementing role in providing access to devolved services for 
people on benefits. Since these were the same people that they wanted to help 
through Scottish initiatives, there was no disagreement on direction. Spending time 
trying to sort out jurisdiction as outlined in the Scotland Act and the differences 
between employment and employability had proven pointless despite meetings 
soliciting the assistance of legal advisors and experts (interview with SE official 
December 2, 2005). In the end, the Scottish Executive officials interviewed through 
this research concluded that employability and welfare to work was ‘grey’ and 
responsibility in almost all areas was shared or concurrent. 
 
From the perspective of Scottish Executive officials, they needed to interact with the 
Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus in order to share information; 
coordinate action; develop policies; implement policies; influence or persuade; 
challenge action; prevent negative consequences; protect or advance their 
jurisdiction, and resolve disputes. They were also seeking legitimacy and support for 
their directions; for example, having the UK Government on board with Scottish 
Executive policy initiatives such as Closing the Opportunity Gap and Workforce Plus 
(SE 2006b) made approval and implementation in Scotland much more likely 
(interview with SE official April 16, 2006). 
 
The relationship with the Department for Education and Skills exhibited more 
tension. Skills and training were considered devolved responsibilities, and Scottish 
Executive officials felt that in most areas the Department for Education and Skills 
had no authority to make policy for them (interviews April 15 and 21, 2005). 
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However, when the UK Government made policy for England it had significant 
knock on effects, either by committing the Scottish Executive to do something they 
would not otherwise choose, or by forcing comparisons with what Scotland was 
doing. A lack of clarity in identifying whether something was a UK-wide or English 
policy, did not help the relationship (interview with SE official April 21, 2005). 
When the UK Government made a policy announcement the media did not take the 
time to distinguish that this might be an English policy direction and so Scottish 
Ministers wanted to know how they should respond, how it impacted them and, (if 
the area was a Scottish policy responsibility), whether what Scotland was doing 
compared favourably to what England was doing (interview with SE official April 
15, 2005). 
 
In skills policy neither Scotland nor the UK Government needed to exchange 
resources to achieve their respective policy goals. With the exception of the work 
with the Sector Skills Development Agency, the objectives for this 
intergovernmental relationship were narrower and confined to information sharing, 
challenging, influencing or persuading, preventing negative consequences, protecting 
jurisdiction, resisting action, and resolving disputes. Sometimes Whitehall officials 
had been told not to tell Scottish officials things in advance for fear that they would 
leak UK proposals and reduce the chance for a ‘big splash’ (interview with SE 
official April 21, 2005). 
 
On immigration matters, the main purpose of the relationship was persuasion. 
Although pressured by the media in particular to challenge UK policy, the Scottish 
Executive under Labour control was reluctant. Once they had successfully persuaded 
the UK Government to make territorial exceptions to accommodate Scottish needs 
through Fresh Talent, interaction was needed for policy development and 
implementation. Although the Scottish Executive got some initial flexibility, they 
would have liked more; as a result approaches continued. Here, there was also a need 
 253
for information sharing, as despite immigration being a reserved responsibility, the 
Scottish public and media expected Scottish politicians to stick up for their needs119. 
 
As far as Scottish Executive officials were concerned, there was a significant degree 
of interdependence with the UK Government in all policy areas. In welfare to work 
the Scottish Executive was primarily in a policy implementation role, using its 
regular contacts with DWP and Jobcentre Plus to design and adjust Scottish 
employability supports to achieve Scottish and UK-wide objectives. In skills, 
information sharing was the key reason for the connection, ensuring that the ‘knock 
on’ consequences of UK policy making were identified. In immigration matters the 
Scottish Executive objective was primarily one of persuasion, seeking adjustments in 
UK-wide policy making to meet Scottish sensitivities. In general, Scottish Executive 
officials felt that the best way to manage the relationship was not by being 
confrontational, but by using the traditional internal civil service methods of 
accommodation. 
 
IGR Structures and Machinery 
 
All intergovernmental relationships in labour market policy during the period of this 
research were managed on a bilateral basis. On welfare to work there were 
relationships within Scotland through Jobcentre Plus as well as Scottish Executive 
relationships with Department for Work and Pensions officials in London. On skills 
and immigration issues, the relationship was primarily with Whitehall officials in 
London in the Department for Education and Skills, and the Home Office.  
 
Almost all Scottish Executive relationships with the Department for Work and 
Pensions and Jobcentre Plus involved extensive face-to-face encounters, as well as e-
mail, telephone and letters. Having Jobcentre Plus physically located in Scotland 
promoted regular dialogue and information sharing. Scotland was small enough for 
people to know each other and for key contacts to meet around a table to solve 
                                                 
119 During the period of this research, there were high profile issues relating to the death of a Kurdish 
asylum seeker and the internment of children of asylum seekers. The funding and provision of 
services to refugees and asylum seekers was another ongoing concern. 
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problems. In the view of a Scottish Executive official, both Scotland and the UK 
Government were still learning about devolution and there was a growing maturity 
on the part of both DWP and the Scottish Executive on how to work together 
(interview April 21, 2005). Face-to-face connections facilitated this understanding. 
 
The relationship with DfES was more challenging because they did not operate in 
Scotland. Although a DfES official from the south came north regularly, the main 
mechanism for contact was telephone calls and e-mail correspondence. This also 
applied to how relationships were managed with the Home Office around 
immigration issues. Here telephone and e-mail contacts were supplemented with co-
sponsorship of public events held in Scotland, facilitating relationship-building. 
Scottish Executive officials viewed Fresh Talent as a “notable success in terms of the 
fact that [the Home Office and Scottish Executive] agreed and implemented a 
scheme rather than how the scheme was itself working” (SE 2006c). This had taken 
hard work, time and effort. The greatest problems occurred when there were changes 
of personnel at both the Ministerial and officials’ level (interview with SE official 
June 6, 2007). 
 
Scottish Executive officials spent a lot of time talking on the phone, exchanging e-
mails, writing letters, and meeting face-to-face with their Whitehall colleagues. As 
the smaller partner, they felt that they needed to make more of an effort to build these 
interpersonal relationships. They regularly explained to Whitehall officials how 
Scotland was different, how Scottish policy was made, and that UK-wide policy in 
many areas needed to take account of devolution (interview with SE official April 
15, 2005). They also recognized that Scottish Executive policies also impacted 
English policy making, and that there had been times when they did not share their 
policy directions, negatively impacting the UK Government with respect to English 
policy. 
 
Most of these ongoing connections between officials were at the Head of Group level 
and below; there rarely were meetings between Permanent Secretaries. At the 
Ministers’ level there were attempts to have the Scottish Deputy Minister meet 
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quarterly with his respective UK colleagues; however this in effect meant meetings 
with three UK Ministers and schedules were hard to coordinate. Coalition 
government provided some interesting cross party interface during the period of this 
research as a former Scottish Minister of Enterprise, Transport and Lifelong 
Learning was a Liberal Democrat and met regularly with his UK Labour colleague 
on common policy issues. An official observed tension relating to party political 
issues “when Labour and the Lib Dems are knocking seven bells out of each other at 
a UK level while at the same time in Scotland a Lib Dem Minister is flanked by his 
Labour Deputy Minister defending Scottish Executive policy” (interview with SE 
official April 21, 2005). An official from the Scottish Executive UK Relations team 
commented that Westminster politicians were not always aware of the impact of 
coalition government in Scotland, and sometimes needed to be reminded that a 
Scottish Liberal Democrat Minister was as important as one from the Labour Party 
(interview March 4, 2005).  
 
When asked to characterize the relationship with the UK Government most Scottish 
Executive officials described it as intergovernmental. They saw the political 
dynamics of the relationship much more clearly than their UK colleagues as they 
worked day-to-day with Scottish politicians. On the other hand, they assumed that 
most of their UK colleagues considered the relationship as interdepartmental, and 
when they were working day-to-day with their UK colleagues it felt very much like 
an interdepartmental relationship. 
 
View from the North East Region of England 
 
Identifying power-relationship dynamics in the English regions was difficult in the 
absence of an identifiable single sub-state structure. No English Region had an 
administrative structure like the pre-devolution Scottish Office that had played a 
leadership role in co-ordination, let alone a political structure equivalent to the 
Scottish Parliament. Instead there were a number of government departments, 
regional institutions, executive agencies, non-departmental public bodies, and local 
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authorities interacting with their parent Whitehall Departments, as well as with a 
wide variety of non-government structures and organizations. 
 
There were no hierarchical arrangements horizontally between these organizations at 
the regional level; instead, the hierarchy occurred vertically between each individual 
department and agency as they reported to their parent organizations in London. 
Although the Government Offices in the regions were responsible for the mechanics 
of transferring funds to the Regional Development Agencies and submitting 
confidential reports to the Department of Trade and Industry on their performance, 
the Regional Development Agencies were accountable to DTI Ministers (interview 
with academic December 7, 2005). Even the Government Office role as ‘ringmaster’ 
was hampered as decentralization was applied in different ways in different policy 
arenas and in the context of different regional institutional inheritances (Pearce and 
Sayres, 2006). 
 
There was significant interdependence between each regional or local entity and its 
parent department, as the entity’s explicit role was to deliver national policies. With 
the UK focus on joined-up thinking, there was no shortage of centrally determined 
processes to manage interdepartmental and interagency cooperation at a regional as 
well as a local level. Although congruence was expected among all players at the 
regional level, some questioned the success of these processes, with departments still 
operating in silos as separate sets of targets gave rise to considerable problems with 
coordination (Pearce and Sayers 2006). 
 
Ultimately it was impossible to assess the power relationship dynamic between the 
UK Government and the North East Region of England through this research as, 
without a regional government, the region as a collective had no power. In the 
absence of directly elected regional governments, each Whitehall department 
relationship with their respective regional arm was clearly hierarchical. There was a 
high degree of interdependence as the regions and local areas were charged with 
program implementation, while policy determination took place at the centre. 
Although horizontal processes to manage these relationships appeared somewhat 
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similar to those used by the Scottish Executive, without the legitimacy of a 




What was notable about the views of officials at the centre and with the Scottish 
Executive with regard to the power relationship dynamic were the similarities. Both 
acknowledged that, despite devolution, the UK Government remained in control, 
particularly with respect to welfare to work and immigration issues. Although skills 
was considered devolved, the asymmetrical nature of the settlement made it very 
difficult to sort out jurisdiction, and officials found that the best way forward was not 
to fight over who did what, but to ensure that communication lines remained open. 
The interdependence in the relationship across all policy areas was acknowledged, 
and officials from both levels of government seemed comfortable with using the 
directions outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding and concordats to stay in 
touch on an informal bilateral basis to ensure ‘no surprises’. 
 
Most relationship-building was undertaken by the Scottish Executive, who as the 
smaller partner, had more at stake in being recognized as a separate level of 
government and in ensuring devolution was a success. There were no concerns 
expressed by officials from either the Scottish Executive or Whitehall with regards to 
any inadequacy in the operation of the intergovernmental machinery. There seemed 
little interest in establishing multilateral links between the centre and all of the 
devolved administrations. 
 
What accounts for this behavior? For UK Government officials central control, the 
need for overarching UK-wide policy direction, and considering local (and now sub-
state) governments as being subordinate was the way the UK had always been 
governed. In this policy area, with the exception of Jobcentre Plus officials living in 
Scotland, UK officials were not particularly aware of Scottish grievances that had led 
to the campaign for a Scottish Parliament (interview with Whitehall official April 11, 
2005). When the government changed, in 1997, and Labour came to power 
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committed to new governing structures for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, 
Whitehall civil servants were more than prepared to do whatever was necessary to 
support devolution, within the confines of the devolution settlement as determined by 
their political masters. Given that devolution did not apply in England, for them there 
were no fundamental changes to how things had traditionally been managed in 
England, or for that matter in the UK as a whole. Disuse of Joint Ministerial 
Committee structures illustrated that, despite devolution, it was ‘business as usual’.  
 
The accommodating and subordinate behavior on the part of Scottish Executive 
officials can be explained in the same vein, rooted in the overall social, political, 
constitutional, and institutional foundation of government in the UK. The Scottish 
Parliament is a subordinate body to Westminster; the issues being worked on are a 
combination of devolved, shared, and reserved competence, but in all cases the UK 
Government is still in charge. Civil servants were traditionally reluctant to use the 
party system for addressing issues. The UK civil service culture of problem solving, 
accommodation and understatement were key factors, as well as a lack of experience 
with territorially based disputes and an acknowledgement that in divided polities 
open disagreement and conflict is often the norm.  
 
For civil servants working in the North East Region of England, nothing fundamental 
in power relationships had changed over the period of this research, as the drive for 
English regional assemblies had failed. What appeared to have changed however, 
was a desire by the centre for regions and local areas to have more joined-up 
thinking, resulting in a variety of centrally determined processes to facilitate this. In 
the end, however, these processes did not change the subordinate role that each 
delivery arm of government had to their parent organization in London. 
 
Character and Workability of the United Kingdom Government-Scottish 
Executive Relationship 
 
The concluding part of this chapter assesses the character and workability of the 
intergovernmental and interdepartmental relationships, using the same definitions 
and analytical framework as the Canadian case study and outlined in Chapter Two. 
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The categories established to judge character were cooperative, collaborative, 
competitive or coercive. Workability was assessed as high, medium or low, based 
upon the presence or absence of trust ties among senior officials. Given different 
accountabilities and institutional arrangements, each policy stream (welfare to work, 
skills, and immigration) was assessed separately.  
 
Welfare to Work Issues 
 
In welfare to work issues, actors from the UK Government and the Scottish 
Executive had a long history of working together at both a regional and local level, 
there were strong interpersonal relationships, and a level of trust had built up over 
time. Almost all of the factors that promote the development of positive trust ties 
were evident: shared objectives, geographic proximity, stability among the key 
players, willingness to engage, capacity to engage, leadership to work through 
differences, limiting agendas, mutual respect, positive history, recognition of mutual 
interdependence, and shared professional training and norms. Overall, the Scottish 
Executive- UK Government relationship in welfare to work was assessed as 
cooperative and highly workable. 
 
At the Scottish-UK level, civil servants from the Department for Work and Pensions 
and the Scottish Executive and their respective agencies (Jobcentre Plus and the 
Enterprise Networks) viewed the relationship positively. However, at the delivery 
and cities level, interviews undertaken through this research provided examples of 
more ‘fraught’ relationships particularly between Jobcentre Plus staff and Scottish 
executive agencies and local authorities (interview with JC+ official March 16, 
2005). This came from neglecting to involve all partners in decision-making, and 
differences of opinion about remits and how services should be provided. Local 
partners in particular expressed frustration at the centralized nature of welfare to 
work policy making across the UK, and desired more flexibilities at the local level.  
 
The most important factors that impacted this largely positive workability assessment 
were the presence of shared goals and objectives. Both the Scottish Executive and 
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the UK Government shared the same overall goals in terms of assisting 
disadvantaged people to get into employment, to stay in employment, and to move 
on in the workplace. They also shared the same overall goal of making devolution 
work and the legitimacy of granting Scotland autonomy to manage their own affairs 
within the framework of the devolution settlement. Although the relationship was 
clearly hierarchical (hence a cooperative rather than a collaborative assessment), the 
parties depended on each other in order to implement their separate political 
imperatives, they respected and acknowledged the individual contributions they each 
made, and consistent and concerted efforts were made to manage the interface 
through both formal and informal mechanisms. 
 
There were some interesting nuances between governments. A Jobcentre Plus official 
characterized working with Scottish policy makers and officials as like “pushing on 
an open door” (interview December 16, 2005). Scottish Executive officials 
characterized trying to get DWP to adjust something to reflect Scottish realities as 
more like “pushing at the door” (interview April 21, 2005).  
 
Although hierarchical, the UK Government respected Scottish autonomy and 
recognized this in some subtle but important ways. Despite rolling out the same 
policies with the same principles across the UK, they recognized that this was done 
not in eleven regions, but in nine English regions plus the two countries Scotland and 
Wales. When there were UK-wide conferences, there were usually distinct and 
separate sessions focused on policies and issues in Scotland and Wales as the 
partnership arrangements and agendas were distinct. Although the Partnership 
Accord with local authorities in England was led by DWP and signed by a DWP 
official, in Scotland and Wales the work was led by Jobcentre Plus: 
Jobcentre Plus is seen as an acceptable face of government whereas DWP is 
seen as a Whitehall department. If you have a devolved administration in 
Scotland and Wales it doesn’t look very good to have a partnership accord 
with DWP written all over it. Jobcentre Plus is OK; we are seen as more 
neutral…greater DWP involvement would be seen as London interfering in 
Scottish affairs (interview with JC+ official April 28, 2005). 
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There was no difference in substance as to whether DWP or Jobcentre Plus was 
leading, as the work of Jobcentre Plus is tightly controlled by DWP. This UK 
Government acknowledgement of the importance of ‘perception’ and the 
‘recognition’ of Scotland and Wales as different is an assumed part of territorial 
relationship management in the UK. It contrasts significantly with historic Canadian 
difficulty in recognizing Quebec as a ‘distinct society’ or a ‘nation’120, leading to 
continuing territorial disputes. 
 
The very positive interpersonal working relationship between officials (particularly 
between Scottish Executive officials with the Department for Enterprise, Transport 
and Lifelong Learning, the Enterprise Networks, Scottish local authorities, the UK 
Department for Work and Pensions and Jobcentre Plus) contributed to the 
development of trust ties. Two respondents identified that a positive working 
relationship also existed because the head of Jobcentre Plus in Scotland had 
previously worked in the Lifelong Learning Group of the Scottish Executive 
(interview with SE officials April 21 and December 5, 2005). The presence of UK 
Government officials living and working in Scotland built on relationships 
previously established by the Scottish Office. These relationships had been 
significantly extended with the joint policy development work undertaken on the 
Partnership Accord and Workforce Plus (SE 2006b). Despite distance, the 
relationship between Glasgow-based Scottish Executive and Department for Work 
and Pensions officials working in London was also strong, and was solidified in 
2005, when they traveled together to make a joint presentation to an international 
American Welfare Conference (interview with SE official April 21, 2005). Their 
joint work as well as their solid interpersonal relationships intensified their 
understanding of each other’s needs, and they were thinking for the future about co-
location, or at minimum, common staff training (interview with JC+ official 
December 16, 2005).  
 
                                                 
120 In Canada the dynamics are more complex, given the often negative reaction of Canadians in the 
rest of the country to the idea of Quebec as a ‘nation’. The British are accustomed to this terminology.  
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But contact was not enough. The attitude of UK officials in recognizing how 
Scotland was different, post-devolution, was also critical. A Jobcentre Plus official 
described it in this way: 
At the end of the day there is a completely separate political dimension which 
they don’t have in England…it starts for me about not being precious about 
who is seen to be in the lead, who is seen to be getting credit, any of that, for 
me it’s about making sure that everybody just focuses on the objectives and 
the outcome (interview December 16, 2005). 
 
The relationship was also working well because of the growing maturity, confidence, 
and capacity of Scottish Executive officials and Scottish politicians. It is hard to 
engage in a meaningful way on a policy issue when the implications and impact have 
not been thought through and the Scottish people (or at least their representatives) 
have not been consulted to identify the flash points and level of interest. In the early 
days of devolution, Scottish officials were invited to UK-wide policy debates but 
didn’t make much of a contribution (interview with JC+ official December 16, 2005). 
At that point, the intergovernmental relationship was just about information-sharing. 
A local government official suggested that, post-devolution, the Scottish Executive 
was becoming a more effective partner, more strategic and not just reactive: 
The shift from the Scottish Welfare to Work Task Force of a number of 
champions promoting something (which had impact but was piecemeal), to 
being more strategic and developing the Employability Framework is 
expected to result in more effective policies that will better meet Scottish 
needs (interview March 31, 2005). 
 
On the other hand, this increased Scottish capacity for policy making creates a 
challenge for UK departments who are accustomed to being at the centre of all policy 
making. According to a local government official, the debate with DWP over its 
targets had been quite robust; DWP did not debate over where Scotland was coming 
from, but tried to ascertain what to do with its targets, given the Scottish environment 
(interview April 19, 2005). This challenge was not just coming from Scotland; DWP 
was starting to realize that the powerful partnerships they had set up in England 
through Local Area Agreements had opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ that instituted a 
framework for dialogue that must be responded to with increased flexibilities and 
freedoms (Comments by DWP official at the Working Together conference 




In skills issues, the relationship between the Scottish Executive and the Department 
for Education and Skills did not demonstrate the same level of trust ties as welfare to 
work policy and was assessed as coercive and moderately workable. There were a 
number of explanations for the differences. The first was geographic 
proximityDfES is an English department and officials do not operate in Scotland; 
as a result the opportunity for face-to-face interaction was more limited. Unlike 
welfare to work, there were no ongoing committees set up to manage the interaction, 
and all issues were dealt with on an informal and ad hoc basis. Second, there were 
instances where DfES and Scottish Executive staff were reluctant to share 
information, impacting perceptions of honesty (interview with SE official April 15, 
2005). The UK Government’s unwillingness to identify skills policy as English (as 
opposed to UK-wide), and its inability to recognize the ‘knock-on’ effects of English 
policy making on Scotland failed to demonstrate respect for Scotland’s devolved 
responsibilities in this area, and its ability to chart its own course post-devolution. 
Third, DfES and the Scottish Executive did not need an ongoing relationship to meet 
their separate objectives. There were no explicit shared goals or objectives, as each 
had developed their own skills frameworks (albeit within an overall UK context), and 
each had its own advisory body. The only areas of interdependence explicitly 
recognized were with respect to issues relating to the Sector Skills Councils, 
qualifications, and European Union matters. 
 
Here, the relationship was more ‘reactive’ on the part of both governments; DfES 
and the Scottish Executive ‘bumped up against’ each other when the UK 
Government issued policy directions for the UK when they really meant England, or 
when Scotland was forced to react to the English agenda setting. As a result, the 
relationship here was characterized as ‘coercive’ on the part of the UK Government, 
as governments were acting as if they were independent when in reality the actions 
of one (the centre) were forcing the other (the Scottish Executive) to do something 
without their agreement. There were also indications of a more competitive 
relationship as English and Scottish policy initiatives were routinely compared. 
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Because officials from the Department for Education and Skills did not live and work 
in the shadow of the Scottish Parliament (as Jobcentre Plus officials did) and there 
was regular staff turnover, DfES officials were not as sensitive to the political 
context and constraints under which Scottish Executive officials worked. The 
absence of a positive shared history, recognition of mutual interdependence, and the 
lack of geographic proximity all served to diminish the presence of trust ties as it 
related to skills policy. On the hand, over the period of this research, the relationship 
had improved, with both Scottish Executive and UK officials indicating that, post-
devolution, the process to accommodation Scottish input on the second UK Skills 
Strategy in 2005 was an improvement over what had occurred on the first in 2003. 
Given this relatively positive assessment, workability in skills was assessed as 




On immigration issues the relationship was categorized as cooperative and 
moderately workable. Once Ministers had given the green light, officials from both 
governments actively worked together to develop the Fresh Talent framework that 
the Scottish Executive had pushed for, while acknowledging that central government 
remained in control. However, unlike welfare to work where both the Scottish 
Executive and the UK Government recognized their interdependence and their 
collective need to work together to achieve shared goals, in immigration matters the 
initiative for working together had come from the Scottish Executive, not the UK 
Government.  
 
As outlined in the interviews undertaken for this research, it had taken significant 
initiative and political capital for the Scottish Executive to persuade the Home Office 
to make adjustments to immigration policy that would respond to Scottish concerns. 
Fresh Talent would have been more ambitious had the Home Office accepted the 
plan as suggested by the Scottish Executive at the outset. Given that this dealt with a 
reserved issue, there was some questioning of the legitimacy of Scottish Executive 
initiative, and Home Office officials were reluctant to engage without Ministerial 
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direction. On the other hand, Scottish Executive officials seemed pleased with the 
progress that had been made once a narrower agenda was agreed on (interview with 
SE official June 6, 2007). The initiative had increased the intensity of linkages 
between Scottish Executive and Home Office officials, facilitating the building of a 
positive shared history. Cross staff placements and joint briefing sessions in Scotland 




Figure 7 summarizes the UK Government-Scottish Executive relationships that have 
been outlined above. 
 
Figure 7: Character and Workability of Whitehall-Scottish Executive 
Relationships  
 
Relationship Character of IGR Workability of IGR 
Welfare to work bilateral Cooperative High 
Skills bilateral Coercive Moderate 
Immigration bilateral Cooperative Moderate 
 
None of the UK Government-Scottish Executive relationships were characterized as 
collaborative, due to hierarchy and continued central control. In skills the 
relationship was less hierarchical, as skills are considered a devolved responsibility. 
Here the relationship was characterized as coercive, as UK Government officials 
seemed unaware of the knock-on effects of UK-wide and English policy making on 
the Scottish Executive’s capacity to set their own directions. Workability in all 
elements of labour market policy was considered positive, but the key reason that 
welfare to work was considered high (compared to moderate in skills and 
immigration matters) was because trust ties were facilitated by geographic proximity. 
The presence of Jobcentre Plus officials actually working within the geographic 
borders of Scotland, and the attention paid to processes to manage the interface 
resulted in highly workable relationships. 
 
What was particularly noteworthy about these relationships was that they were all 
bilateral. Although officials from the Scottish Executive might informally meet with 
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their counterparts from Wales or Northern Ireland at Sector Council, European 
Union, or Welfare to Work conference events, the focus there was on best practices 
and information-sharing, not territorial management or policy development. Given 
the asymmetrical nature of devolution in the UK, there were few compelling reasons 
for collective engagement in the way that was common in Canada. 
 
Workability in the North East Region of England 
 
When examining the character and workability of relationships in the North East 
Region of England, relationships between each UK Government department at the 
centre and their regional and local bodies were not examined, because by definition 
these relationships are hierarchical and interdependent. Instead the interview 
evidence provided a basis upon which to assess relationships between the various 
actors working within the region and on a local level. Since interviewing in the North 
East Region of England was more limited than in Scotland, only tentative 
conclusions can be drawn, and then only with respect to welfare to work policy. The 
secondary literature was also helpful in this regard.  
 
The definitions used in this thesis identified that collaborative relationships were 
non-hierarchical, and assumed more equality between the partners in terms of joint 
decision-making and approaches. This closely mirrors the manner in which 
relationships between the various partners in the North East Region were described 
through the interviews undertaken for this research. Certainly there were a variety of 
formal processes in place to facilitate collaborationPartnership Agreements, Local 
Area Agreements, Local Strategic Partnerships, and Skills Action Plans. However, 
both those interviewed from the North East Region of England, as well as the 
secondary literature consulted, questioned the effectiveness of these processes.  
 
The English regional structure was described by one academic as “lots of first mates 
but no captain”, leading to a significant governance deficit (interview December 7, 
2005). A Jobcentre Plus official suggested that the problem was too many agencies 
with remits that overlapped with everything done by committee, and no real 
leadership at a regional level. Finding agreement was difficult as the different 
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agencies had different authorities and scope and therefore different interests. For 
example, local authorities only worried about local activities, Regional Development 
Agencies were only concerned with regional issues, while Jobcentre Plus and the 
Learning and Skills Councils had UK-wide or English remits (interview December 5, 
2005).  
 
During the period of this research, DWP undertook a detailed evaluation of the 
effectiveness of Jobcentre Plus’ partnership working. Delivering Labour Market 
Policies through Local and Regional Partnerships (DWP 2004b) concluded that: 
While there is a general feeling that strategic partnership working 
contributes positively towards Jobcentre Plus business objectives and targets, 
the precise impact on labour market outcomes is difficult to identify…The 
main constraints on effective partnership working on the part of Jobcentre 
Plus include a focus on nationally set short-term performance targets; limited 
flexibility to operate at the local level; recent focus on internal issues and an 
organizational culture that appears to be primarily inward-looking (DWP 
2004). 
 
Examining the various regional skills strategies and the regional partnership 
arrangements outlined in a variety of documents, an academic familiar with 
arrangements in the North East Region of England characterized them as: 
glossy words on paper…platitudes that no regional agency has the capacity 
to make happen. The only people with power are central government as they 
have the money…people in the regions sitting on these committees are just 
overseeing the implementation of centrally set policies in their regions 
(interview December 7, 2005). 
 
The author concluded on the basis of this evidence that these relationships could be 
considered as collaborative, with a low degree of workability. Despite geographic 
proximity, routinized and regular engagement, recognition of mutual 
interdependence, and shared goals and objectives, trust ties were diminished by the 
absence of a capacity to engage and autonomy to decide, and the fact that, without a 
devolved parliament or assembly, there was no leadership to work through 
differences. Given the number of agencies involved and staff turnover, stability 





When comparing the workability of the English regional structure for skills and 
welfare to work with what happened in Scotland under devolution, two significantly 
different elements emerged. The first is that devolution has resulted in a new way of 
making policy in Scotland. Before devolution the Enterprise Networks, local 
authorities and Jobcentre Plus were each working away doing their own thing, 
reporting primarily to their central office down south in the same way that English 
regional authorities, departments and agencies reported to their parent organizations 
during the period of this research. Pre-devolution the Scottish Office played an 
administrative coordination role around some of these activities, and did provide 
some level of overall direction. Devolution, however, has provided additional 
resources to the Scottish Executive to force more joined-up thinking across Scottish 
organizations, and the legitimacy through a Scottish Parliament to impose a direction 
when necessary. Every person interviewed through this research (with the Scottish 
Executive, Whitehall, Jobcentre Plus as well as Scottish stakeholders) believed that 
this had improved policy effectiveness and outcomes within Scotland. 
 
The second organizational issue that impacted workability was the larger number of 
English organizations involved with welfare to work issues, compared to Scotland, 
and the continuing changes impacting them. For example, in England the Regional 
Development Agencies and Learning and Skills Councils reported to separate UK 
structures, while in Scotland all of these responsibilities were under the authority of 
the Scottish Executive Enterprise, Transport, and Lifelong Learning Department, 
simplifying horizontal management. In the view of a Scottish Enterprise official this 
provided Scotland with a “better architecture” for skills and learning that placed key 
tools (economic development, skills training, labour market information and career 
counseling) within a single integrated organizational structure (in this case the 
Department of Enterprise, Transport, and Lifelong Learning), allowing the 
development of strategic directions. Post-devolution, Scotland had also had an 
element of consistency through Smart, Successful Scotland (SE 2004b). This 
contrasted with a more fragmented English structure that required more people to be 
 269
around the table and seemed to be ever-changing (interview with HIE official April 
18, 2005).  
 
In the North East region of England the most significant problem appeared to be a 
process for decision-making, leaving jurisdictional issues between the various 
government departments and agencies to trump substance. In contrast, during the 
period of this research, there was a lack of conflict between the Scottish Executive 
and Whitehall over jurisdiction, and within Scotland the Scottish Executive and 
Parliament were accountable for resolving differences between departments. 
Organizational deficiencies and a perceived democratic oversight in the English 
Regions were not isolated to just labour market policy issues; they appeared to be an 
outcome of unfinished business from the first round of UK devolution. 
 
Recalling John Elvidge’s words in the opening quote of this chapter, although the 
power relationship dynamic and the character and workability of the UK 
Government-Scottish Executive relationship examined through this research were 
largely cooperative and workable, given the degree of hierarchy, the Scottish 
Executive has a way to go to evolve “from the inheritance of a single Government 
Department into a fully integrated Government” (Elvidge 2006). A new era may be 
underway starting in 2007 when the Scottish National Party took control of the 
Executive and began using the name the ‘Scottish Government’. 
 
Positive cooperation and workability in labour market policy in the UK during the 
period of this research was largely based on factors in the overall country context, 
including that fact that all relationships in the UK are bilateral (as opposed to 
multilateral), the centre is still in charge, jurisdiction is shared (as opposed to 
divided), and the pre-devolution forces of accommodation found in a unified civil 
service and political party system have not changed.   
 
This concludes the empirical work for this thesis. Intergovernmental relations in 
labour market policy in the UK have been examined using a similar analytical 
framework to that used for assessing intergovernmental relations within the more 
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mature Canadian federal system. The final chapter of this thesis explicitly considers 
the differences in intergovernmental relations between the two countries, and 
identifies what accounts for these differences. 
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CHAPTER 8: INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND 
LABOUR MARKET POLICY IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 
 
As a long time practitioner and observer of intergovernmental relations in labour 
market policy in Canada, the author undertook this thesis in order to gain a better 
understanding of the dynamics around what was perceived as a fractious relationship, 
by putting the Canadian experience into a comparative context. The United Kingdom 
was chosen as the key comparator, and it was assumed from the start that, given 
differences in the constitutional structure in each country, that this would be a most 
different systems design comparison. 
 
Chapters One and Two provided the necessary theoretical and analytical information 
to frame the research. Chapter Three identified and compared the numerous variables 
in the overall country context in each country, highlighted the differences between 
Canada and the UK, and assessed how these influenced intergovernmental relations 
in any policy sector. In Chapters Four and Five, the development and operation of 
the mature Canadian intergovernmental relations system in labour market policy was 
examined; this was followed in Chapters Six and Seven by an assessment of the 
emerging intergovernmental system in the newly devolved UK. Having carried out 
each country analysis separately, the purpose of this chapter is to compare the two 
countries, as well as determine whether what has transpired in intergovernmental 
relations in these two countries during the period of this research might improve our 
understanding of intergovernmental relations in general. 
 
This final chapter is structured around the research questions which were outlined in 
Chapter One. The first two research questions focused on identifying the differences 
in intergovernmental relations between the two countries: 1) To what extent were 
there differences in intergovernmental relations in labour market policy between 
Canada and the United Kingdom? 2) What accounted for these differences? 
Of all the variables initially identified in Figure 2 of the analytical framework for this 
thesis, the author concluded that the most important differences between Canada and 
the United Kingdom can be organized around three themes: differences in the 
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structure of the state, differences in the structure of the policy domain, and 
differences in the forces of accommodation. These emerged based upon the analysis 
undertaken through this thesis. 
 
The third research question to be answered was: What impact did these differences 
have on the character and workability of the intergovernmental relations system in 
labour market policy in each country? In this section of the chapter the results from 
the separate analysis of the Government of Canada-Government of Alberta 
relationship and the UK Government-Scottish Executive relationship are considered 
and the two countries compared. A more limited analysis of relationships in the rest 
of the country (Ontario and British Columbia in Canada, and the North East Region 
of England) is also provided.  
 
The final section of this chapter looks to the future, to consider political 
developments in 2007 and beyond. In the United Kingdom, the election of the 
Scottish National Party has changed one of the key forces of intergovernmental 
accommodation that was available in the UK during the period of this research. In 
Canada, the change was within the policy sector, where the new Conservative 
Government has committed to further devolution.  
 
The chapter concludes with a reflection on how what has been learned about 
intergovernmental relations in two countries during a time when responsibilities were 
being shifted from one order of government to another might be more broadly 
applied to other countries or to the development of intergovernmental theory. It also 
considers the contribution that this research makes to the intergovernmental relations 
literature. 
 
Differences in the Structure of the State  
 
There were four features of the structure of the state which, in the view of the author, 
fundamentally shaped how intergovernmental relations were conducted in Canada 
and the United Kingdom during the period of this research. These were the nature of 
the constitution in terms of ultimate authority, the composition and number of sub-
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state units, how finances were shared, and how powers were divided. As a result of 
these features, Canada’s provincial governments are more powerful than the UK’s 
devolved administrations, and the UK central government is more powerful than 
Canada’s federal government. These state structures provide profoundly different 
influences on intergovernmental relations in any policy area in Canada, compared to 
the UK.  
 
The most significant difference between the two countries is that Canada is a 
federation (where neither order of government is subordinate to the other), whereas 
the United Kingdom is a devolved state, with the Scottish Parliament and Scottish 
Executive subordinate to the Westminster Parliament and Whitehall. This establishes 
a completely different power dynamic between central and sub-state governments in 
each country. 
 
Protected by the constitution (which requires their approval for any changes), 
Canadian provinces are powerful political entities that view themselves as equal 
partners to the national government and fully sovereign within their respective area 
of competence. Although federal officials may have viewed Alberta as their delivery 
agent with regard to the Labour Market Development Agreement, Alberta officials 
considered that they were acting within their jurisdiction to deliver the programming 
that suited Albertans, and then charging the Government of Canada for those 
expenditures that fit within the parameters of the federal funding agreement. During 
the period of this research, when the federal government attempted to involve 
themselves in areas that were constitutionally assigned to provinces using conditional 
grants and unilateral action, provinces individually and collectively pushed back. 
This effectively blocked the Government of Canada from realizing many of its goals. 
 
In contrast, in the United Kingdom the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Executive 
were created by central government, and could, in theory, be abolished by the 
Westminster Parliament. Despite some powers being passed down to the Scottish 
Parliament, strategic policy making during the period of this research still occurred at 
the centre of government. Even those powers passed down were retained by the 
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centre through the UK Government’s reserved responsibility for European Union 
matters. In welfare to work policy the Scottish Executive was viewed as the delivery 
agent for central government, despite being given control of policy instruments 
necessary to help people into work. Even though skills policy was considered 
devolved, strategic directions were still determined by the centre. Whitehall officials 
regarded the devolved administrations as subordinate, indeed some even questioned 
whether the Scottish Executive was even a ‘government’, viewing the relationship, 
eight years post-devolution as still interdepartmental. The hierarchy in the 
relationship with Westminster still in charge was clearly acknowledged by Scottish 
Executive officials who, unlike Canadian provincial governments, had more limited 
constitutional backing to assert their autonomy. 
 
The second structuring factor was the number of sub-state units and the degree of 
asymmetry in the relationship between central and sub-state governments. In Canada, 
when relationships between governments occur, the federal government is facing ten 
provinces and three territories with relatively equal jurisdictional competence, 
making multilateral interprovincial coalition building as a counterweight to federal 
control an important consideration. In labour market policy during the period of this 
research, bargaining occurred on a bilateral, interprovincial and federal-provincial 
basis. The presence of a multilateral bargaining arena comprising 14 different 
jurisdictions increased the number of actors involved in intergovernmental relations 
in Canada and complexity. Not only were there a lot of players, there was also 
considerable organizational churn, as the players turned over regularly. Part of this 
was due to the propensity of both federal and provincial governments in Canada to 
reorganize regularly in response to electoral cycles and political party turnover 
within each jurisdiction.  
 
In contrast, in the United Kingdom there were only three small devolved 
administrations, collectively representing only 15 percent of the UK population. 
Since the UK Government acted as both central and the largest regional government 
(for England), the demarcation between devolved and reserved issues was often 
unclear, allowing the centre to exert significant influence over policy even in areas of 
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devolved competence as they needed to make these governance choices for England. 
During the period of this research there was no perceived need in the UK for 
multilateral intergovernmental relationships (either with the centre and all of the 
devolved administrations or between the devolved administrations), as each 
administration had different needs, competence and powers. Instead, all 
intergovernmental relationships between the UK Government and the devolved 
administrations were almost exclusively bilateral. The asymmetrical nature of 
devolution in the UK meant that there were fewer sub-state players to enhance 
coalition building, while at the same time the UK central government possessed 
substantially greater powers than its Canadian counterpart. 
 
The third structuring factor where differences were significant was finances. 
Canadian provinces have considerable autonomy as each order of government has 
direct access to tax revenues and provinces have access to resource revenues. They 
can choose to spend on labour market policy as they see fit, subject to overall 
provincial priorities. During the period of this research, provinces did not look to 
provincial taxpayers to fund labour market policy: instead, they looked primarily to 
the federal government for resources, in particular access to the Employment 
Insurance account, which was exclusively under the control of the Government of 
Canada. Federal funding for labour market matters built on an existing complicated 
system of financial transfers from the federal to provincial governments that had 
evolved over time.  
 
The broader financial context during the period of this research involved federal 
cutbacks to this funding, with provinces asserting that the Government of Canada 
was taking more money from taxpayers than was required to fulfill their 
responsibilities, shortchanging provincial governments. When agreements were put 
in place, federal officials sought conditional arrangements, with provincial 
governments having to account for the expenditure of funds. All of these factors 
made disputes over finances and how to account for intergovernmental transfers one 
of the key irritants in both federal-provincial and interprovincial relations. In labour 
market policy disputes about whether federal funds should be allocated to provinces 
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or be spent directly, the overall adequacy of federal funds to be allocated, how these 
funds should be distributed between individual provinces, and how they should be 
accounted for, were all evident.   
 
In contrast, in the United Kingdom the devolved administrations did not raise the 
funds they required through taxes and did not have direct access to resource 
revenues; instead, they received a population-based block grant from the UK 
Government based on a formula regarding comparable UK services in England. Not 
only were the devolved administrations free to spend on devolved services as they 
saw fit without having to account to the UK Government, during the period of this 
research overall funding increased. Although this population-based grant removed 
the need to negotiate the allocation or appropriate accountabilities between 
governments and reduced intergovernmental tension, it also meant that the Scottish 
Executive was completely dependent upon the UK Government for resources.  
 
The final state-structuring factor that was very different between the two countries 
was the division of powers. Although the listing of reserved items in the Scotland 
Act appeared to set up a structure like in Canada where the distribution of functions 
was divided, in reality, devolution established shared (as opposed to divided) 
competencies. In the UK, jurisdiction in labour market policy was considered grey 
and unclear, and officials acknowledged the difficulty in identifying which areas 
were devolved and which were reserved. The fact that the Scottish Executive was 
taking more responsibility in employability supports was welcomed by the UK 
Government. Given the UK Government’s overall fiscal responsibility as well as its 
continued responsibility for European, UK-wide, and English policy making, neither 
Whitehall nor Scottish Executive officials saw any benefit in protecting or advancing 
jurisdiction. If both sides saw the benefit of adjusting the demarcation of reserved 
issues in the Scotland Act, this was relatively easy to do121.   
 
In contrast, in Canada a focus on protecting and advancing jurisdiction was 
paramount. Divided jurisdiction, by its very nature, sets the stage for disputes 
                                                 
121 Post-devolution, adjustments had already been made in areas such as transportation. 
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between governments when one order of government perceives that the other is 
trespassing on its area of responsibility. Making changes to jurisdiction is difficult, 
given that competence between governments is entrenched in the Canadian 
constitution. Jurisdiction, and who is responsible for which government function, is 
especially important when governments are directly responsible for raising the funds 
needed for the services they provide. As outlined extensively in Chapter Four, over 
the years, labour market policy in Canada had been characterized by periods of 
federal-provincial cooperation, overshadowed by conflict and continuing disputes 
over jurisdiction. Without the Quebec sovereignty referendum, it is highly unlikely 
that the Government of Canada would have agreed to devolve active measures, as 
pre-devolution, this was an area of high federal expertise and presence across 
Canada. Even when they did agree to transfer responsibility, the Government of 
Canada retained control of many policy levers. Eventually it came to regret its 
devolution decision, and attempted to re-assert control. Its refusal to follow through 
on the initial devolution offer increased intergovernmental tension, especially with 
the Province of Ontario. During the period of this research, rather than constitutional 
clarity on who was responsible for what in this policy domain, devolution led to a 
‘checkerboard’ system with different services and accountabilities in different 
provinces. 
 
These state structuresthe constitution, the number of sub-state governments and 
the asymmetry between them, how finances were shared, and how power was 
dividedprovided very different motivations for governments in each country to 
engage in intergovernmental relations. During the period of this research key 
provincial goals in Canada were to protect and advance jurisdiction while still 
securing federal money. The federal government engaged in order to demonstrate 
relevance and to achieve a national purpose. In the UK, the main motivator for 
governments to engage in intergovernmental relations was to manage 
interdependence and implement the devolution settlement; money was not a 
motivator and protecting jurisdiction was perceived as irrelevant. 
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Differences in the Structure of the Policy Domain  
 
Despite similar programs and services supported by government funding that help 
individuals in Canada and the United Kingdom prepare for, find, and keep a job, and 
that assist employers in securing, retaining and developing the workforce that they 
require, the policy governing structure in the two countries was fundamentally 
different. Differences included the degree of decentralization, the capacity of central 
government to show leadership, the involvement of players external to government, 
and intergovernmental institutional structures.  
 
Canada’s labour market policies were built up over time around the constitutional 
division of powers, with some parts federally conceived, funded and delivered; some 
parts provincially conceived, funded, and delivered; and some parts federally 
conceived and funded and provincially delivered. This contrasts significantly with 
the United Kingdom, where all components of labour market policy were developed 
as part of a national system under national legislation with national equity as a 
central organizing principle. Although all aspects of labour market policy were 
initially centrally conceived and funded, historically segments relating to vocational 
education and training were delivered by the Scottish Office. With the exception of 
skills development through the European Social Fund, pre-devolution all labour 
market policy direction in the United Kingdom was under control of the centre. 
 
A major difference between the two countries relates to which order of government 
is responsible for policy determination and policy implementation. Both orders of 
government in Canada are significantly involved in both deciding and delivering 
passive labour market programs, with the federal government responsible for 
Employment Insurance and provinces responsible for last resort social assistance122. 
Although historically a federal responsibility, Canadian provinces greatly expanded 
their expertise and capacity in active labour market policy during the 1990s, in order 
to deal with rising social assistance caseloads and costs. Provinces with devolved 
                                                 
122 These are the largest income support programs in Canada for working aged adults. Other programs 
include Canada Pension Plan Disability and income support for aboriginal persons on reserve (federal) 
and Worker’s Compensation (provincial).  
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LMDAs further expanded their involvement in the policy domain through the 
devolution offer. In contrast, in the United Kingdom the UK Government is 
responsible for both policy making and policy delivery of all passive labour market 
programs (including Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income Support, and Incapacity 
Benefits123), as well as the conditionality associated with benefit delivery. The 
Scottish Executive is involved through their responsibility for skills, training and 
employability supports. 
 
Which order of government has competence and capacity in a particular policy 
domain is an important component of any country-to-country comparison. Using 
passive labour market policy, as well as the sub-functions of active labour market 
policy as outlined in Chapter One of this thesis, Figure 8 provides a weighted (out of 
100) assessment of each labour market sub-function in terms of which government 
has control of the policy instruments. For passive labour market policy, the 
assessment of control was done through a relatively objective process using caseload 
counts as the criteria124. In active labour market policy, it represents the author’s 
subjective assessment of the degree to which each order of government is involved in 
deciding, delivering and reporting on the particular policy sub-function. This was 
based upon the policy documents reviewed for this research, information from 
parliamentary hearings and secondary sources, as well as the intelligence provided 






                                                 
123 Jobseeker’s Allowance is similar to Canada’s Employment Insurance Program while Income 
Support and Incapacity Benefit are similar to Canada’s social assistance programs. 
124 Caseload counts were felt to be better measure than program expenditures. The analysis is based on 
available data and is meant to be illustrative. The following caseload data was derived from the 
Directors of Income Support (2006), Statistics Canada (2006) and Puttee (2002): SA 2002: 1,130,401 
cases; WCB 1997: 790,000 recipients; C/QPP Disability 1998: 437,000 recipients; EI 2002: 828,723 
beneficiaries. Given these numbers, the share was 60% provincial and 40% federal. Data on SA on 
reserve (which is federal) was not available; as a result it was assumed that when included the federal 
share would be increased to 50%.  
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125 This comparison uses the sub-states of Alberta and Scotland in each country and cannot be 
generalized as applying across each country.  
126 PLMP only includes income support programs for working aged adults (as opposed to seniors and 
children). 
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This assessment confirms one respondent’s view that, in Alberta, the Government of 
Canada has slowly but surely “slipped out of the game” and is now only “dabbling 
around the edges in labour market policy”, responsible for approximately only 16 
percent of the activities. The LMDA transfer, plus the investment that the province 
made in labour market programs, pre- and post-devolution, confirms that, in this 
policy area, the provincial government carries most of the responsibility. The picture 
is not the same in those provinces without devolved LMDAs, as in those jurisdictions 
the Government of Canada still delivers many programs and runs the public 
employment service.  
 
What may be surprising in the United Kingdom is how significantly involved the 
Scottish Executive is in labour market policy, with this research assessing it at 45 
percent of the activity. Building on the Scottish Office’s historic involvement in 
vocational education and training and local authority involvement through the 
European Social Fund, post-devolution the Scottish Executive has increased its 
involvement in workforce development, careers advice, labour market information, 
and targeted measures, all without jurisdictional conflict or a need to change the 
division of powers outlined in the Scotland Act. 
 
The level of government that is ultimately responsible for a policy domain has a 
significant impact on the power dynamics of intergovernmental relations. In Alberta, 
the fact that the provincial government accounted for 84 percent of the programs and 
services greatly reduced interdependence with the Government of Canada. On the 
other hand, interdependence increased as many functions delivered by Alberta were 
supported through conditional federal funding. In the UK, during the period of this 
research, the Scottish Executive became a significant new player in the policy 
domain, increasing interdependence and the need for government-to-government 
interaction to manage the relationship. 
 
A second significant difference between Canada and the United Kingdom was with 
respect to the capacity of the national government to show leadership. This is a direct 
outcome of the degree of decentralization in the policy domain, as well as the overall 
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power of central governments to command. During the period of this research, the 
UK Government regularly issued policy papers, statistics and evaluations on labour 
market policy. There were countless green papers and white papers, as well as high-
profile reviews of performance. These set targets that guided the performance of all 
actors, including the devolved administrations. Many of these targets were set not 
just to motivate UK actors, but in the context of UK participation in the European 
Union. 
 
In contrast, the Government of Canada is limited in its ability to set targets in active 
labour market policy, as policy instruments are mostly in provincial, not federal 
hands, and, as demonstrated through this research, no over-arching federal-provincial 
protocols have been established. The key attempt that the federal government made 
at demonstrating leadership during the period of this research was in relation to the 
2002 Innovation Strategy. This failed to engage provinces and territories. The federal 
institutions set up as an outcome of that process (the Canadian Council on Learning, 
the Foreign Credentials Recognition program, and the Workplace Skills Strategy) are 
not uniformly recognized by provincial governments. Likewise, provincial efforts 
through the Council of the Federation to lead in postsecondary education and skills 
were ignored by the Government of Canada. Without a robust intergovernmental 
process to bridge between the two orders of government, as a country Canada cannot 
set national targets or strategic directions in labour market policy like the UK 
Government regularly does. It cannot even gather the information required for this 
national goal setting process (Canadian Council on Learning 2007). In the view of 
the author, Canada’s demonstrated inability to set and implement a national human 
capital development strategy has serious consequences for the overall 
competitiveness of the country, as well as individual prosperity and well-being. 
 
The third area of difference between Canada and the United Kingdom relates to the 
involvement of actors external to government. In the UK, civil servants interacted 
within a rich network of external actors interested in labour market matters, ranging 
from dedicated industry and civil society advisory committees, to parliamentary 
committees, to local and regional service delivery networks. In addition, the 
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European Union provided a forum for civil servants to connect not only with industry 
and civil society members from within the UK, but also with similar actors in other 
European countries. 
 
During the period of this research there were a number of national level advisory 
committees in the UKthe National Employment Panel, the Skills Alliance, the 
Social Security Advisory Committee, the Disability Employment Advisory 
Committee, the Sector Skills Councils and the Sector Skills Development Agency. 
Although these UK-wide advisory bodies may not have been particularly aware of 
the impact of devolution on UK Government policy making, the 25 sector councils in 
the UK were specifically mandated to take Scottish concerns into account through an 
extensive agreement with the Scottish Executive that also included their coordinating 
body, the Sector Skills Development Agency. This ensured that sector council 
activities in Scotland were linked to Scottish Executive plans and other Scottish 
stakeholder concerns and issues. 
 
Within Scotland, the Welfare to Work Advisory Task Force gave way to short lived 
task groups on specific issues like the development of Workforce Plus (SE 2006b). 
There were also extensive networks and committees within individual cities, as well 
as parliamentary committees concerned with welfare to work and skills issues. These 
parliamentary committee deliberations were open and stakeholders often presented 
briefs to politicians.  
 
Through the European Employment Strategy the European Commission facilitated 
the coordination of employment policies among the 27 member states. As part of its 
commitment to this strategy, the UK Government sought input on UK plans from the 
devolved administrations through routinized processes, as well as from industry and 
civil society representatives. These ongoing and frequent European processes 
provided a multitude of opportunities for civil servants and others interested in 
labour market policy to connect face-to-face on the issues facing governments. 
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The UK research community in labour market policy consisting of academics, think 
tanks and research institutes was extensive; in addition the UK Government and the 
Department for Work and Pensions were committed to ‘evidence based policy 
making’, resulting in extensive studies, evaluations, and assessments of both welfare 
to work and skills policy. These studies were all publicly available and provided a 
foundation for debate. Citizens and stakeholder groups were encouraged to make 
their views known. 
 
In contrast, in Canada not only were intergovernmental relations in labour market 
policy executive-dominated, the entire policy area was executive dominated. 
Although there were federal parliamentary committees concerned with labour market 
matters that held open public hearings and inquiries on behalf of the Government of 
Canada, no such committees existed in Alberta. With the demise of the Canadian 
Labour Force Development Board, there were no ongoing national bodies that 
provided advice and input on labour market policy, and only Quebec and 
Saskatchewan had provincial bodies. Although Canadian governments might 
individually reach out to labour market partners through term limited consultations, 
they generally did not do this together; indeed provinces avoided joint consultation 
efforts for fear that the national government would use these opportunities to 
‘browbeat’ them into doing something against their interests. This contrasted with 
the UK, where multi-government consultations were the norm. 
 
Most stakeholders in Canada had limited knowledge of federal-provincial relations 
or the institutions in place, and often complained that federalism trumped policy 
substance, leaving issues unresolved and shunted between governments. The lack of 
institutional structures between governments was particularly noticeable with respect 
to federal bodies established by the Government of Canada. Although Canada’s 
sector councils operated in a similar fashion to those in the UK, no efforts had been 
made to formally link these national bodies with sub-state governments, limiting 
sector council effectiveness as competence in the areas they were dealing with was 
substantially provincial. Similarly, not only were provinces not formally connected 
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with the federally supported Canadian Council on Learning, some provinces actively 
opposed its attempts to develop any kind of national view of skills and education. 
 
Unlike the UK, in Canada there was a lack of information generally and transparency 
on what was happening with respect to government action in the labour market. 
Although each province and the federal government issued individual reports on 
labour market activities, no efforts were made to ensure comparable measures. While 
labour market policy is generally recognized as an area where both orders of 
government have legitimacy to act, there was even less information available than in 
the social assistance127 area, which is an area of exclusive provincial jurisdiction.  
 
Why was there so much more involvement with actors external to government in the 
UK, compared to Canada? The presence of the European Union and the collectively 
agreed on consultation requirements built into the European Employment Strategy 
and the European Social Inclusion Strategy were an obvious important factor. As 
identified in Chapter Two, Borzel (2000) attributed Europeanization as the reason for 
the shift of the autonomous communities in Spain from competition to cooperation, 
as otherwise they feared losing competencies. The extensive government-to-
government interaction through the Open Method of Coordination which 
underpinned the European Employment Strategy provided a structure not just for 
member country-European Union-European Commission relations, but also for sub-
state involvement. In Canada none of these processes existed, as active labour market 
policy was considered a strictly domestic issue, and not subject to international 
deliberations. There were no external pressures (other than through the OECD), that 
forced Canadian governments to come together and cooperate on labour market 
policy issues.  
 
Another factor was that pre-devolution, the UK Government had democratized 
labour market policy: many functions had been re-allocated from direct government 
delivery to executive agencies and non-departmental public bodies. In addition, local 
                                                 
127 For example, provincial Directors of Income Support, with the support of federal officials, 
voluntarily provide regular statistical and comparative information on social assistance across Canada. 
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authorities were also involved, given their responsibility for deprivation and the 
funds that had been made available over the years to combat it through the European 
Social Fund. Historic central government control over all elements of policy making 
and policy implementation, a huge bureaucracy, and Labour’s commitment to 
‘evidence-based policy making’ significantly expanded partnerships and networks in 
the UK. In Canada none of these forces were evident. 
 
A final difference with respect to the policy domain concerned the institutional 
structures set up to manage government-to-government interaction. All four 
governments examined in detail through this research the Government of Canada, 
the Alberta Government, the UK Government and the Scottish 
Executiverecognized and acknowledged a high degree of interdependence, 
although this varied by issue and events. In both countries there was a considerable 
investment and reliance on bilateral arrangements, supported by formal committee 
meetings between officials as well as an array of intergovernmental agreements. In 
the United Kingdom, most agreements were procedural. While Canada also had 
procedural agreements, of more significance were the substantive agreements 
involving a transfer of funds from the Government of Canada to provinces in relation 
to specific labour market programs.  
 
In Canada relationships between governments were not only bilateral, but also 
multilateral. Over the years, an elaborate intergovernmental structure to manage 
labour market policy had been put in place, involving four separate 
intergovernmental forums with overlapping mandates. This occurred because labour 
market services in Canada are siloed by client group and delivered by different 
orders of government. The United Kingdom was not immune from this focus on 
client groups and the silos this created: indeed, there were separate New Deals under 
the control of Jobcentre Plus for the unemployed, single parents, older workers and 
the disabled. However, at least these separate New Deals were all under the control 
of one government, which had the ability to prescribe some level of coordination. 
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In Canada each of these four multilateral forums had dedicated secretariats. In both 
the Social Services Forum and the Forum of Labour Market Ministers, there were 
processes for both federal-provincial as well as interprovincial relations. In contrast, 
the Council of Ministers of Education Canada had no regularized process for 
engaging with the Government of Canada, and the Forum of Immigration Ministers 
had no regularized process for interprovincial dialogue. Federal officials viewed the 
Forum of Labour Market Ministers as particularly dysfunctional; this view predated 
devolution. They were satisfied with the Social Services forum and the control they 
wielded over Immigration Ministers, but were dissatisfied with their lack of standing 
with respect to issues considered through the Council of Ministers of Education 
Canada. While provinces recognized the problems associated with these multilateral 
forums, they were more supportive of their continued use, as this increased their 
bargaining power over the Government of Canada. Alberta in particular would have 
liked to ‘regularize’ the Immigration Ministers’ Forum, putting a neutral secretariat 
in place and opportunities for interprovincial collaboration. They had no interest in 
allowing the federal government a way into the Council of Ministers of Education 
Canada, with the view that shutting the federal government out of the 
intergovernmental mechanism that coordinated postsecondary education across 
Canada shut them out of the sector.  
 
In Canada, when multilateral intergovernmental forums are ineffective a number of 
behaviors result. Conflicting issues are not put on the agenda and intergovernmental 
exchange is avoided, leaving problems to fester and grow. Governments practice 
blame-shifting, leaving citizens to wonder about their governance, undermining trust 
in government in general. The lack of decision-making rules results in lowest-
common-denominator solutions, not particularly satisfactory to anyone. The bilateral 
decision-making which is put in place as a substitute to multilateral action provides 
greater control to the federal government, allowing it the opportunity to play one 
province off against the other to achieve its goals. Given that there were four separate 
forums involved in labour market policy in Canada during the period of this research, 
issues fell between the gaps and were not dealt with or cumbersome processes to 
manage between forums were established, frustrating officials and Ministers alike 
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when some necessary people were excluded from decision-making. Despite 
acknowledging the problems with the existing multilateral forums in labour market 
policy, there were no activities underway in Canada on either a federal or provincial 
basis to change the status quo. The only actors in the Canadian federal system with 
the breadth of knowledge of the issues and structures that these four forums were 
dealing with would have been intergovernmental affairs specialists with the Privy 
Council Office in Ottawa or with a provincial central agency like the Department of 
International and Intergovernmental Affairs in Alberta. Given their focus on 
protecting jurisdiction and an inability to control the intergovernmental work at the 
sector level, it would have required extraordinary agency on the part of a single 
individual to advocate for change. 
 
Differences in the Forces of Intergovernmental Accommodation 
 
These fundamental differences in the structure of the policy domain between Canada 
and the United Kingdomthe degree of decentralization, the power of the central 
government to act, the involvement of actors external to government and the 
intergovernmental machinerypresented different contexts for the operation of 
intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in Canada and the United 
Kingdom. In addition, when differences between governments arose, the United 
Kingdom had access to two powerful forces of intergovernmental accommodation 
that were not available in Canada. These were the integrating forces of a unitary 
party system and a unified civil service. 
 
Devolution was a key project of the British Labour Party, and during the period of 
this research, Labour was in charge of both the Westminster and Scottish 
Parliaments, providing a ready mechanism for informal political accommodation. 
McEwen (2006, p. 179) suggests that: 
The sense of shared identity between Scottish and British Labour is crucial to 
understanding their shared political objectives and the collaborative nature 
of Scottish-UK intergovernmental relations… The Scottish Labour Party 
remains firmly integrated with the British Labour Party…although free to 
make distinctive policies within the areas devolved to the Scottish Parliament, 
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it has been reluctant to do so unless pressured by the coalition politics that 
are a reality of devolution.  
 
The Labour Party across the UK had two important shared objectives which 
impacted intergovernmental relations in labour market policy during the period of 
this research. The first was a commitment to making devolution work. Both the 
Scottish and British Labour parties agreed that this was best accomplished within the 
parameters of the existing devolution settlement. Neither had any interest in formally 
extending the settlement into additional areas of labour market policy, even though 
they were both quite comfortable with the Scottish Executive informally taking more 
responsibility for employability. This occurred because Labour politicians also 
shared similar objectives with respect to welfare reform and increasing the 
employment rate to 80 percent. When objectives are shared and governments lack the 
constitutional or financial resources to achieve its goals on their own, this provides 
the incentives needed for negotiation and positive intergovernmental relations.  
 
In Canada, not only are federal and provincial political parties not integrated, the 
‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system actually exacerbates regionalismwhen entire 
parts of the country find themselves voting for a political party shut out from central 
government. During most of the period of this research, Canadian governments did 
not share the objective of making intergovernmental relations harmonious; in fact the 
period started with a significant break in traditional federal-provincial cost-sharing 
arrangements, impacting all social policy areas. Labour market objectives were 
shared only for a brief period around the implementation of the Labour Market 
Development Agreements, but within two years the Government of Canada had 
changed its mind about further devolution. From the historical review undertaken for 
this research, it appeared that the last time governments in Canada shared sustained 
common objectives in the labour market field was in the 1940s, when all 
governments agreed to a constitutional amendment so that the federal government 
could operate a national Unemployment Insurance program. 
 
Unlike the UK, the political party system in Canada provides limited mechanisms for 
intergovernmental accommodation, as federal and provincial political parties operate 
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separate structures, and have no formal connections. In any case, provincial and 
federal Ministers usually represent different political parties. Bilateral meetings and 
multilateral meetings between federal and provincial Ministers occurred on a regular 
basis to handle the business of governing, but during the period of this research, 
party politics played an incidental role. It is notable, however, that the 
accommodation finally achieved between the governments of Ontario and Canada 
around a devolved LMDA was not realized until Liberal parties were in power in 
both jurisdictions. This demonstrates that party politics can play an important role. 
However, in the Canadian context this was an anomaly, and on a regular basis the 
party system does not provide a force for intergovernmental accommodation. 
 
The second powerful force for accommodation found in the United Kingdom but not 
in Canada is the civil service. Post-devolution, the Scottish Executive remains part of 
the Home Civil Service, with continuing opportunities for individuals to move from 
one service to another. Being in the same club, civil servants in the UK share similar 
values and interests, the most important of which was making devolution work and 
making welfare and skills reform a success. Maintaining good will and positive 
working relationships and coming up with solutions to problems was an important 
part of achieving these objectives. During the period of this research, civil servants in 
the UK were loath to raise issues to the Ministerial level, as this would be seen as an 
embarrassment and unhelpful. Given that Labour was in charge of both the Scottish 
and Westminster Parliaments, intergovernmental issues became intertwined with 
party politics. Having Ministers sort out issues would have put them in the position 
of having to ‘wash their dirty linen in public’; as a result, every effort was made to 
solve issues at the civil service level.  
 
In contrast, in Canada each order of government has its own civil service, and there 
are few cross-over opportunities to move between governments. While the interests, 
expectations, values, capacity, and experience of civil servants from different 
governments in Canada may diverge, a key focus for all was protecting and 
advancing the jurisdiction of their respective government. To do this, the stronger 
provinces (like Quebec, Alberta, Ontario and British Columbia) as well as the 
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national government invested in civil service expertise and capacity. 
Intergovernmental relations in Canada were often conducted by intergovernmental 
policy specialists through structured multilateral processes that were highly 
institutionalized. These individuals provided the necessary support to senior officials, 
including Deputy Ministers, Assistant Deputy Ministers, as well as Ministers, who 
made the key intergovernmental decisions. 
 
In the UK, almost all intergovernmental relations were conducted by policy civil 
servants as part of their day-to-day responsibilities, assisted by Scotland Office 
officials whose explicit role was to encourage close working relationships between 
governments and act as an intermediary if necessary. In the UK, most interaction 
between governments was handled at middle and lower levels within each 
organization, and some of these officials were not even considered civil servants, as 
they worked for non-departmental public bodies. In contrast, in Canada, officials at 
the highest level of government were directly involved in intergovernmental 
relations, and all were direct employees of their respective government. 
 
In Canada, federal and provincial officials live in separate worlds, serve different 
masters, and generally do not come together except through their involvement in 
intergovernmental relations. There are very few national, international, or provincial 
conferences or events that draw them together. This stands in stark contrast to their 
UK colleagues, who participate in an abundance of Scottish, UK-wide and European 
conferences and events relating to labour market policy. These provide opportunities 
for practitioners, policy officials, and Ministers from all governments in the UK, as 
well as other European countries, to come together and share their views.  
 
Chapter Two of this thesis outlined the rationale for selecting actor-centered 
institutionalism as the theoretical approach for this thesis. This considered how an 
actor’s interests, values, expectations, experiences, and capacity interacted with the 
institutional context in which they worked. The analysis in this chapter has 
highlighted the structure of the state, the structure of the policy domain, as well as 
the role of political parties and the civil service, as constraining forces on civil 
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servants involved with intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in Canada 
and the United Kingdom.  
 
Despite the constraints of these institutional structures, intergovernmental 
administrative relations in both Canada and the United Kingdom are about human 
interaction. The civil servants who were involved in labour market policy during the 
period of this research still had the capacity within their control to build either 
positive or negative trust ties with their colleagues. The final section of this 
concluding chapter compares the character and workability of intergovernmental 
relations in labour market policy in post-devolution Canada and the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Character and Workability of Intergovernmental Relations  
 
The analysis in the chapter to this point has focused on the first two research 
questions, assessing to what extent there were differences in intergovernmental 
relations in labour market policy between Canada and the United Kingdom. It has 
also considered what accounted for these differences. The next part of this chapter 
focuses on the third research question, and assesses the impact that these differences 
had on the character and workability of intergovernmental relations within each 
country. It starts with a recap in Figure 9 of the separate analysis carried out in 
Chapter Five (for Canada) and Chapter Seven (for the United Kingdom). 
 
In the UK issues were subdivided into welfare to work, skills and immigration. In 
Canada, issues were subdivided based upon the multilateral forum that took 
responsibility: labour market (Forum of Labour Market Ministers), disability (Social 
Services Ministers), or immigration (Immigration Ministers). Relationships in 
Canada occurred on both a bilateral and multilateral basis, whereas in the United 
Kingdom they occurred only on a bilateral basis.  
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Figure 9: Character and Workability in Intergovernmental Relations 
 
Relationship Character Workability
Canada-Alberta labour market bilateral collaborative high 
Canada-Alberta labour market multilateral  competitive low 
Canada-Alberta disability bilateral  collaborative high 
Canada-Alberta disability multilateral collaborative moderate 
Canada-Alberta immigration bilateral collaborative high 
Canada-Alberta immigration multilateral cooperative moderate 
UK Gov.-Scottish Exec. welfare to work bilateral cooperative high 
UK Gov.-Scottish Exec. skills bilateral coercive moderate 
UK Gov.-Scottish Exec. immigration bilateral cooperative moderate 
 
‘Character’ was used as a short hand way to describe relationships between 
governments. The terms collaborative, cooperative, competitive or coercive were all 
drawn from the existing intergovernmental literature (Breton 1985, Scharpf 1988, 
Watts 1989, Kincaid 1990, as referenced in Watts 2006, Cameron and Simeon 2002). 
Workabilitydefined as the degree to which intergovernmental institutions and 
processes provided a forum to foster cooperation and collaboration, accommodate 
conflict, and resolve disputes that impeded the effective functioning of the 
systemwas chosen to assess intergovernmental performance in this research. The 
idea for this performance indicator came from Dupré’s work in 1985. It also drew on 
the work of Breton and Wintrobe (1982), Agranoff (1994), Banting (1998), Johns, 
O’Reilly and Inwood (2007), Fukyuama (1995), and the OECD (2007). This research 
took these academic contributions one step further and attempted to measure 
workability in each relevant policy area (as high, moderate or low) by reflecting on 
how officials directly involved in both sides of the relationship viewed their 
intergovernmental relationship, especially with respect to trust ties. Not only were 
civil servants asked to describe how they related to their colleagues in the other order 
of government, probing questions were asked in order to provide evidence of the 
degree to which trust ties existed or not. 
 
What was most evident when comparing the two countries was that in Canada 
relationships were both bilateral and multilateral, whereas in the UK relationships 
were only bilateral. It is noteworthy that almost all bilateral relationships in the two 
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countries were positive. In Canada, the most problematic relationships were 
multilateral, illustrating the challenges involved in managing across 14 jurisdictions, 
as opposed to just four in the United Kingdom. 
 
In the United Kingdom, as could have been predicted given the hierarchy implicit in 
the devolution settlement, none of the relationships were characterized as 
collaborative; instead, the term cooperative applied. The exception was the 
relationship in skills which was identified as coercive, given that UK Government 
actions sometimes forced the Scottish Executive to do things in skills policy that they 
would not necessarily have chosen. This is rooted in the UK Government’s 
unwillingness to acknowledge that, with devolution, UK-wide policy making is now 
different, and that in devolved areas it would be more respectful to the devolved 
administrations if greater differentiation was made between actions taken for 
England and actions that are UK-wide. During the period of this research, UK 
officials did not do this as they perceived it as complicated and unnecessary. 
 
Acknowledging the equality between governments that is implicit in federalism, in 
Canada most relationships examined through this research were considered 
collaborative, with two exceptions. The multilateral relationship around immigration 
issues was considered cooperative as the federal government exerted control in this 
area. The only relationship that was identified as competitive was the multilateral 
relationship in labour market issues. Despite the LMDA offer, this research has 
demonstrated that the forty year legacy of federal-provincial conflict in this policy 
area has not changed.  
 
What is noteworthy from these results is the degree to which all bilateral 
relationships managed between sub-state officials and their national office 
counterparts living within the geographic boundaries of the sub-state (in this case, 
Scotland and Alberta) were considered highly workable. In all of these relationships, 
there was routinized and regular informal engagement, often supplemented by more 
formal committee structures and intergovernmental agreements. This allowed for the 
development of trust ties between officials that were both extensive and deep. As 
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officials working for both orders of government shared the same geography, this 
ensured an enhanced understanding of the issues which governments together must 
try to solve, within the context of the tools they had at their disposal at the sub-state 
level. It also provided for enhanced opportunities for developing interpersonal 
relationships face-to-face instead of on the other end of a telephone, by e-mail, or on 
a teleconference call. This confirms Dupré’s view that geographical proximity 
enhances trust ties and workability. 
 
In the UK, some elements of this positive relationship were easily explained by the 
fact that civil servants belonged to the same service, were governed by the same 
political party, and shared similar norms and values. Although none of these features 
were evident in Canada, it is noteworthy that during the period of this research 
intergovernmental administrative actors working within a bilateral context were able 
to develop the necessary trust ties to sustain positive relationships.  
 
In Canada, all multilateral relationships by definition are managed at a distance, and 
there the distance is great, especially when for equity purposes meetings are held in 
all areas of the country. Similarly, in the UK skills and immigration issues are 
managed between Scottish Executive officials and their Whitehall counterparts living 
in London. Despite geography, it is noteworthy that workability in all but one case 
examined through this research was assessed as moderate, meaning that officials had 
found ways to develop trust ties despite geographic hurdles. In the UK, both 
governments were highly committed to devolution, and the extra efforts taken by the 
Scottish Executive to develop its own capacity and build connections with its 
Whitehall colleagues has had a positive result. They have also been assisted by the 
rich network of opportunities to engage face-to-face afforded by UK-wide advisory 
groups and European Union activities. Although Canada did not have these same 
engagement opportunities with actors external to government, in the disability and 
immigration areas governments shared similar objectives and the multilateral forums 
set up to manage their relationships were generally assessed positively. 
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Not surprisingly, the only relationship examined through this study where 
workability was assessed as low was in regard to multilateral labour market issues 
managed through the Forum of Labour Market Ministers in Canada. As outlined in 
detail in Chapters Four and Five, longstanding disputes over jurisdiction and money 
in this policy area are at the root of this dysfunctional relationship, exacerbated by its 
management in close proximity to an even more dysfunctional federal-provincial 
relationship, that of postsecondary education. The Forum of Labour Market 
Ministers as a federal-provincial forum sits beside (and Ministers are often involved 
in both) the interprovincial Council of Ministers of Education Canada. Provincial 
Education Ministers in Canada refuse to establish an ongoing mechanism to consult 
with the Government of Canada on postsecondary issues, fearful that an 
acknowledgement of a relationship would legitimize the Government of Canada 
involvement in education. Provincial jurisdiction in postsecondary education has 
been jealousy guarded since the 1960s. Distrust of the federal government in this 
area continues to the time of writing this thesis, seriously undermining the possibility 
of collaborative or even cooperative action between Canadian governments in 
postsecondary education. This created spillover effects on labour market policy, due 
to the close association of the two policy domains. 
 
This was not the only reason for a dysfunctional intergovernmental relationship in 
labour market policy in Canada. If the Chrétien Liberal government had followed 
through on its initial offer to devolve responsibility in labour market policy and had 
not changed its mind and attempted to take back the field through disengagement and 
unilateral action, it is very possible that the assessment of workability in this 
relationship would also have been considered moderate. Instead it was assessed as 
low over most of the period of this research. 
 
In terms of character and workability in other parts of Canada and the United 
Kingdom, less can be said. In the UK, collaborative relationships between 
government departments working in the North East Region of England seemed to 
exist, although workability was deemed to be low. The refusal by the Government of 
Canada to negotiate an initial (with Ontario) or devolved (with British Columbia) 
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Labour Market Development Agreement for most of the period of this research 
seriously impeded bilateral federal-provincial relationships in those provinces, and 
also had spillover impacts on all multilateral relationships in labour market policy, 
including the work of the Forum of Labour Market Ministers. This may change, 
starting in 2007, since the province of British Columbia has taken over responsibility 
for the FLMM Secretariat from Ontario.  
 
Political Developments in 2007 and Beyond 
 
This research focused on intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in 
Canada and the United Kingdom over the period 1996 to 2006. The changes brought 
about by each country’s version of devolution built upon on a pre-existing legacy of 
how relationships in labour market policy had been managed in each country pre-
devolution. Devolution in Canada started late in 1996, with the signing of the 
Canada-Alberta Labour Market Development Agreement. In the United Kingdom, 
the changes came a few years later with the establishment, in 1999, of the Scottish 
Parliament, the formation of the Scottish Executive under the primary control of the 
Labour Party, and the transfer of staff from the Scottish Office to the Scottish 
Executive. The end date for this research was 2006, providing approximately ten 
years to view both the implementation of devolution, and the establishment of new 
intergovernmental relationships in each country. 
 
Since this research concluded, there have been significant new political 
developments in each country that could influence intergovernmental relations in 
labour market policy. In Canada, in January 2006, the federal Conservatives replaced  
the governing Liberals and formed a minority government. Writing to the Council of 
the Federation, in January 2006 Prime Minister Stephen Harper said: 
It is my hope as Prime Minister to initiate a new style of open federalism128 
which would involve working more closely and collaboratively with the 
provinces and the Council of the Federation to develop Canada’s social and 
economic union, to clarify appropriate federal and provincial 
                                                 
128 Open federalism is characterized by a commitment to restore the constitutional balance between 
federal and provincial governments, a commitment to the notion of strong provinces, a promise to 
work cooperatively with the provinces, and a promise to limit the federal spending power.  
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responsibilities, and to resolve the fiscal imbalance between the federal and 
provincial-territorial governments (Harper 2006). 
 
By early 2007, Conservative plans with respect to skills and postsecondary education 
had become clear. The March 2007 federal budget committed to increase federal 
funding to provinces for both skills and postsecondary education. It also committed 
to a new ‘labour market architecture’ and offered to negotiate full transfer Labour 
Market Development Agreements with provinces and territories operating under co-
managed arrangements. This will regularize Employment Insurance Part 11 
programming across the country, in that all elements will now be provincially-
delivered. The Government of Canada also offered all provinces new funding to 
provide services and supports to non-EI clients, along the lines of the Labour Market 
Partnership Agreements that had been negotiated between the former Liberal 
government and three provinces. Finally, they offered to explore with provinces the 
possibility of transferring other federal programs, such as those currently offered by 
the Government of Canada to youth, older workers and persons with disabilities. If 
successfully implemented, these initiatives could remove many of the irritants over 
jurisdiction described through this research. These changes also signal another 
substantial federal withdrawal from the labour market policy domain, building upon 
Liberal decisions outlined through this research. 
 
In the United Kingdom the May 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections saw the 
Scottish National Party (SNP) win the most seats and assume control of the Scottish 
Executive, with its leader Alex Salmond becoming First Minister. In addition, the 
restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly, in May 2007, provided the Scottish 
Executive with a second devolved partner (in addition to Wales) with whom 
intergovernmental relations could be transacted. The end of Labour domination of 
both the Scottish and Westminster Parliaments and a drive by the party in power for 
increased Scottish autonomy could, like in Canada, make intergovernmental relations 
in the UK more conflict-laden and provide imperatives for seeking alternative 
mechanisms of intergovernmental accommodation. In addition, the Scottish National 
Party has committed to establish a devolved Scottish civil service. 
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In August 2007, First Minister Salmond launched Choosing Scotland’s Future: a 
National Conversation (SE 2007), seeking views on increased devolution, federalism 
or independence. He also committed to work bilaterally and multilaterally with the 
Northern Ireland Assembly and British Irish Council to identify areas where they 
could cooperate and advance their mutual interests. In anticipation of addressing the 
Northern Ireland Assembly in June 2007 Salmond outlined SNP directions on 
intergovernmental relations: 
I have said I’m attracted to reviving the Joint Ministerial Committees that 
were agreed in 1999 to bring together ministers from London, Belfast, 
Edinburgh and Cardiff. I think that the idea of having these JMCs at 
departmental level and plenary sessions is a good way forward…I also 
recognize that the devolved administrations and Westminster will not always 
agree on the way forward. Of course they won't. But it's important we have in 
place structures and processes that allow us to disagree properly, to know 
where each other stands and to respect that (Salmond 2007). 
 
These new developments are, in effect, just changes in one variable in each of the 
case study countries. On the other hand, not all variables are equal, and the policy 
changes in Canada and the political changes in the UK post 2007 could have far-
reaching implications on intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in both 
Canada and the United Kingdom. In any event, the changes will not adjust the need 
for a robust system of intergovernmental relations in each country, but may instead 
insert new dynamics into the relationship including a renewed focus on multilateral 
relations, especially in the United Kingdom. 
 
Contributions to the Literature and the Development of Theory 
 
This thesis was about a small slice of intergovernmental relations. Unlike most of the 
existing literature on intergovernmental relations, it did not concern itself with ‘high 
politics’ and the big disputes over money, jurisdiction and power that energize First 
Ministers, Intergovernmental Ministers, and Finance Ministers. It did not focus on 
the ‘big policy issues’ of health, environment and economic development which are 
often controversial and subject to media and academic attention. Instead, the 
attention was on a small group of people at the bureaucratic civil service level who 
actually managed the day-to-day interaction between governments within a defined 
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policy sector in two countries. The policy sector chosenlabour market policyis 
particularly complex, given its relationship to other policy domains such as social 
assistance, immigration, economic development and postsecondary education. The 
time period under review was not one of crisis: instead, it was a time of ‘making 
things work’.  
 
This thesis sought to shed insight into the often impenetrable and secretive world of 
intergovernmental relations, and assess the workability of the relationship between 
government officials involved with labour market policy in Canada and the United 
Kingdom, including the role of trust ties. The analysis was further refined by 
comparing what was discovered in one country with another, highlighting the 
significance of differences in each country’s most basic organizing principles. 
Although many authors had identified the significance of trust ties between officials 
to the study of intergovernmental relations, no previous attempt had been made to 
measure the degree to which it existed or not. Although there have been studies of 
central intergovernmental relations officials in Canada (Pollard B 1986 and Johns C., 
O'Reilly, P and Inwood G 2007), there has been little focus on the bureaucratic level 
within a specific policy domain. A focus on intergovernmental administrative actors 
is important, as these individuals are the carriers of the institutional legacies and 
provide the crucial technical information, specialist knowledge, and expertise needed 
to support engagement by their political masters. This study sought to fill these 
various gaps. 
 
In terms of the development of theory, this thesis confirms that, in parliamentary 
systems, executives do indeed play the key role in intergovernmental relations, 
certainly to the exclusion of legislatures and the courts. The UK experience, 
however, demonstrates that executive dominance does not mean that citizens and 
stakeholders need necessarily be excluded, as they routinely are in Canada. It is 
possible to put processes in place to democratize executive federalism. 
 
The research also confirms that how intergovernmental relations in each country 
works is a direct outcome of key state structures. On the other hand, a common civil 
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service, supervision by the same political party, or geographic proximity are not 
necessary features for workable intergovernmental relations between officials who 
work for different orders of government. The most important factors are consistency 
between the key players, routinized engagement, predictability and reliability, 
honesty, respect, capacity and willingness to engage, and transparency. Consistency 
among the key players enhances personal commitment, and informal connections and 
a ‘safe space’ for discussions are necessary for more formal arrangements to be a 
success. Keeping one’s promises is important, as is knowing what others have been 
promised, and being able to see the outcomes of interventions. Failing to engage as a 
way to protect jurisdiction or as a way to act unilaterally only exacerbates problems. 
Although shared objectives make engagement easier, they are not a prerequisite for a 
positive relationship.  
 
It is much easier to find these factors when relationships are bilateral, involving just 
two orders of government and, by definition, fewer people. Multilateral relationships 
are much harder to manage, especially in a country like Canada where the partners 
consider themselves as equals. Without established and accepted rules of the games 
or a respected neutral party to broker the relationship, it can take extraordinary 
leadership at the individual level to move intergovernmental relations beyond what 
one individual characterized in Canada as a ‘group grope’. There was no evidence of 
this leadership in Canada in this policy area on a multilateral basis during the period 
of this research. In the view of the author, this confirms Jean Monnet’s view 
expressed earlier that, when dealing with governments that are substantially 
sovereign in their area of jurisdiction in the context of multilateral relationships, 




For the author, doing this thesis has provided considerable insight into the often 
conflicted world of intergovernmental relations in labour market policy in Canada, 
including what accounts for this conflict. By comparing the Canadian situation to 
that in the United Kingdom, the significance of differences in the structure of the 
state, the structure of the policy domain, and the presence of two accommodating 
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forces found in the UK but not in Canada (the integrating role played by political 
parties and the civil service) emerged. As the two countries are so significantly 
different in these areas, it is almost impossible to suggest lessons that one country 
might learn from another. 
 
On the other hand, this thesis has demonstrated the significance of workability in 
intergovernmental relations, the role that trust ties between senior officials play in 
enhancing workability, and that the factors that support or diminish trust ties are 
universal. Of great interest to the author is how to design formal institutional 
structures and processes to support the development of trust ties between senior 
officials in order to enhance workability in intergovernmental relations. Since 
governments are locked into relationships by geography, and since relationships must 
be repeated over time, coordination mechanisms must be built to manage a 
cooperation that is unavoidable. 
 
As this research demonstrates, despite having had over 140 years to develop 
intergovernmental machinery suited to this role, Canada’s intergovernmental 
accommodation processes in the labour market domain were inadequate for the task, 
especially the formal mechanisms for multilateral cooperation across orders of 
government and across policy domains. With the loss of the political-party system as 
the prime means of intergovernmental accommodation in the UK, governments in 
that country will also need to consider new and possibly more formal mechanisms 
and processes for intergovernmental relations. How these existing processes can be 
modified and replaced with more robust intergovernmental mechanisms that will 
foster collaboration and cooperation, accommodate conflict, and resolve disputes 
which impede the effective functioning of the system is a unique challenge facing 
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW SUMMARY 
 
Category London Scotland  Other  Ottawa Alberta Other Canada 


















Other policy civil 
servants 





Team Leader, SETLLL 








  Ex. Dir., AHRE 
Manager, Seniors 
 
Dedicated policy IGR 
staff 
n/a n/a  Director, HRSDC Ex. Dir, AHRE 
Sen. Mgr, AHRE 
Manager, AHRE 
Director, Ontario  
Training, Colleges 
& Universities 





Head, UK Liaison SE 
Manager, SE 
Head, Legal, SE 




















 Manager, AHRE 






Ex civil servants    Director, HRSDC 
DM, BC Social 
Services 
DM, Alberta 






Other   
Chair, Disability 
Emp Ad. Comm 
Manager, Joined up for 
Jobs 
Manager, COSLA 




 Exec. Dir, SSA 
Director, CLBC 
Ex. Dir, Ottenow 
VP, Bow Valley 
College 
 
MP, Victoria  
Experts   Academic, Education, U 
of E. 
Academic, Employment 

















Acronyms in this chart not included in listing on page 9 and 10 
CLBC  Canadian Labour and Business Centre CCSD  Canadian Council on Social Development 
CPRN  Canadian Policy Research Networks CS   Communities Scotland    
IIGR  Institute of Intergovernmental Relations MP  Member of Parliament       
SI  Social Inclusion     SO  Scotland Office          
VP  Vice President     UCL  University College London   
U of E  University of Edinburgh 
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APPENDIX 2: DATA CATEGORIES 
 
1. Political actors: interests (includes political will), expectations (from IGR 
process) values (includes attitudes), personal experiences, capacity 
2. Overall country context: role of political parties, courts, legislators, finances 
3. Labour market history, significance 
4. Division of powers, roles & responsibilities 
5. Issues 
6. Other actors: business, labour, think tanks, civil society, advisory groups, 
media, other departments, other governments, legislators 
7. Independence 
8. Interdependence and need to exchange resources (money, authority, 
information, organizational, public opinion, political support, skills and 
expertise, size & wealth, rules of the game), availability and substitutability 
9. Hierarchy: authority, control, compliance, accountability frameworks, 
reporting, audit, whether reactive or not. 
10. IGR structure: bilateral or multilateral; p/t or f/p/t; formal vs. informal; which 
issues go to which forum; access by other parties 
11. Purpose of IGR: shaping, implementing, exchanging info, sharing resources, 
coordinating action, influencing behavior, challenging behavior, protecting 
jurisdiction, resolving conflict 
12. Strategies and tactics: arenas; bilateral vs. multilateral; alliances and 
coalitions; which forum; use of stakeholders 
13. Formal IGR machinery: forums, agreements, secretariats 
14. Informal IGR 
15. Character of IGR: cooperative, collaborative, competitive, coercive 
16. Workability: regularity of engagement; commitment to engage; 
communications; trust ties; narrow agendas; positive history; minimized 
grievances; shared objectives; recognition of interdependence; honesty; 
integrity; mutual respect; stable structures; personality; ability to accept 
flaws; creative ambiguity 
17. Has devolution made a difference? 
18. How is Alberta/Scotland different from other sub-states? 
19. Sub-state or central capacity for policy making/implementation. 
20. Decentralization vs. centralization. 
 
